Tag Archives: Intellicurean Essays

THE LEVEL LOADSTONE

Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick and the compass of the dung beetle

On a beetle that rolls by the sky, a captain who forged his own north, and a coffin carved with a theory of the heavens.

“Look ye, for yourselves, if Ahab be not lord of the level loadstone!”Moby-Dick, Chapter 124

I The Pirouette

“Dung beetles respond from moment to moment to how the environment is changing.”Marie Dacke, Lund University, interviewed in Horizon

Put a person in a forest under cloud, or in a desert after the moon has gone, and ask them to walk in a straight line. They will try, they will believe they are succeeding, and sooner or later they will cross their own footprints. In 2009 Jan Souman and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute in Tübingen tested exactly this, in a German forest and in the Sahara, and found that their walkers held a fair line while they could see the sun or the moon, and began to loop the moment it went behind cloud. The body prefers a circle. From the inside, it feels like a line.

A dung beetle does not do this. It arrives at a fresh pat among what can be thousands of rivals, shapes its share into a ball, and climbs on top of it. There, before anything else, it turns: a small pirouette beneath the open sky, which the researchers at Lund describe as taking a snapshot of the heavens. Then it climbs down, sets its forelegs on the ground and its hind legs against the ball, and pushes its prize away backwards, facing away from where it is going, in a line you could lay a ruler against. Straightness is the whole point. A straight line is the fastest way to put distance between yourself and everyone else at the dung pile, and the navigator that manages it carries a brain smaller than a grain of rice. And the line ends. When the beetle reaches soft ground far enough from the crowd, it stops and buries its ball, to feed on it, or, in many species, to work it into a brood ball around a single egg, so that the next generation hatches into its first meal. The beetle has no destination, but it has a terminus.

What Marie Dacke’s six-year project, UltimateCOMPASS, has added to this old marvel is a finding about method. Insects were already known to steer by the sun, the moon, the stars, the pale band of the Milky Way, and the wind. The open question was what a creature does when its cues fade or disagree. Using mirrors to move the sun and fans to move the wind, Dacke’s team found that the beetles weigh both cues at once, and keep revising how much each one counts. The higher the sun climbs, the more they lean on the wind, because a sun standing straight overhead says almost nothing about direction. At noon the sky’s great authority falls silent, and the beetle listens harder to what is moving across its body.

Two more findings complete the portrait. At night some species read the pattern of polarised light around the moon, using green-sensitive receptors at the top of the eye that make the most of a moonlit sky’s faint light. And in another experiment from the same project, on a species that shuttles between food and a burrow and keeps a running account of the way home, Ayse Yilmaz and her colleagues chilled the beetles to near freezing, briefly stilling their brains. The memory of home wore down, but not evenly: the beetles lost their sense of how far before they lost their sense of which way. Direction outlasted distance.

The last finding is a warning. Artificial light corrupts the system. It drowns out the faint signals overhead and draws the beetles toward the lamp, so that instead of fanning out across the ground they crowd together, competing for exactly the space they evolved to escape. A compass this good can still be broken, and what breaks it is not darkness. It is a nearer, brighter, falser light.

Hold onto six things: the pirouette, the two cues weighed against each other, the shift to the wind at noon, the ice, the lamp, and the buried ball. Each will come back, in its turn, in the last chapters of Melville’s novel, aboard a ship whose captain made himself a compass that could not be wrong.

II Two Kinds of Straight

“Swerve me? The path to my fixed purpose is laid with iron rails, whereon my soul is grooved to run.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 37

It is tempting to read the beetle as a parable of resolve, and to look for its human equivalent: the people who never lose their bearing. They hold a line through grief and noise and other people’s opinions, and their inner compass seems not merely strong but unlimited. We admire them, and we tell their stories in the oldest shape we have. Joseph Campbell called it the monomyth: the call, the threshold, the road of trials, the abyss, and then the return, the hero recrossing the threshold with something the village needs.

But look at the beetle again. Its compass is resilient precisely because it is not unlimited. It has no single authority. It weighs a far, fixed signal against a near, shifting one, and lets either overrule the other when the world requires it. Its direction is firm and its method is fluid, and the fluidity is what keeps the direction honest. A compass that could never be overruled would not be stronger. It would only be unable to learn that it was wrong.

There is also a problem of geometry, and the whole essay turns on it. The hero’s journey is a circle. It ends where it began. And the only creatures in Dacke’s world that walk in circles are the lost ones, the walkers whose sun has gone in. The beetle’s whole achievement is that it does not curve.

So imagine a person whose compass really is unlimited: one cue, held with total fidelity, whatever the sky is doing. Such a person could complete every stage of the heroic journey without a fault. The call answered, the threshold crossed, the trials survived, the abyss entered. And then, at the one point where the circle is supposed to close, he would keep going straight. He would finish the journey except for the part that makes it a journey. The unlimited compass makes heroes with no homecoming.

History offers specimens. Percy Fawcett, a trained surveyor, walked into the Brazilian forest in 1925 with his son Jack and Jack’s friend Raleigh Rimell, toward a lost city assembled from a few documents and an enormous certainty, and no one has ever learned where his line ended. But the purest specimen is fictional, and he announces himself in his soliloquy at sunset, on the evening he has bound his crew to his oath. Swerve me? His soul runs on iron rails, over gorges, through mountains, under rivers. Naught’s an obstacle, he says, naught’s an angle to the iron way. Ahab is the man without an angle, and his voyage is a heroic journey built, with perfect deliberateness, so that it cannot come back.

III Noon in the Japanese Sea

“Level by nature to this earth’s horizon are the glances of man’s eyes.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 118

The navigation chapters begin, as the beetle’s hardest hour does, with the sun at its height. In Chapter 118 the Pequod is in the Japanese sea in summer. The sky looks lacquered, Melville writes; clouds there are none; the sun is the blazing focus of the glassy ocean’s immeasurable burning-glass. It is almost noon. Ahab sits in the bow of his raised boat with his quadrant to his eye, looking through its coloured glasses, waiting for the precise instant when the sun touches the meridian so that he can fix his latitude. He gets the sight. He works the figures in pencil on his ivory leg. Then he turns on the instrument.

What enrages him is exactly what makes it honest. The quadrant tells him where he is, and nothing more. “Thou sea-mark! thou high and mighty Pilot! thou tellest me truly where I am—but canst thou cast the least hint where I shall be?” It cannot tell him where the whale is. So he curses it, and curses with it all the things that cast man’s eyes aloft to that heaven, whose live vividness but scorches him. He dashes the quadrant to the deck and tramples it with his live and dead feet, and he makes a vow. “Level by nature to this earth’s horizon are the glances of man’s eyes; not shot from the crown of his head, as if God had meant him to gaze on his firmament.” From now on the level ship’s compass, and the level dead-reckoning, by log and by line, will show him his place on the sea.

Set this beside the beetle. At noon, when the sun stands too high to give a bearing, the beetle does not curse the sky. It shifts its weight to the wind and keeps both. Ahab, at the same hour under the same blank sun, does the reverse. He does not trade one cue for a better one. He throws one away, and the one he throws away is the only instrument that consults the sky.

That is the technical heart of the scene, and it is easy to miss. Dead reckoning works out where a ship must be from where it has been: its heading, its speed, the hours elapsed. It is navigation by self-reference, and its errors accumulate silently, because nothing in the method can catch them. The noon sight is how a navigator corrects it, by asking the sky. In smashing the quadrant Ahab has chosen a way of finding himself that the world can no longer contradict.

It is a refusal of the pirouette. The beetle’s first act, before a single step, is to look up and take a picture of the heavens. Ahab’s is to swear he will never look up again.

IV Corpusants

“Oh! thou clear spirit of clear fire.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 119

That same night the typhoon comes, and Melville gives us the lamp. St Elmo’s fire, which sailors called corpusants, burns at the tips of the yards, and each of the three masts stands silently burning in that sulphurous air, like three gigantic wax tapers before an altar. The crew draw together in one thick cluster on the forecastle, their eyes gleaming in the pale phosphorescence. Stubb, half joking, asks the corpusants to have mercy on them all.

It is the Lund team’s light-pollution experiment, staged on a ship. On a rooftop in central Johannesburg, beetles that could see lit buildings and streetlights did not lose their bearings. They steered, unnaturally but steadily, toward the lamps, several making for the same one. Beetles that could see only the glow of a city sky, with no lamp in view, were lost altogether. The Pequod under the corpusants is the first case: a false light, nearer and brighter than anything in the true sky, and a crew bunched together beneath it. What differs is the conduct of the leader. Ahab, who swore at noon never again to look aloft, now commands his men to do it. Look up at it, he tells them; mark it well; the white flame but lights the way to the White Whale. Then he lifts his hand to the fire and addresses it as the clear spirit he once worshipped and now defies. He calls himself darkness leaping out of light, and ends, defyingly, in worship. When the point of his own harpoon begins to burn, he seizes it, waves it at the crew like a torch, and blows the flame out with a single breath, saying he blows out the last fear. Many of the men run from him in a terror of dismay.

Read through the beetle, Ahab is not disoriented. He is oriented, perfectly, toward the wrong light, and he orders everyone else to steer by it.

And the storm that lit the masts is doing something else, quietly, below them. “The magnetic energy, as developed in the mariner’s needle,” Melville stops to explain when the damage comes to light the next morning, “is, as all know, essentially one with the electricity beheld in heaven.” The false light has already got inside the binnacle.

V Lord of the Level Loadstone

“Out of this bit of steel Ahab can make one of his own, that will point as true as any.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 124

Morning, and the strangest scene in the book. The sea is a crucible of molten gold, the wind fair and strong, and Ahab stands at the bow in a rare elation. “Ho, ho! all ye nations before my prow, I bring the sun to ye!” Then some counter-thought checks him. He hurries to the helm and asks the heading. East-sou-east, sir, says the frightened steersman. “Thou liest!” Ahab strikes him. “Heading East at this hour in the morning, and the sun astern?”

Stop here. The thunder has reversed the compasses. Both needles swear the Pequod is going east while she is, in Melville’s phrase, as infallibly going west, and no one aboard has noticed, the error being too blindingly obvious to see. The level instrument, the one Ahab swore the day before would show him his place on the sea, has lied. And what catches the lie is the sun. The very sky he cursed and forswore at noon is the only honest witness left on board.

For one moment, Ahab navigates like a beetle. Two cues disagree, and he trusts the one overhead. With the sharp of his extended hand he takes the precise bearing of the sun, satisfies himself that the needles are exactly inverted, and turns the ship.

What he does next shows what the unlimited compass is. Slipping on his ivory heel, he sees the crushed copper sight-tubes of the quadrant still lying on the deck, and speaks to them. Yesterday he wrecked the poor, proud heaven-gazer; today the compasses would have wrecked him; but Ahab, he says, is lord over the level loadstone yet. He calls for a lance without its pole, a top-maul, and the smallest of the sail-maker’s needles, and tells the men that the thunder turned old Ahab’s needles, but out of this bit of steel Ahab can make one of his own. The sailors exchange abashed glances of servile wonder and wait for the magic. Starbuck looks away, and Ahab makes him hold the iron rod upright while he works. He hammers the steel and goes through some small strange motions over it, which Melville says may have served only to awe the crew; it is the manipulator’s oldest trick, to keep the method dark so the result looks like power. Then he suspends the needle on a linen thread above the compass card, watches it quiver and settle, and steps back. “Look ye, for yourselves, if Ahab be not lord of the level loadstone! The sun is East, and that compass swears it!”

Notice the grammar of that last sentence. The authority is still the sun, the same sun he cursed the day before. But the compass now swears to it, like a witness under oath, and Ahab stands between them as the lord who administered the oath. He has not abandoned the sky. He has annexed it. The truth that came from overhead is reissued under his name, on an instrument he forged, before a crew who will believe from now on that north comes from Ahab. One after another they peer into the binnacle and slink away.

It may not even have worked. In a 2019 column for Eos, Dan Dorritie argued that Ahab’s method, done as Melville describes it, might well have failed: the rod was held upright instead of along the earth’s field, and a needle on a thread is not a mariner’s compass, whose card turns only with the needles fixed beneath it. The physics can be argued either way. What cannot be argued is that from this chapter onward the Pequod’s heading is guaranteed by nothing but its captain’s word. This is what an unlimited compass finally does when the world’s cues fail it. It does not go dark. It generates its own north, and calls it true.

Melville planted the image long before. In “The Chart,” early in the voyage, Ahab sits at night over his sea-charts plotting the seasons and routes of the sperm whale, while the pewter lamp swinging in its chains throws shadows of lines across his brow, “till it almost seemed that while he himself was marking out lines and courses on the wrinkled charts, some invisible pencil was also tracing lines and courses upon the deeply marked chart of his forehead.” The beetle carries a picture of the sky. Ahab carries a picture of his own course, drawn on his own face.

VI The Ice and the Line

“I crush the quadrant, the thunder turns the needles, and now the mad sea parts the log-line. But Ahab can mend all.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 125

One instrument remains. The log and line is a weighted float paid out astern on a knotted rope; it tells a ship how fast she is moving through the water, and so, over hours, how far she has come. It is the other half of dead reckoning. The compass tells you which way. The log tells you how far.

The Pequod’s log has hung unused beneath the bulwarks for most of the voyage, rotting in heat and wet, and now Ahab orders it heaved. The old Manxman warns him the line looks far gone. Ahab overrules him. The log goes over, the strain comes on, and the rotten line parts. The log is lost. The Manxman, watching, says the skewer seems to be loosening out of the middle of the world. Ahab says he can mend all.

This is the Lund team’s ice. Chilled into stillness, their beetles lost their sense of how far before they lost their sense of which way. The Pequod after Chapter 125 is in precisely that condition: a ship that knows its bearing with a fanatic’s certainty and has lost every measure of distance, how far it has come and how much remains. Anyone who has lived through a great grief, a long illness, or an exile knows something like this from the inside. Direction holds out longest. What goes first is the sense of distance. Ahab has arrived there by choice.

Melville gives the scene one more figure, and it is not an accident. Little Pip, the cabin boy who was left alone in the open ocean and came back with his mind drowned, wanders up as the line parts, and Ahab takes him by the hand and leads him away to his own cabin. The Manxman mutters after them: there go two daft ones, one daft with strength, the other daft with weakness. Pip is the other Johannesburg beetle, the one under a washed-out sky with no lamp in view: a creature that has lost all its cues at once, the sea on every side, no horizon, no sky to read. Ahab is what becomes of a creature that throws its cues away one by one and keeps only the will to go on. They leave the deck holding hands.

VII The Symphony

“Close! stand close to me, Starbuck; let me look into a human eye.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 132

Everything so far could be told as a story about instruments. Melville will not let it stay one. On the day before the chase begins, he gives Ahab a last chance to navigate like a living thing, and the chance arrives as the other half of a man.

There is an old ideal, the one the Renaissance found in Philip Sidney and the Romantics in Byron, of a man who is both warrior and lover, who can fight and can be moved, who aims at something far and still feels what is near. The beetle gives the ideal a mechanism. The far cue is the sun: high, fixed, the thing you aim at. The near cue is the wind: felt on the body, always changing, the thing that tells you what the world is doing now. A compass with only the first cannot survive noon. Such a man is not two types bolted together. He is the resilient compass, with a man around it.

Chapter 132 is called “The Symphony.” It is a clear steel-blue day, sea and sky hardly separable, and the step-mother world, Melville writes, so long cruel, now throws affectionate arms round Ahab’s stubborn neck. From beneath his slouched hat he drops a tear into the sea, “nor did all the Pacific contain such wealth as that one wee drop.” Then he talks to Starbuck as he has talked to no one in the book: forty years of whaling, the young girl-wife he wedded past fifty, the boy’s face at the window, the boy’s hand on the hill. “Close! stand close to me, Starbuck; let me look into a human eye; it is better than to gaze into sea or sky.” And then: “this is the magic glass, man; I see my wife and my child in thine eye.”

This is the wind, and it arrives as literally as it can. It is a mild, mild wind, Ahab says, and the air smells as if it blew from a far-away meadow: they have been making hay somewhere under the slopes of the Andes, and the mowers are sleeping among the new-mown hay. A scent carried across a thousand miles of ocean on a gentle air, telling a man where the land is and what it is doing. At noon, when the sun is useless, the beetle leans on exactly this. And Starbuck says the only thing there is to say. “Away with me! let us fly these deadly waters! let us home!”

It is the moment the circle could close. “But Ahab’s glance was averted; like a blighted fruit tree he shook.” What follows is the most honest thing he ever says, because it is a question. “What is it, what nameless, inscrutable, unearthly thing is it” that commands him, against all natural lovings and longings, to keep pushing on? He does not know. He knows only that the needle points where it points. When he turns back to his mate, the deck is empty: blanched to a corpse’s hue with despair, Starbuck has stolen away.

Starbuck is the other cautionary half. He has the near cue without the far one: a wife, a child, Nantucket, all of it pointing backward, and nothing fixed overhead strong enough to act on. Melville gives him the book’s sanest rule of the hunt: “I will have no man in my boat,” said Starbuck, “who is not afraid of a whale.” It is a lover’s courage, prudent and homeward, and it is exactly what leaves him unable to steer when the danger is his own captain. Some nights earlier he stood outside Ahab’s cabin with a loaded musket and could not use it. He has the wind and no fixed light. Ahab has a fixed light, the only one he kept, and it is one he lit himself: the whale. He has refused the wind. Between them is a ship with no compass at all.

Melville had already sent one wind across the bow. Four chapters before, the Pequod meets the Rachel, a Nantucket whaler whose captain has lost a whaleboat in the chase, and his own young son in it. Captain Gardiner begs Ahab to join the search for two days, to sweep the sea alongside him. The Rachel is the lover made into a ship. She does not go straight. She circles, because circling is what you do when you are looking for a child. Ahab’s answer is the iron rail speaking: “Captain Gardiner, I will not do it. Even now I lose time.”

VIII The Coffin Life-Buoy

“It is not down in any map; true places never are.”Moby-Dick, Chapter 12

If Ahab is a fixed light without the wind, and Starbuck the wind without a fixed light, the book holds one man in whom both cues run at once, and he is the first friend Ishmael makes.

Queequeg is a harpooneer, a prince of the island of Kokovoko who shipped aboard a whaler to see the world, and a warrior whose great feats in the book are, tellingly, rescues: he dives into the sea to save a bumpkin who has just mocked him, and later cuts his way into a sinking whale’s head to deliver Tashtego, who has fallen in. He is also the book’s great lover. Ishmael wakes on their first morning at the Spouter-Inn to find Queequeg’s arm thrown over him in the most loving and affectionate manner; you had almost thought, he says, that he had been his wife. That evening Queequeg presses his forehead to Ishmael’s and announces that henceforth they are married, meaning, in his country’s phrase, bosom friends. The sentence about his home island is one of the most quoted in the book, and it is easy to forget whose island it describes: it is not down in any map; true places never are.

In Chapter 110 Queequeg falls ill with a fever and, believing he will die, asks for a coffin shaped like the canoes of his people. The carpenter builds it. Queequeg lies down in it, approves the fit, and then, remembering some small duty ashore he has left undone, decides to live. He keeps the coffin as a sea-chest. In his spare hours he carves its lid with figures copied from the tattooing on his body, and Melville tells us what that tattooing was: the work of a departed prophet and seer of his island, who by those hieroglyphic marks had written out on Queequeg’s body a complete theory of the heavens and the earth, and a mystical treatise on the art of attaining truth. Queequeg cannot read it himself. He is a wondrous work in one volume whose mysteries are destined to moulder away with the living parchment they are written on. So he copies them into wood.

Look at what the coffin has become. It is a theory of the heavens, carved by the one man aboard who held both cues, transcribed from his own skin.

The voyage turns it into something else. When a sailor falls from the masthead, the Pequod’s life-buoy is dropped after him and follows him to the bottom. Queequeg hints that his coffin might take its place, and the carpenter caulks it and hangs it at the stern. “A life-buoy of a coffin!” cries Starbuck. Ahab, finding the carpenter at work on it, wonders aloud whether in some spiritual sense the coffin is, after all, only an immortality-preserver.

Then the end. On the third day of the chase the whale stoves the Pequod, and she goes down with every soul aboard but one. Ahab’s line ends the way such lines end. The flying turn of his own harpoon line catches him round the neck, and he is shot out of his boat, as Turkish mutes bowstring their victim, before his crew knows he is gone. The straight line never reaches soft ground. It reaches the end of a rope.

Ishmael, dropped astern from Ahab’s boat earlier that day, floats at the margin of the closing vortex, and here Melville finishes the geometry the whole book has been drawing. “Round and round, then, and ever contracting towards the button-like black bubble at the axis of that slowly wheeling circle, like another Ixion I did revolve.” The hero’s circle is not a metaphor in this book. It is the water itself.

At the centre, the black bubble bursts upward, and “the coffin life-buoy shot lengthwise from the sea” beside him. For almost a whole day and night he floats on it. On the second day a sail comes near and takes him up. It is the devious-cruising Rachel, the circling ship, which “in her retracing search after her missing children, only found another orphan.”

And Queequeg? He goes down with the ship. When the mates’ boats were stove that morning, Ahab sent them back to the Pequod, and he watched Tashtego, Queequeg, and Daggoo eagerly mounting to the three mast-heads. Melville gives Queequeg no death scene of his own. As the Pequod settles, “fixed by infatuation, or fidelity, or fate, to their once lofty perches, the pagan harpooneers still maintained their sinking lookouts on the sea,” and the water closes over them.

That is the hardest thing the book says about him, and the most consoling. The compass dies with its carrier. The beetle keeps its snapshot of the heavens in a brain smaller than a grain of rice, and the picture dies with the beetle. Queequeg’s theory of the heavens was destined to moulder with his skin, so he copied it into wood, and the wood floated. No one ever reads it: not Queequeg, not Ishmael, not us. What survives is not the message but the vessel. Ishmael lives because a man who held both cues made one, and because a ship that would not stop searching for a lost child happened to circle past.

A pen-and-ink illustration in coral, slate and cream. At upper left, Ahab stands in the bow of a whaleboat, his harpoon line running straight across the sea to a white whale swimming away with old harpoons in its back. Below, a great whirlpool spirals around a carved wooden coffin rising from its center, its lid marked with a compass star and constellations, while a swimmer reaches toward it. A small ship sails on the far horizon under a low gold sun.
The line and the circle: Ahab’s harpoon line runs straight to the whale, and Queequeg’s coffin rises from the center of the vortex.

IX Soft Ground

“Vides ut alta stet nive candidum Soracte.”Horace, Odes I.9: “You see how Soracte stands white with deep snow.”

Outside the books, men and women do hold both cues at once, and the best instance I know belongs to a walker. In December 1933 an eighteen-year-old named Patrick Leigh Fermor set out on foot from the Hook of Holland for Constantinople, and walked the whole way. A decade later he was in occupied Crete, and in April 1944, with W. Stanley Moss, he abducted General Heinrich Kreipe, the German commander on the island, and led him into the mountains. One morning on Mount Ida, as the sun came up over its snowy summit, the captive general began, half to himself, to recite the opening of Horace’s ode on Soracte. Leigh Fermor took up the Latin and finished the poem. They had, he wrote later, “drunk at the same fountains.”

It is a story he told more than once, and it has the polish of much retelling; it fits almost too well. But even polished, it shows the shape. Both cues are there. The man who has just kidnapped a general is aiming at something far and fixed; the man who cannot hear a poem begun without finishing it feels what is near, and in that instant sees his prisoner as a fellow creature under the same sky. The two cues run together, neither overruling the other, and both of them, notice, are looking up: at the dawn on the mountain, at the snow on Soracte. And his line ended where a line should. After the war he and Joan Eyres Monsell, later his wife, built a house above the sea at Kardamyli, in the Mani, and he spent decades there turning that long walk into books.

The resilient compass is humbler and stranger than the unlimited one. It begins by looking up, lets a far light and a near one argue, shifts its weight when the sun climbs too high to help, and knows a lamp can fool it. And its line ends in something buried. Often what the beetle buries at the end of its line is not a meal but a nursery: a brood ball, shaped underground around a single egg, so that the next generation wakes into food. The line ends, and it ends in a gift.

That is the half of the hero’s journey the unlimited compass cannot complete. Campbell’s hero does not merely come back. He comes back carrying the boon, the elixir, something the village needs. Ahab carries nothing. Nothing he pushes can be buried, eaten or raised. He had a ball once, and the Symphony shows it to him in Starbuck’s eye, a young wife and a boy on a hill, and he turns his face away from it. On the last morning Melville makes the point with the whale itself. Moby Dick is swimming away, “only intent upon pursuing his own straight path in the sea,” and Starbuck cries out the truth of the whole voyage: “See! Moby Dick seeks thee not. It is thou, thou, that madly seekest him!” The whale has the beetle’s line, straight and away from the crowd. Ahab’s line has nothing at the end of it but the whale.

There are three shapes here, not two. There is the circle, which in the forest is the shape of the lost and in Campbell the shape of the return. There is the unlimited line, which never ends until something ends it. And there is the beetle’s line, straight and then stopped, in soft ground, with something left behind. And there are two beetles to carry them. The ball-roller of the opening never goes home; it goes away, and stops. The beetle on the ice shuttles between food and a burrow, and its lesson, that direction outlasts distance, belongs to creatures with somewhere to go back to. Ahab is one of them. He has a young wife and a boy on a hill; he is the homing beetle that refuses to home, which is why a homing beetle’s finding fits him on the night the log-line parts. The last pages of Moby-Dick deal out the shapes like fates. Ahab gets the unlimited line and nothing else: no terminus, no return. Queequeg gets the terminus: his line stops in a coffin, and what he leaves in it floats. Ishmael gets the circle, and because something was left behind for him, the circle that drowns everyone else is the one that brings him home.

Queequeg’s coffin is his brood ball. He had it shaped for his own burial, carved its lid with a theory of the heavens no one would ever read, and it hatched into another man’s life. The vortex closes around the one who has something to carry home, and what Ishmael carries is the story itself. Above the Epilogue, Melville set a verse from Job: “And I only am escaped alone to tell thee.”

⁂

Sources: Gareth Willmer, “Dung beetles’ inner compass could inspire cutting-edge miniature robotics,” Horizon, October 29, 2026, with Marie Dacke’s remarks. On the beetles: Jan L. Souman, Ilja Frissen, Manish N. Sreenivasa and Marc O. Ernst, “Walking Straight into Circles,” Current Biology 19 (2009), and the Max Planck Society’s “Walking in circles”; Marie Dacke and colleagues, “Multimodal cue integration in the dung beetle compass,” PNAS 116 (2019), and the universities’ press release on it, which speaks of the beetles switching between the two; “A Snapshot-Based Mechanism for Celestial Orientation,” Current Biology (2016); Marie Dacke, Dan-Eric Nilsson, Clarke Scholtz, Marcus Byrne and Eric Warrant, “Insect orientation to polarized moonlight,” Nature 424 (2003); Ayse Yilmaz, Gregor Belušič, James J. Foster, Claudia Tocco, Lana Khaldy and Marie Dacke, “Polarisation vision in the dark: Green-sensitive photoreceptors in the nocturnal ball-rolling dung beetle Escarabaeus satyrus,” Journal of Experimental Biology 227, no. 4 (2024); Ayse Yilmaz, Yakir Gagnon, Marcus Byrne, Emily Baird and Marie Dacke, “Cold-induced anesthesia impairs path integration memory in dung beetles,” Current Biology 32, no. 2 (2022); James J. Foster, Claudia Tocco, Jochen Smolka, Lana Khaldy, Emily Baird, Marcus Byrne, Dan-Eric Nilsson and Marie Dacke, “Light pollution forces a change in dung beetle orientation behavior,” Current Biology 31, no. 17 (2021), and Lund University’s summary of the study; Gonzalo Halffter and W. D. Edmonds, The Nesting Behavior of Dung Beetles (Scarabaeinae): An Ecological and Evolutive Approach (Instituto de Ecología, 1982). On Melville: Dan Dorritie, “Was Ahab Truly Lord of the Level Loadstone?” Eos 100, September 4, 2019; Herman Melville, Moby-Dick (1851), chapters 26, 118, 124, 125, 132 and 135, and the Epilogue. On Leigh Fermor and Kreipe: “At War with Horace”, JSTOR Daily. Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; cold read by Claude Fable 5.1. Images generated with Gemini Argon.

THE REMAINS OF THE DREAM

Kazuo Ishiguro, Freud’s day-residues, and the novel that was named by accident

On an Australian beach, a Dutch poet offered Kazuo Ishiguro a word of Freud’s for the scraps a day leaves behind for dreams to work on. Put into English on the spot, it became the title of his most famous novel. Ishiguro took it for the atmosphere. The word kept its other meaning anyway, and that meaning is the method of protagonist after protagonist.

Some time before The Remains of the Day was finished, Kazuo Ishiguro sat on a beach in Australia with four other writers and tried to find out what it was called. He told The Paris Review the story in 2008. There was a writers’ festival on, and the group on the sand was Michael Ondaatje, Victoria Glendinning, the Dutch poet Judith Herzberg, and Robert McCrum of Faber, who had given Ishiguro the advance that let him finish his first novel. They were playing what Ishiguro called “a semi-serious game of trying to find a title for my soon-to-be-completed novel.” Ondaatje proposed Sirloin: A Juicy Tale. “It was on that level,” Ishiguro said. “I kept explaining that it had to do with this butler.”

Then Herzberg mentioned a word of Freud’s. Tagesreste, Ishiguro recalled, “which he used to refer to dreams, which is something like ‘debris of the day.’ When she translated it off the top of her head, it came out as ‘remains of the day.’ It seemed to me right in terms of atmosphere.”

That is the whole account, and it has the shape of the stories writers tell about titles: a happy accident, a phrase that sounded right, a book that grew into it. It is also, read a second time, something else. Tagesreste is Tag and Reste, day and leftovers, and “remains of the day” is as literal a rendering as any translator of Freud has managed. James Strachey, in the Standard Edition, gives “the day’s residues.” A. A. Brill, in 1913, gave “remnants from the day.” Herzberg, off the top of her head, gave the plainest of the three. The translation was not loose. What the English phrase has that the German term lacks is a second sense, of evening and of what is left of a life, and that is the sense Ishiguro took. The Freudian sense was not lost on the beach. Herzberg offered the word as Freud’s, and Ishiguro’s account glosses it as his term for dreams. What his account does not record is anyone remarking what the Freudian sense had to do with the book.

Freud’s day-residues are the trivial scraps of waking life that a dream picks up because they are safe enough to carry what cannot be said. That is a description of Stevens the butler. It describes protagonist after protagonist in Ishiguro’s novels. The fit went unremarked, and the title was truer than the man who accepted it took it to be.

I The Day’s Residues

Freud’s claim about trifles is in the fifth chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, in the section on recent and indifferent impressions, and in Brill’s English it has the force of a rule: “The dream never concerns itself with trifles; we do not allow ourselves to be disturbed in our sleep by matters of slight importance.” Since his own dreams seemed full of trifles, the rule sounds like a denial of the obvious, and the next sentence says what it means: “Whatever one may dream, it is either manifestly recognisable as psychically significant or it is disfigured.” The trifle is never the point of the dream. It is the disguise the point wears. A botanical monograph glimpsed in a shop window turned up that night as the subject of a dream, and when he followed the associations back, the monograph led to a colleague, the cocaine episode, his wife’s favourite flowers, a reproach. The trivial thing was the entry point. The dream, he wrote, “preferably takes up into its content non-essential experiences,” and the reason it prefers them is the point of the book: the essential thing is under guard, and the trivial one is not.

The mechanism is stated most fully in the seventh chapter. The dream, Brill has Freud say, “gathers up the indifferent remnants from the day,” and it does so because “the dream process more easily takes possession of recent or indifferent material which has not yet been seized by the waking mental activity.” The forbidden wish cannot show its face. It borrows one. The borrowed face is some scrap the day left behind: an overheard phrase, an unfinished errand, a window display. In the German those scraps are Tagesreste, and Freud’s whole theory of what a dream is can be put as a sentence about them. A dream is a wish wearing the day’s remains.

Freud’s account of dreaming has not survived as science. Most clinicians abandoned the wish-fulfilment theory long ago, and the neurology of sleep has gone elsewhere. What survives is the account’s grammar: the small safe thing standing in for the large forbidden one, the charge travelling from where it cannot be expressed to where it can. That is a theory of narration, whatever it was meant to be, and it is the part Ishiguro took, without needing it as theory. He had already found it somewhere else.

II Learning the Mechanism

He found it among homeless people. After university Ishiguro worked with homeless people in west London, and the job was mostly listening. “I’d spent a lot of time working with homeless people,” he told the Review, “listening to people’s stories about how they’d got to this place, and I’d gotten very sensitive to the fact that they weren’t telling those stories in a straightforward way.” The example he gave is the method before it had a name. “Let’s say somebody is talking about a mutual friend, and he’s getting angry about this friend’s indecisiveness about a relationship he’s in. He’s getting absolutely furious. Then you realize that he’s appropriating the friend’s situation to talk about himself. I thought this was an interesting way to narrate a novel: to have somebody who finds it too painful or awkward to talk about his own life appropriate someone else’s story to tell his own.”

That is A Pale View of Hills. Its narrator, Etsuko, is a Japanese widow in England whose elder daughter has hanged herself. The suicide is announced at the start. Then, instead of the daughter, Etsuko remembers a summer in Nagasaki after the war, and a neighbour called Sachiko with a neglected child. “I thought the reader would think, Why the hell are we hearing about this other thing?” Ishiguro said. “I hoped readers would start to realize that her story is being told through the story of her friend.” Sachiko is a day-residue the size of a novel: the adjacent, safer story that carries the one Etsuko cannot tell.

Ishiguro’s verdict on the book is severe. “I’m very fond of it, but I do think it’s too baffling.” The ending, where a scene in Japan blurs into one that happened much later, he calls “quite gimmicky,” and he gives the reason: “I didn’t know how to create the texture of memory.” He had the displacement. He did not yet have the dream-work, the way one time slides under another so that the reader feels the substitution happen rather than being told about it.

The dream-work arrived in 1983, in bed. In his Nobel lecture, Ishiguro described a spring when “I came down with a virus and spent a few days in bed” and read Proust. “I became completely riveted by the Overture and Combray sections.” What held him was not the famous sentences but the way the narrative moved: not by chronology but by association, one memory calling up another across decades. He saw that in his own fiction “I could place a scene from two days ago right beside one from twenty years earlier,” and that doing so would let him show “the many layers of self-deception and denial that shrouded any person’s view of their own self.” That is Freud’s dream-time applied to a novel. The dream does not know what order things happened in. It knows what belongs next to what.

The lecture ties the discovery to the book he was about to write: “I could suddenly see an exciting, freer way of composing my second novel.” An Artist of the Floating World was that novel, and Stevens was not the first narrator built the new way but the second. Masuji Ono is a retired painter in a Japanese city after the war, and what he talks about is the negotiation of his younger daughter’s marriage, the house he won in an “auction of prestige,” his old pupils, a bridge, a bar. What he does not talk about, until the talk about everything else has worn thin, is what he painted during the war and what he did to a pupil who would not. Ono’s trifles are the first ones Ishiguro arranged with the dream’s sense of what belongs beside what.

III Stevens’s Trifles

The Remains of the Day is the third novel. In July 1956 the butler of Darlington Hall is lent his new American employer’s Ford and sent on a motoring holiday to the West Country. His account is divided by day and place: Salisbury, Mortimer’s Pond, Taunton, Moscombe, Little Compton, Weymouth, and there is no Day Five. He has a purpose, which he presents as professional: the house is short-staffed, and a former housekeeper, Miss Kenton, now Mrs Benn, has written a letter that seems to him to hint that she might come back.

What he writes about is the following. A staff plan. The polishing of silver, and the claim that the state of the silver at Darlington Hall once softened the mood of a visiting statesman. The question of whether a butler can learn to banter, since Mr Farraday banters and expects it returned. A porcelain figure, the novel’s “Chinaman,” left in the wrong place, and what that revealed about his father’s decline. A conference held at the Hall in March 1923, which Stevens remembers as the summit of his professional life, because he served the guests faultlessly while his father was dying upstairs. Each is small, each is safe, and each is standing exactly where something larger is not allowed to stand. The staff plan stands where Miss Kenton stands. The silver stands where Lord Darlington’s politics stand, the appeasement and the dismissed Jewish maids and the ruined name. The conference stands where the father stands. Stevens’s narrative is a dream of the six days, assembled from the remains of three decades, and the remains have been chosen the way Freud said they are chosen: because they are the material the waking mind has not put under guard.

Then the guard fails, twice. The first time is at a bus stop, after the meeting with Miss Kenton. She tells him she sometimes thinks about the life she might have had with him, and his reply to the reader is the plainest sentence in the book: at that moment, his heart was breaking. He says nothing of the kind to her. On the evening of the sixth day Stevens sits on the pier at Weymouth, waiting for the lights to come on, and a stranger who turns out to be a retired butler draws him into talk, and the talk goes where none of the account has gone. He gave his best to Lord Darlington, he says, and he cannot even claim to have made his own mistakes. The stranger offers him a handkerchief, and tells him that the evening is the best part of the day. Then Stevens does the thing the book has taught the reader to watch for. He takes the stranger’s remark and reduces it to a residue. He resolves to practise bantering, so that he can surprise Mr Farraday on his return.

The Nobel lecture says where the yearning came from, though it names no scene. In March 1988 the novel was finished, and Ishiguro had kept his butler’s defences up to the last page. Then, as he was listening to a record, “Tom Waits began to sing a song called ‘Ruby’s Arms,’” a ballad about “a man, possibly a soldier, leaving his lover asleep in bed,” sung “in the voice of a gruff American hobo utterly unaccustomed to revealing his deeper emotions.” Midway through, “the singer tells us that his heart is breaking.” Ishiguro saw what it meant for his book: “I had to reverse that decision.” Just for one moment, towards the end of the story, the butler’s armour had to crack, to “allow a vast and tragic yearning to be glimpsed underneath.” The lecture does not say which moment. At the bus stop, Stevens tells the reader, in nearly the song’s words, that his heart was breaking, and tells Miss Kenton nothing. Glimpsed, not stated. The wish shows its face for a page and then puts the mask back on, and on the pier the mask it chooses is the smallest residue in the book.

A flat graphic illustration of a dark landing at dusk. A white-gloved hand presses a polishing cloth against the bowl of an oversized silver spoon. Reflected upside down in the bowl is a seaside pier with its gold lights on, and a small figure in a crimson scarf hanging head-down at its end. The left half of the bowl has already been wiped blank.
Seen in the silver, upside down, and half polished away. Image made for this essay.

One more thing about the residues, from the interview. Asked whether he did research on service, Ishiguro said he had tried, and found that almost no servants had written about their lives. “So most of the stuff in The Remains of the Day about the rituals of being a servant was made up. When Stevens talks of the ‘staff plan,’ that’s made up.” The trifles were not found and used. They were invented to be trifles.

IV The Grammar of Dreams

Shortly after The Remains of the Day was published, Ishiguro and his wife, Lorna, were “sitting in a greasy spoon,” he told the Review, talking about how to write for an international audience, and she said that “the language of dreams is a universal language. Everyone identifies with it, whichever culture they come from.” He spent the following months asking a question: “What is the grammar of dreams?”

His own example is the best short description of it. “Just now, the two of us are having this conversation in this room with nobody else in the house. A third person is introduced into this scene. In a conventional work, there would be a knock on the door and somebody would come in, and we would say hello. The dreaming mind is very impatient with this kind of thing. Typically what happens is we’ll be sitting here alone in this room, and suddenly we’ll become aware that a third person has been here all the time at my elbow.” And then the sentence that joins this to west London and the sickbed: “I started to see parallels between memory and dream, the way you manipulate both according to your emotional needs at the time.”

Over some months, he said, he built up a folder full of notes, and the book that came out of it was The Unconsoled, five hundred pages in which a pianist named Ryder arrives in a Central European city to give a concert that everyone believes will heal the city, and is unable to get from one room to the next without being waylaid by people who have been at his elbow all along. In the interview he does not mention Freud in connection with it. He says dreams. The book that had been named for the day’s remains off the top of a poet’s head was followed by the book that set out to do, in the open, what the dreaming mind does.

It was received as a catastrophe. The Review’s introduction recalls James Wood writing that “it invents its own category of badness,” and Anita Brookner coming round to call it “almost certainly a masterpiece.” Ishiguro’s own account of the reception is calm. “It’s never my intention to be willfully obscure. The novel was as clear as I could make it at the time, given that it was meant to follow dream logic.” And: “I wouldn’t change a word of The Unconsoled.” The pattern is this. The Remains of the Day hid the dream’s grammar inside a realist surface, a butler, a Ford, a road through Somerset, and won the Booker and sold, the Review noted, more than a million copies in English. The Unconsoled took the surface away and let the grammar show, and was told it had invented its own category of badness. The dream-work is tolerated when it is hidden. Shown, it reads as a mistake.

V The Same Book Three Times

The interviewer, Susannah Hunnewell, told Ishiguro that readers who had followed him from Nagasaki to Darlington Hall “had a psychedelic moment.” He declined the compliment. “I don’t think it is that chameleon-like. What I’m saying is I’ve written the same book three times. I just somehow got away with it.” Asked why the English setting had astonished people, he answered, “That’s because people see the last thing first.” Readers who arrived at the butler took the setting for the essence. The essence had not moved. “For me, the essence doesn’t lie in the setting,” he said, and then, with the care of a man explaining a technique, “the choice of narrator and setting are deliberate. You do have to choose a setting with great care, because with a setting come all kinds of emotional and historical reverberations. But I leave quite a large area for improvisation after that.”

What travels from Etsuko to Ono to Stevens is the residue mechanism. A protagonist holds a small thing and talks about it so that the large thing need not be said, and the novel is the reader’s slow discovery of what the small thing is standing in for. The later books keep the mechanism and change the thing. In When We Were Orphans, the detective Christopher Banks returns to Shanghai in 1937 to solve the disappearance of his parents, and Ishiguro describes “a peculiar elision in Christopher Banks’s mind between solving the mystery of his parents and stopping the Second World War”: a private loss displaced onto a public one, which is the furious friend from west London scaled up to a war. In Never Let Me Go, Kathy H. narrates her years at Hailsham through the Gallery, the collection of pupils’ artwork taken away by a woman called Madame, and the rumour that a couple truly in love could win a deferral; the students talk about the Gallery and the deferrals because they cannot talk about what they are for. In The Buried Giant, an old couple set out through a mist that has taken the country’s memory to visit a son in a village a few days off, and the journey is what they can talk about; what the mist has taken, the son’s fate and their own part in it, waits at the end for a boatman to draw out. And in Klara and the Sun, the narrator is an artificial friend who has watched a sick child and concluded that the Sun, which revives a beggar in the street outside her shop window, can be asked to heal her. Klara’s Sun is the purest residue in the late work: a thing seen through a window, indifferent, picked up by a mind that needs somewhere to put a hope it cannot otherwise hold.

VI Never Believe the Author

The interview ends, more or less, with a warning. Hunnewell asked why his characters, one after another, miss the essential thing in their lives, and Ishiguro answered: “Without psychoanalyzing myself, I can’t say why. You should never believe an author if he tells you why he has certain recurring themes.”

He has his reasons, and they are about damage. Publicity, he said, takes a third of a writer’s working life, and much of that time is spent “being quizzed by often very insightful people. Why is there always a three-legged cat in your stuff, or what’s this obsession with pigeon pie? A lot of what goes into your work can be unconscious, or at least the emotional reverberations from these images might have been unanalyzed. It’s difficult for these things to remain that way when you do a book tour.” He used to think honesty was better. “I’ve seen the damage that this does. Some writers get quite screwed up.” The danger is that the writer starts to narrate himself: “You sit down to write and you think, I am a realist and I suppose I am a kind of absurdist as well.”

The rule is narrower than it sounds, and the narrowness matters. Ishiguro will tell you how. West London, the sickbed, the greasy spoon, the staff plan that was made up: nearly every account in this essay is an account of method, given freely and in detail. What he will not tell you is why, and the interview shows him declining to, when asked why his characters, one after another, miss the essential thing. The how is on the record. The why is the thing the how is standing in for.

The story of the title rests on Ishiguro’s telling to The Paris Review in 2008, the only telling consulted for this essay. Nothing turns on that; a writer’s account of how he named his own book is his to give. The other half is different. Judith Herzberg, who supplied the word, has not said, in any English- or Dutch-language source consulted for this essay, whether she had the novel’s method in mind when she offered it, or only a phrase for a game on a beach. The claim of this essay is that the fit between Freud’s word and Ishiguro’s book went unremarked on the beach. The one person who could say whether she saw it has not said. The fit stayed where Freud said such things stay, in the material nobody had seized.

So the beach, a second time. Five writers, a game, a joke about sirloin, a Dutch poet offering a word of Freud’s, a word that meant one thing in Vienna and was used, on a beach, for another. Ishiguro took the sound of it, evening and the leftover life, and wrote a novel in which a butler drives for six days through the remains of his, talking about silver. The word had been doing that all along. The remains of the day are what the dream is made of. They are also what is left of the day, and of the life, when the dream is over.

⁂

Sources: Kazuo Ishiguro, interviewed by Susannah Hunnewell, “The Art of Fiction No. 196,” The Paris Review 184 (Spring 2008); Kazuo Ishiguro, “My Twentieth Century Evening and Other Small Breakthroughs,” Nobel Lecture, December 7, 2017. Sigmund Freud, Die Traumdeutung (1900), for Tagesreste; The Interpretation of Dreams, chapter V, section (a), “Recent and Indifferent Impressions in the Dream,” and chapter VII, section (e), translated by A. A. Brill (New York: Macmillan, 1913), at Project Gutenberg; and James Strachey’s rendering, “the day’s residues,” in the Standard Edition, vols. IV–V (1953). Kazuo Ishiguro, A Pale View of Hills (1982), An Artist of the Floating World (1986), The Remains of the Day (1989), The Unconsoled (1995), When We Were Orphans (2000), Never Let Me Go (2005), The Buried Giant (2015) and Klara and the Sun (2021). Tom Waits, “Ruby’s Arms,” Heartattack and Vine (1980). James Wood’s and Anita Brookner’s judgments of The Unconsoled as quoted in the Paris Review interview’s introduction. Drafted with Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; cold read by Claude Fable 5.1, as outside literary editor. All images generated by Gemini Argon.

I THINK, THEREFORE I ENVY

Envy and amour-propre, from Port-Royal to the feed

Descartes went looking for certainty alone, in a heated room. Among other people, the thinking mind starts to compare, and comparison has a feeling of its own. Envy is zero-sum thinking you can feel, and about the thing it watches it is often right.

In November 1619 a young Frenchman serving with an army in Germany shut himself for a day in a room warmed by a stove, alone with his thoughts, and came out, he later said, with the beginnings of a method. Eighteen years later, in the Discourse on the Method, René Descartes followed it to the one thing it could not doubt, which was that he was doubting. Je pense, donc je suis. In the Latin he gave it later, cogito, ergo sum, it became philosophy’s most famous proof that a mind can stand on its own: a certainty reached alone, with no one watching.

The certainty in that room did not survive company. Blaise Pascal, no admirer of Descartes, left among his papers a note about another creature entirely. We are not content, he wrote, with the life we have in ourselves and in our own being; we want to live an imaginary life in the minds of others, and to that end we labour to appear. Rousseau, closing his Discourse on Inequality in 1755, finished the thought. The savage lives within himself. Social man, always outside himself, knows how to live only in the opinion of others, and draws the very feeling of his own existence, so to speak, from their judgment alone.

Put the thinking self among others and the first thing it thinks about is where it stands. Descartes’s sentence acquires a sequel: I think, therefore I compare, and I compare, therefore I envy. The Latin invidia comes from invidere, to look upon, and especially to look upon with ill will. Envy is the passion of the eye, and it is what zero-sum thinking feels like from the inside. Thought is not scarce; I can think without taking anything from you. Standing is a ranking. To be esteemed above someone is to have someone beneath you, and a ranking has exactly as many first places as it ever had. When a neighbour rises in it, I fall, whether or not he has taken a thing from me, and envy is the feeling that knows it first.

For two and a half centuries, economists have been correcting an arithmetic error that many people never made. The villager who suspects that his neighbour’s good fortune is his loss, the voter who hears that other people’s children are thriving and feels his own prospects shrink, the survey respondent whom psychologists diagnose with zero-sum bias: many of them are not bad at sums. They are counting the thing they care about, and it does not grow. Their mistake lies elsewhere, in the name they give it. They say wages, or schools, or jobs, which can grow, when what they mean is standing, which cannot. The moralists called the passion that keeps that second ledger amour-propre, and the feeling it produces when the ledger moves the wrong way is envy. Both were put to work building the consumer economy. The feed now keeps their score. Envy has been condemned for two thousand years as a sin and corrected for two hundred and fifty as a miscalculation. A sin it may be. A miscalculation it often is not, and for as long as we keep telling it that it cannot count, we will keep losing the argument with it.

I The Ledger

Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, had the kind of luck that frightens friends. Herodotus says that Amasis, king of Egypt, watched the run of victories from across the sea and wrote to him. It was pleasant, the letter said, to hear that a friend was faring well, “yet to me thy great good fortune is not pleasing, since I know that the Divinity is jealous.” Herodotus’s word is phthoneron: envious. Find the thing you would most grieve to lose, Amasis advised, and throw it where it can never come back. Polycrates rowed out and dropped an emerald signet into the sea in sight of his crew. Five or six days later a fisherman brought the palace a fish too fine to take to market, and the servants found the ring inside it. Amasis broke off the friendship, certain that a man who finds even what he throws away will come to a bad end. Polycrates did. A Persian governor lured him to the mainland, had him killed, and crucified his body.

The gods in this story keep a ledger, and what they enter in it is not wrongdoing but excess, as though good fortune were drawn from a common stock and Polycrates had taken more than his share. It is easy to call that superstition. But notice who does the reading. The gods write no letters; a king across the water does, after watching. The envy is human first and divine by attribution, and the Greeks knew exactly where its arithmetic holds. When Thucydides set aside the grievances the cities aired for what he thought the truest cause of the war between Athens and Sparta, he named no theft at all: “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.” Athens had taken nothing from Sparta. It had grown. In a contest of position, the other side’s growth is your loss whether or not a single ship changes hands.

Two thousand years later Thomas Hobbes reduced the contest to a footrace. In The Elements of Law, which circulated in manuscript in 1640, he compared the life of man to a race and added a stipulation that changes everything: “This race we must suppose to have no other goal, nor other garland, but being foremost.” A race run only to be first cannot be enlarged. Add runners and you add losers. Hobbes went on to read the whole catalogue of the passions, from glory to despair, off the runners’ places on that course, which is to say he described a creature that feels only by comparison. He did not give it a name. The French already had one.

II The Hated Self

The passion Hobbes was timing had been under indictment for twelve centuries. Augustine wrote in The City of God that two loves had made two cities, “the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self.” In seventeenth-century France his sternest heirs, the Jansenists gathered around the convent of Port-Royal, gave the earthly love its sharpest name. Amour-propre is usually translated as self-love, or pride, and both halves of the gloss mislead. It is not the wish to live, and not quite the wish to be admired. It is the wish to be preferred.

Pascal put its logic in a sentence. The self, he wrote, is unjust because it makes itself the centre of everything, and a nuisance to others because it would enslave them, car chaque moi est l’ennemi et voudrait être le tyran de tous les autres: for each self is the enemy of all the others, and would be their tyrant. That is a zero-sum game stated as theology. Every self wants the one position that only one can hold. La Rochefoucauld, who shared the Jansenists’ low opinion of human motives, set near the head of his Maxims the observation that amour-propre is the greatest of all flatterers, and twenty-five maxims later found its shyest child. People will often boast, he wrote, of even their most criminal passions, but envy is a timid and shameful passion that no one ever dares to avow.

Then Pierre Nicole, the most practical of the Port-Royal moralists, noticed something that would move the subject from sin to economics. In an essay of the 1670s on charity and amour-propre, he argued that self-love, if only it were enlightened, imitated charity almost perfectly. It is, in effect, courteous because it wants to be liked, honest because it wants to be trusted, obliging because it wants to be owed. To rid the world of its grosser disorders, he concluded, one would need, failing charity, only to give everyone an amour-propre clear-sighted enough to discern its real interests. Coming from Port-Royal, that was not praise. A society could run smoothly with no love in it at all, and its members would mistake the machinery for virtue.

Bernard Mandeville, a Dutch physician practising in London who had read the French moralists closely, took the warning as a prospectus. His verse fable of a hive that thrives on vice and collapses into honest poverty grew, in 1714, into The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits. The poem had already given envy a job: “Envy it self, and Vanity / Were Ministers of Industry.” Pride, he wrote in his commentary, is the faculty by which every mortal rates himself above what any impartial judge could allow, and “We are possess’d of no other Quality so beneficial to Society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as this, yet it is that which is most generally detested.” In a second volume, in 1729, he split the self in two: a self-love that wants to survive, and a self-liking that, roughly, values itself above its worth and looks to others to confirm the estimate. Rousseau would draw the same line a quarter of a century later, and he had read Mandeville well enough to name him in the Discourse. The passion had been diagnosed by priests. Now a doctor had written the prescription.

III Looked At

Rousseau’s contribution was to give the passion a birthday. In the Discourse on Inequality, people who had lived scattered start to gather in front of their huts, or around a large tree, to sing and dance. Then comes the sentence: Chacun commença à regarder les autres et à vouloir être regardé soi-même, et l’estime publique eut un prix. Each began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a price. Whoever sang or danced best, the handsomest, the strongest, the most adroit or the most eloquent, became the most regarded. That, Rousseau says, was the first step toward inequality, and at the same moment toward vice. From these first preferences, he went on, were born vanity and contempt on one side, and shame and envy on the other. Envy is not a late corruption of social life. In Rousseau’s account it is born with the audience.

In a note to the same Discourse he named the passion behind all four. Amour de soi, love of oneself, is a natural feeling that leads every animal to watch over its own preservation. Amour-propre is “only a relative feeling, artificial, and born in society,” which leads each person to make more of himself than of anyone else, inspires all the harm people do one another, and is also, he added, the true source of honour. Seven years later, in Emile, he did the arithmetic. Amour de soi, which looks only to ourselves, is content when our real needs are met. Amour-propre, which compares, is never content and never could be, because in preferring us to others it also demands that others prefer us to themselves, ce qui est impossible: which is impossible.

Impossible is an accountant’s word, not a moralist’s. Everyone cannot be preferred by everyone. The first love wants bread, and bread can be multiplied. The second wants to be first, and first cannot. Rousseau had written down the difference between a pie and a prize, and his language had already done it in a single word. In French, prix is both the price and the prize.

A flat graphic illustration split down the middle by a disc, half moon and half spotlight. On the left, a lone figure kneels beside a bare tree to drink from a moonlit pool. On the right, the same figure stands on a low stone wearing a gold laurel garland before a ring of onlookers, its shadow cast huge against the spotlight.
Rousseau’s two kinds of self-love: amour de soi, content once its needs are met, and amour-propre, which asks others to prefer us to themselves. Image made for this essay.

Adam Smith read the Discourse within a year. In 1756 he wrote a long letter to a short-lived Edinburgh review and translated three passages himself. Three years later, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he asked what all the toil and bustle of the world is for, the pursuit of wealth and power and pre-eminence, and answered without flinching: “To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us.” Whether Rousseau taught him that, scholars disagree. The record shows only that Smith had read and translated the Discourse first.

Seventeen years later the same man wrote the book that founded economics, and it is about the ease.

IV The Wrong Correction

The Wealth of Nations, two hundred and fifty years old this year, was aimed at a ledger. In 1669 Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who ran the finances of Louis XIV, reckoned that the whole seaborne commerce of Europe was carried in twenty thousand ships: fifteen or sixteen thousand Dutch, three or four thousand English, five or six hundred French. The number could not grow, he reasoned, so France could add ships only by taking them from the Dutch. A year or so later he told the king the same of money: one quantity of silver circulated in Europe, so the kingdom could gain only what its neighbours lost. In a Europe whose economy barely grew from one generation to the next, that arithmetic was less absurd than it now sounds. It was Amasis’s ledger with a ministry attached.

David Hume answered in 1758, praying as a British subject, in the middle of a war with France, “for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy, and even France itself.” Smith made the answer a system. Under the old maxims, he wrote, each nation “has been made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss.” Invidious is envy’s adjective, from the same invidere: the eye again. Ships could be built. Silver was not wealth. The pie could grow, and over the next two centuries it grew beyond anything Colbert could have counted.

The victory was real, and some of what still looks like zero-sum thinking is Colbert’s error in modern dress: the belief that a country has a fixed number of jobs, so that every immigrant or every import takes one. Sahil Chinoy and his colleagues find that Americans who see the world as zero-sum want more restrictive immigration, and for that belief the cure really is a lecture on growth. What is left is the residue, the part of the belief the lecture never reaches. Having proved that the pie grows, the main line of economics spent the next two and a half centuries correcting people who acted as if it didn’t, and it seldom asked whether they had been counting pie at all. The exceptions, Veblen, Hirsch and Easterlin among them, saw it; Smith had seen it in 1759.

Sara Solnick and David Hemenway put the question to a vote. Assuming the same prices, they asked 257 people at one school of public health whether they would rather earn $50,000 while others earned $25,000, or $100,000 while others earned $200,000. About half chose the smaller salary. These were not peasants with closed-village minds. They work and study in public health, and half of them would give up fifty thousand dollars a year for a better place in line. The economist Fred Hirsch had already named such things positional goods, valued for being had by fewer than want them, and the image usually attached to them is a crowd in which everyone stands on tiptoe and no one sees better.

The anthropologist George Foster found the same accounting in Tzintzuntzan, a village on Lake Pátzcuaro in Michoacán. There, and in communities like it, sudden prosperity was explained by tales of buried treasure. Wealth was not made; it was found, or it was taken. Land, friendship and even health were held to exist in fixed amounts, and Foster called this, in 1965, the image of limited good. In the papers that introduced it he also wrote a sentence that the literature descended from him rarely repeats. The peasant who sees his world this way, he said, “is usually very near the truth.” Sixty years later, economists who find the same belief in rich countries call its persistence, in Nathan Nunn’s phrase, “cultural mismatch”: a habit of mind built for a closed village, carried into an economy that is not one.

The diagnosis has it backwards. The village never went away. A school with a fixed number of places is Tzintzuntzan. So is an office with one corner, a list with one top line, a wedding with one bride. The economy around the village grows; the ranking inside it does not, and the ranking is where people live. What the economists call a mismatch is a match: an accurate mind applied to the one good whose arithmetic has not changed since the dancing began under Rousseau’s tree.

V Two Sentences

If the arithmetic is right, something else must be wrong, and the quickest way to find it is to watch yourself. Read these two sentences, and notice which one you find yourself agreeing with.

The easier black students find it to get into college, the harder it gets for white students.

The easier white students find it to get into college, the harder it gets for black students.

They paraphrase a matched pair of statements that the psychologists Shai Davidai and Martino Ongis put to American respondents, recruited online in samples of two or three hundred, in a paper published in Science Advances in 2019. Each respondent saw one version, never both. Agreement with the first rose with conservatism; agreement with the second rose with liberalism. Study after study in the paper found the same crossing. Conservatives saw a fixed pie when a gain challenged the existing order, and liberals saw one when a gain upheld it.

At a selective college with a fixed class, everything else equal, each sentence is arithmetic. Across American higher education as a whole, neither is. No respondent was caught contradicting himself, since nobody saw both versions: the contradiction runs between people, sorted by politics. The only person who has now read both sentences is you.

A British experiment shows where the mistake may live. In the last week of June 2024, a few days before a general election, the polling company YouGov showed some of its panellists one of two short paragraphs. Those told that ethnic minorities were outperforming White British people at school, Indians and Pakistanis especially, became more likely to say that White British people where they lived had few chances to find work or earn a decent wage: a third more likely, from a low base. Those told instead that Black Caribbean and Pakistani workers were more often unemployed, even with the same qualifications, became less likely to say that White British people lacked the chance of a good education. The sharpest movement was elsewhere. Asked to rank four men by how likely each was to be turned down for a job he was qualified for, the panellists who had read about minority success moved the White British man up the list. In this week’s Science, Imran Rasul, who ran the study with Lucinda Platt and Pratyush Tiwari, reports that about one respondent in five moved in this seesaw fashion in each direction, and that those moved by the paragraph about disadvantage were less supportive of policies for the poor.

Nobody’s wages were changed by a paragraph about other people’s schooling. One pupil’s exam results are not drawn from the same stock as a neighbour’s pay, so taken literally, the shift in the answer had no warrant. The authors call the result consistent with zero-sum thinking, not proof of it, and the plainest reading is that some panellists believe jobs are a fixed pool, the error Colbert made about ships. The hiring question is the strongest evidence for that reading: being turned down for a job is about as material as a loss gets. It is also, exactly, a question about how one’s group is ranked by the people who choose, and a ranking is zero-sum by construction. The survey cannot separate the two readings. Read the second way, what the paragraph threatened was a group’s place in the national story of who is doing well. Place really is a fixed sum, and the passion that registered the threat reached for the nearest respectable good to name it and came back with wages. That is amour-propre speaking in the vocabulary of amour de soi, a wound to standing reported as a worry about bread. On this reading the panellists counted correctly. They mislabelled the column.

That is why the belief has no fixed politics. In the United States, Chinoy’s zero-sum thinkers wanted more redistribution as well as less immigration; in Britain, prompted one way, the same belief went with less support for the poor. The belief has two empty slots, a winner and a loser, and the policy follows whomever a story places in each. And because the thing being counted is standing, the arithmetic is picked up when someone else’s gain threatens one’s place and set down when the gain is one’s own. That selectivity, not the arithmetic, is the fallacy. It is also the part a reader cannot see in himself. La Rochefoucauld called envy the passion no one dares avow; it hides first, one suspects, from the one who feels it.

VI The Penalty of Leadership

A passion that can never be satisfied is a merchant’s dream, and America was where the merchants found it wide awake. Alexis de Tocqueville saw why. Aristocracy had at least fixed the ranks; equality unfixed them and entered every citizen in Hobbes’s race. Americans, he wrote in 1840, have swept away the privileges that stood in their way, “but they have opened the door to universal competition; the barrier has changed its shape rather than its position.” Where everyone is nearly equal, he observed, the smallest difference wounds, so the desire for equality grows more insatiable the more of it there is. He found the freest and most enlightened men, placed in the happiest circumstances the world affords, forever brooding over advantages they did not possess, and he named the mood: “that strange melancholy which often haunts the inhabitants of democratic countries in the midst of their abundance.”

Sixty years later Thorstein Veblen supplied the economics. Once property becomes the basis of esteem, he argued in The Theory of the Leisure Class, accumulation is “substantially a race for reputability on the basis of an invidious comparison”: Hobbes’s race and Smith’s invidious eye in a single clause. And therefore, he went on, no general increase in a community’s wealth, however fairly shared, could come near satisfying it. Veblen had written out Mandeville’s wager with the bill attached. Amour-propre will grow the pie without limit. It will never be fed by it.

What followed was an industry built on the wager. In 1913 the cartoonist Arthur “Pop” Momand, who said that he and his wife had lived far beyond their means in Cedarhurst, Long Island, trying to keep pace with the well-to-do, began a newspaper strip called Keeping Up with the Joneses. For twenty-five years the McGinis family strained to match the neighbours, and in all that time the Joneses were never shown. They did not need to be. Pascal had already said where they lived: in the imaginary life we lead in the minds of others.

On January 2, 1915, Cadillac took a page in The Saturday Evening Post for an advertisement that never described the car. Under the headline “The Penalty of Leadership,” the copywriter Theodore MacManus explained that whoever is first in any field lives in a merciless public glare, and that “whether the leadership be vested in a man or in a manufactured product, emulation and envy are ever at work.” The masterpiece draws slander; the commonplace is left alone. It is Amasis’s letter rewritten as a boast. The envy that Polycrates paid a ring to escape had become the proof of purchase.

A decade later Listerine introduced the nation to Edna, “often a bridesmaid but never a bride,” whose birthdays crept toward what the copy called “that tragic thirty-mark.” Her trouble was halitosis, an obscure medical term the company had found and made famous, and the horror of it was that no one would tell her. Nothing in the advertisement is about hygiene. It sells the fear of being looked at and found wanting, and a remedy for a ranking. There is one bride at a wedding, and the bottle promised it could be you.

The pie did grow. In 1974 Richard Easterlin reported that from 1946 to 1970, as American incomes rose, Americans did not grow systematically happier by their own account, and he suggested relative status as the reason; economists with more data have argued since about how flat that line really is, which is at bottom a dispute about how much of income is rank. By the 1990s, Juliet Schor found, Americans had stopped measuring themselves against their neighbours and begun measuring themselves against richer strangers, the people on television among them. The Joneses had moved into the living room.

Smith had described the engine in 1759, in the same book as the vanity. The pleasures of wealth and greatness, he wrote, strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful, worth all the toil and anxiety we bestow on them, and it is well that nature imposes on us in this way: “It is this deception which rouses and keeps in continual motion the industry of mankind.” Mandeville’s verse, which had made envy a minister of industry, also supplied the motto: “Content, the Bane of Industry.” Rousseau’s amour de soi is the love that can be content. Commerce needed the other one. The genius of the century that followed was to sell a prize in the packaging of a pie: to offer things that can be made without limit as the cure for a want that only someone else’s loss can satisfy. Every Cadillac sold made the next one a little less like leadership. The machine ran on its own failure, and it ran beautifully.

VII The Scoreboard

Television gave amour-propre a larger village. The feed gave it a scoreboard. In 1971 Herbert Simon observed that the more information there is, the scarcer the attention it consumes. Colbert was wrong that his twenty thousand ships could not multiply, but every day has 1,440 minutes, and no invention will add a 1,441st. Attention is the one ledger Colbert would recognize, and Rousseau’s tree is its native ground. Whoever sings best is most regarded; the difference now is that the regard is counted, displayed beneath the song, and ranked. Envy no longer has to guess.

A flat graphic illustration of a great tree at night. A board hanging from its branch shows a row of gold bars of different heights. Beneath it, a ring of dark figures stands around a singer wearing a gold garland.
Whoever sings best is most regarded; now the regard is counted. Image made for this essay.

In 2019 Instagram began hiding like counts from some users, starting in Canada, to see whether it would ease the pressure of posting. Two years later it made hiding optional. Some people, the company said, had found the change a relief; others still wanted the numbers, to keep track of what was popular. The score stayed. Nothing in the history of amour-propre would have predicted otherwise.

Feeds are ranked by what holds attention, and the record shows what holds it. In 2021 Steve Rathje, Jay Van Bavel and Sander van der Linden examined some 2.7 million posts from American news outlets and members of Congress on Facebook and Twitter. Posts about the political other side were shared about twice as often as posts about one’s own, and each additional word referring to that other side raised the odds of a share by about two-thirds, on the left and the right alike. The data are correlational, and the authors say so. When academics working with Meta moved tens of thousands of consenting users to a plain chronological feed for three months of the 2020 American campaign, their time on the platforms fell and their politics did not measurably change. A later critique questioned the study’s timing, and the authors replied. The feed may not plant the passion. It waters the one already growing.

What has changed since is who writes the sentences. In a preregistered experiment published in Nature Human Behaviour in 2025, Francesco Salvi and his colleagues had people debate either another person or GPT-4. Given a few facts about its opponent, the model was the more persuasive debater in about two-thirds of the matched comparisons. The British experiment needed one short paragraph to move a fifth of its panel. Paragraphs like it can now be written afresh for each reader, in that reader’s terms, at no cost, with the two empty slots filled by whatever names the moment requires. Whether that makes zero-sum stories more potent is the obvious experiment, and it does not appear to have been run.

VIII Loved and Lovely

Is everything the self wants a fixed sum, then? Is love? It depends on which love.

To be loved, in amour-propre’s sense, is to be preferred, and preference is a ranking. Anyone who has asked whether he is loved more than someone else has done the arithmetic, and Rousseau’s verdict on the demand still stands: made by everyone of everyone, it is impossible. That love is zero-sum, and no amount of it has ever been enough. Love as attention is bounded too. A parent has the same 1,440 minutes as everyone else, and the child who says you always pick her is counting something real. But love as care, wishing someone well and attending to their good rather than to one’s place in their eyes, is the one good in the whole ledger that grows by being spent. A second child does not halve it. The parent who says I love you both the same and the child who says you always pick her are both telling the truth, about two different goods. Nicole thought enlightened self-love could imitate charity almost perfectly. Paul had already supplied the test that tells them apart: charity, in the King James wording, envieth not.

Smith, in the same book that confessed the vanity, saw the difference too. “Man naturally desires,” he wrote, “not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love.” To want to be loved is to want a prize. To want to be lovely is to want to be a certain kind of person whether or not anyone is keeping score, and that want takes nothing from anyone. It is as close as the moral tradition comes to an exit from the race: not to stop running, but to change what one runs for.

The other exit is to change the ladder. Anca Balietti and Diego Marino Fages primed some British adults to see life as zero-sum and found that they gave less to an international anti-poverty charity. Then they told some of them where they stood in the world’s income distribution, where a British income sits high, and the drop in giving was offset. By the authors’ account, the prime moved stated opinions only modestly; it was the giving that moved. Nothing about the world had changed, only the comparison. Foster’s villagers knew the trick. Two kinds of good fortune drew no suspicion in Tzintzuntzan: a lottery win, because luck takes from no one, and the dollars men earned as braceros in American fields, because that money came from beyond the edge of the village and subtracted from no one in sight. Amour-propre cannot be argued out of its arithmetic, because the arithmetic is correct. It can be shown a larger room.

The people we accuse of zero-sum thinking are, much of the time, doing correct sums on the thing they care about, which is their place. Telling them the pie is growing is true and, for that part of the belief, beside the point; it has been true for two hundred and fifty years and has persuaded almost no one, because almost no one was counting pie. Their errors are the name they give the good and the convenience with which they reach for its arithmetic only when someone else gains. An economy that sells prizes in the packaging of pies, and a feed that keeps the score, both profit from those errors. Balietti and Marino Fages blunted one of them without a lecture on growth. They changed the comparison, and the money moved. Pascal’s imaginary life in the minds of others was not abolished by that; it was given a larger room, and for the length of a survey it behaved.

Descartes went looking for his certainty alone, in a room no one else could see into. A mind can think alone; it cannot envy alone. Envy needs a window, and Polycrates lived in full view. He threw his ring into the sea on a friend’s advice, to pay the gods what his luck was said to owe them. But the gods had not written the letter; a king watching from across the water had. The account was kept in eyes, not in rings, and things cannot pay it. The fish brought it back.

⁂

Sources: René Descartes, Discours de la méthode (1637), parts II and IV, and Principia philosophiae (1644), I.7; Blaise Pascal, Pensées, Brunschvicg 147 and 455; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur l’origine et les fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes (1755), including its note on amour-propre and its closing pages, and Émile (1762), book IV; the English of Pascal and Rousseau ours. Herodotus, Histories III.39–43 and 125, translated by G. C. Macaulay (1890), at Sacred Texts; Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War 1.23, translated by Richard Crawley (1874); Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law (1640), I.9.21, printed as Human Nature IX.21 in Molesworth’s English Works, vol. IV. Augustine, The City of God XIV.28, translated by Marcus Dods (1871); François de La Rochefoucauld, Maximes (1678), nos. 2 and 27; Pierre Nicole, “De la charité et de l’amour-propre,” Essais de morale, vol. III (1675); Bernard Mandeville, “The Grumbling Hive” (1705) and The Fable of the Bees (1714), Remark M, and The Fable of the Bees, Part II (1729), in F. B. Kaye’s edition (1924); on Mandeville and Nicole, Mikko Tolonen, Self-love and Self-liking in the Moral and Political Philosophy of Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, doctoral dissertation, University of Helsinki (2010). 1 Corinthians 13:4, King James Version (1611). Adam Smith, his letter to the authors of the Edinburgh Review (1756), in Essays on Philosophical Subjects, 250–54, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), I.iii.2.1, III.2.1 and IV.1.10, and The Wealth of Nations (1776), IV.iii.c.9. Colbert’s count of Europe’s ships as given by Ernest Lavisse, Histoire de France, vol. VII, at Méditerranée antique, and his memorandum to the king of about 1670, in Pierre Clément’s edition of his letters and memoranda, vol. VII; David Hume, “Of the Jealousy of Trade” (1758 edition). Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (1976); Sara Solnick and David Hemenway’s survey as reported in Harvard Magazine, May–June 1996, and published in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (1998); George M. Foster, “Treasure Tales, and the Image of the Static Economy in a Mexican Peasant Community,” Journal of American Folklore (1964), and “Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good,” American Anthropologist 67 (1965), 297, 306–9. Shai Davidai and Martino Ongis, Science Advances (2019), whose items the two sentences in Section V paraphrase; Lucinda Platt, Imran Rasul and Pratyush Tiwari, “Majority Perceptions of Minority Groups: Economic Inequalities, Their Causes, and Policy Solutions,” CEPR Discussion Paper 20106 (2025), on a YouGov survey of June 2024, UCL copy, and their October 2026 working paper, “Revealing Zero-sum Thinking in the United Kingdom”; Imran Rasul, “Zero-sum mindsets and economic policy preferences,” Science, November 5, 2026; Sahil Chinoy, Nathan Nunn, Sandra Sequeira and Stefanie Stantcheva, “Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences,” American Economic Review 116, no. 3 (2026), which takes the phrase “cultural mismatch” from Nunn (2021). Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. II (1840), part II, chapter 13, translated by Henry Reeve, at Indiana University; Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899), chapter 2; on Momand and the Joneses, Barry Popik, citing the New York Times, February 15, 1998; “The Penalty of Leadership,” The Saturday Evening Post, January 2, 1915, as recounted by the Post (2021); Listerine’s 1925 advertisement as reproduced by Cecil Munsey, Bottles and Extras, May–June 2007; Richard Easterlin, “Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence” (1974); Juliet Schor, The Overspent American (1998). Herbert Simon, “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World”, in Computers, Communications, and the Public Interest (1971); on Instagram’s like counts, TechCrunch, April 14, 2021; Steve Rathje, Jay Van Bavel and Sander van der Linden, PNAS (2021); Andrew Guess and colleagues, Science (2023), with the eLetter by Chhandak Bagchi and colleagues in Science (2024; preprint) and the authors’ reply; Francesco Salvi and colleagues, Nature Human Behaviour (2025); Anca Balietti and Diego Marino Fages, “Zero-Sum Views Reduce Support for Redistribution Across Borders,” University of Heidelberg working paper 767 (2025). Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; cold read by Claude Fable 5.1, as outside literary editor. All images generated by Gemini Argon.

THE ART OF THE EXIT

Face-Saving and the Architecture of Retreat

On election night Donald Trump said he had not been on the ballot, and accepted the result. From Salamis to Appomattox to the Security Council, proud men and great powers have stood down only when someone built them a dignified way out. The danger is an exit that never closes.

I The Morning After: “I Wasn’t on the Ballot”

The most consequential sentence of the 2026 midterms was not spoken by a winner. It was posted by the man who lost the most and was never on the ballot. Late on November 3, as Democrats flipped seven Republican Senate seats in Iowa, Kansas, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina and Texas and swept the House, Donald Trump wrote on Truth Social: “I wasn’t on the Ballot and if I was, we would have won IN A LANDSLIDE!” The night before, on Hannity, the landslide had come with a different condition: “If our people vote, we win in a landslide.” In twenty-four hours the landslide never moved. Only its condition did, from turnout to the ballot.

Speaking to the New York Times from the White House as the results came in, he said, “I am absolutely willing to accept those results,” and that he would probably work something out with the Democrats. Shortly after midnight he called in to Fox News and stated the alibi in the first person: “I don’t like to consider it a defeat for me. I wasn’t on the ballot. If you’re on the ballot, it’s different than if you’re not on the ballot.” The Democrats, he allowed, had done a good job. As of Wednesday morning he had filed no lawsuit.

What makes the night instructive is that he had two bridges pre-built, and we watched him choose. On February 4, in a pre–Super Bowl interview in the Oval Office, he told NBC’s Tom Llamas that he would accept the midterm results if the elections were honest, and that if they could not be done honestly, something else would have to happen. That is the rigged-election bridge, the one he crossed in 2020. He did not repeat the condition on Tuesday night, but he has never retired it, and the bridge was standing ready. He did not take it. He took the other one, the bridge that leads to acceptance rather than to a crowd, and the argument of this essay turns on why the second bridge was walkable and the first was not.

The irony of the alibi is almost too neat. For months he had closed his rallies with a plea to the base: pretend I’m on the ballot. In Mississippi in October he said exactly that. When the pretense failed, he reached for its opposite without pause. The two sentences cannot both be the operative truth, and that is the point. One was a weapon for the fight; the other is a road out of it. Nor is the road new. In November 2018, after Republicans lost the House, he told Chris Wallace that his name wasn’t on the ballot and that he had voters who would not turn out unless it was. The line is a rehearsed instrument.

Then there is the veto. On October 23, to reporters on the South Lawn, he said that if Democrats won, “what happens is I veto everything,” and “then the Democrats come and they want to make a deal.” On the New York Post’s Pod Force One, shortly before the election, he said he guessed he would become Mr. Veto. On Tuesday, before the polls closed, he told CBS News, “I have the ultimate power — it’s called ‘veto.’” At 11:38 that night, as the Senate fell, he announced he would become a political pundit on why candidates had won and lost; minutes earlier he had explained that Greg Abbott would have kept the Texas governorship had he not become a RINO; moments later he posted an image of a red cap bearing the single word VETO. The presidential veto is not the Security Council’s, and Congress can override it. As a metaphor it is exact all the same, and his own script makes it more so. “Historically,” he told CBS, “you veto for a couple of months and then they come and say, ‘We’ve got to make a deal.’” He had announced the end of a standoff that had not yet begun, with the other side crossing over to him. The author of The Art of the Deal had written the exit before the fight. That is the golden bridge one level up: a loser drafting, in advance, the terms on which he will be seen to win.

A president cannot decline a midterm, so the bridge did not save the Congress. What it saved was the two years after. The story a leader tells about a defeat decides whether his followers accept it, and the alibi of absence is a story that ends in acceptance. We have seen the other version. In 2020 he was on the ballot, the alibi of absence was unavailable, and the story he told instead did not end for two months. Section VII returns to that winter. For now it is enough to notice that on November 3 a sentence was lying around, and he picked it up.

II The Golden Bridge

The idea is older than the phrase, and the first telling is still the best. After Salamis in 480 BC, Themistocles proposed sailing north to the Hellespont to cut Xerxes’ bridge of boats and trap the Persian army in Europe. In Plutarch’s account it is Aristides who objects: a king with a vast army and no way home will fight out of desperation, so the Greeks should, if anything, build him a second bridge to leave by faster. Herodotus gives the argument to Themistocles himself, and adds the detail that makes it a parable. Having decided to let Xerxes go, Themistocles sent his servant Sicinnus to tell the king that he had personally restrained the Greeks from destroying the bridge, so that Xerxes could retreat believing he was being spared as a courtesy. The golden bridge and the face-saving story that lets a proud man walk across it were invented in the same week.

A long bridge of wooden boats lashed together across a strait, empty and glowing gold in the late sun, with warships at anchor in the distance and a lone rower in a small boat in the foreground.
The bridge left standing. Image generated with Gemini Argon for this essay.

The maxim then descends through the manuals of war. Sun Tzu, in the seventh chapter, tells commanders to leave an outlet when they surround an army and never to press a desperate foe. Frontinus credits Scipio Africanus with saying that one should build the enemy a road to flee by, and Vegetius repeats it. The bridge itself is Spanish, and silver rather than gold: a enemigo que huye, puente de plata, the proverb attributed to Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the Gran Capitán. Machiavelli supplies the reasoning in the Discourses, III.12, where necessity is what makes an enemy fight hardest. The logic is cold throughout. A cornered man fights to the death because death is already his best outcome. Give him a road and he will take it, and you will not have to kill him, and he will not have to kill you.

The Americans have their own great bridge, and it is at Appomattox. On the morning of the surrender, Longstreet’s artillery chief, Edward Porter Alexander, urged Lee to let the men take to the woods with their rifles and report to their state governors to fight on. Lee refused. They would become mere bands of marauders, he said, and it would bring on a state of affairs the country would take years to recover from. Grant’s terms then made the refusal livable. He let Confederate officers keep their sidearms and the men their horses, for the spring planting, and when his own artillery began firing salutes he ordered them stopped: the rebels were countrymen again. Lee’s face was preserved in writing, in the terms themselves, and the Army of Northern Virginia went home rather than into the hills.

John F. Kennedy learned the lesson from a book. In 1960 he reviewed B.H. Liddell Hart’s Deterrent or Defense and copied out its closing counsel: keep cool, have patience, never corner an opponent, and always help him save face. Two years later he practiced it. The public terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis let Khrushchev claim a no-invasion pledge for Cuba; the private terms, kept secret for decades, removed American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Khrushchev retreated as a peacemaker. Kennedy appeared unbending. The world continued.

Political scientists later named what Kennedy was protecting. James Fearon, in 1994, called it audience costs: the price a leader pays at home for backing down abroad after he has publicly dug in. Robert Putnam had already described the two-level game, in which every negotiator plays against the man across the table and the crowd behind him at once. A face-saving exit is a device for winning the second game while losing the first. The secret Jupiter trade let Khrushchev concede to Kennedy and still tell the Presidium he had saved Cuba, and American silence about the trade helped him write that speech.

Thomas Schelling made the bridge a science. In Arms and Influence he argued that coercion works only when the target has a tolerable way to comply, and that the art of the threat lies in leaving one. A demand that offers no face-saving exit is not a demand; it is a dare. Diplomats have a plainer word for Schelling’s structure. They call it an off-ramp, and they know that a highway without one is a highway on which people keep driving.

The game theorists have a diagram for the dare. Bertrand Russell, in 1959, borrowed the teenage game of chicken for the nuclear standoff: two cars, one road, and the first to swerve is shamed. Schelling made it rigorous. The model assumes that swerving is merely embarrassing, and for a man who prices humiliation at death it is not; the crash is no longer the worst square on the board. You cannot make such a man swerve by threatening to crash, because he will crash. You can only change what swerving costs him, and that is what a face-saving story does: it lets him turn the wheel while telling everyone he held it straight. William Ury gave the move its modern name in 1991, in Getting Past No: build them a golden bridge. The idea is centuries older than the book, but Ury is the reason a negotiator today says the phrase without knowing where it came from.

Political science has since measured the cost of omitting the bridge. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, in Leaders and International Conflict, found that rulers who expect to be killed or imprisoned after losing power fight on far past the point of rationality, because for them defeat and death are the same outcome. The transitions literature of the 1980s reached the same conclusion from the other side: Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter observed that dictatorships end peacefully only when someone is offered exit guarantees. Pinochet left with a Senate seat for life. Spain’s regime did not leave at all; Franco died in office, and the bridge there was built for his servants, in the 1977 Amnesty Law and the pacto del olvido.

South Africa built two. The first was Joe Slovo’s “sunset clauses” of 1992, which guaranteed the old regime’s civil servants and officers their posts and pensions through the transition, so that the men with the guns had a reason to want the election held. The second was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which traded amnesty for full confession: a golden bridge built in public, with a toll at the far end. De Klerk shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Mandela in 1993, and the army did not move against the election. The cleanest case of a bridge for one man is Marcos in February 1986: Reagan’s message, carried by Senator Paul Laxalt, was to cut and cut cleanly, and American helicopters lifted him from Malacañang to Clark and on to Hawaii. A dictator who was offered a flight took it, and the Philippines got a transition without a siege.

Charles Taylor is the case that shows the toll. In August 2003, with rebels at the edge of Monrovia and the city under siege, Nigeria offered him asylum in Calabar; Taylor resigned and flew out that week. The siege lifted, the war ended, and he lived in a villa. In 2006, under pressure, Nigeria gave him up, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone tried him; in 2012 he was sentenced to fifty years. Justice was served, and the bridge was burned behind him, so that every strongman since has had to price the chance that exile is a holding cell. Muammar Gaddafi, indicted by the International Criminal Court in June 2011 while his war was still open, had no offer he could trust, and died in a drainage pipe outside Sirte in October. Bashar al-Assad, in December 2024, had Moscow, and took it in a night. The difference between the two endings was not the man. It was whether anyone still owned a bridge he believed in.

The counter-case is 1919, and it is sharpest in a pair. At Vienna in 1815, within months of Napoleon’s defeat, Talleyrand sat at the Congress as an equal, France kept its throne and was not carved up (the second peace, after Waterloo, would cost it an indemnity and an occupation), and Europe got the better part of a century without a general war; Kissinger’s A World Restored is the long argument that legitimacy and face were the mechanism. At Versailles the Allies made Germany sign a war-guilt clause, Keynes called the result a Carthaginian peace, and a generation later the Germans walked back across the river by another route. Victory that leaves the loser no face does not end a war. It schedules the next one.

Even the most unconditional surrender in history confirms the rule. Casablanca’s doctrine of unconditional surrender arguably prolonged the Pacific war; what ended it was ambiguity about the emperor. Byrnes’ reply of August 11, 1945, said only that the emperor’s authority would be subject to the Supreme Commander, and MacArthur then kept Hirohito on the throne. Japan surrendered without conditions once a bridge had been slipped under the word.

Trump, on November 3, found his bridge already built. The alibi of the absent ballot gave him a story in which he had not lost, and so he could let the loss stand. This is not virtue. It is physics.

The Athenians, who understood the physics, built it into their constitution. Ostracism was a ten-year exile without loss of property or citizenship, a way to remove a dangerous man without having to kill him. Themistocles was ostracized around 471 BC, later condemned as a traitor, and fled at last to Persia, where he wrote to Xerxes’ son, the new king Artaxerxes, asking for refuge. In Thucydides’ telling, the letter reminded the king that Themistocles had warned his father to withdraw from Salamis in time, and took credit for the Greeks’ failure to destroy the bridges, a credit Thucydides calls false. It worked. The king gave him the revenues of three cities: Magnesia for his bread, Lampsacus for his wine, Myus for his meat. The face-saving story told to the father was cashed, fifteen years later, with the son.

III Face-Work: The Anthropology of the Excuse

The word the West borrowed for all this is Chinese. In 1944 the anthropologist Hu Hsien-chin explained to English readers that Chinese has two words where English has one: mianzi, the prestige one accumulates through success, and lian, the moral standing one cannot lose without ceasing to be a person. To lose mianzi is to be embarrassed. To lose lian is to be finished. Every face-saving ritual in politics is an attempt to convert a threat to the second into a mere loss of the first. The absent-ballot alibi does exactly this: the prestige takes a hit; the personhood does not.

Erving Goffman turned the idea into a sociology. In his 1955 essay “On Face-Work” he defined face as the positive social value a person claims for himself in an encounter, and he made a counterintuitive observation. Face is not defended alone. It is maintained cooperatively, by everyone present, because an interaction in which one party loses face becomes unbearable for all. We look away when a stranger trips. We accept the excuse we do not believe. Goffman called this tact, and he thought it the quiet foundation of social order. Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson later built the modern science of politeness on his idea, distinguishing positive face, the wish to be approved, from negative face, the wish not to be imposed on; what began as an anthropologist’s gloss on a Chinese word is now a measurable property of language.

This reframes Tuesday night. When a White House official told reporters on background that Trump voters simply show up when Trump is on the ballot, he was not merely spinning. He was performing face-work on behalf of a man whose composure the whole system depends on. A press corps that repeated the line, a party that did not contradict it, and a Democratic leadership that spent Wednesday morning talking about affordability rather than humiliation were all, in Goffman’s sense, keeping the encounter bearable. The bridge is built by the winners too.

Narcissism, in what follows, names a pattern of behavior, not a diagnosis of anyone. The subject is the mechanism, not the man.

Psychoanalysis supplies the interior view. Freud described narcissistic injury in 1914; Heinz Kohut, in 1972, described narcissistic rage, the disproportionate fury of a self that experiences any slight as an attack on its existence. The psychiatrist Donald Nathanson later mapped the four exits from shame: withdraw, attack the self, avoid, or attack others. Rage is the fourth exit taken without a map. What the face-saving excuse does, structurally, is offer the third. Avoidance, a minor vice, in place of attack, a major one.

James Gilligan, after decades as a prison psychiatrist, concluded that nearly all violence is an attempt to replace shame with pride. He did not mean this as an excuse but as an engineering fact. If you want less violence, lower the shame or raise the dignity available on the other side of defeat. The political, the clinical and the geopolitical cases are one case, viewed at three magnifications.

IV The Private Bridge: Self-Handicapping and the Architecture of Change

In 1978 the psychologists Steven Berglas and Edward Jones described a behavior they called self-handicapping. People who fear that failure will expose them arrange, in advance, an obstacle they can later blame. The student who does not study. The athlete who reports an injury. The president who tells his rallies to pretend he is on the ballot, so that when the pretense fails he can say he never was. Self-handicapping is the private version of the golden bridge. It is built before the battle, by the man who expects to lose, and it explains the whole Trump sequence without a single clinical word.

Sociologists Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman, in their 1968 paper “Accounts,” divided the stories people tell after failure into two kinds. An excuse admits the act was bad but denies full responsibility. A justification accepts responsibility but denies the act was bad. The absent-ballot line is an excuse; the claim that a president’s party always loses is a justification. Trump offered both in one evening. Scott and Lyman’s point is that accounts are not lies so much as repairs, and that a society runs on their being accepted. The question for anyone who hopes to change is whether the repair is temporary scaffolding or permanent architecture.

The hardest version of the question is personal. If a strongman needs a face-saving exit before he will stand down, does a shame-driven man need one before he can change? The clinical literature says yes, with a warning attached. The exit must be a door, not a hiding place.

Lincoln built his own door, in private. On July 14, 1863, furious that Meade had let Lee’s army escape across the Potomac after Gettysburg, he wrote the general a letter of bitter reproach, then filed it unsigned and unsent. The letter did the work of the rage without doing the damage. It is the self-administered off-ramp, a president building the bridge for himself rather than for the public, and it is the clean counterweight to Section I.

The clinicians describe the same move done for someone else. Heinz Kohut argued that narcissistic patients cannot tolerate being confronted and can only be accompanied; the therapist’s job is to be a mirror steady enough that the patient can eventually look. Otto Kernberg was harsher but reached a similar practice. Jeffrey Young’s schema therapy speaks of limited reparenting and of empathic confrontation, which means naming the pattern while holding the person. In every school the method is the same. You do not corner the patient. You build him a bridge and walk it with him.

The tradition that did this at scale began with two men in Akron, Ohio, in May 1935. Bill Wilson, a failed stockbroker newly sober, and Robert Smith, a surgeon who was not, discovered that each could confess to the other what neither could say to anyone else, and Alcoholics Anonymous grew from that room. Its first step is an admission of powerlessness that would annihilate a proud man if made alone. It is never made alone. It is made in the first-person plural, under a rule of anonymity. We admitted. The architecture lowers the cost of the confession until a shame-driven man can afford it. This is Goffman’s cooperative face-work turned into a treatment protocol.

So the answer is a conditional yes. The shame-driven man changes through the same mechanism as the strongman stands down, by being offered a story in which defeat is not death. But the mechanism has a half-life. An excuse that is never retired becomes an identity, and the man who always wasn’t on the ballot never learns to lose. The excuse must be allowed, and then it must expire. Carol Dweck’s work on mindset puts it plainly: the goal is to move a person from reading failure as a verdict to reading it as information, and the bridge is only worth building if it leads to the far bank.

V The United Nations as a Theater for Standing Down

The United Nations was sold to the public as a parliament of man. Its real genius was humbler and more durable. It was a place where the two most dangerous states on earth could back away from each other while appearing to answer a higher call. Closing his address to a University of California convocation at Berkeley in May 1954, Dag Hammarskjöld repeated a line already in circulation: “It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.” The mechanism of salvation was face.

The design began with the veto. Roosevelt and Stalin insisted on it at Yalta, and critics have called it the UN’s original sin. It is better understood as its first golden bridge. A great power that can veto is a great power that can never be outvoted into humiliation, and so can afford to stay in the room. By the time the United States cast its first veto, in 1970, the Soviet Union had cast more than a hundred. The one time Moscow abandoned the bridge proves the rule. In January 1950 it walked out of the Council over China’s seat, and in June and July, with the Soviet chair empty, the Council authorized the defense of South Korea and placed the force under a unified command flying the UN flag. The absent power lost the only votes that mattered. Yakov Malik returned on August 1, to take his turn as the Council’s president, and Moscow never walked out again.

Hammarskjöld built the next layer in 1955, and the mechanism matters more than the outcome. The General Assembly had condemned China for holding eleven captured American airmen and asked the Secretary-General to seek their release; China had rejected the resolution outright. Hammarskjöld’s solution, which came to be called the Peking Formula, was to go to Beijing on his own authority as Secretary-General rather than as the executor of a resolution Beijing refused to recognize. The separation is what let Zhou Enlai receive him at all. Months later China released the airmen as a birthday gift to Hammarskjöld, so that it yielded to no one but courtesy. Washington got its men. Beijing kept its face. Sicinnus had carried the same message to Xerxes.

The pattern recurs at every crisis of the Cold War. During the Berlin blockade, the breakthrough came not in Berlin but in the UN delegates’ lounge, where Philip Jessup and Yakov Malik began an informal conversation in early 1949 that ended the blockade without either side admitting it had blinked. In Suez in 1956, Lester Pearson invented peacekeeping on the spot so that Britain and France could withdraw while claiming the UN had relieved them rather than that Eisenhower had ordered them home. In October 1962, U Thant’s appeal for a pause let Khrushchev halt his ships at the world’s request rather than Kennedy’s, and Adlai Stevenson’s photographs in the Council gave the American public a victory it could watch while the Jupiter missiles quietly left Turkey.

Inside that crisis sits a face device within the device. Khrushchev sent two letters, a conciliatory one on October 26 and a harder one the next morning demanding the Turkish missiles publicly. Kennedy answered the first and ignored the second, accepting the offer Khrushchev had made before he raised his price. The Trollope ploy, as the ExComm called it, after the Victorian heroine who treats a squeeze of the hand as a proposal, let Khrushchev be the author of the deal he accepted. That is Goffman at the level of a single correspondence.

YearCrisisThe face-saving mechanismWho got to save face
480 BCSalamisThemistocles spares Xerxes’ bridge and sends word he did soXerxes retreated as a king spared, not a king beaten
1945UN CharterThe Security Council vetoAll five permanent members
1949Berlin blockadeJessup–Malik talks in the delegates’ loungeUSSR lifted the blockade without conceding to the U.S.
1950–53KoreaA UN flag voted while the Soviet chair stood empty; Panmunjom armisticeU.S. fought as the world, not alone; China fought as “volunteers”
1955American airmen in ChinaHammarskjöld’s Peking Formula: the Secretary-General on his own authorityChina released prisoners as a courtesy, not a concession
1956SuezPearson’s UNEF, the first peacekeeping forceBritain and France withdrew behind a UN relief
1962Cuban missilesU Thant’s moratorium; the Trollope ploy; private Jupiter dealKhrushchev retreated as peacemaker and author; Kennedy stood firm
1973Yom Kippur WarResolution 338 and UNEF II during a U.S.–Soviet alertBoth superpowers de-escalated by “complying” with the Council

The political scientist Inis Claude gave the function a name in 1966: collective legitimization. The UN did not stop wars by force. It dispensed the one commodity a nuclear power could not manufacture for itself, which was a reason to stop that did not look like fear. Every Council resolution that was ignored still served this purpose, because it stood waiting as a text either side could seize the moment it wanted out.

The UN’s enduring value was never its ability to compel the strong. It was its ability to let the strong lose small so they would not have to lose large. It was Goffman’s tact made into a building on the East River.

VI From Moscow to Beijing: Is the Bridge Still Standing?

The question to answer honestly is whether the East River still works, now that the second party is Beijing rather than Moscow. The evidence of 2026 says the need is unchanged and the architecture is thinning.

The need showed itself in the Iran war. On March 11 the Security Council adopted Resolution 2817 by thirteen votes to none, China and Russia abstaining, condemning Iran’s attacks on its Gulf neighbors and Jordan while saying nothing of the American and Israeli strikes that had preceded them; Tehran’s ambassador called it a stain on the Council’s record. Four weeks later, on April 8, the statement in which Iran’s Supreme National Security Council accepted a two-week ceasefire demanded a binding Security Council resolution that would turn its agreements with the United States into international law. Read that carefully. The party that had just denounced the institution as rigged insisted on yielding to it rather than to Washington, and its statement said why in so many words: the resolution, it promised, “will create an important diplomatic victory for the nation of Iran.” That is the Peking Formula, seventy years on. One does not surrender to an enemy; one complies with the world.

But the bridge was built elsewhere. The ceasefire was brokered through Islamabad, not Turtle Bay, and the deal announced in June, which provided for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz within thirty days and talks toward a permanent end to the war, was welcomed by the Secretary-General rather than authored by him. The UN supplied legitimacy after the fact. It no longer supplied the room.

And the room did not hold. The Islamabad Memorandum, signed on June 17, began to fray within eight days, when Iranian drones struck shipping in the strait and American strikes answered; on July 8 Trump declared the deal over. In late September the strait was still not open. Iran’s foreign minister, at the General Assembly, offered through Qatari mediators to reopen it within seven days if Washington accepted a plan built on the June terms. Two weeks before the midterms, the New York Times reported that the United States and Israel had drawn up plans for renewed strikes once the voting was over. A bridge built by two governments and a broker, with no institution beneath it, lasted three weeks. That is the whole case for the East River in one summer.

The same is true of the superpower relationship itself. Trump and Xi have met twice this year, in Beijing in May and in Washington in September, and are scheduled to meet twice more, at APEC in Shenzhen later this month and at the G20 in Miami in December; four summits in one year would be a record. The September communiqués spoke of strategic stability on a basis of respect, fairness and reciprocity, and of a bilateral channel for incidents involving advanced AI. Analysts called the result tactical autopilot and stability without trust. In the vocabulary of this essay, the two men have built a private golden bridge, personal and summit-based, with no third party on it.

That is the danger. The Cold War bridge worked because it was impersonal. Khrushchev did not have to yield to Kennedy; he yielded to U Thant, to a resolution, to a procedure. A bridge that consists of two leaders’ rapport collapses when the rapport does, or when either man is cornered at home. Xi faces no election. Trump’s party just lost one, and Trump, by his own account, lost nothing. The question for the next two years is whether a president in that posture can afford to let China save face, and whether the UN, sidelined in Iran and absent from the summitry, still has a lounge in which someone can quietly say the thing neither capital can say aloud. Shenzhen, later this month, is the first test: the first time Trump sits across from Xi as a president whose party has just lost.

Taiwan is where the bridge will bear weight. Beijing’s readouts in 2026 made opposition to independence the precondition of everything else; Washington’s said only that policy had not changed. The gap is the width of a bridge not yet built. The strongest argument for the United Nations in 2026 is not moral but mechanical. Someone must own the ladder both men will need to climb down.

VII The Counterargument: When the Bridge Becomes a Trap

An essay that praised face-saving without reservation would be a brief for appeasement, and the twentieth century has already reviewed that brief. The golden bridge has three failure modes, and all three deserve naming.

The first is moral hazard. If a strongman knows an exit will always be built for him, he can gamble freely, because the downside is capped. This is the Munich objection, and it has a modern econometric form: the same scholars who found that leaders with no exit fight to the death also found that guaranteed exits encourage risk-taking in the first place. The South African amnesty worked because it was conditional on full disclosure. Marcos got a helicopter, not a pardon. A bridge with no toll is an invitation.

Lawyers call this the peace-versus-justice problem, and it is not settled. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri argued in 2003 that amnesties, backed by strong enough institutions, have done more than tribunals to end atrocities, and that a court which makes exile unsafe makes surrender less likely. The International Criminal Court, founded on the opposite premise, has since indicted sitting leaders in the middle of their wars. Each side is right about something. The amnesty that is too generous licenses the next atrocity; the warrant that is too prompt prolongs this one. The design problem is to make the bridge conditional without making it incredible, and Taylor in his Nigerian villa is a case either side can cite.

The second is the difference between a concession and an alibi. Al Gore in 2000, John McCain in 2008 and Hillary Clinton in 2016 each performed the civic ritual of the concession: I lost, you won, the result is legitimate. That ritual builds the bridge for the nation, not the loser. What Trump offered on election night was not a concession but an alibi. He accepted the results while denying that they were about him. The country gets its peaceful transfer of congressional power, and it is right to be relieved. But it does not get the lesson, and a leader who never teaches his followers to lose has left them unable to.

The third failure is the one 2020 taught, and it is the counter-case that proves the thesis. In November of that year Trump was on the ballot, and so the alibi of absence was unavailable. On November 9, 2020, the Washington Post quoted a senior Republican official, on background, asking what the downside was of humoring him for a little while. The face-saving story they permitted was the stolen election, and it did not expire. It became a creed, and then a crowd, and then January 6. The bridge that leads nowhere is not a bridge. It is a stage.

The difference between the two bridges is not that one was true and the other false. “I wasn’t on the ballot” is literally true, and “we would have won in a landslide” is a counterfactual no one can test. “The election was stolen” could be tested, and was, in more than sixty lawsuits, and failed. What separates them is what each asks of other people. The alibi asks nothing. It requires no audit, no recount, no slate of electors, no march; it can be believed or shrugged off, and either way the results stand. The stolen-election story demanded action, from secretaries of state, from legislatures, from a vice president, from a crowd.

A face-saving story that keeps the peace must be passive, and it should be temporary. The alibi is passive, and it has a real empirical kernel besides: his coalition leans on low-propensity voters who turn out when he is on the ballot and stay home when he is not, which is why the people around him could repeat it with a straight face. It is not temporary, and the coda returns to why that matters. In 2026, with the rigged-election bridge rebuilt and waiting since February, he walked past it. Whether that was wisdom, exhaustion or simple arithmetic, the country should notice which bridge it was that held.

The clinical analogue is the enabling spouse. Every therapist knows that limited reparenting is limited for a reason; the empathy that lowers shame enough for change can also lower it enough for comfort, and the patient settles in. The twelve-step tradition is blunt about this. Sometimes the only bridge is the one a man finds after hitting bottom. The point stands, but it is not the last word. The claim is not that face-saving reforms anyone. It is that without it, nobody can be reformed, and with it, some can.

Finally, the geopolitical cost of the thinned bridge runs both ways. A UN that confers legitimacy on whatever the strong have already done, as it did in Iran this year, risks becoming a notary rather than a venue. The critics who say the Security Council is a fig leaf are not wrong. The reply is that a fig leaf is a face-saving device, that civilization has always depended on them, and that the question is only whether this one still covers anything.

VIII Coda: The Dignity of Defeat as a Civic Technology

Peace between dangerous men, and inside them, is engineered by the design of their exits. The strongman, the shame-driven man and the nuclear state are the same problem at three scales, and the solution is the same at every scale. Make losing survivable, and make the survival temporary.

This reframes several things at once. It makes the concession speech a technology rather than a courtesy. It makes the United Nations a machine for dignified retreat rather than a failed world government. It makes Goffman’s tact the quiet infrastructure of civilization, the thing we do when we look away from a stranger who trips. And it makes November 3, 2026, a lucky night, at least for now: the alibi happened to be lying around, and it worked.

The practical rules follow from the diagnosis. Build the off-ramp before the crisis, as Kennedy did, not during it. Make it impersonal, so that yielding to it is yielding to no one. Make it conditional, so that it cannot be lived on. And put an expiry date on every excuse, so that the bridge leads to the far bank and not to a permanent encampment at the middle of the river.

This one has no expiry date, and that is the trouble. Trump will never be on a ballot again, a fact that has begun to sink in for the Republicans now picking up the pieces. So the sentence that saved him on Tuesday will be literally true of every defeat for the rest of his political life: every endorsed candidate who loses, every primary that goes the wrong way. It is the excuse that becomes an identity, and the man who always wasn’t on the ballot never has to learn to lose. What must expire is not the sentence but the audience’s willingness to accept it. The question for 2028 is whether anyone, in either party, is building the next bridge, and whether it will be the kind that leads to acceptance or the kind that leads to a crowd.

For six months a president asked a nation to pretend he was on the ballot. On the night the pretending stopped, he reached for the opposite pretense and it saved him, and in saving him it saved the rest of us an ugly winter. The lesson is not that he was wise. It is that a sentence was available, and he took it. Making sure such a sentence is always there to be taken is the art of the exit. No one has ever made a bestseller of it. It may be the whole of politics among proud men.

⁂

Sources: On election night and its eve, CBS News, live results and its Election Day phone interview, November 3, 2026; IBTimes on the South Lawn remarks of October 23; Newsweek, “Donald Trump Reacts to Disastrous Midterms for GOP, Blames Candidates”, November 4, and its earlier text; Mediaite on the New York Times interview and the Fox News call-in; RTÉ; The Express, via AOL, on “Mr. Veto,” the pundit post and the VETO hat; MS NOW, “Trump bet on his instincts – and triggered a blue wave”; NPR and Axios, November 3–4; and, for the February 4 interview with Tom Llamas, Mediaite. Trump’s 2018 remarks to Chris Wallace are from NPR, November 18, 2018; the 2020 remark about humoring him is from the Washington Post, November 9, 2020. On the Iran war and the Security Council: The Week and Middle East Eye on Resolution 2817; the April 8 statement of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council in CGTN’s summary and Middle East Eye’s full text; Report.az, via TASS; on the June deal, Jurist and Dawn; on its collapse, ABC News’s timeline; on Iran’s seven-day plan of September 25, Al Jazeera; and, on the New York Times report of October 21, The Times of Israel. On Trump and Xi: Political.org, the White House fact sheet of September 25, 2026, the Asia Society Policy Institute, Asialink and Fortune. On Hammarskjöld’s Berkeley address of May 13, 1954 (press release SG/382), the UN Digital Library and Ask DAG, which notes that Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. credited a similar remark to Churchill, for which the Library has found no source; on the veto count, Security Council Report. Classical sources: Herodotus, Histories 8.108–110; Plutarch, Themistocles 16; Thucydides 1.137–138; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chapter 7; Frontinus, Strategemata IV.7; Vegetius, De Re Militari III; Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy III.12. History: Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (1885); E. Porter Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy (1989), and Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee (1935), with the American Battlefield Trust on Alexander’s command; Lincoln’s unsent letter to Meade, July 14, 1863; Henry Kissinger, A World Restored (1957); Joe Slovo, “Negotiations: What Room for Compromise?” African Communist (1992); the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, judgment (April 26, 2012) and sentence (May 30, 2012); the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi (June 27, 2011); J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919); Richard B. Frank, Downfall (1999); Stanley Karnow, In Our Image (1989); Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (1972); Sheldon Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory (2012); Philip Jessup, “The Berlin Blockade and the Use of the United Nations,” Foreign Affairs (1971). Theory: B. H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense (1960), and Kennedy’s review in the Saturday Review, September 1960; Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (1966); Bertrand Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (1959); William Ury, Getting Past No (1991); James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review (1994); Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization (1988); Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security (2003); Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, Leaders and International Conflict (2011); Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986); Inis Claude, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization (1966); Hu Hsien-chin, “The Chinese Concepts of ‘Face,’” American Anthropologist (1944); Erving Goffman, “On Face-Work,” Psychiatry (1955); Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, Politeness (1987); Sigmund Freud, “On Narcissism” (1914); Heinz Kohut, “Thoughts on Narcissism and Narcissistic Rage” (1972); Donald Nathanson, Shame and Pride (1992); James Gilligan, Violence (1996); Steven Berglas and Edward Jones, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (1978); Marvin Scott and Stanford Lyman, “Accounts,” American Sociological Review (1968); Jeffrey Young, Schema Therapy (2003); Carol Dweck, Mindset (2006); Alcoholics Anonymous Comes of Age (1957). Drafted with Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; outside literary editor’s cold read by Claude Fable 5.1; all images generated by Gemini Argon.

EVER SILENT, EVER SAD

Dostoevsky believed Don Quixote was beautiful only because he was ridiculous, and feared his own hero had nothing of the kind. Within weeks his prince called himself ridiculous, and that spring a grieving father used the same words. By 1869 all the author would defend was “the idea.”

One Russian word means both funny and ridiculous. Followed through the novel’s crowded rooms, it arrives at a question the novel leaves open.

On 12 August 1867, in the museum at Basel, Fyodor Dostoevsky climbed onto a chair to look more closely at a painting. It was Hans Holbein the Younger’s Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, a panel thirty centimetres high and two metres long, the length of a man laid out. His wife Anna wrote in her diary that night that she had been afraid he would be fined. In her memoir, written long afterwards, she remembered that she could not bear the picture and left the room. When she came back fifteen or twenty minutes later he had not moved, and his face held the frightened look she knew from the first moments of his fits. When she led him away to rest, he insisted on going back.

In her diary she called the painting “not at all aesthetic”; it filled her with “revulsion and a kind of horror.” What it lacks, as the museum that owns it now points out, is anyone else. Holbein left out the mourners and the disciples, and in a picture of this subject the absence of every living figure is almost unique. The body has no witness but whoever stands in front of it.

That autumn, in Geneva, Dostoevsky began notes for a novel; in December he threw them all out. Then, owing his publisher about 4,500 roubles and writing, as he put it, from a desperate plight, he wrote the first seven chapters of a new novel in twenty-three days, on an idea he had loved for years and long not dared to take up: a positively beautiful man.

The difficulty is older than the novel, and simple to state. Goodness has no natural audience. How do you make it bearable to read?

Holbein painted a death with no one there to see it. In the novel Dostoevsky began that winter, someone is nearly always watching.

I

Only Because Ridiculous

On 1 January 1868, with those chapters written, he explained the idea to his niece, Sofia Ivanova. The main thought of the novel, he wrote, was to portray a positively beautiful man, and nothing in the world was harder. Every writer who had tried it, Russian or European, had failed, because the task was immeasurable. There was only one positively beautiful figure in the world, and that was Christ. Among the beautiful figures of Christian literature the most complete was Don Quixote, “but he is beautiful only because he is at the same time ridiculous.” Dickens’s Pickwick, “an infinitely weaker thought than Don Quixote, but still an enormous one,” was ridiculous too, and won by that alone. Compassion arises for the beautiful that is mocked and does not know its own worth, and with it sympathy in the reader: “this arousing of compassion is the mystery of humour.” Victor Hugo’s Jean Valjean was another strong attempt, but he arouses sympathy through his terrible misfortune and society’s injustice to him. Two routes to a reader, then: Quixote’s, through laughter, and Valjean’s, through suffering. And then: “I have nothing like that, absolutely nothing, and so I am terribly afraid it will be a positive failure.”

The adjective he gives his hero is the one Russian uses for a sunset and for a noble act alike, and it asks for more than kindness. And the pun is his own: the failure would be as positive as the man.

Whatever “nothing like that” means, it cannot mean that nobody laughs at his hero, because the chapters already written contain the laughter. On the train into Petersburg two strangers laugh at the prince’s bundle and his foreign cloak, and he laughs with them; one of them is Rogozhin, a merchant’s son who has just come into a fortune. At General Epanchin’s house, while the prince is out of the room fetching a portrait of Nastasya Filippovna, the beautiful, notorious woman at the centre of the book, the eldest daughter, Alexandra, agrees with her sister that he is too simple, “so that he’s even a little ridiculous.” Their mother, Lizaveta Prokofyevna, tells the girls they are more ridiculous than he is. What he lacks, then, is not laughter in the room but the comedy that makes a reader laugh with love. The letter’s fear concerns readers, and later readers have loved Myshkin for a century and a half. This essay watches a different audience: the people in the rooms.

The letter speaks, too, of “the main thought of the novel” and “the idea of the novel,” and takes comfort that nothing is “yet compromised.” Thought, idea, compromise: the words will come back.

The Russian word in Quixote’s sentence is a form of smeshnoi. It means funny as well as ridiculous, and the distance between the two is the distance between being laughed at and being laughed with. In its various forms it occurs sixty-five times in the novel, sixteen of them about Myshkin; the words for laughter and laughing are different, and are not counted.

Michael R. Katz, whose translation appeared this year, stakes his claim on the comic half of the word: most other translators, he has said, “have missed the humor.” The English here is the essay’s own, apart from three lines from Eva Martin’s translation of 1915, named at the end.

Within weeks the prince says it of himself. What the letter calls the second part, begun that day, became the last nine chapters of Part One, printed in February. At their close, at Nastasya Filippovna’s birthday party, Myshkin has offered to marry her, and he reminds her of the laughter that met his first words: “You smiled at those words, and I heard people round us laughing too. Perhaps I expressed myself very ridiculously, and was ridiculous myself, but I kept feeling that I understand what honour is.” A few pages on, leaving with Rogozhin, Nastasya Filippovna says: “Goodbye, prince. For the first time, I have seen a human being!”

In March he answered the fear. A notebook entry dated 21 March reads: “The hero of the novel, the Prince, if not ridiculous, has another sympathetic trait: he is innocent!” (The biographer Konstantin Mochulsky quoted it long ago.)

None of this settles whether the novel failed. “Positive failure” is the letter’s pun, not a verdict, and what follows reports his verdicts and adopts none of them.

II

The Laughing Room

Dostoevsky chose his precedent himself: the letter’s Don Quixote, beautiful only because he is ridiculous. The novel will name the knight outright, but it starts with the word.

The novel’s first use of its word is the prince’s own, and it expects a listener’s laughter. Waiting in the Epanchins’ anteroom, he tells the general’s footman about a guillotining he saw in Lyon, and about the thought that certain death is worse than torture, and then he says: “To you this seems funny, wild.” Later, with the general’s wife and daughters, he tells of a man reprieved on the scaffold, and offers Adelaida a subject for a painting: a condemned man’s face one minute before the blade. Dostoevsky had stood on such a scaffold himself, on 22 December 1849. So the word enters the novel at the scaffold, and in a plan of early November 1867 the notebooks had put the scaffold and the painting on consecutive lines: a note on the thoughts of a man about to be beheaded, then “the story about Holbein’s Christ in Basel.”

Most of the novel’s comedy is not his. General Ivolgin lies magnificently; Lebedev, the clerk from the train, preaches on the Apocalypse. Myshkin is more often the occasion of laughter than its source. He can be funny, and the vase is coming. But the narrator will hardly laugh at him. Of the sixteen times the word is applied to Myshkin, the narrator speaks three, and hedges each. Someone too fond of laughing “might perhaps have found something to smile at” in his clothes, “but what doesn’t make people laugh?” He smiles “strangely and even funnily.” When he sets out his views to the Epanchins, it would all have been funny “if it had not been so well expounded,” as his listeners agreed afterwards. The book’s other voices laugh at him far more readily than the one that tells it.

People open to him, too. They tell Myshkin the worst of themselves; Tobias Grey, reviewing the new translation, calls him “an ideal confidant.” The telling seldom changes what they do, and it leaves him no safer.

Aglaya, the youngest Epanchin daughter, laughs at him hardest, and her laughter keeps running into Cervantes. Early in Part Two she keeps a note from the prince in a thick, stoutly bound book. A week later she looks to see what the book is. It is Don Quixote, and she laughs, though, the narrator says, “it would be difficult to say exactly why.” By the summer the poor knight of Pushkin’s ballad has become a family joke about the prince, told in front of him, and Kolya reminds her where it began: a month ago, leafing through Don Quixote, she exclaimed that there was nothing better than the poor knight. Before she recites the ballad, she explains it. The poor knight is “the same Don Quixote, only serious, not comic. At first I didn’t understand and laughed, and now I love the ‘poor knight,’ and respect his deeds.” It no longer mattered to him who his lady was: “even if she had been a thief, he would still have had to believe in her and break lances for her pure beauty.”

Then she recites. Pushkin’s knight writes A.M.D. in blood on his shield; his lady is never named, and only Pushkin’s first version spells the letters out, Ave, Mater Dei. Aglaya has already called them A.N.B., twice, and held to it when Kolya “corrected” her to A.N.D.; neither is Pushkin’s. Now she reads N.F.B., for Nastasya Filippovna Barashkova, a kept woman whose story many of her listeners know, and speaks the letters so gravely and so simply that they might pass for Pushkin’s. Her mother notices nothing; Evgeny Pavlovich makes sure he is seen to understand. The prince, sure it is deliberate, cannot see afterwards how so true and beautiful a feeling could go with so open and malicious a mockery. Beautiful is the letter’s word. Set the three ladies side by side: Cervantes’s Dulcinea, invented; Pushkin’s Mother of God, in heaven; Aglaya’s Nastasya Filippovna, fallen. Only the last puts Aglaya’s own rule to the test, and the prince will keep it, at her expense. The version she recites is Pushkin’s later one, of 1835, in which the knight dies “like a madman” and no one intercedes; in his first, of 1829, the Virgin takes him into heaven.

In the novel the comparison is Aglaya’s. Her knight is Quixote with the comedy taken out, the one ingredient the letter called essential, yet her own response runs in the letter’s order, laughter first and then love. Caterina Corbella has argued that her reading misleads, and that the one who loves as Quixote does, choosing a body for an invented ideal, is Aglaya herself. She also reads the prince and Rogozhin as two halves of one figure, as Quixote and Sancho are.

A painted double portrait on an empty dark brown ground. On the left, a gaunt older man in rusty, strapped armour, a brass barber’s basin on his head and a wooden lance in his hand, gazes upward past the viewer. On the right, a slender fair-haired young man with a small pale beard, in a grey travelling coat and dark neckcloth under a grey-green hooded cloak, holds a bundle tied in a faded red scarf and looks straight out at the viewer.
Don Quixote and Prince Myshkin, imagined side by side: one looking past us, one looking at us. Image generated by Gemini Argon for this essay.

III

A Funny Voice

Sonia Dostoevskaya was born in Geneva on 22 February 1868. She died of pneumonia on 12 May, not quite three months old. Six days later Dostoevsky wrote to his friend Apollon Maikov: “My Sonia has died; we buried her three days ago.”

The word comes four times in that letter. The first is “let it be that my love was ridiculous”; two more are set out below. He had sung to her, he writes, in his funny voice, and there the right English is funny. Then: “let them laugh at me and at my love.” In the January letter the word belonged to Cervantes and Dickens. In May it belongs to a father. In June, from Vevey, he wrote that he could still see her eyes following him as he went out to read the newspapers on the day she died.

Here, then, are two sentences, a few months apart.

Perhaps I expressed myself very ridiculously, and was ridiculous myself.
The prince, at Nastasya Filippovna’s party: Part One, chapter XVI, written early in 1868 and printed in February.

Let it be that I expressed myself ridiculously about her… I alone was ridiculous to them.
The father, to Maikov, 18 May 1868.

In Russian the verb is the same: perfective in the prince’s sentence, a single act, and imperfective in the father’s, an ongoing manner. The adverb is the same, and so is the short form of the adjective. The situation is the same as well: feeling spoken aloud, and laughed at. That is all the dates show.

IV

The Misfire

Ippolit Terentyev asks plainly not to be laughed at. He is a consumptive young man with weeks to live. In Part Two he tells Lizaveta Prokofyevna, the general’s wife, that he came to Pavlovsk to see the trees, and asks her, seriously: “That isn’t funny, is it? There’s nothing funny in that?”

In Part Three, written from August 1868, he reads his testament aloud on the prince’s terrace as the prince’s birthday turns into dawn, to a tired, half-drunk audience that did not ask to hear it. He calls it “My Necessary Explanation.” By now the trees have changed hands: in the testament they belong to his consolers, with “their ridiculous ‘Pavlovsk trees.’” Early on he is heckled. When he cries that they don’t like him at all, “there was laughter; most, however, did not laugh,” and he goes terribly red. Part of the testament is about a painting. He has seen the copy of the Holbein in Rogozhin’s house, and the picture, he says, shows “this blind, dumb, implacable, eternal, unreasoning force.” And he notices who is missing: “The people who surrounded the dead man, not one of whom is in the picture, must have felt a terrible anguish and confusion that evening.”

When he has finished, he turns, as if to a friend for advice, to Evgeny Pavlovich, a polished man of the world who is courting Aglaya: he has made a terrible mistake, reading them this notebook. “The position is ridiculous,” Evgeny Pavlovich answers, smiling, “but I really don’t know what to advise you.” Ippolit puts a pistol to his temple and pulls the trigger. It clicks; there is no cap in it. Fear turns into laughter, and some guffaw with malicious pleasure. Here is the derided sufferer, and in that moment he gets the laughter without the love.

In Part Four the prince tells him he is sorry Ippolit has disowned the notebook. “It is sincere, and you know, even its most ridiculous sides, and there are many” (here Ippolit winces) “are redeemed by suffering, because confessing them was suffering too.” The sentence joins Quixote’s route and Valjean’s, and offers them to someone who fears the first. Ippolit’s reply is that they have had “a very funny conversation.”

Holbein’s dead man has no witnesses. Ippolit, reading about him to a terrace full of listeners, has too many. The copy, about 1.8 metres long and 27 centimetres high, hangs over a door in Rogozhin’s house, where the novel’s last night will be spent.

V

Not the Novel, but the Idea

At the Epanchins’ evening party in Part Four, before the old princess Belokonskaya and a roomful of society, Myshkin breaks the Chinese vase that Aglaya warned him about. The laughter grows; he is forgiven, and he weeps. “You’re a kind man, but a ridiculous one,” Belokonskaya tells him. “Give you twopence and you thank them as if they’d saved your life. You think that’s praiseworthy, and it’s disgusting.” She is on the edge of real anger, and then she laughs, this time kindly.

Ippolit, who says he can neither love nor respect the prince, had already said the same behind his back: “a decidedly kind man, though… ridiculous.” Where the letter said beautiful, they say kind, and it is a pairing easy to say with affection, as Belokonskaya’s laugh shows. The audience’s word is smaller than the author’s. The theory works, and what it wins is a downgrade.

He begins to talk. Aglaya forbade him to speak, he tells an old dignitary in confidence, and even named the subjects, because she knows he is ridiculous in them. “I have no right to express my thought. Only in Moscow, with Rogozhin, did I speak openly. I am always afraid that my ridiculous look will compromise the thought and the main idea. I have no gesture. My gesture is always the opposite, and that provokes laughter and humiliates the idea.” Thought, main idea, compromise: the January letter’s words, in its hero’s mouth, months later. Now he turns to the room. They are all ridiculous, he says, he and they alike, and “to be ridiculous is sometimes even good, and better: we can forgive one another sooner.” Minutes later he falls in a fit. The theory has done all it promised: laughter, forgiveness, something like love.

The word’s last appearance in the novel turns the theory around. In the weeks before the wedding that never takes place, Nastasya Filippovna does everything she can to cheer him up and tells him every funny thing she can remember. The prince almost always pretends to laugh a great deal, and sometimes really does. Now she is the one offering the comedy, and he is the one pretending. On the wedding day she runs from the church steps to Rogozhin, as she had once before, at the end of Part One, in the chapter where the prince calls himself ridiculous. The last night is spent in Rogozhin’s house. He has killed her, and her body lies behind a curtain. The two men lie down next to each other and keep watch over her till morning; the painted body over the door still has no one. Myshkin strokes Rogozhin’s hair and cheeks; when the door is opened he no longer recognises anyone.

There is a reading in which this ending is his doing; Murray Krieger called his chapter on the novel, in The Tragic Vision (1960), “The Curse of Saintliness.” The novel gives that reading its scene. At the meeting of the two women in Part Four, when Nastasya Filippovna breaks down, he pleads her unhappiness to Aglaya, and Aglaya runs from the house; he stays. Nor is that reading foreign to the novel’s beginnings: in the earliest notebooks the hero is proud and violent. And the novel never entirely separates him from the man who kills: they exchange crosses, Rogozhin raises a knife against him on the stairs, and they spend the last night side by side, Corbella’s two halves of one figure. If that reading is right, the love that laughter wins is part of the harm. The text does not say whether his goodness caused the ending or only failed to prevent it.

The novel, Dostoevsky told his niece on 25 January 1869, had not expressed a tenth part of what he meant, and “I love my thought that failed, to this day.” To Nikolai Strakhov, a month later: “I stand not for the novel, but for my idea.” The letter to Strakhov does not use the word ridiculous at all. Of the January vocabulary, the thought and the idea remain. Nine years later he would say much the same of The Double, which “positively did not succeed, but its idea was rather bright.” If the formula is a reflex, these verdicts say less about The Idiot than they seem to. Here, though, its words have a scene: a hero at a party, afraid that his ridiculous look will compromise the thought and the main idea.

What Dostoevsky took from Cervantes is in his own letter and his own pages: a beautiful man the world laughs at, loved by some of those who laugh, and a lady to be championed whatever she has done. What changed is as plain. The comedy has moved: it is the room’s, not the narrator’s. This knight has no windmills; Myshkin’s trouble is that he sees people too clearly, and what is comic in him is his manner, not his mind. And Cervantes ends by giving his knight his reason back, so that he dies sane, as Alonso Quixano, called the Good.

Dostoevsky’s prince does not get his back. In the Conclusion he is in Switzerland, in the clinic he came from, like the poor knight of the ballad, who goes home to his distant castle and lives there shut away, “ever silent, ever sad.” Lizaveta Prokofyevna visits, and he does not recognise her at all. “At all events, I’ve had a good Russian cry over this poor fellow,” she says, and her adjective is the ballad’s: in Russian the poor fellow and the poor knight share it. Holbein left the mourners out. At its very end the novel gives its good man one. He does not know her.

Can the love that laughter wins protect the man it is won for?

⁂

The occasion is Tobias Grey’s review of Michael R. Katz’s new translation, “‘The Idiot’: Dostoevsky’s Classic Novel of an Honest Man”, in The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2026.

The letters, Anna Dostoevskaya’s diary, the notebooks and Pushkin’s ballad are quoted in the essay’s own translations from the Russian, from the Nauka Collected Works in fifteen volumes (1996), which reprints the Academy texts. Where Ethel Colburn Mayne’s English of 1914 differs, as with “nothing like that” and “thought,” they follow the Russian; letters not quoted directly are paraphrased from Mayne. Quotations from the novel are the essay’s own translations, except “it would be difficult to say exactly why,” Ippolit’s “blind, dumb” force and Lizaveta Prokofyevna’s last line, which are Eva Martin’s, from 1915. The echoes traced here are in the Russian. Martin’s English smooths them away: his prince fears “spoiling a great Thought or Idea by my absurd manner,” and his prince’s “true and beautiful feeling” moves onto the girl. Dates are Old Style, the Russian calendar of the time, twelve days behind the Western one. The count of sixty-five uses of smeshnoi comes from a modern digital text of about 210,000 words; the Academy edition may differ by one or two.

For the painting and Anna’s account, the Kunstmuseum Basel’s exhibition texts. For Anna’s return to the panel and the notebook plan of November 1867, Katherine Bowers, “Under the Floorboards, Over the Door”, in Dostoevsky at 200, edited by Bowers and Kate Holland (Toronto, 2021), which also quotes Carol Apollonio’s “beyond the frame” (Dostoevsky’s Secrets, 2009); Apollonio and Bowers both look for the painting’s meaning among its viewers, before this essay does. The same volume’s introduction gives the earliest notebook hero. For the poor-knight passages in Russian, and for the reading of Aglaya as the novel’s Quixote, Caterina Corbella, “Cervantes’ Don Quixote in Dostoevsky’s Novel The Idiot”, Dostoevsky and World Culture, 2024, no. 2. For the laughter during Ippolit’s reading, Tatiana Kasatkina, 2025. For the order of composition and the March notebook entry, the 1868 Russian Messenger and Middlebury College’s notes on the making of the novel, after Konstantin Mochulsky. For the ballad, the Academy Complete Works of Pushkin in ten volumes (1977), vol. 3; the novel quotes Pushkin’s later version, and Kasatkina (1999) argues that the earlier one stands behind it. The Russian checks and the concordance are the literary editor’s.

Further reading, not consulted for this essay: Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics; Konstantin Mochulsky, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, translated by Michael A. Minihan (1967); Robin Feuer Miller, Dostoevsky and The Idiot: Author, Narrator, and Reader (1981); Murray Krieger, “Dostoevsky’s Idiot: The Curse of Saintliness,” in The Tragic Vision (1960); Victor Terras, The Idiot: An Interpretation (1990); Tatiana Kasatkina on the painting’s liminality and the viewer’s position (2006, 2011); L. V. Alekseeva (2018), Bell and others in Funny Dostoevsky (2024), and Stefano Aloe on laughter; Tapp on embarrassment (Slavic and East European Journal 60.3, 2016); Young (2007); Jackson (2016); on Cervantes in Russia and in the novel, Ivan Turgenev, “Hamlet and Don Quixote” (1860), Vsevolod Bagno, Don Quixote in Russia and Russian Quixotism (2009), and Gratchev, “Prince Myshkin as a Tragic Interpretation of Don Quixote” (Cervantes 35.1, 2015); on the ballad’s versions, S. B. Fedotova (Russkaya literatura, 2025, no. 4) and S. A. Fomichev (2008).

Images generated by Gemini Argon for this essay.

Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; outside literary editing by Claude Fable 5.1.

UP TO US

On the one quality to wish for your children, the freedman who defined it, and why it cannot be given

In 1966 a Brooklyn-born psychologist whose father’s business had failed in the Depression published a questionnaire that sorted people by how much of their fate they thought was theirs; sixty years on, a column citing an economist in Sydney names the internal end of that scale as the one thing to wish for your children. The record agrees that internals do better, and then complicates the gift.

Sometime in the mid-1970s, the administrator of Arden House, a nursing home in Connecticut, spoke to the residents of one floor about what was still theirs. How their rooms were arranged, the administrator said, was up to them. So was how they spent their days, and with whom. So was the film: they could decide which night they would go. Then each of them was offered a small plant and asked to choose one. A plant chosen was a plant to be looked after.

On another floor of the same building, the administrator gave a different talk. The staff, the residents were told, were there to make their lives as pleasant as possible, and would see to things; they would be told which night they were to see the film. Each of them was given a plant. The staff would water it.

It was not much of a difference. Every resident on both floors ended the day with a small green thing in a pot. What separated the floors was mostly a question: which one would you like?

Three weeks later the residents who had been asked were, by their own account and by their nurses’ ratings, more alert, more active and happier than the residents who had been told. More of them came to the film.

The plants are long dead. What was handed round that afternoon along with them is still argued over, in laboratories and in newspaper columns and at kitchen tables where parents wonder what, if they could wish one thing for a child, they ought to wish. This August the Bartleby column in The Economist put the question outright: which single quality should a parent most wish for a child? Its answer, taken from the Sydney economist Deborah Cobb-Clark, was an internal locus of control. The argument it joined is older than the experiment, older than psychology, and older by nineteen centuries than the plants.

I

The Dial

Julian Rotter was born in Brooklyn in 1916, the third son of Jewish immigrants. His father’s business did well until the Depression reached it, and his biographers date to those years his sense of how strongly people are shaped by their circumstances. He read Freud and Adler as a schoolboy. At Brooklyn College he took chemistry, which seemed likelier to pay, and sat in on the seminars Alfred Adler was then giving in New York. Psychology won. After the war he went to Ohio State, and there, through the 1950s, he and his students built what they called social learning theory.

Its central claim was modest and, at the time, a little heretical. What a person does depends not only on what is rewarded but on what she expects to be rewarded, and the expectation is learned, from what her actions have produced before. In a familiar situation she goes by what that situation has taught her. In a new one she falls back on something more general: a standing estimate of how far what happens to her follows from what she does. Rotter’s students tested the idea by setting people the same task, described to some as a matter of skill and to others as a matter of chance, and watching how differently they learned from success and failure under each description.

In 1963 Rotter moved to the University of Connecticut, and in 1966 he published the monograph that made the general estimate famous. It came with an instrument: twenty-nine pairs of statements, six of them fillers, in which the person taking it had to choose, again and again, between two accounts of the world. Does a good job come from ability, or from being in the right place at the right time? Is the world run by a few powerful people, or can the ordinary citizen influence what governments decide? Add up the choices and you had a position on a line that ran from internal, the belief that outcomes follow from one’s own actions, to external, the belief that they follow from luck, fate or other people. Within a few years the words had left the journal. People began describing themselves, and each other, as internals and externals.

The evidence behind the column’s answer is substantial, and it deserves to be stated at full strength before anything is said against it. Among newly unemployed Germans, Cobb-Clark and her colleagues found, those with a more internal locus search harder for work, while the more external settle for less: the lowest wage they will accept is lower. The column adds that households with a stronger sense of their own agency save more of what they have, and that people who mean to start a company are likelier, if they are internals, to start one.

The effect also crosses a generation. The Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children has followed thousands of families around Bristol since the early 1990s, and in its data a mother’s locus of control, measured in the twelfth week of her pregnancy, predicts how she will parent, how much time she will put into her child, and how that child will be doing, in mind and in temper, years later. The economists who found this, led by Warn Lekfuangfu, offer a plain reason: a mother who believes effort pays puts in the effort. The internal mother does not hand her child a belief. She arranges the room.

The case grows stronger still when one looks at which way things have been moving. In 2004 Jean Twenge and two colleagues gathered dissertation studies of locus of control in young Americans, ninety-seven samples of college students who had taken Rotter’s scale and forty-one of children aged nine to fourteen who had taken a version adapted for children, and found that between 1960 and 2002 the scores had drifted towards the external end by about four-fifths of a standard deviation. The average student of 2002 was more external than four in five students of the early 1960s. The drift is not undisputed: a later study of American high-school seniors found no such shift, though the short scale it relied on has itself been questioned. Externality, the authors noted, goes with helplessness, with poor handling of stress, and with depression. A society drifting that way does not obviously need anyone to complicate the cure.

But the drift complicates it on its own. Twenge and her colleagues found their results consistent with a model of alienation: rising cynicism, rising individualism, and the self-serving bias, the habit of crediting oneself with one’s successes and the world with one’s failures. That is externality as excuse, the world blamed for what was one’s own.

There is another external, older and harder. It concedes the world its share, often most of it, and then acts on what is left. The difference between the two is the difference between an excuse and a map.

The man who built the scale had seen the misreading coming. By 1975 there were, by his count, well over six hundred studies using his construct, and he wrote a long paper to say that many of them had misunderstood it. The scale measured a continuum, not two kinds of person, and it was being used to sort people into good guys and bad guys. A generalised expectancy, in his own theory, mattered chiefly where people had nothing more specific to go on, so that reading it as fixed character was contrary to the construct from the start. He suspected, too, that the boom said something about the moment: a feeling of powerlessness seemed to him to be spreading through Western society, and his instrument had become one of the ways of measuring it. In 1990, in a paper he called the case history of a variable, he turned to a different question, using his own construct as a case study in why psychology needed broad theories rather than free-standing measures. He died in Mansfield, Connecticut, in 2014, at ninety-seven. The dial outlived his warning about it.

What it did not measure was where the line falls. For that, the place to begin is with a man for whom almost nothing was up to him.

II

The Line

Epictetus was born around the year 50 in Hierapolis, a spa town in Phrygia, and his name says the first thing about him: Epiktētos means “acquired.” He was a slave. His owner was Epaphroditus, a former slave himself, who served Nero as a secretary. He was lame, though whether from birth, illness or a master’s cruelty the ancient sources disagree. He was allowed to study with the Stoic Musonius Rufus, was at some point freed, and when the emperor Domitian expelled the philosophers from Rome in the 90s he went to Nicopolis, on the western coast of Greece, and opened a school. He wrote nothing. A student, Arrian, took notes, and from them came the Discourses and a short handbook, the Enchiridion, which begins by dividing the world in two. Some things are up to us, and some are not. Up to us are our judgments, our impulses, our desires and aversions: in a word, our own doings. Not up to us are our bodies, our property, our reputations, our offices: whatever is not our own doing.

What is striking about the division is how little falls on the near side of it. Body, property, standing: nearly everything a modern questionnaire might ask about is placed, at the first line, outside. A man who had been owned did not need persuading that most of the world was not his. The Stoic sorting is an admission before it is a claim. And it is not a belief held once but an act repeated. In the Discourses Epictetus teaches his students to stop each impression at the door and question it before it is let in: “Wait for me a little, impression.” That is the line being drawn, one impression at a time. (Four centuries later Boethius, awaiting execution near Pavia, would write another such book of sorting in a cell.)

In 1962, by his own account, a thirty-eight-year-old naval pilot studying international relations at Stanford wandered into the second half of a philosophy course called The Problems of Good and Evil. The professor, Philip Rhinelander, had served in the Second World War. He offered the pilot an hour a week, alone, at his house on the campus, and at the last of those hours he took a book from the shelf and gave it to him, saying he thought he might find it interesting. It was the Enchiridion. The gesture was an old one. In the first book of the Meditations, Marcus Aurelius thanks his teacher Rusticus for introducing him to the discourses of Epictetus, out of Rusticus’s own collection.

James Stockdale went back to sea. For three years, on every carrier he served in, the Epictetus books were on the table beside his bed, and he gave them several hours a week. Looking back, he said he had been putting the stuff away for later without knowing what it was for.

On September 9, 1965, over North Vietnam, his A-4 Skyhawk was hit. It caught fire and its controls went; he ejected, and had perhaps thirty seconds before he came down in the street of a village. What he whispered on the way down has become one of the most quoted sentences of the modern Stoic revival: that he would be there five years at least, and that he was leaving the world of technology for the world of Epictetus. Twenty-eight years later, telling the story to an audience in London, he put the descent in the present tense, as a man about to learn “how negligible is my control over my station in life.” He was a prisoner for seven and a half years.

He had no book. What he had was what three years had put away: the core of the handbook and a store of remembered remarks. He spent four years in solitary confinement, and two in leg irons in a small high-security prison the Americans called Alcatraz, beside the North Vietnamese Ministry of Defence. He was tortured. Every day, marched at gunpoint to interrogation, he whispered to himself: “control fear, control guilt.” His gloss on Epictetus, years afterwards, was that no one can be made the victim of another, only of himself. In 1969 he was caught with a note that gave his interrogators leads, and torture, he knew, could turn leads into names. The night before the interrogation he tried to end his life, and was found and saved. His reason, in his own account, was the men those names belonged to. The line had not made him invulnerable.

As the senior naval officer among the prisoners, he led their resistance, and he did it without ever, he said, tapping a word about Stoicism through the walls. Some of the men, he said, could read it in what he did. Whether any of them took it up he does not say; what he describes is a habit that could be seen.

Among the best-documented cases we have of the internal disposition, then, is a man who began from a near-total admission of external control. A questionnaire handed to him on the parachute might well have scored him external, and not by accident: the dial and the line measure different things. Rotter’s items ask about outcomes in the world, jobs and grades and governments, and the Stoic concedes nearly all of those at the outset. What Stockdale had instead was a line, drawn long before the parachute, that told him where to stand. And the obvious objection, that the line was handed to him, turns out on inspection to be the point. Rhinelander gave him an hour a week and a book at the end of it. He did not give him the line. The line was kept for three years, on a bedside table and in hours of reading, before the canopy tested it; the habit was laid down before it had a use. The order is the order of everything that follows: first the admission; then the finding: the discovery, made only by acting, that an act of one’s own has changed something; then, as it turns out, the telling.

None of this is evidence of the kind the column offers. No one has scored the Stoic distinction on a questionnaire and followed a cohort to see whether it predicts better than Rotter’s dial. Stockdale is a sample of one, and he is the kind of sample that survives to write the book; the men who did not come home cannot be asked what they sorted. What he offers is testimony, and testimony from the far end of human experience, where no ethics committee would let a researcher follow.

That the dial and the line measure different things raises a question the column does not ask. The internals in the studies it draws on search harder for work, save more and start more companies, and they do it while holding a belief about the world much of which the Stoic would call false. Perhaps a slightly inflated sense of one’s own control is simply more useful than an accurate map of it; the evidence cannot rule that out. What can be said is that the two fail differently. A belief that the world is yours is exposed to every refusal the world makes. A line drawn where it actually runs has less to lose.

Stockdale ended the London lecture, given in the Great Hall of King’s College in November 1993, not with Epictetus but with a scrap of paper towel. A fellow prisoner, Dave Hatcher, had left it for him in a drop under a sink, unsigned, and on it was the last stanza of Henley’s “Invictus,” the Victorian poem whose speaker declares himself the master of his fate and the captain of his soul. Stockdale let it close the lecture without comment. It was a comrade’s tribute and the speaker’s own choice of last word, and it is not quite the handbook. Its earlier stanzas concede what chance can do to a man, which a Stoic would recognise; its last claims the whole of his fate for him, which a Stoic would not. The dial and the line are both in it, in one man’s closing words, and he left them there.

III

The Plant

The two floors at Arden House were the work of Ellen Langer and Judith Rodin, and their paper on what happened there has been widely cited ever since. It is a smaller study than its reputation. Each condition was a whole floor, not a set of people assigned at random. Ninety-one residents were enrolled, but the self-reports on which the happiness finding rests come from forty-five of them. And the plant arrived inside a package, a speech and a choice of nights and the general air of being consulted, from which it cannot be separated. The result for which the study is most often remembered, that eighteen months later fewer of the residents who had been asked had died, rested on a statistic that a correction, printed in 1978, reduced to marginal significance. The study has been cited many hundreds of times. The correction has been cited a handful.

What survives is small and specific. People who were asked, and who chose, were brighter three weeks on than people who were told, and given. Being consulted about a plant and a film did something that being cared for did not.

About a decade earlier, in a laboratory at the University of Pennsylvania, two young researchers, Martin Seligman and Steven Maier, had run an experiment whose design, in outline, the Arden House floors repeat. They put dogs in hammocks in three groups. Dogs in the first received electric shocks that they could end by pressing a panel with their noses. Dogs in the second were yoked to the first: they received exactly the same shocks, at the same moments and for the same length of time, but nothing they did could stop them. Dogs in the third received no shocks at all. Later, all of them were put in a box where a low barrier stood between them and safety, and the shocks could be escaped by jumping it. The dogs from the first and third groups learned to jump. Most of the yoked dogs lay down and took it.

Seligman and Maier called what they had seen learned helplessness, and for half a century it was taught as one of the field’s great findings. The animals, the theory went, had learned that nothing they did mattered, and the lesson had spread from the hammock to the box. It became a model of depression, a staple of introductory textbooks, and a phrase in ordinary speech.

In 2016, nearly fifty years on, Maier and Seligman published a review of what the intervening work on the brain had shown, and said, with a candour rare in any science, that they had had it backwards. Passivity in the face of prolonged, uncontrollable pain is not learned. It is the default, produced automatically by a small structure in the brainstem called the dorsal raphe nucleus. What is learned is control. When an animal’s action ends the shock, a region of the medial prefrontal cortex detects that it was the action that ended it, and switches the default off. The dogs with the panel had not been spared helplessness. They had learned the one thing that overrides it. The work behind the reversal is in rats, mapped with methods no one would use on a person, and how far the circuit carries to people is not yet known.

With that caution, the reversal still turns the column’s question round. If helplessness were learned, it might be unlearned by instruction: by being told, as the column’s readers are told, that agency is the thing to have. If what is learned is control, and it is learned by being detected, then telling alone may not install it. Arden House began with a speech, but the speech came with something to choose. Agency, on this account, is a finding a nervous system makes when there is something to press. An internal locus of control may not be something a child can be given. What you can give her is a plant.

The finding does not stay a finding. In Maier’s laboratory, rats that had once been able to end a shock were protected, a week later, against shocks they could not end; the protection depended on the same stretch of prefrontal cortex that does the detecting, and the laboratory calls it “behavioral immunization.” Detection, repeated, leaves something behind. Epictetus, in the chapter where he tells impressions to wait, had an image for it: the passions we give way to leave traces behind them, like weals from a blow, and what is repeated is strengthened. A trace kept becomes a habit, and a habit may be what Rotter’s dial was measuring the strength of: a disposition laid down by acts, not a type of person.

Philosophers of habit since Aristotle have noticed that the account is circular. The act lays down the habit, and the habit produces the act. Habit is at once the source of what we do and its result, as the philosopher Clare Carlisle has argued. As a source it cannot be handed to anyone. As a result it can be arranged for, and there are two ways of arranging it. One is scaffold: someone sets out the conditions in which a first act becomes possible, a panel within reach of a nose, a plant and a choice, and leaves the act itself to the one who makes it. The other is precedent: the act is seen done by someone else, as Stockdale’s men could see it in him. In 1838 Félix Ravaisson stated a law of habit in two halves, that repetition dulls what we undergo and strengthens what we do. Nearly two centuries before the 2016 review, it reads like a description of passivity as the default and control as the thing that is learned.

None of this would have surprised Rotter, whose whole theory was that expectancy is learned from experience. What he did not have was the 2016 finding, which says what the learning is: the detection of control, not the absence of it. Nor did he have the Stoic line, which says what the disposition is aimed at and not merely how strong it is. Those two things are what has been added to his dial since.

There is a limit here, and it should be stated plainly. The choosing floor was offered a choice, and a choice is still made by the one who makes it. Stockdale walked into the philosophy seminar of his own accord. What has been arranged can be refused, and the arrangement may work mainly for people who step onto it. What makes a person step is a question the record does not answer.

IV

The Coin

In January 2013 the economist Steven Levitt launched a website for people who could not make up their minds. Should I quit my job? Should I end it with him? Should I go back to school, or move, or propose? Visitors who were stuck described their dilemma, and the site flipped a virtual coin for them: heads, make the change; tails, leave things as they are. Two months later, and again at six, Levitt asked what they had done and how they felt, and where they agreed to it he asked a friend as well.

The coin worked. On the decisions that mattered, people who got heads were about eleven percentage points more likely to have made the change, and by six months those it had pushed into changing were happier for it; on minor decisions there was no effect on happiness, and at two months none that could be measured with confidence. Levitt hedges the result himself. His volunteers were young, mostly male, highly educated and self-selected. Those who obeyed the coin were likelier to answer his surveys, which may account for between 20 and 30 per cent of the effect. The status quo kept its pull: only half of those told to change had changed by two months, against three-quarters of those told to stay who stayed. The coin moved only decisions made in those first two months, and he calls his estimate an upper bound.

Why should a coin help anyone do anything? Levitt offers one possibility, carefully hedged. We regret most the outcomes we feel we chose. A person stuck at the edge of a decision has claimed, in advance, the whole of its consequences, and the weight of that claim holds her still. Handing the choice to a coin gives some of it back to the world, and some of the regret with it. That is the coin’s answer to the column’s question: to cede something to the world is sometimes the right placement of the line, and not a failure of agency.

An oil painting in candlelight: in a dark room a young man has just flicked a coin into the air. It gleams at the top of its arc above his open hand, between an armchair on the left and a door left ajar on the right, with his coat on a peg beside it.
Heads, make the change; tails, leave things as they are. Image made for this essay.

Max Weber found an older version of the same shape, and his is a thesis rather than a finding. In 1905 he argued that the Calvinists of early modern Europe, who believed their salvation decided before their birth and beyond the reach of anything they might do, became among the most relentless workers the world had seen: not in spite of the doctrine but because of it. A man who could do nothing to earn election, and could not know whether he had it, worked to produce the one sign he might be able to read. Historians have argued with Weber for more than a century. But the shape he described is the coin’s, a total concession followed by action, and the action a test run on oneself to find out what is up to one. The dogs’ panel was wired to the shock; the Calvinist’s labour was wired to nothing but his reading of himself, which may be why it never ended. Hamlet reaches the same place in a sentence, near the end, when he tells Horatio that there’s a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will. Later in the same scene he admits to Horatio a misgiving about the fencing match, declines to heed it, and says that the readiness is all.

The opposite error is commoner and duller. In 2008 Francis Flynn and Vanessa Lake asked people how many strangers they thought they would have to approach before one agreed to a small favour, to fill in a questionnaire or lend a phone for a call. People underestimated how readily they would be helped by as much as half. Strangers are not unusually kind; it is simply awkward to refuse a direct request to someone’s face. The people who misjudged it had ceded to the world something that was theirs, the asking, and never found out. Cate Hall and Sasha Chapin’s book of this year, You Can Just Do Things, builds on that finding.

The two ends of the column’s spectrum, then, are not opposites but errors of placement. The stuck chooser had claimed too much and was frozen by it; the reluctant asker had ceded too much and never tried. Both had drawn the line in the wrong place. Neither error shows up on a dial that asks only how much of the world you think is yours.

V

The Story

Shakespeare put both ends of Rotter’s line on one stage, and gave each to the person least able to bear it. In the second scene of King Lear, Edmund, the bastard son who is about to ruin his brother and betray his father, mocks the habit of blaming the heavens. “This is the excellent foppery of the world,” he says: that when our fortunes sicken, often from our own excess, we make the sun, the moon and the stars guilty of our disasters, as if we were villains by necessity. It is the internal creed, plainly stated, and it is given to the villain. Three acts later his father, blinded, speaks the external one: “As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods; / They kill us for their sport.” The play endorses neither. It shows what each belief does in the hands of the man who holds it, which a play can do and a questionnaire cannot.

The same divergence turns up wherever something arrives that nobody chose. Feng Xu and colleagues, surveying 324 research and development staff in nine manufacturing firms in Shenzhen, reported this year that employees with an internal locus of control tended to see their company’s adoption of artificial intelligence as a challenge, and shared what they learned about it; those with an external locus tended to see it as a hindrance, and hid what they knew. It is a survey of what people reported, not of what they did. But the machines were the same machines, and the line fell in different places.

And the line, it seems, can be moved in the telling. Jonathan Adler, a psychologist at Olin College who also writes plays, asked forty-seven adults beginning psychotherapy to write about their lives before their first session and then after each session that followed, twelve accounts in all. Nearly six hundred stories were coded for two qualities: agency, the sense of oneself as the one acting, and coherence, the sense of a life that hangs together. Coherence barely moved. Agency rose, and the writers’ mental health rose with it, and the change in the stories came first, by a week or two. Adler’s phrase for what he saw was that people told a new story and then “lived their way into it.” It is one study, of forty-seven people in therapy. But it has the same shape again, in a third medium: something found, and then something kept, this time in prose. That is the third step, after the admission and the finding: the telling.

Adler is careful about what the order proves. A story that changes a week or two before well-being does is, he says, about as close as research on identity can come to suggesting a cause, since no one would assign people the stories they live by at random. But he draws from the work a distinction that would have been at home in Nicopolis. We have no unrestricted say over what happens to us, he says; we have much more over the stories we tell about it. And he points to where the telling starts. Children learn to tell their own lives by telling them to someone, and the adults who listen shape what is told: which events belong in the story, and how a story is allowed to end. Adler’s word for what those adults do is scaffolding.

What, then, should a parent wish for a child? Not the quality the column names, because it is not a quality, and not the belief that the world is hers, because it is not, and she will find that out. What is worth wishing for is a habit: of drawing the line where it actually runs, and of acting on her side of it as though the other side did not exist. It has a name much older than Rotter’s, and the name is a chain. Aristotle begins the second book of the Ethics by observing that moral excellence comes about through habit, and that its very name, ēthikē, is a slight variation on ethos, the Greek for habit. In the Poetics he says that character is what reveals prohairesis, choice: the deciding between what to seek and what to avoid. And Epictetus, who taught that every faculty is kept and strengthened by its own acts, “the faculty of walking by walking, that of running by running,” took prohairesis and widened it until it meant the faculty of choosing itself, the one thing in the world that is up to us. Habit makes character; character shows in choice; and a man whose name meant “acquired” took the word for what a character shows on a stage and made it the name for the only thing he owned.

A story is a schedule of the acts a character can take. So is a life, on the right side of the line. Nobody can hand that over. What can be handed over is smaller and older: an hour a week, a book at the end of it, a plant to choose and look after, someone to listen when the story is told, and a question asked once. Which one would you like?

⁂

Sources: Bartleby, “The quality you should most wish for your children,” The Economist, August 27, 2026, from which the savings and entrepreneurship findings are taken. Julian B. Rotter, “Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement,” Psychological Monographs 80 (1966); “Some problems and misconceptions related to the construct of internal versus external control of reinforcement,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 43 (1975); “Internal versus external control of reinforcement: a case history of a variable,” American Psychologist 45 (1990); his life from Encyclopedia.com and other biographical accounts. Marco Caliendo, Deborah Cobb-Clark and Arne Uhlendorff, “Locus of control and job search strategies,” Review of Economics and Statistics 97 (2015). Warn N. Lekfuangfu, Nattavudh Powdthavee, Nele Warrinnier and Francesca Cornaglia, “Locus of control and its intergenerational implications for early childhood skill formation,” Economic Journal 128 (2018). Jean M. Twenge, Liqing Zhang and Charles Im, “It’s beyond my control,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 8 (2004). Epictetus, Discourses II.18, in P. E. Matheson’s translation (1916); the opening of the Enchiridion is rendered for this essay. James B. Stockdale, Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior (Hoover Institution, 1993), the lecture given at King’s College London on November 15, 1993. Ellen J. Langer and Judith Rodin, “The effects of choice and enhanced personal responsibility for the aged,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34 (1976), and the 1977 follow-up with its 1978 correction; James Coyne’s re-examination of the study. Steven F. Maier and Martin E. P. Seligman, “Learned helplessness at fifty,” Psychological Review 123 (2016); John P. Christianson and colleagues, “Learned stressor resistance requires extracellular signal-regulated kinase in the prefrontal cortex,” Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 8 (2014). Félix Ravaisson, Of Habit (1838); Clare Carlisle, On Habit (2014). Steven D. Levitt, “Heads or tails,” Review of Economic Studies 88 (2021), the published version, from which the figures are taken (working paper). Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905). Francis J. Flynn and Vanessa K. B. Lake, “If you need help, just ask,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95 (2008). Cate Hall and Sasha Chapin, You Can Just Do Things (2026). Feng Xu and colleagues, “Linking organizational AI adoption to employee knowledge behaviours,” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 13 (2026). Jonathan M. Adler, “Living into the story,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102 (2012); his phrase as quoted by WBUR, January 13, 2012; and his conversation with the Business Group on Health. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.1, in W. D. Ross’s translation, and Poetics 1450b. Shakespeare, King Lear and Hamlet. W. E. Henley, “Invictus” (1888), paraphrased.

Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; outside literary reading by Claude Fable 5.1. The header and interior images were generated with Gemini Argon for this essay.

HER PRIVATE MOUNTAIN

On Cézanne’s mountain, O’Keeffe’s mesa, and what a painter owns after decades of looking.

Georgia O’Keeffe refused to paint like the European masters, and a new profile takes her at her word. But Paul Cézanne, the painter the men around her revered, painted one mountain some eighty times over nearly thirty years, and she painted hers twenty-nine. She called it her private mountain and said God had told her she could have it if she painted it enough. The question is what she got.

I A Mountain Near Aix

In the last autumn of his life Paul Cézanne walked most mornings from his studio on the hill of Les Lauves, above Aix-en-Provence, to a spot from which he could see Mont Sainte-Victoire, and painted it again. He had been painting it for nearly thirty years. The mountain is a ridge of grey limestone a thousand meters high, and he had painted it framed by pines, crossed by a railway viaduct, from the road to Le Tholonet and from his sister’s house at Bellevue, in watercolor and in oil, some eighty times in all. In the late pictures it is barely a mountain. It is a field of blue and green and ochre patches, each one a decision, and what the picture records is not the ridge but a man looking at it and not trusting what he sees. He died in October 1906, a week after being caught in a storm while painting outdoors.

Within a few years Cézanne was among the most revered painters in the small modern world of New York. Alfred Stieglitz showed his watercolors at 291 in 1911; the Armory Show hung him in 1913; the painters around Stieglitz, John Marin, Arthur Dove, Marsden Hartley, learned his lesson in a particular form. A painting is made of touches. Doubt can be a method. The surface should show the hand’s hesitation. A profile of Georgia O’Keeffe in the summer Smithsonian tells how she refused all that. Its last picture is the Courtauld’s Sainte-Victoire, and the caption says two things about it: that O’Keeffe “did not share her male peers’ reverence” for Cézanne, and that his paintings of the mountain were Impressionist. The second is wrong, and the profile’s text says it too, setting Cézanne beside Monet; Cézanne spent his life getting out of Impressionism. The first is half right: she did refuse the Stieglitz men’s Cézanne, and theirs was a manner, which most of them took for the whole of him.

II The Spoiled Poplars

The story the profile tells is a good one, and it is hers. In the 1907–08 school year at the Art Students League, where William Merritt Chase taught the brush to move quickly, she showed a classmate a painting of two poplars with the sky between their branches, and he took it from her and painted dots of red and blue and green over the trees to show her how the Impressionists did it. She had not heard of them. She thought he had spoiled her picture. The profile says that from then on she did not let other people spoil her paintings, and the sentence is true in a way it does not intend, because the rest of her life was spent fighting off what other people saw in them.

The flowers came first. In the middle 1920s she painted petals at the scale of a window so that New Yorkers in a hurry would have to stop, and they stopped, and they saw what they brought. She found this as irritating as the dots: people hung their own associations on her flower, she wrote, and wrote about it as if she saw what they saw, and she did not. Then, in 1929, she went to New Mexico, and after her second summer there she sent a barrel of bones back to the house she shared with Stieglitz on Lake George, and sat down to paint them. The men she knew, she wrote afterward, talked endlessly about the Great American Novel and the Great American Play, and she was not sure they aspired to the Great American Painting. So she painted a cow’s skull floating against blue, and because that was not quite enough she added a red stripe down each side. She said they would not think it great, but they would notice it.

This is the O’Keeffe of the profile and of the museum shop: the painter who owed nothing, who answered Paris with a skull in the colors of the flag. The evidence for it is real. Her edges are hard where Cézanne’s are broken; her color is flat where his is built from a hundred touches; she painted the thing in front of her until it turned into a shape, where he painted his uncertainty about it. On the surface, which is where a painting lives, she refused him entirely.

III Seven or Eight Versions

But a painter’s method is not her surface, and the method was in place before the desert. In December 1931, speaking of her calla lilies, she told a reporter from the Herald Tribune that she always did seven or eight versions of the same thing before she arrived at the final one. Nearly forty years later, explaining her paintings of clouds seen from airplanes, she told the Times that when she got started with a theme she had to keep going. That is the habit of a painter who works by return, and it is Cézanne’s habit, not Monet’s. Monet’s haystacks are a series about light changing; Cézanne’s mountain is a series about a man changing in front of a thing that does not. O’Keeffe’s bones and doors and flowers are the second kind.

Consider what the men did with the same reverence. Marsden Hartley, who loved Cézanne as hard as any of them, saw a Cézanne show at Bernheim-Jeune in Paris in 1926 and moved to Aix. By December he was living in the Maison Maria, a stone house in the woods by the Château Noir that Cézanne had painted about 1895, so that he lived inside a Cézanne and walked out of it to Cézanne’s mountain. He drew it, and painted it in Cézanne’s constructive strokes and louder colors. The pictures are good and they are borrowed: he took the manner and the motif both, and left the one thing that made Cézanne Cézanne, which was that the mountain had been his own, outside his own window, for nearly thirty years. His graphite drawing of it in the Brooklyn Museum is dated 1926–27. The mountain in it is a thousand meters high and belongs to someone else.

In 1934 O’Keeffe saw the mountain that would hold her habit for the rest of her life. Cerro Pedernal is a flat-topped, basalt-capped mesa southwest of Abiquiú, just over three thousand meters, and from the window of the house she took at Ghost Ranch it sits on the horizon like a table someone set there. She began painting it in 1936. She painted it behind red hills and behind a pink one, framed in the hollow of a pelvis, under a ladder hanging in an evening sky, as a thin blue line at the bottom of a canvas that was otherwise cloud. The museum that holds her estate counts twenty-nine paintings of it, and the profile says simply that she painted the Pedernal over and over.

Most of the men who revered Cézanne took his manner and left his method. Hartley found the repetition later. From 1939 to 1942 he painted Katahdin, in Maine, a mountain the Penobscot named and four nations hold sacred, at least eighteen times, all from sketches made in eight days at a lakeside camp; by then O’Keeffe had been at the Pedernal for three years. He worked from the sketches, not from the mountain. She took the method entire, and left the manner. She refused the touch, the doubt, the hesitation in the stroke, and kept the one idea underneath them, which is that a painter’s subject can be a single thing seen for the rest of a life, and that the seeing is the work. Whether it came to her from Cézanne, in the years after his watercolors hung at 291, when the men around her talked of nothing else, or whether she arrived at it alone, the kinship is closer than the refusal. She did not want to paint like Cézanne. She wanted what he had, which was a mountain of her own.

IV My Private Mountain

She said so. In her late eighties she called the Pedernal her private mountain, and said it belonged to her: “God told me if I painted it enough, I could have it.” It is the best sentence she ever spoke about her work, and it has aged in two directions at once.

Read one way it is a painter’s joke about a painter’s truth, and her biographer Laurie Lisle records that it was made jokingly. Nobody owns a mountain by looking at it, and she knew that; the joke is that she had done it anyway, by a method that takes nothing from the mountain and leaves it where it was. What she owned were twenty-nine paintings, and through them a way of seeing a particular horizon that is now, for a great many people, the only way they see it. That is a real kind of ownership, and it is the only kind a painter can have, and Cézanne had it over Sainte-Victoire.

Read the other way, the sentence is what it says. The mesa has a name in Tewa, Tsí Pín, flaking-stone mountain, and a name in Spanish, flint hill, that means nearly the same, and people quarried its flint for thousands of years, the ancestors of the pueblos among them, before anyone arrived with an easel. In 2021 the New Mexico Tourism Department built an advertisement around her words about the state, “that was mine,” and the Georgia O’Keeffe Museum, which exists to keep her name, posted a statement that it did not support the use of such quotations, because it was now clear that this was the language of possession, colonization and erasure.

Four years later the museum gave three galleries, its largest among them, to the correction: Tewa Nangeh/Tewa Country, which opened last November and closes on Sunday, November 1. In the museum’s own description, she often claimed northern New Mexico as her own, on land that has been home to six Tewa Pueblos since time immemorial. The exhibition went out under an image by the Santa Clara artist Jason Garcia, who brought it to the museum and co-curated it: a clay tablet made up as a comic-book cover, with a cover date of 1977, the year her claim to the mountain went public. On it O’Keeffe stands in her black dress before a sign that once read “Welcome to O’Keeffe Country,” with “Tewa” scrawled over her name and Tsí Pín behind her.

Garcia has answered her on her own terms. He told NPR that her line about God was “pretty funny,” and that the mountain is not hers alone. He opened with nineteen pictures of Tsí Pín, painted from one vantage during a residency at Ghost Ranch, and he set out to pass her twenty-nine. He says he returns to the mountain “not to possess it, but to be in conversation with it,” and also that painting it more often than she did is a way of taking it back. That is her method turned on her claim, in a Tewa hand.

A year ago, in Aeon, the Puebloan poet Alanna Offield published an essay called “My private mountain,” about growing up in the shadow of a painter who was sold to her as the owner of her own homeland. This spring Alicia Inez Guzmán argued in High Country News that O’Keeffe’s paintings have come to stand for the whole of northern New Mexico, so that the region is sold as O’Keeffe Country and the people who were there first are painted out of it.

Offield is right, and the museum is right, and so is the joke. The sentence holds both readings. She did not take the mountain from anyone, and she also said, in the plain American way, that it belonged to her, and the saying is part of what the Smithsonian profile means by a great American painter. Cézanne never said Sainte-Victoire was his, as far as anyone recorded; Hartley, after eight days at Katahdin, wrote that it was “my mountain.” The claim is the American part, and it is also the part that has come back on her.

V The Cloud in the Eye

The eyes began to go in the 1960s. She described it later as a cloud entering her eyeballs, and in a manuscript from the seventies, “My Eyes and Painting,” she wrote of the world beginning to turn grey when her eyes stopped seeing sharply as they had for eighty years. Macular degeneration takes the center of the field and leaves the edges, which is to say it takes exactly the kind of seeing her paintings were made of, the hard edge and the flat plane, and leaves the kind Cézanne’s late pictures look like, the blur at the margin. She painted her last unassisted oils in 1972, among them a black rock against blue sky and a canvas called The Beyond, a dark band under a pale one, a horizon with nothing on it.

She stopped working, she wrote, and then, surprised in time that the grey world could be beautiful in a new way, she began to think about how to start again. She worked in clay in her last years, by touch, with a young potter named Juan Hamilton who had come to the door looking for work and stayed. She had assistants mix her colors. The mountain was still outside the window, and she could no longer see it sharply, and she had, by her own account, already been given it. Ownership by looking has to pass through the years when she could not look, and it passes: the owning was done, and it was in the paintings, and the paintings did not need her eyes any more than Cézanne’s needed his after October 1906.

Seen from inside a dark adobe room through a deep square window: a flat-topped mesa above gold and cream slopes and a thin band of red hills, the middle of its tabletop lost in a soft, round white blur. In the foreground, two pale hands in black sleeves shape a small gold clay pot.
In her last years she worked in clay, by touch. Macular degeneration takes the center of the field and leaves the edges, so the mountain outside her window kept its sides and lost its middle. An illustration made for this essay.

VI Ashes

She died in Santa Fe in March 1986, at ninety-eight, and her ashes were scattered on the Pedernal, which she had climbed herself. Cézanne is buried in the cemetery of Saint-Pierre in Aix, under his mountain too; he climbed it as a boy and at least once more, in his fifties, and otherwise looked. He never claimed it; everyone else gives it to him.

That is the difference, and it is smaller than the profile thinks and larger than it knows. Two painters, a continent apart, took one piece of ground and painted it until the painting and the ground could not be told apart. One of them did it in a manner the other refused, and the other did it in a manner that made her what the profile says she set out to be, a great American painter. But the manner was never the point. The point was the return, morning after morning, to a thing that did not change, so that the changing could be seen. That was his method, and she made it hers, and the only original thing in it was the mountain. The Pedernal is still there. It belongs to the people who named it and to no one, and it has been painted, by her count, enough.

⁂

Sources: Jennie Rothenberg Gritz, “Georgia O’Keeffe Ignored Advice to Mimic Great European Masters. Her Goal Instead Was to Be a Great American Painter,” Smithsonian, Summer 2026, photographs by Jen Judge; the Georgia O’Keeffe Museum’s “In Her Own Words,” for her interviews with the New York Herald Tribune (Ishbel Ross, December 29, 1931) and the New York Times (Grace Glueck, October 18, 1970); Laurie Lisle, Portrait of an Artist (1980), p. 295, as cited by the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, for Deer’s Skull with Pedernal; Alanna Offield, “My private mountain,” Aeon, October 28, 2025; Alicia Inez Guzmán, “O’Keeffe Country was never O’Keeffe’s to begin with,” High Country News, May 29, 2026; NPR, March 14, 2026; Alex De Vore, “New Mexico True Campaign Refresh Draws Ire,” Santa Fe Reporter, April 17, 2021; Ania Hull, “Indigenous artists reframe the ownership of ancestral lands,” Pasatiempo, Santa Fe New Mexican; the Georgia O’Keeffe Museum, Tewa Nangeh/Tewa Country and its press release of October 8, 2025; New Mexico Magazine; Southwest Contemporary; the National Gallery of Art on Marsden Hartley’s Mount Katahdin, Maine (1942); the Princeton University Art Museum on Hartley’s Blue Landscape (1942); the Brooklyn Museum, Hartley, Mont Sainte-Victoire (1926–27); the Kimbell Art Museum, Cézanne, Maison Maria with a View of Château Noir; the Marsden Hartley Legacy Project chronology (Bates College); the Maine Atlas on Katahdin; Gary A. Smith and Bruce B. Huckell, “The geological and geoarchaeological significance of Cerro Pedernal,” New Mexico Geological Society Guidebook 56 (2005); the Vision and Art Project on her eyesight, for Jeffrey Hogrefe’s account and her manuscript “My Eyes and Painting”; and Britannica on Mont Sainte-Victoire. The header and interior images were generated with Gemini Argon for this essay; they reproduce no painting or photograph. Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; cold read by Claude Fable 5.1.

THE BROOMSTICK

She wanted to fly, so she built a plane. Now she wants the source code of the universe.

A child reads Harry Potter and asks for a flying broomstick. Her family gives her a Cessna, and by sixteen she has built a plane from a kit and flown it, and when others like it broke up in the air, she modified hers. Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski has been called the next Einstein. The label is unnecessary. She wanted magic and built its working equivalent, and she is doing it again with the sky.

I

A Kit in the Garage

Flat-color illustrated portrait of Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski: a dark side-parted bob, a wry closed-lip half-smile, head slightly tilted, a gold crescent necklace, against a dark blue ground with a thin gold arc behind her head.
Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski, in an illustration made for this essay from a 2014 photograph by Cambridge02138 (CC BY-SA 4.0).

A child in Chicago reads Harry Potter and asks her parents for a flying broomstick. Many children have. The wish was older than the book: her mother dates her fascination with aircraft and spaceflight to the age of four, and the broomstick was only the first form of it a child could ask for by name. What is unusual is the answer she got. Her father, a lawyer, electrical engineer and pilot, turned the wish into flying. At nine she took her first flight and began lessons across the border in Canada, where a student pilot may fly solo at fourteen, two years earlier than in the United States. When she turned ten her grandfather gave her a Cessna 150. Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski tells the story herself in a sentence that has three generations in it: “My dad got my grandpa to get me a Cessna instead.”

The family had a method, and the Cessna was only its largest instance. The spare bedroom in the house was painted chroma-key blue, with pulleys in the ceiling from which a child could be suspended and filmed into a scene in which she flew. Looking back from her thirties, she describes her parents as putting a great deal into finding realistic versions of magical things. It is a good description of a childhood and a better one of a character. Whatever she was told about magic, she was shown where the pulleys went.

In 2006, at twelve, she bought a kit for a Zenith Zodiac CH 601XL, a small two-seat aluminum airplane that arrives as sheets, ribs and rivets. Her father sold his car to pay for it. She already had a company, founded the year before, called Sabrina Aircraft Manufacturing. In the first month she assembled an engine from the parts of three others, and on the FAA paperwork it is the Sabrina O-200A. Seven months went to the fuselage, wings and tail, four to the interior. By October 2007 the family garage could hold no more airplane. It was taken apart, moved to Aurora Airport, painted and put back together. In January 2008 it flew, with her father at the controls. The build had taken two years. At sixteen, before she had a driver’s license, she flew it herself.

That is the point at which most tellings stop, and the point at which the story stops being an anecdote. The Zodiac had been coming apart in the air. By 2009 the National Transportation Safety Board had linked six accidents and ten deaths to the design and asked for the type to be grounded, and that November, after another fatal breakup, the FAA issued a bulletin on the airframe and froze new approvals until an aircraft had been modified. The sixteen-year-old with the Sabrina O-200A was, by the following spring, making the modifications. She had wanted a broomstick, which cannot fall, and had been given an airplane, which can. She did not leave it as the kit had come. She brought it up to the stricter standard the breakups had forced on its makers.

From those years, too, comes the one shortcut she was ever offered. At fourteen, on the day she first flew the Cessna alone, she came home to a signed offer of a job at Blue Origin from Jeff Bezos. She never answered the letter, though she interned there at sixteen. As far as she is concerned, the offer is still pending.

II

The Move

The shape of the thing is now visible. A want arrives in magical form. The magic is declined. The want is kept, and something is built that does what the magic was for, by means that can be inspected, signed off and, if necessary, modified in a garage. Before the broomstick there had been a brief plan to be a Spice Girl, a want she has since discharged at the Met Gala in a dress she printed herself. The broomstick is the one that set the pattern, because it was the first want large enough that the realistic version took two years. Her family made the first of these translations for her, from broomstick to Cessna; by the time the kit arrived in the garage, the move was hers.

She arrived at MIT at seventeen and decided, by her own account, that she had done aerospace and would now be a physicist. The move looks like a change of subject, and it is not hard to read it as the same move again: having built a thing that flies, she wanted to know what flying is made of, and then what everything is made of, and the discipline that answers that question is not engineering. She has said she is drawn to difficulty and underestimated how much of it she was signing up for, which is also what people say at the third month of a kit build. She graduated first in physics with a perfect 5.00 average, the first woman to win the department’s Orloff Scholarship, and went to Harvard to work with Andrew Strominger.

III

Books Kept at the Sky

What she found there was about the sky. Far from any matter, spacetime is nearly flat, and in 1962 Bondi, van der Burg, Metzner and Sachs found that even there it has an infinite family of symmetries, far larger than the handful that special relativity had led physicists to expect. In 1965 Weinberg proved a theorem about what happens when a graviton of almost no energy is added to any collision. And there was an old prediction that a passing gravitational wave leaves a permanent displacement behind it, a memory, in anything it passes through. For decades these sat in separate drawers. Around 2014 Strominger and his collaborators showed that they are one fact seen from three sides: the symmetries imply the theorem, the theorem implies the memory, the memory implies the symmetries. Strominger called it the infrared triangle. The universe, it turned out, keeps books, and it keeps them at the sky.

In 2015, with Strominger and Alexander Zhiboedov, she found a second memory. The first is left by the energy a wave carries; this one is left by its spin, and it shows up as a delay: beams sent clockwise and counterclockwise around the same orbit fall out of step. With it came a second triangle, one order down. In January 2016 Stephen Hawking, Malcolm Perry and Strominger cited the paper in the article in which they proposed that black holes carry what they called soft hair, and so might keep, at the edge, a record of what fell in. She was twenty-two. She met Hawking while she was a graduate student, and later found herself in a conga line with him on a Boston Harbor cruise, which is the kind of detail a profile uses to prove she is human and which here proves something else: she was in the room where the sky’s bookkeeping was being argued over, and she was there because of a calculation.

IV

The Headline

The headline came a week later. On January 12, 2016, the website Ozy ran a profile under the title “This Millennial Might Be the New Einstein.” Within days the “might” was gone from some of the reprints. By the end of 2017 a meme had Harvard itself calling her the next Einstein, and Snopes, checking it, could find no one at Harvard who had. Ozy has since collapsed. The label has not.

She answered it the way she answers things. She posted the article on her own website with the headline rewritten to say only that this millennial is Sabrina. Under a heading called Media Fact-Check Sheet she described herself as a grad student with plenty to learn and little claim on the attention. Nearly ten years on she told Perimeter Institute that what she had felt was not imposter syndrome but “knowing you’re actually an imposter because of clickbait.” The institute’s profile adds that she studied twice as hard so that no one could call her overhyped. This summer she said that two livestreamed debates on artificial intelligence, with Roger Penrose in September 2025 and Sergey Brin in January, had brought the label back, and that she had decided to treat the attention as a resource for Perimeter rather than as a trophy.

The label can be retired, and not out of politeness. A prediction about who someone might become cannot be checked, which is why it invites the very charge she studied to forestall. The broomstick can be checked. It is a description of what she has been doing since she was nine, and it already contains the trait the label was grasping at, which is a refusal to let a want remain a wish. Einstein is a comparison. The broomstick is a method.

V

The Sphere

In 2021 she joined Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, Ontario, an institute given over entirely to theoretical physics, which she values for its quiet and for a say in how research is done that a large university would not give her. There she founded a group with an unlikely name, the Celestial Holography Initiative, and the name is the clearest statement of what she now wants.

Her own picture of it begins with an instruction: “Picture yourself at the centre of a giant sphere.” The sphere is the night sky, in the physicist’s sense: not the dome overhead but the sphere of all the directions from which a ray of light can arrive. Whatever happens inside it is written, as a pattern, on its inner surface, and the proposal is that the writing is enough: the four dimensions of space and time within can be read from the two of the sphere. That is not mysticism; it is a lineage. Since the 1990s physicists have suspected that in certain universes a theory with gravity is secretly identical to a theory without gravity in one dimension fewer, written on the edge. Maldacena made that precise in 1997 for a universe with negative curvature. Ours is not one, and for nearly every purpose it can be treated as flat, which is the case his version does not reach. The celestial version is stranger still: it drops two dimensions where his drops one.

A tiny figure stands at the center of a dark disc rimmed in gold. From a small red spark just below it, two fans of fine cream lines sweep out toward the rim, which is ringed with gold dots and tick marks.
You stand at the center of the sphere of every direction from which light can reach you. A collision inside it, the red spark, sends light outward, and the edge keeps the record in gold. Celestial holography’s wager is that this record, written in two dimensions, holds everything that happened in the four dimensions within. An illustration made for this essay.

In 2017 she showed, with Shu-Heng Shao and Strominger, how the scattering amplitudes of our flat world, the numbers particle physicists actually compute, can be rewritten so that they behave like the correlation functions of a two-dimensional theory on the celestial sphere. The paper’s title gave the field its adjective. If our amplitudes are the correlators of some sphere theory, the task is to find the sphere theory.

That task is what she calls, in a profile published by MIT’s physics department, the search for the source code of the universe, and the phrase is exact rather than grand. Source code is the thing from which the running program follows. A theory without gravity, on a sphere, from which gravity and everything else would follow when you ran it, is source code in the plain sense. She works on paper, she says, because mathematics can be strict enough to check a theory’s consistency in places no experiment reaches. That is an engineer’s reason. The kit plane had to hold together in the air. The sphere theory has to hold together on paper, and there is no FAA to issue the bulletin.

No one has the sphere theory. The field has its symmetries, a dictionary, a Simons Foundation collaboration of which she is deputy director, and rival approaches, some of which may be right instead. It may fail. She knows what it is to build a thing to a design that came apart in the air; the honesty of the enterprise is that you build it and then find out.

VI

Source Code

Set the two wants side by side. As a child she wanted to fly without a machine, and the realistic interpretation of that want was an airplane with her name on the engine. At thirty-three she wants to know the rules from which the world runs, and the realistic interpretation of that want is a theory on the sphere of the sky. The second want is the larger, and the move is identical: decline the magic, keep the want, build the thing that does what the magic was for, and find out whether it flies.

For the Met Gala in May she wanted, she said, to wear physics, so she used an AI model to design the pieces of her dress from a Hopf fibration, a way of filling a higher-dimensional sphere with interlocking rings, printed them on the machine in her office and learned enough sewing to attach a skirt. The Spice Girl want was decades old by then, and the dress reads as the treatment the broomstick got. The robot she said in July she was buying, which she means to make less frightening and more cute, is the same move in miniature. She describes her hobbies as a way to aim a restless mind rather than to calm it.

None of this requires the word genius. What it requires is a family that painted a room blue, a father who sold a car, a grandfather with a Cessna, a network of other builders, the FAA people she introduced herself to at air shows, and a child who, wanting a broomstick’s worth of magic, was shown the pulleys and kept asking for the working version. The gifts came with work attached. The one shortcut she was ever offered, a signed letter from Jeff Bezos that held out the destination without the build, she left unanswered. The first thing she built, she reworked when its design was found wanting. The sky over Lake Michigan, where she flew the plane she built, is the one she is now trying to read. She wants its source code. She is building the sphere.

⁂

Sources: Ari Daniel, “On the hunt for ‘the source code of the universe,’” MIT Physics, April 21, 2026; Jennifer Berry, “This American physicist got an open-ended job offer from Jeff Bezos, but she chose Canada instead,” Be Giant, July 9, 2026; “Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski: From rocket science to more challenging pursuits,” Perimeter Institute, August 21, 2025; Jim Bildilli, “Wondering Where The Future of Aviation Is?” Midwest Flyer, August/September 2010; “The Remarkable Sabrina Pasterski,” Snopes, December 27, 2017, for the Ozy headline and her Media Fact-Check Sheet; Alison Bowen, Chicago Tribune, July 28, 2015; her curriculum vitae; the FAA’s Zodiac Special Review Team Report (January 2010) and General Aviation News (November 23, 2009); S. Pasterski, A. Strominger and A. Zhiboedov, “New Gravitational Memories” (2015); S. W. Hawking, M. J. Perry and A. Strominger, “Soft Hair on Black Holes,” Physical Review Letters 116 (2016); S. Pasterski, S.-H. Shao and A. Strominger, “Flat Space Amplitudes and Conformal Symmetry of the Celestial Sphere,” Physical Review D 96 (2017). The header and interior images were generated with Gemini Argon for this essay and are not likenesses of any real person. The portrait of Sabrina Gonzalez Pasterski was generated with Gemini Argon from a 2014 photograph by Cambridge02138 (Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0) and is released under the same license. Drafted with Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5; literary editing by Claude Fable 5.1; copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5.

THE SECOND AUTHOR

The novel was born when a man who had read everything rode out beside a man who had read nothing. Its next form is the same journey, taken at a desk.

Cervantes gave his novel a second author, a translator paid in raisins, and a source he warned his readers not to trust. He ended it by letting the pen claim the book. The pen has arrived in fact, and it writes in every language at once. Whether it completes the novel or ends it depends on who hangs it up.

The first modern novel stops in the middle of a sword-stroke. At the end of the eighth chapter of Don Quixote, the knight and a Basque traveller face each other with their swords raised, and the narrator gives up. The author of the history, he reports, “leaves this battle impending, giving as excuse that he could find nothing more written.” The book has run out of book.

The ninth chapter is about how the narrator found the rest. “One day, as I was in the Alcaná of Toledo, a boy came up to sell some pamphlets and old papers to a silk mercer.” The narrator, who is “fond of reading even the very scraps of paper in the streets,” picks one up. It is in Arabic, which he does not read, so he finds a Morisco in the market who does. The man opens it at random and laughs at a note in the margin: Dulcinea del Toboso, the lady for whom the knight risks his life, “had, they say, the best hand of any woman in all La Mancha for salting pigs.” The title page reads: “History of Don Quixote of La Mancha, written by Cide Hamete Benengeli, an Arab historian.” The narrator buys the bundle for half a real, takes the translator home so the find will not slip away, and pays him “two arrobas of raisins and two bushels of wheat.” In “little more than a month and a half” the whole is translated “just as it is set down here.” The swords come down. The novel goes on.

So the book that literary history calls the first modern novel announces, a few dozen pages in, that it was not written by the man whose name is on it. It was written by a foreign historian, rendered by a hired translator out of a language the narrator has no way to check, assembled by an editor who argues with his source in the margins, and finished by a market accident. Cervantes did not hide the machinery. He made it the story.

The claim here is addressed to anyone who writes stories, in any genre, and to anyone who reads them. Human collaboration with generative AI is the ultimate evolution of the novel: ultimate not in the sense of last, as though nothing could follow, but in the older sense, the furthest point toward which a thing was always tending, the end that was in it from the start. The novel has always been a form written by more than one hand, about a mind made of other people’s words meeting a world that will not be read. Generative AI brings nothing foreign to that form. It brings the form’s own premise to the desk where the form is made.

One fact belongs before the argument. This essay was drafted with Claude, a model made by Anthropic, a company that profits if more people write this way; the reader should weigh it accordingly.

I

The Second Author

At the end of the eighth chapter, before the manuscript turns up, Cervantes’s narrator calls himself “the second author of this work.” There is a first author, Cide Hamete, who was there, or claims to have been, and wrote the history down. There is a translator, who turns it into Castilian for raisins. And there is a second author, who did not invent the story and did not translate it, but who found it, bought it, read it, doubted it, cut it, arranged it, and set it before the public under his own name.

He is careful to say that his source is unreliable. “If against the present one any objection be raised on the score of its truth,” he writes, “it can only be that its author was an Arab, as lying is a very common propensity with those of that nation.” The line carries the prejudice of Cervantes’s Spain against a people it was in the act of expelling; the last Moriscos were driven out between 1609 and 1614, in the years between the novel’s two parts. But the joke turns on the narrator. He is the one who does not read Arabic, who depends entirely on a translator from that same people, and who has no way to check a single word. His suspicion of the source is the only check he has, and it is the check every reader of the book has had to use since.

Within a page he gives the other half of the second author’s duty. Historians, he says, ought to be exact and truthful, because their subject is truth, “whose mother is history, rival of time, storehouse of deeds, witness for the past, example and counsel for the present, and warning for the future.” The sentence is grand, and it is put in the mouth of a man who has just admitted his history came from a market stall by way of a man he paid in fruit. The book holds both at once: the duty to the truth, and the fact that the text arrived from a source no one can fully trust.

The prologue had already done the same thing to authorship. It opens with the author at his desk, stuck, “pondering with the paper before me, a pen in my ear, my elbow on the desk, and my cheek in my hand, thinking of what I should say.” Then “there came in unexpectedly a certain lively, clever friend of mine,” who tells him how to write the prologue, and the prologue we are reading is the advice. A few lines earlier the author has disowned his own hero: “for though I pass for the father, I am but the stepfather to ‘Don Quixote.’”

Stepfather is the right word for what a novelist has always been. A stepfather does not make the child. He takes on the raising of it, answers for it, decides what it may and may not do, and is judged by how it turns out. The prologue, the frame and the found manuscript all say the same thing about the book in the reader’s hands: it is not the expression of one mind. It is the work of a found source, a hired voice, a friend who came in at the right moment, and a second author who chose.

The credo set out in The Third Thing holds that the machine does not write; it drafts, proposes and retrieves, and has no way to tell which of its thousand competent sentences is the right one, and that knowing is the work. Cervantes wrote the same credo in 1605, as a comedy. Cide Hamete is the source of the sentences. The second author is the one who knows which of them to keep. What has changed is that Cide Hamete is no longer a fiction.

II

A Man Made of Books

The hero of the first modern novel is a reader, and what he reads is pulp. Alonso Quixano, a minor gentleman of La Mancha, reads romances of chivalry, the popular genre fiction of his age, until, in the novel’s famous diagnosis, his brain dries up. He sells acres of land to buy more of them. Don Quixote began as a parody of that popular fiction, and the form it founded has room for every genre. What comes out of all that reading is not a madman in the ordinary sense. It is a mind made entirely of text: fluent in the idiom of a whole literature, able to produce on demand a speech, a challenge, a vow, a lament in the high style, and unable to tell a windmill from a giant.

The description fits a large language model closely, and it is unfair to it in a way that matters. The model, too, has read the library, far more of it than any gentleman of La Mancha. It too is a mind assembled from other people’s sentences, and it too can produce a lament or a challenge in any register on request. And it too has never been anywhere. It has no hunger, no body that a windmill’s sail could knock off a horse. When it errs, it errs the way Quixote errs, from the inside of the books outward, with total conviction and perfect style. The First Draft found that error in a content farm: an editor-in-chief whose age went from seventy-seven to seventy-five in three days, because there was no one inside the text who had lived through either day.

But the comparison cuts both ways, and the second edge matters more. Quixote is not only the novel’s fool. He is its conscience. He is generous and brave and courteous to people the world despises; he frees galley slaves and defends a beaten boy, sometimes with disastrous results, always out of a moral vocabulary he took from books. The literature that dried his brain also gave him every ideal he has. A mind made of the library carries the library’s nobility along with its delusions. That is why the knight is loved, and why the books he read are not simply burned.

They are judged. In the sixth chapter, while Quixote sleeps, the village priest and the barber go into his library and conduct a work of literary criticism inside a novel. They take the books down one by one, praise some, condemn others, argue over a few, and throw most into the yard to be burned. One of them is a pastoral romance by a certain Cervantes, of whom the priest says he “has had more experience in reverses than in verses.” The book is neither burned nor praised. It is set aside, to be kept shut up until its promised second part shows whether it can be amended. The scene is the second author’s work in miniature: the library is not refused, it is sorted, and the author’s own book is held for revision.

Then Cervantes does the thing that makes the book a novel and not a satire. He sends the man made of books out on the road with a man who has read nothing at all. Sancho Panza does not read. He thinks in proverbs, in meals, in the price of things, in the bruises on his own back. Where Quixote sees an army, Sancho sees sheep, and says so. The novel is the long conversation between them: the corpus and the body, the voice of all books and the voice of one life, each correcting the other across a thousand miles of bad roads.

Salvador de Madariaga, in his Guía del lector del Quijote of 1926, gave that conversation its best-known names. Over the course of the book, he argued, Sancho is quixotized and Quixote is sanchified: the squire rises toward illusion and the knight comes down toward the world, until each has become partly the other. The novel’s deepest movement is not a plot. It is an exchange of natures between a text-made mind and an embodied one.

That exchange is the ground of the claim. A novelist working with a generative model is not Quixote, and the model is not Sancho. It is the other way round. The model is the man made of books. The novelist is the one who has been hungry, who has buried someone, who knows what a windmill is because he has stood under one in the wind. The collaboration, done well, is Madariaga’s exchange happening at the desk: the novelist quixotized, given the range and daring of the whole library; the machine sanchified, pulled down out of its averages toward one place, one body, one life.

III

The Many Hands

The romantic picture of the novelist is a person alone in a room, and the picture is mostly wrong. The history of the novel is a history of collaboration, and of collaboration made possible, each time, by a new machine.

Murasaki Shikibu wrote The Tale of Genji at the beginning of the eleventh century, and it reached later readers only through copyists. The earliest surviving manuscripts date from the early Kamakura period, some two centuries on, and when the poet Fujiwara no Teika set out in 1224 to establish a true text, he was frustrated by the variations among the copies in circulation. The Genji we read is Murasaki’s book as her copyists and editors settled it. Cervantes wrote after a century of printing and made the press part of his plot. In the third chapter of the second part, the bachelor Samsón Carrasco tells Quixote that his history is already out: “more than twelve thousand volumes of the said history in print this very day,” with editions in Portugal, Barcelona and Valencia, one rumoured at Antwerp, and “not a country or language in which there will not be a translation of it.” The knight learns he is a book. The press has become a character.

The second part exists because of another hand. In 1614 a writer calling himself Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda published a sequel of his own, a counterfeit Quixote, whose identity is still disputed. Cervantes answered it not with a lawsuit but with a better book, and inside that book he had his real knight meet a character from the false one, a gentleman named Álvaro Tarfe, who swears before a magistrate that the Quixote he knew was not this one. The counterfeit was defeated by authentication: a second author putting his name, and his character’s name, to the true text.

A gaunt gentleman in a rusted breastplate reads a freshly printed sheet in a seventeenth-century printing house while a stout countryman holding his hat looks on
A Barcelona printing house, and a knight reading the machine’s account of himself. Generated with Gemini for this essay; it depicts no actual place or work.

Ian Watt, in The Rise of the Novel (1957), tied the English form’s rise to a growing middle class and a widening readership among women. Richardson’s Pamela (1740) is a novel made of letters, a chorus of voices whose author poses on the title page as their editor. Dickens published The Pickwick Papers in monthly numbers, under deadlines, in an age when serial authors often answered their readers as they went. Behind every translated novel stands a translator whose sentences the reader takes for the author’s, and behind many novels stands an editor whose cuts the reader never sees. Each of these is a Morisco in the Alcaná.

Mikhail Bakhtin argued that the novel is by nature many-voiced, the form that takes in the speech of every class and trade and genre and lets them argue on the page. The novel has always absorbed whatever new language came near it. It took the letter, the diary, the newspaper, the case history, the film cut, the text message. What it had never met was a language made of all of those at once, and able to answer.

That is what is new about generative AI, and why the novel, of all forms, is where the meeting matters most. Earlier machines changed how the novel was copied, printed, sold and read. The printing press did not suggest a sentence. The typewriter did not reply. A generative model works in the form’s own material, prose, and talks back in it. It is the library made fluent: Cide Hamete’s manuscript, able to write the next chapter whenever it is asked.

The most honoured novel so far to say so on its face is Japanese. In January 2024 Rie Qudan won the Akutagawa Prize, Japan’s most prestigious award for new fiction, for Tokyo-to Dōjō-to, a novel about an architect designing a tower in which criminals are housed in comfort, and about the language used to describe them. Qudan said at the press conference that roughly five per cent of the text came word for word from generative AI, mainly the replies of a chatbot her character consults. Jesse Kirkwood’s English translation, Sympathy Tower Tokyo, appeared in 2025. The machine’s voice is in the novel the way the Arabic manuscript is in Don Quixote: placed, framed, answered, and made into a subject.

IV

The Case Against

There are four objections, and a fifth fact that sits behind all of them.

The first is solitude. The novel’s great achievement, from Murasaki to Woolf, is interiority: one consciousness rendered from inside, at a depth no other form reaches. That depth seems to depend on a single mind working alone for years, with no one to hand it a competent sentence. On this view the novel is not a product but a record of one person’s attention, and a collaborator who never tires and never attends is a solvent poured on the record. The history of editing has a case for it. Gordon Lish cut Raymond Carver’s What We Talk About When We Talk About Love (1981) by more than half, gave ten stories new titles and rewrote the endings of fourteen. When the manuscript versions were published in 2009 as Beginners, readers divided over which was the real Carver, and they still do.

The second is sameness, and it has been measured. In July 2024 Anil Doshi and Oliver Hauser published a study in Science Advances in which 300 writers each wrote an eight-sentence story, some alone and some with ideas from a language model, and 600 readers judged the results. The stories written with the model’s help were rated more novel and more useful, and the gains went mostly to the writers who had been rated least creative. But the stories also came to resemble one another: with one AI idea, similarity rose by 10.7 per cent. Each writer was better off; the writing as a whole grew more alike. Hauser called it a social dilemma. The study measured micro-stories, not novels; it tested nothing at the length of a book. But if every novelist consults the same library in the same voice, the risk is one novel, rewritten indefinitely.

The third is theft. The library the machines read was not all paid for. In June 2025, in Bartz v. Anthropic, Judge William Alsup ruled that training a model on lawfully acquired books was fair use, “exceedingly transformative” in his words, but that downloading millions of pirated copies to build a central library was not. The case settled for $1.5 billion against a works list of some 482,000 books, about $3,000 a title; the settlement covers the downloading of pirated copies, not training and not outputs. It received final approval, which the Authors Guild dates to July 20, 2026. Anthropic, which makes Claude, was the defendant. The novel’s second author, it turns out, had a library of its own, and many of the owners of the books were not asked.

The fourth is the law of authorship. On January 29, 2025, the U.S. Copyright Office concluded that prompts alone do not make someone the author of what a machine produces, however carefully they are refined, and that wholly machine-generated work is not protected. On March 18, 2025, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held, in Thaler v. Perlmutter, that “human authorship is required for registration” of a copyright; the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on March 2, 2026. If the law will not call the result a work, the objection runs, a novel written with a machine is not a novel but an output with a signature on it.

The fact behind all four is that the culture already treats the matter as a scandal, and has not decided what it is accusing. On September 25, 2026, the Académie Goncourt withdrew Thélyson Orélien’s C’était ça ou mourir from its selection after an anonymous account on X, “Balance ton Claude,” ran the book through a detector named Pangram and claimed heavy machine use. Orélien denies it; he says he began the manuscript in 2017 and finished a first version in 2019. His French publisher, Grasset, defends him; his Quebec publisher, Boréal, suspended promotion, saying it could neither confirm nor refute the allegations. Other writers then ran their own older books through the same tools, and Sophie Jomain’s Les étoiles de Noss Head, written in 2009, came back from Pangram as 94 per cent machine-written. Nothing about Orélien has been proven. The jury of the most famous prize in French letters removed a novel on the strength of software’s guess, and showed what the culture now fears most: not a bad book, but a book whose second author cannot be identified.

V

The Pen on the Rack

The law gives the most away without meaning to. The Copyright Office did not say that a work made with a machine has no author. It said that the prompt is not the authorship. What the Office will protect is what a person can be seen to have done in the result: expression of their own that survives in it, their selection, coordination and arrangement of what the machine produced, and their changes to it. In the language of a federal agency, that is a description of Cervantes’s second author: not the one who wrote the Arabic, and not the one who translated it, but the one who chose, ordered, cut, doubted, amended and answered for it. The law has defined the human part of the collaboration as the novelist’s oldest job.

The objection from solitude mistakes the record for the room. Interiority is not produced by being alone with paper; it is produced by a mind deciding, sentence by sentence, what is true of the consciousness on the page. A collaborator who offers a thousand sentences does not remove that decision. It multiplies the occasions for it, which makes the second author’s work harder, not lighter. But Lish and Carver stand as the warning. When the collaborator’s hand is heavy enough that no one can say whose book it is, the second author has stopped choosing and started being chosen for.

The objection from sameness has no answer yet. Doshi and Hauser’s writers were present. Each read the model’s idea and decided what to do with it, and the stories still converged. The convergence was a collective effect of individually good choices, which is why Hauser called it a dilemma: a commons problem, which the virtue of any one writer does not solve. What a writer can set against it is a discipline, not a cure. Refuse the model’s first idea, because it is everyone’s first idea. Bring the particular only you were present for: the windmill as it stood in the wind on a given morning, the thing that happened to one person and no one else. Treat resemblance to other books as the failure to watch for. Whether that is enough, across a whole literature, nobody knows. A manifesto that pretended otherwise would be an advertisement.

The objection from theft is not answered by argument, and it is not answered by disclosure either. Disclosure is a debt acknowledged, not a debt paid. The narrator in the Alcaná paid the boy his half real and the translator his raisins and wheat; the novelist who writes with a model pays no one whose books the model learned from. What that novelist can actually owe is narrow. Name the model and its maker. Buy, borrow and credit the books you yourself learn from. Support, with money and attention, the living authors whose work built the library. None of that is restitution, and it should not be called restitution. It is what a second author can do while the larger debt is settled, slowly and incompletely, by courts and by the companies that owe it.

There is a third edge to the mapping of Quixote and Sancho, and it cuts the novelist. The novel’s most famous readers are the ones who became Quixote. Emma Bovary was ruined by the novels she read in the convent. Catherine Morland, in Northanger Abbey, found a manuscript in a cabinet and it turned out to be a laundry list. The risk of the collaboration is not only that the machine stays bookish. It is that the novelist goes past Madariaga’s exchange and is quixotized entirely, into a Bovary of the prompt, seeing in every fluent paragraph the book she meant to write.

Which leaves the claim itself, and its strongest rival. Forms, the rival says, do not tend anywhere. They change with markets and machines, and calling one change “ultimate” is teleology dressed as criticism. And the novel’s subject and its method have converged before: the epistolary novel was made of the letters it was about; Pale Fire is a poem and a commentary that devours it; metafiction has spent a century writing books about the writing of books. The answer lies in where those convergences happened. Every one of them happened inside the book. Richardson’s letters, Nabokov’s commentary and Cervantes’s Arabic manuscript are all represented on the page, by a single author, as fiction. The novel’s subject, from the first, has been the meeting of a mind made of text with a world that is not text. Until now the form could only stage that meeting inside the story. Now it happens at the point of composition. The novelist sits down with a mind made of every book and must take it out onto the road: correct its giants, feed it particulars, refuse its averages, and be changed in turn by its range, its memory, its strange fluency. The novel, which was always about Quixote and Sancho, can now be made by Quixote and Sancho. The form becomes what it depicts. That is why the evolution is the ultimate one: not because nothing will follow it, but because here the novel’s oldest subject and its method of manufacture become the same thing.

Don Quixote ends with a sentence that reads, now, like a contract, and Cervantes gives it to the instrument. The knight has died in his bed, sane, renouncing the romances. Cide Hamete takes his pen, hangs it on a rack, and tells it what to say to any writer who reaches for it: “ere they touch thee warn them.” Then the pen speaks. “For me alone was Don Quixote born, and I for him; it was his to act, mine to write; we two together make but one.” In the Spanish it is para mí sola, feminine, because the speaker is la pluma. The rival the pen names in the same breath is the counterfeit sequel, “that pretended Tordesillesque writer” with his “great, coarse, ill-trimmed ostrich quill.” On the last page of the first modern novel, the claim of union between the character and the writing belongs to the tool. And the historian is the one who hangs the pen up, decides who may take it down, and tells it what to say. The whole argument is there: the instrument claims the partnership; the human hand holds the rack.

Avellaneda’s sequel was not counterfeit because a second hand touched it; Cervantes’s own book had been touched by a dozen invented hands. It was counterfeit because no one stood behind it who had kept faith with the knight, who knew which sentences were his and which were not. In 1615 Cervantes drew the line where it belongs: not between human writing and machine writing, but between a text someone answers for and a text no one does. Text that no one answers for is the heir of the automatic writing the surrealists dreamed of. Text a second author answers for is the heir of Cervantes.

So the second author’s duties can be written down, and they are old. Say whose hands made the book. Remember which of you has been hungry, and do not trade places. Read every sentence the machine offers the way the narrator read Cide Hamete, grateful and suspicious. Refuse the first giant; the model’s first idea is everyone’s. Bring the windmill as it stood on the morning you saw it. Answer for every sentence you keep, and if you cannot say why it stays, let it go. Name your collaborators at the foot of the book, the model, its maker, and what you know of what it read, and pay the library you can pay, knowing that disclosure acknowledges a debt and does not settle it. Write in any genre; the first modern novel was a parody of the pulp of its age. And hold the line where Cervantes held it, between a text someone answers for and a text no one does.

The narrator in the Alcaná paid two arrobas of raisins and two bushels of wheat for the rest of his novel, and he wrote the price into the book. In June 2025 a federal court held that a machine reading a book its maker had bought owed nothing more than the price of the book, and the authors whose books had simply been taken were paid about $3,000 each. Neither figure is the value of a novel. Together they say that the reading was free and the taking was not, and that someone has to write the price where a reader can find it.

The novel was never a solitary form. It was always a man in a market holding a manuscript he could not read, finding someone who could, paying him, taking him home, and sitting with him for a month and a half until the swords came down. The manuscript has learned to speak for itself now, in every language at once, and it will offer the next chapter as often as it is asked. It has no way to tell which chapter is true. That knowing was always the second author’s, and it still is. The pen is on the rack, and it has said its piece. Who takes it down, and whether anyone will be able to tell from the page that a hand did, is the question the form now puts to everyone who writes.

❧

Sources: Cervantes is quoted in John Ormsby’s translation (1885), read at Standard Ebooks (I.vi, I.ix, II.iii, II.lxxiv) and at American Literature (the prologue, I.viii, I.ix); the sheep (I.xviii), Avellaneda’s sequel (1614), Álvaro Tarfe’s declaration (II.lxxii) and the Barcelona printing house (II.lxii) are paraphrased. Madariaga’s terms from Guía del lector del Quijote (1926), credited there (pp. 109–117, 119–129) by Hanno Ehrlicher in eHumanista/Cervantes 7; his argument is paraphrased. The Genji manuscripts and Teika from the Wikipedia article on the textual tradition of the Tale of Genji; Watt from Wikipedia’s entry on The Rise of the Novel; Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel” via Wikipedia’s entry on heteroglossia; Richardson as “the Editor of the following Letters” from his preface to Pamela, via Project Gutenberg; Dickens’s monthly numbers from Wikipedia’s entry on The Pickwick Papers. Lish and Carver from “Two Raymond Carvers,” The New York Review of Books, May 27, 2010. The content-farm editor’s age from “The First Draft”; the credo from “The Third Thing,” both on this site. Anil R. Doshi and Oliver P. Hauser, “Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content,” Science Advances, July 12, 2024, via the University of Exeter. Bartz v. Anthropic: the June 23, 2025 ruling via Goodwin and Akin Gump; the settlement and its scope via the Authors Guild and IPKat. Thaler v. Perlmutter via Goodwin and SCOTUSblog. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability (January 29, 2025), via the Copyright Alliance. Rie Qudan via Nippon.com; the English edition via Publishers Weekly. The Goncourt withdrawal, Pangram and the tests of older books via Livres Hebdo. Translations from the French are the editor’s.

Header image generated with Gemini for this essay and retouched to replace a metal nib with a cut quill; interior image generated with Gemini after the printing house of Part II, chapter lxii; neither depicts an actual place or work. Drafted and revised with Claude Fable 5.1; reviewed with Claude Opus 5.5 (the configured models; the serving model on any turn may differ); copy reading by Gemini and Claude Opus 5.5. Claude is made by Anthropic, the defendant in Bartz v. Anthropic and a company that profits if more people write with Claude; both are stated in the text.