Tag Archives: Don Quixote

EVER SILENT, EVER SAD

Dostoevsky believed Don Quixote was beautiful only because he was ridiculous, and feared his own hero had nothing of the kind. Within weeks his prince called himself ridiculous, and that spring a grieving father used the same words. By 1869 all the author would defend was “the idea.”

One Russian word means both funny and ridiculous. Followed through the novel’s crowded rooms, it arrives at a question the novel leaves open.

On 12 August 1867, in the museum at Basel, Fyodor Dostoevsky climbed onto a chair to look more closely at a painting. It was Hans Holbein the Younger’s Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, a panel thirty centimetres high and two metres long, the length of a man laid out. His wife Anna wrote in her diary that night that she had been afraid he would be fined. In her memoir, written long afterwards, she remembered that she could not bear the picture and left the room. When she came back fifteen or twenty minutes later he had not moved, and his face held the frightened look she knew from the first moments of his fits. When she led him away to rest, he insisted on going back.

In her diary she called the painting “not at all aesthetic”; it filled her with “revulsion and a kind of horror.” What it lacks, as the museum that owns it now points out, is anyone else. Holbein left out the mourners and the disciples, and in a picture of this subject the absence of every living figure is almost unique. The body has no witness but whoever stands in front of it.

That autumn, in Geneva, Dostoevsky began notes for a novel; in December he threw them all out. Then, owing his publisher about 4,500 roubles and writing, as he put it, from a desperate plight, he wrote the first seven chapters of a new novel in twenty-three days, on an idea he had loved for years and long not dared to take up: a positively beautiful man.

The difficulty is older than the novel, and simple to state. Goodness has no natural audience. How do you make it bearable to read?

Holbein painted a death with no one there to see it. In the novel Dostoevsky began that winter, someone is nearly always watching.

I

Only Because Ridiculous

On 1 January 1868, with those chapters written, he explained the idea to his niece, Sofia Ivanova. The main thought of the novel, he wrote, was to portray a positively beautiful man, and nothing in the world was harder. Every writer who had tried it, Russian or European, had failed, because the task was immeasurable. There was only one positively beautiful figure in the world, and that was Christ. Among the beautiful figures of Christian literature the most complete was Don Quixote, “but he is beautiful only because he is at the same time ridiculous.” Dickens’s Pickwick, “an infinitely weaker thought than Don Quixote, but still an enormous one,” was ridiculous too, and won by that alone. Compassion arises for the beautiful that is mocked and does not know its own worth, and with it sympathy in the reader: “this arousing of compassion is the mystery of humour.” Victor Hugo’s Jean Valjean was another strong attempt, but he arouses sympathy through his terrible misfortune and society’s injustice to him. Two routes to a reader, then: Quixote’s, through laughter, and Valjean’s, through suffering. And then: “I have nothing like that, absolutely nothing, and so I am terribly afraid it will be a positive failure.”

The adjective he gives his hero is the one Russian uses for a sunset and for a noble act alike, and it asks for more than kindness. And the pun is his own: the failure would be as positive as the man.

Whatever “nothing like that” means, it cannot mean that nobody laughs at his hero, because the chapters already written contain the laughter. On the train into Petersburg two strangers laugh at the prince’s bundle and his foreign cloak, and he laughs with them; one of them is Rogozhin, a merchant’s son who has just come into a fortune. At General Epanchin’s house, while the prince is out of the room fetching a portrait of Nastasya Filippovna, the beautiful, notorious woman at the centre of the book, the eldest daughter, Alexandra, agrees with her sister that he is too simple, “so that he’s even a little ridiculous.” Their mother, Lizaveta Prokofyevna, tells the girls they are more ridiculous than he is. What he lacks, then, is not laughter in the room but the comedy that makes a reader laugh with love. The letter’s fear concerns readers, and later readers have loved Myshkin for a century and a half. This essay watches a different audience: the people in the rooms.

The letter speaks, too, of “the main thought of the novel” and “the idea of the novel,” and takes comfort that nothing is “yet compromised.” Thought, idea, compromise: the words will come back.

The Russian word in Quixote’s sentence is a form of smeshnoi. It means funny as well as ridiculous, and the distance between the two is the distance between being laughed at and being laughed with. In its various forms it occurs sixty-five times in the novel, sixteen of them about Myshkin; the words for laughter and laughing are different, and are not counted.

Michael R. Katz, whose translation appeared this year, stakes his claim on the comic half of the word: most other translators, he has said, “have missed the humor.” The English here is the essay’s own, apart from three lines from Eva Martin’s translation of 1915, named at the end.

Within weeks the prince says it of himself. What the letter calls the second part, begun that day, became the last nine chapters of Part One, printed in February. At their close, at Nastasya Filippovna’s birthday party, Myshkin has offered to marry her, and he reminds her of the laughter that met his first words: “You smiled at those words, and I heard people round us laughing too. Perhaps I expressed myself very ridiculously, and was ridiculous myself, but I kept feeling that I understand what honour is.” A few pages on, leaving with Rogozhin, Nastasya Filippovna says: “Goodbye, prince. For the first time, I have seen a human being!”

In March he answered the fear. A notebook entry dated 21 March reads: “The hero of the novel, the Prince, if not ridiculous, has another sympathetic trait: he is innocent!” (The biographer Konstantin Mochulsky quoted it long ago.)

None of this settles whether the novel failed. “Positive failure” is the letter’s pun, not a verdict, and what follows reports his verdicts and adopts none of them.

II

The Laughing Room

Dostoevsky chose his precedent himself: the letter’s Don Quixote, beautiful only because he is ridiculous. The novel will name the knight outright, but it starts with the word.

The novel’s first use of its word is the prince’s own, and it expects a listener’s laughter. Waiting in the Epanchins’ anteroom, he tells the general’s footman about a guillotining he saw in Lyon, and about the thought that certain death is worse than torture, and then he says: “To you this seems funny, wild.” Later, with the general’s wife and daughters, he tells of a man reprieved on the scaffold, and offers Adelaida a subject for a painting: a condemned man’s face one minute before the blade. Dostoevsky had stood on such a scaffold himself, on 22 December 1849. So the word enters the novel at the scaffold, and in a plan of early November 1867 the notebooks had put the scaffold and the painting on consecutive lines: a note on the thoughts of a man about to be beheaded, then “the story about Holbein’s Christ in Basel.”

Most of the novel’s comedy is not his. General Ivolgin lies magnificently; Lebedev, the clerk from the train, preaches on the Apocalypse. Myshkin is more often the occasion of laughter than its source. He can be funny, and the vase is coming. But the narrator will hardly laugh at him. Of the sixteen times the word is applied to Myshkin, the narrator speaks three, and hedges each. Someone too fond of laughing “might perhaps have found something to smile at” in his clothes, “but what doesn’t make people laugh?” He smiles “strangely and even funnily.” When he sets out his views to the Epanchins, it would all have been funny “if it had not been so well expounded,” as his listeners agreed afterwards. The book’s other voices laugh at him far more readily than the one that tells it.

People open to him, too. They tell Myshkin the worst of themselves; Tobias Grey, reviewing the new translation, calls him “an ideal confidant.” The telling seldom changes what they do, and it leaves him no safer.

Aglaya, the youngest Epanchin daughter, laughs at him hardest, and her laughter keeps running into Cervantes. Early in Part Two she keeps a note from the prince in a thick, stoutly bound book. A week later she looks to see what the book is. It is Don Quixote, and she laughs, though, the narrator says, “it would be difficult to say exactly why.” By the summer the poor knight of Pushkin’s ballad has become a family joke about the prince, told in front of him, and Kolya reminds her where it began: a month ago, leafing through Don Quixote, she exclaimed that there was nothing better than the poor knight. Before she recites the ballad, she explains it. The poor knight is “the same Don Quixote, only serious, not comic. At first I didn’t understand and laughed, and now I love the ‘poor knight,’ and respect his deeds.” It no longer mattered to him who his lady was: “even if she had been a thief, he would still have had to believe in her and break lances for her pure beauty.”

Then she recites. Pushkin’s knight writes A.M.D. in blood on his shield; his lady is never named, and only Pushkin’s first version spells the letters out, Ave, Mater Dei. Aglaya has already called them A.N.B., twice, and held to it when Kolya “corrected” her to A.N.D.; neither is Pushkin’s. Now she reads N.F.B., for Nastasya Filippovna Barashkova, a kept woman whose story many of her listeners know, and speaks the letters so gravely and so simply that they might pass for Pushkin’s. Her mother notices nothing; Evgeny Pavlovich makes sure he is seen to understand. The prince, sure it is deliberate, cannot see afterwards how so true and beautiful a feeling could go with so open and malicious a mockery. Beautiful is the letter’s word. Set the three ladies side by side: Cervantes’s Dulcinea, invented; Pushkin’s Mother of God, in heaven; Aglaya’s Nastasya Filippovna, fallen. Only the last puts Aglaya’s own rule to the test, and the prince will keep it, at her expense. The version she recites is Pushkin’s later one, of 1835, in which the knight dies “like a madman” and no one intercedes; in his first, of 1829, the Virgin takes him into heaven.

In the novel the comparison is Aglaya’s. Her knight is Quixote with the comedy taken out, the one ingredient the letter called essential, yet her own response runs in the letter’s order, laughter first and then love. Caterina Corbella has argued that her reading misleads, and that the one who loves as Quixote does, choosing a body for an invented ideal, is Aglaya herself. She also reads the prince and Rogozhin as two halves of one figure, as Quixote and Sancho are.

A painted double portrait on an empty dark brown ground. On the left, a gaunt older man in rusty, strapped armour, a brass barber’s basin on his head and a wooden lance in his hand, gazes upward past the viewer. On the right, a slender fair-haired young man with a small pale beard, in a grey travelling coat and dark neckcloth under a grey-green hooded cloak, holds a bundle tied in a faded red scarf and looks straight out at the viewer.
Don Quixote and Prince Myshkin, imagined side by side: one looking past us, one looking at us. Image generated by Gemini Argon for this essay.

III

A Funny Voice

Sonia Dostoevskaya was born in Geneva on 22 February 1868. She died of pneumonia on 12 May, not quite three months old. Six days later Dostoevsky wrote to his friend Apollon Maikov: “My Sonia has died; we buried her three days ago.”

The word comes four times in that letter. The first is “let it be that my love was ridiculous”; two more are set out below. He had sung to her, he writes, in his funny voice, and there the right English is funny. Then: “let them laugh at me and at my love.” In the January letter the word belonged to Cervantes and Dickens. In May it belongs to a father. In June, from Vevey, he wrote that he could still see her eyes following him as he went out to read the newspapers on the day she died.

Here, then, are two sentences, a few months apart.

Perhaps I expressed myself very ridiculously, and was ridiculous myself.
The prince, at Nastasya Filippovna’s party: Part One, chapter XVI, written early in 1868 and printed in February.

Let it be that I expressed myself ridiculously about her… I alone was ridiculous to them.
The father, to Maikov, 18 May 1868.

In Russian the verb is the same: perfective in the prince’s sentence, a single act, and imperfective in the father’s, an ongoing manner. The adverb is the same, and so is the short form of the adjective. The situation is the same as well: feeling spoken aloud, and laughed at. That is all the dates show.

IV

The Misfire

Ippolit Terentyev asks plainly not to be laughed at. He is a consumptive young man with weeks to live. In Part Two he tells Lizaveta Prokofyevna, the general’s wife, that he came to Pavlovsk to see the trees, and asks her, seriously: “That isn’t funny, is it? There’s nothing funny in that?”

In Part Three, written from August 1868, he reads his testament aloud on the prince’s terrace as the prince’s birthday turns into dawn, to a tired, half-drunk audience that did not ask to hear it. He calls it “My Necessary Explanation.” By now the trees have changed hands: in the testament they belong to his consolers, with “their ridiculous ‘Pavlovsk trees.’” Early on he is heckled. When he cries that they don’t like him at all, “there was laughter; most, however, did not laugh,” and he goes terribly red. Part of the testament is about a painting. He has seen the copy of the Holbein in Rogozhin’s house, and the picture, he says, shows “this blind, dumb, implacable, eternal, unreasoning force.” And he notices who is missing: “The people who surrounded the dead man, not one of whom is in the picture, must have felt a terrible anguish and confusion that evening.”

When he has finished, he turns, as if to a friend for advice, to Evgeny Pavlovich, a polished man of the world who is courting Aglaya: he has made a terrible mistake, reading them this notebook. “The position is ridiculous,” Evgeny Pavlovich answers, smiling, “but I really don’t know what to advise you.” Ippolit puts a pistol to his temple and pulls the trigger. It clicks; there is no cap in it. Fear turns into laughter, and some guffaw with malicious pleasure. Here is the derided sufferer, and in that moment he gets the laughter without the love.

In Part Four the prince tells him he is sorry Ippolit has disowned the notebook. “It is sincere, and you know, even its most ridiculous sides, and there are many” (here Ippolit winces) “are redeemed by suffering, because confessing them was suffering too.” The sentence joins Quixote’s route and Valjean’s, and offers them to someone who fears the first. Ippolit’s reply is that they have had “a very funny conversation.”

Holbein’s dead man has no witnesses. Ippolit, reading about him to a terrace full of listeners, has too many. The copy, about 1.8 metres long and 27 centimetres high, hangs over a door in Rogozhin’s house, where the novel’s last night will be spent.

V

Not the Novel, but the Idea

At the Epanchins’ evening party in Part Four, before the old princess Belokonskaya and a roomful of society, Myshkin breaks the Chinese vase that Aglaya warned him about. The laughter grows; he is forgiven, and he weeps. “You’re a kind man, but a ridiculous one,” Belokonskaya tells him. “Give you twopence and you thank them as if they’d saved your life. You think that’s praiseworthy, and it’s disgusting.” She is on the edge of real anger, and then she laughs, this time kindly.

Ippolit, who says he can neither love nor respect the prince, had already said the same behind his back: “a decidedly kind man, though… ridiculous.” Where the letter said beautiful, they say kind, and it is a pairing easy to say with affection, as Belokonskaya’s laugh shows. The audience’s word is smaller than the author’s. The theory works, and what it wins is a downgrade.

He begins to talk. Aglaya forbade him to speak, he tells an old dignitary in confidence, and even named the subjects, because she knows he is ridiculous in them. “I have no right to express my thought. Only in Moscow, with Rogozhin, did I speak openly. I am always afraid that my ridiculous look will compromise the thought and the main idea. I have no gesture. My gesture is always the opposite, and that provokes laughter and humiliates the idea.” Thought, main idea, compromise: the January letter’s words, in its hero’s mouth, months later. Now he turns to the room. They are all ridiculous, he says, he and they alike, and “to be ridiculous is sometimes even good, and better: we can forgive one another sooner.” Minutes later he falls in a fit. The theory has done all it promised: laughter, forgiveness, something like love.

The word’s last appearance in the novel turns the theory around. In the weeks before the wedding that never takes place, Nastasya Filippovna does everything she can to cheer him up and tells him every funny thing she can remember. The prince almost always pretends to laugh a great deal, and sometimes really does. Now she is the one offering the comedy, and he is the one pretending. On the wedding day she runs from the church steps to Rogozhin, as she had once before, at the end of Part One, in the chapter where the prince calls himself ridiculous. The last night is spent in Rogozhin’s house. He has killed her, and her body lies behind a curtain. The two men lie down next to each other and keep watch over her till morning; the painted body over the door still has no one. Myshkin strokes Rogozhin’s hair and cheeks; when the door is opened he no longer recognises anyone.

There is a reading in which this ending is his doing; Murray Krieger called his chapter on the novel, in The Tragic Vision (1960), “The Curse of Saintliness.” The novel gives that reading its scene. At the meeting of the two women in Part Four, when Nastasya Filippovna breaks down, he pleads her unhappiness to Aglaya, and Aglaya runs from the house; he stays. Nor is that reading foreign to the novel’s beginnings: in the earliest notebooks the hero is proud and violent. And the novel never entirely separates him from the man who kills: they exchange crosses, Rogozhin raises a knife against him on the stairs, and they spend the last night side by side, Corbella’s two halves of one figure. If that reading is right, the love that laughter wins is part of the harm. The text does not say whether his goodness caused the ending or only failed to prevent it.

The novel, Dostoevsky told his niece on 25 January 1869, had not expressed a tenth part of what he meant, and “I love my thought that failed, to this day.” To Nikolai Strakhov, a month later: “I stand not for the novel, but for my idea.” The letter to Strakhov does not use the word ridiculous at all. Of the January vocabulary, the thought and the idea remain. Nine years later he would say much the same of The Double, which “positively did not succeed, but its idea was rather bright.” If the formula is a reflex, these verdicts say less about The Idiot than they seem to. Here, though, its words have a scene: a hero at a party, afraid that his ridiculous look will compromise the thought and the main idea.

What Dostoevsky took from Cervantes is in his own letter and his own pages: a beautiful man the world laughs at, loved by some of those who laugh, and a lady to be championed whatever she has done. What changed is as plain. The comedy has moved: it is the room’s, not the narrator’s. This knight has no windmills; Myshkin’s trouble is that he sees people too clearly, and what is comic in him is his manner, not his mind. And Cervantes ends by giving his knight his reason back, so that he dies sane, as Alonso Quixano, called the Good.

Dostoevsky’s prince does not get his back. In the Conclusion he is in Switzerland, in the clinic he came from, like the poor knight of the ballad, who goes home to his distant castle and lives there shut away, “ever silent, ever sad.” Lizaveta Prokofyevna visits, and he does not recognise her at all. “At all events, I’ve had a good Russian cry over this poor fellow,” she says, and her adjective is the ballad’s: in Russian the poor fellow and the poor knight share it. Holbein left the mourners out. At its very end the novel gives its good man one. He does not know her.

Can the love that laughter wins protect the man it is won for?

⁂

The occasion is Tobias Grey’s review of Michael R. Katz’s new translation, “‘The Idiot’: Dostoevsky’s Classic Novel of an Honest Man”, in The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2026.

The letters, Anna Dostoevskaya’s diary, the notebooks and Pushkin’s ballad are quoted in the essay’s own translations from the Russian, from the Nauka Collected Works in fifteen volumes (1996), which reprints the Academy texts. Where Ethel Colburn Mayne’s English of 1914 differs, as with “nothing like that” and “thought,” they follow the Russian; letters not quoted directly are paraphrased from Mayne. Quotations from the novel are the essay’s own translations, except “it would be difficult to say exactly why,” Ippolit’s “blind, dumb” force and Lizaveta Prokofyevna’s last line, which are Eva Martin’s, from 1915. The echoes traced here are in the Russian. Martin’s English smooths them away: his prince fears “spoiling a great Thought or Idea by my absurd manner,” and his prince’s “true and beautiful feeling” moves onto the girl. Dates are Old Style, the Russian calendar of the time, twelve days behind the Western one. The count of sixty-five uses of smeshnoi comes from a modern digital text of about 210,000 words; the Academy edition may differ by one or two.

For the painting and Anna’s account, the Kunstmuseum Basel’s exhibition texts. For Anna’s return to the panel and the notebook plan of November 1867, Katherine Bowers, “Under the Floorboards, Over the Door”, in Dostoevsky at 200, edited by Bowers and Kate Holland (Toronto, 2021), which also quotes Carol Apollonio’s “beyond the frame” (Dostoevsky’s Secrets, 2009); Apollonio and Bowers both look for the painting’s meaning among its viewers, before this essay does. The same volume’s introduction gives the earliest notebook hero. For the poor-knight passages in Russian, and for the reading of Aglaya as the novel’s Quixote, Caterina Corbella, “Cervantes’ Don Quixote in Dostoevsky’s Novel The Idiot”, Dostoevsky and World Culture, 2024, no. 2. For the laughter during Ippolit’s reading, Tatiana Kasatkina, 2025. For the order of composition and the March notebook entry, the 1868 Russian Messenger and Middlebury College’s notes on the making of the novel, after Konstantin Mochulsky. For the ballad, the Academy Complete Works of Pushkin in ten volumes (1977), vol. 3; the novel quotes Pushkin’s later version, and Kasatkina (1999) argues that the earlier one stands behind it. The Russian checks and the concordance are the literary editor’s.

Further reading, not consulted for this essay: Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics; Konstantin Mochulsky, Dostoevsky: His Life and Work, translated by Michael A. Minihan (1967); Robin Feuer Miller, Dostoevsky and The Idiot: Author, Narrator, and Reader (1981); Murray Krieger, “Dostoevsky’s Idiot: The Curse of Saintliness,” in The Tragic Vision (1960); Victor Terras, The Idiot: An Interpretation (1990); Tatiana Kasatkina on the painting’s liminality and the viewer’s position (2006, 2011); L. V. Alekseeva (2018), Bell and others in Funny Dostoevsky (2024), and Stefano Aloe on laughter; Tapp on embarrassment (Slavic and East European Journal 60.3, 2016); Young (2007); Jackson (2016); on Cervantes in Russia and in the novel, Ivan Turgenev, “Hamlet and Don Quixote” (1860), Vsevolod Bagno, Don Quixote in Russia and Russian Quixotism (2009), and Gratchev, “Prince Myshkin as a Tragic Interpretation of Don Quixote” (Cervantes 35.1, 2015); on the ballad’s versions, S. B. Fedotova (Russkaya literatura, 2025, no. 4) and S. A. Fomichev (2008).

Images generated by Gemini Argon for this essay.

Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary and copy editing by Claude Sonnet 5.5; outside literary editing by Claude Fable 5.1.

THE SECOND AUTHOR

The novel was born when a man who had read everything rode out beside a man who had read nothing. Its next form is the same journey, taken at a desk.

Cervantes gave his novel a second author, a translator paid in raisins, and a source he warned his readers not to trust. He ended it by letting the pen claim the book. The pen has arrived in fact, and it writes in every language at once. Whether it completes the novel or ends it depends on who hangs it up.

The first modern novel stops in the middle of a sword-stroke. At the end of the eighth chapter of Don Quixote, the knight and a Basque traveller face each other with their swords raised, and the narrator gives up. The author of the history, he reports, “leaves this battle impending, giving as excuse that he could find nothing more written.” The book has run out of book.

The ninth chapter is about how the narrator found the rest. “One day, as I was in the Alcaná of Toledo, a boy came up to sell some pamphlets and old papers to a silk mercer.” The narrator, who is “fond of reading even the very scraps of paper in the streets,” picks one up. It is in Arabic, which he does not read, so he finds a Morisco in the market who does. The man opens it at random and laughs at a note in the margin: Dulcinea del Toboso, the lady for whom the knight risks his life, “had, they say, the best hand of any woman in all La Mancha for salting pigs.” The title page reads: “History of Don Quixote of La Mancha, written by Cide Hamete Benengeli, an Arab historian.” The narrator buys the bundle for half a real, takes the translator home so the find will not slip away, and pays him “two arrobas of raisins and two bushels of wheat.” In “little more than a month and a half” the whole is translated “just as it is set down here.” The swords come down. The novel goes on.

So the book that literary history calls the first modern novel announces, a few dozen pages in, that it was not written by the man whose name is on it. It was written by a foreign historian, rendered by a hired translator out of a language the narrator has no way to check, assembled by an editor who argues with his source in the margins, and finished by a market accident. Cervantes did not hide the machinery. He made it the story.

The claim here is addressed to anyone who writes stories, in any genre, and to anyone who reads them. Human collaboration with generative AI is the ultimate evolution of the novel: ultimate not in the sense of last, as though nothing could follow, but in the older sense, the furthest point toward which a thing was always tending, the end that was in it from the start. The novel has always been a form written by more than one hand, about a mind made of other people’s words meeting a world that will not be read. Generative AI brings nothing foreign to that form. It brings the form’s own premise to the desk where the form is made.

One fact belongs before the argument. This essay was drafted with Claude, a model made by Anthropic, a company that profits if more people write this way; the reader should weigh it accordingly.

I

The Second Author

At the end of the eighth chapter, before the manuscript turns up, Cervantes’s narrator calls himself “the second author of this work.” There is a first author, Cide Hamete, who was there, or claims to have been, and wrote the history down. There is a translator, who turns it into Castilian for raisins. And there is a second author, who did not invent the story and did not translate it, but who found it, bought it, read it, doubted it, cut it, arranged it, and set it before the public under his own name.

He is careful to say that his source is unreliable. “If against the present one any objection be raised on the score of its truth,” he writes, “it can only be that its author was an Arab, as lying is a very common propensity with those of that nation.” The line carries the prejudice of Cervantes’s Spain against a people it was in the act of expelling; the last Moriscos were driven out between 1609 and 1614, in the years between the novel’s two parts. But the joke turns on the narrator. He is the one who does not read Arabic, who depends entirely on a translator from that same people, and who has no way to check a single word. His suspicion of the source is the only check he has, and it is the check every reader of the book has had to use since.

Within a page he gives the other half of the second author’s duty. Historians, he says, ought to be exact and truthful, because their subject is truth, “whose mother is history, rival of time, storehouse of deeds, witness for the past, example and counsel for the present, and warning for the future.” The sentence is grand, and it is put in the mouth of a man who has just admitted his history came from a market stall by way of a man he paid in fruit. The book holds both at once: the duty to the truth, and the fact that the text arrived from a source no one can fully trust.

The prologue had already done the same thing to authorship. It opens with the author at his desk, stuck, “pondering with the paper before me, a pen in my ear, my elbow on the desk, and my cheek in my hand, thinking of what I should say.” Then “there came in unexpectedly a certain lively, clever friend of mine,” who tells him how to write the prologue, and the prologue we are reading is the advice. A few lines earlier the author has disowned his own hero: “for though I pass for the father, I am but the stepfather to ‘Don Quixote.’”

Stepfather is the right word for what a novelist has always been. A stepfather does not make the child. He takes on the raising of it, answers for it, decides what it may and may not do, and is judged by how it turns out. The prologue, the frame and the found manuscript all say the same thing about the book in the reader’s hands: it is not the expression of one mind. It is the work of a found source, a hired voice, a friend who came in at the right moment, and a second author who chose.

The credo set out in The Third Thing holds that the machine does not write; it drafts, proposes and retrieves, and has no way to tell which of its thousand competent sentences is the right one, and that knowing is the work. Cervantes wrote the same credo in 1605, as a comedy. Cide Hamete is the source of the sentences. The second author is the one who knows which of them to keep. What has changed is that Cide Hamete is no longer a fiction.

II

A Man Made of Books

The hero of the first modern novel is a reader, and what he reads is pulp. Alonso Quixano, a minor gentleman of La Mancha, reads romances of chivalry, the popular genre fiction of his age, until, in the novel’s famous diagnosis, his brain dries up. He sells acres of land to buy more of them. Don Quixote began as a parody of that popular fiction, and the form it founded has room for every genre. What comes out of all that reading is not a madman in the ordinary sense. It is a mind made entirely of text: fluent in the idiom of a whole literature, able to produce on demand a speech, a challenge, a vow, a lament in the high style, and unable to tell a windmill from a giant.

The description fits a large language model closely, and it is unfair to it in a way that matters. The model, too, has read the library, far more of it than any gentleman of La Mancha. It too is a mind assembled from other people’s sentences, and it too can produce a lament or a challenge in any register on request. And it too has never been anywhere. It has no hunger, no body that a windmill’s sail could knock off a horse. When it errs, it errs the way Quixote errs, from the inside of the books outward, with total conviction and perfect style. The First Draft found that error in a content farm: an editor-in-chief whose age went from seventy-seven to seventy-five in three days, because there was no one inside the text who had lived through either day.

But the comparison cuts both ways, and the second edge matters more. Quixote is not only the novel’s fool. He is its conscience. He is generous and brave and courteous to people the world despises; he frees galley slaves and defends a beaten boy, sometimes with disastrous results, always out of a moral vocabulary he took from books. The literature that dried his brain also gave him every ideal he has. A mind made of the library carries the library’s nobility along with its delusions. That is why the knight is loved, and why the books he read are not simply burned.

They are judged. In the sixth chapter, while Quixote sleeps, the village priest and the barber go into his library and conduct a work of literary criticism inside a novel. They take the books down one by one, praise some, condemn others, argue over a few, and throw most into the yard to be burned. One of them is a pastoral romance by a certain Cervantes, of whom the priest says he “has had more experience in reverses than in verses.” The book is neither burned nor praised. It is set aside, to be kept shut up until its promised second part shows whether it can be amended. The scene is the second author’s work in miniature: the library is not refused, it is sorted, and the author’s own book is held for revision.

Then Cervantes does the thing that makes the book a novel and not a satire. He sends the man made of books out on the road with a man who has read nothing at all. Sancho Panza does not read. He thinks in proverbs, in meals, in the price of things, in the bruises on his own back. Where Quixote sees an army, Sancho sees sheep, and says so. The novel is the long conversation between them: the corpus and the body, the voice of all books and the voice of one life, each correcting the other across a thousand miles of bad roads.

Salvador de Madariaga, in his Guía del lector del Quijote of 1926, gave that conversation its best-known names. Over the course of the book, he argued, Sancho is quixotized and Quixote is sanchified: the squire rises toward illusion and the knight comes down toward the world, until each has become partly the other. The novel’s deepest movement is not a plot. It is an exchange of natures between a text-made mind and an embodied one.

That exchange is the ground of the claim. A novelist working with a generative model is not Quixote, and the model is not Sancho. It is the other way round. The model is the man made of books. The novelist is the one who has been hungry, who has buried someone, who knows what a windmill is because he has stood under one in the wind. The collaboration, done well, is Madariaga’s exchange happening at the desk: the novelist quixotized, given the range and daring of the whole library; the machine sanchified, pulled down out of its averages toward one place, one body, one life.

III

The Many Hands

The romantic picture of the novelist is a person alone in a room, and the picture is mostly wrong. The history of the novel is a history of collaboration, and of collaboration made possible, each time, by a new machine.

Murasaki Shikibu wrote The Tale of Genji at the beginning of the eleventh century, and it reached later readers only through copyists. The earliest surviving manuscripts date from the early Kamakura period, some two centuries on, and when the poet Fujiwara no Teika set out in 1224 to establish a true text, he was frustrated by the variations among the copies in circulation. The Genji we read is Murasaki’s book as her copyists and editors settled it. Cervantes wrote after a century of printing and made the press part of his plot. In the third chapter of the second part, the bachelor Samsón Carrasco tells Quixote that his history is already out: “more than twelve thousand volumes of the said history in print this very day,” with editions in Portugal, Barcelona and Valencia, one rumoured at Antwerp, and “not a country or language in which there will not be a translation of it.” The knight learns he is a book. The press has become a character.

The second part exists because of another hand. In 1614 a writer calling himself Alonso Fernández de Avellaneda published a sequel of his own, a counterfeit Quixote, whose identity is still disputed. Cervantes answered it not with a lawsuit but with a better book, and inside that book he had his real knight meet a character from the false one, a gentleman named Álvaro Tarfe, who swears before a magistrate that the Quixote he knew was not this one. The counterfeit was defeated by authentication: a second author putting his name, and his character’s name, to the true text.

A gaunt gentleman in a rusted breastplate reads a freshly printed sheet in a seventeenth-century printing house while a stout countryman holding his hat looks on
A Barcelona printing house, and a knight reading the machine’s account of himself. Generated with Gemini for this essay; it depicts no actual place or work.

Ian Watt, in The Rise of the Novel (1957), tied the English form’s rise to a growing middle class and a widening readership among women. Richardson’s Pamela (1740) is a novel made of letters, a chorus of voices whose author poses on the title page as their editor. Dickens published The Pickwick Papers in monthly numbers, under deadlines, in an age when serial authors often answered their readers as they went. Behind every translated novel stands a translator whose sentences the reader takes for the author’s, and behind many novels stands an editor whose cuts the reader never sees. Each of these is a Morisco in the Alcaná.

Mikhail Bakhtin argued that the novel is by nature many-voiced, the form that takes in the speech of every class and trade and genre and lets them argue on the page. The novel has always absorbed whatever new language came near it. It took the letter, the diary, the newspaper, the case history, the film cut, the text message. What it had never met was a language made of all of those at once, and able to answer.

That is what is new about generative AI, and why the novel, of all forms, is where the meeting matters most. Earlier machines changed how the novel was copied, printed, sold and read. The printing press did not suggest a sentence. The typewriter did not reply. A generative model works in the form’s own material, prose, and talks back in it. It is the library made fluent: Cide Hamete’s manuscript, able to write the next chapter whenever it is asked.

The most honoured novel so far to say so on its face is Japanese. In January 2024 Rie Qudan won the Akutagawa Prize, Japan’s most prestigious award for new fiction, for Tokyo-to Dōjō-to, a novel about an architect designing a tower in which criminals are housed in comfort, and about the language used to describe them. Qudan said at the press conference that roughly five per cent of the text came word for word from generative AI, mainly the replies of a chatbot her character consults. Jesse Kirkwood’s English translation, Sympathy Tower Tokyo, appeared in 2025. The machine’s voice is in the novel the way the Arabic manuscript is in Don Quixote: placed, framed, answered, and made into a subject.

IV

The Case Against

There are four objections, and a fifth fact that sits behind all of them.

The first is solitude. The novel’s great achievement, from Murasaki to Woolf, is interiority: one consciousness rendered from inside, at a depth no other form reaches. That depth seems to depend on a single mind working alone for years, with no one to hand it a competent sentence. On this view the novel is not a product but a record of one person’s attention, and a collaborator who never tires and never attends is a solvent poured on the record. The history of editing has a case for it. Gordon Lish cut Raymond Carver’s What We Talk About When We Talk About Love (1981) by more than half, gave ten stories new titles and rewrote the endings of fourteen. When the manuscript versions were published in 2009 as Beginners, readers divided over which was the real Carver, and they still do.

The second is sameness, and it has been measured. In July 2024 Anil Doshi and Oliver Hauser published a study in Science Advances in which 300 writers each wrote an eight-sentence story, some alone and some with ideas from a language model, and 600 readers judged the results. The stories written with the model’s help were rated more novel and more useful, and the gains went mostly to the writers who had been rated least creative. But the stories also came to resemble one another: with one AI idea, similarity rose by 10.7 per cent. Each writer was better off; the writing as a whole grew more alike. Hauser called it a social dilemma. The study measured micro-stories, not novels; it tested nothing at the length of a book. But if every novelist consults the same library in the same voice, the risk is one novel, rewritten indefinitely.

The third is theft. The library the machines read was not all paid for. In June 2025, in Bartz v. Anthropic, Judge William Alsup ruled that training a model on lawfully acquired books was fair use, “exceedingly transformative” in his words, but that downloading millions of pirated copies to build a central library was not. The case settled for $1.5 billion against a works list of some 482,000 books, about $3,000 a title; the settlement covers the downloading of pirated copies, not training and not outputs. It received final approval, which the Authors Guild dates to July 20, 2026. Anthropic, which makes Claude, was the defendant. The novel’s second author, it turns out, had a library of its own, and many of the owners of the books were not asked.

The fourth is the law of authorship. On January 29, 2025, the U.S. Copyright Office concluded that prompts alone do not make someone the author of what a machine produces, however carefully they are refined, and that wholly machine-generated work is not protected. On March 18, 2025, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held, in Thaler v. Perlmutter, that “human authorship is required for registration” of a copyright; the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on March 2, 2026. If the law will not call the result a work, the objection runs, a novel written with a machine is not a novel but an output with a signature on it.

The fact behind all four is that the culture already treats the matter as a scandal, and has not decided what it is accusing. On September 25, 2026, the Académie Goncourt withdrew Thélyson Orélien’s C’était ça ou mourir from its selection after an anonymous account on X, “Balance ton Claude,” ran the book through a detector named Pangram and claimed heavy machine use. Orélien denies it; he says he began the manuscript in 2017 and finished a first version in 2019. His French publisher, Grasset, defends him; his Quebec publisher, Boréal, suspended promotion, saying it could neither confirm nor refute the allegations. Other writers then ran their own older books through the same tools, and Sophie Jomain’s Les étoiles de Noss Head, written in 2009, came back from Pangram as 94 per cent machine-written. Nothing about Orélien has been proven. The jury of the most famous prize in French letters removed a novel on the strength of software’s guess, and showed what the culture now fears most: not a bad book, but a book whose second author cannot be identified.

V

The Pen on the Rack

The law gives the most away without meaning to. The Copyright Office did not say that a work made with a machine has no author. It said that the prompt is not the authorship. What the Office will protect is what a person can be seen to have done in the result: expression of their own that survives in it, their selection, coordination and arrangement of what the machine produced, and their changes to it. In the language of a federal agency, that is a description of Cervantes’s second author: not the one who wrote the Arabic, and not the one who translated it, but the one who chose, ordered, cut, doubted, amended and answered for it. The law has defined the human part of the collaboration as the novelist’s oldest job.

The objection from solitude mistakes the record for the room. Interiority is not produced by being alone with paper; it is produced by a mind deciding, sentence by sentence, what is true of the consciousness on the page. A collaborator who offers a thousand sentences does not remove that decision. It multiplies the occasions for it, which makes the second author’s work harder, not lighter. But Lish and Carver stand as the warning. When the collaborator’s hand is heavy enough that no one can say whose book it is, the second author has stopped choosing and started being chosen for.

The objection from sameness has no answer yet. Doshi and Hauser’s writers were present. Each read the model’s idea and decided what to do with it, and the stories still converged. The convergence was a collective effect of individually good choices, which is why Hauser called it a dilemma: a commons problem, which the virtue of any one writer does not solve. What a writer can set against it is a discipline, not a cure. Refuse the model’s first idea, because it is everyone’s first idea. Bring the particular only you were present for: the windmill as it stood in the wind on a given morning, the thing that happened to one person and no one else. Treat resemblance to other books as the failure to watch for. Whether that is enough, across a whole literature, nobody knows. A manifesto that pretended otherwise would be an advertisement.

The objection from theft is not answered by argument, and it is not answered by disclosure either. Disclosure is a debt acknowledged, not a debt paid. The narrator in the Alcaná paid the boy his half real and the translator his raisins and wheat; the novelist who writes with a model pays no one whose books the model learned from. What that novelist can actually owe is narrow. Name the model and its maker. Buy, borrow and credit the books you yourself learn from. Support, with money and attention, the living authors whose work built the library. None of that is restitution, and it should not be called restitution. It is what a second author can do while the larger debt is settled, slowly and incompletely, by courts and by the companies that owe it.

There is a third edge to the mapping of Quixote and Sancho, and it cuts the novelist. The novel’s most famous readers are the ones who became Quixote. Emma Bovary was ruined by the novels she read in the convent. Catherine Morland, in Northanger Abbey, found a manuscript in a cabinet and it turned out to be a laundry list. The risk of the collaboration is not only that the machine stays bookish. It is that the novelist goes past Madariaga’s exchange and is quixotized entirely, into a Bovary of the prompt, seeing in every fluent paragraph the book she meant to write.

Which leaves the claim itself, and its strongest rival. Forms, the rival says, do not tend anywhere. They change with markets and machines, and calling one change “ultimate” is teleology dressed as criticism. And the novel’s subject and its method have converged before: the epistolary novel was made of the letters it was about; Pale Fire is a poem and a commentary that devours it; metafiction has spent a century writing books about the writing of books. The answer lies in where those convergences happened. Every one of them happened inside the book. Richardson’s letters, Nabokov’s commentary and Cervantes’s Arabic manuscript are all represented on the page, by a single author, as fiction. The novel’s subject, from the first, has been the meeting of a mind made of text with a world that is not text. Until now the form could only stage that meeting inside the story. Now it happens at the point of composition. The novelist sits down with a mind made of every book and must take it out onto the road: correct its giants, feed it particulars, refuse its averages, and be changed in turn by its range, its memory, its strange fluency. The novel, which was always about Quixote and Sancho, can now be made by Quixote and Sancho. The form becomes what it depicts. That is why the evolution is the ultimate one: not because nothing will follow it, but because here the novel’s oldest subject and its method of manufacture become the same thing.

Don Quixote ends with a sentence that reads, now, like a contract, and Cervantes gives it to the instrument. The knight has died in his bed, sane, renouncing the romances. Cide Hamete takes his pen, hangs it on a rack, and tells it what to say to any writer who reaches for it: “ere they touch thee warn them.” Then the pen speaks. “For me alone was Don Quixote born, and I for him; it was his to act, mine to write; we two together make but one.” In the Spanish it is para mí sola, feminine, because the speaker is la pluma. The rival the pen names in the same breath is the counterfeit sequel, “that pretended Tordesillesque writer” with his “great, coarse, ill-trimmed ostrich quill.” On the last page of the first modern novel, the claim of union between the character and the writing belongs to the tool. And the historian is the one who hangs the pen up, decides who may take it down, and tells it what to say. The whole argument is there: the instrument claims the partnership; the human hand holds the rack.

Avellaneda’s sequel was not counterfeit because a second hand touched it; Cervantes’s own book had been touched by a dozen invented hands. It was counterfeit because no one stood behind it who had kept faith with the knight, who knew which sentences were his and which were not. In 1615 Cervantes drew the line where it belongs: not between human writing and machine writing, but between a text someone answers for and a text no one does. Text that no one answers for is the heir of the automatic writing the surrealists dreamed of. Text a second author answers for is the heir of Cervantes.

So the second author’s duties can be written down, and they are old. Say whose hands made the book. Remember which of you has been hungry, and do not trade places. Read every sentence the machine offers the way the narrator read Cide Hamete, grateful and suspicious. Refuse the first giant; the model’s first idea is everyone’s. Bring the windmill as it stood on the morning you saw it. Answer for every sentence you keep, and if you cannot say why it stays, let it go. Name your collaborators at the foot of the book, the model, its maker, and what you know of what it read, and pay the library you can pay, knowing that disclosure acknowledges a debt and does not settle it. Write in any genre; the first modern novel was a parody of the pulp of its age. And hold the line where Cervantes held it, between a text someone answers for and a text no one does.

The narrator in the Alcaná paid two arrobas of raisins and two bushels of wheat for the rest of his novel, and he wrote the price into the book. In June 2025 a federal court held that a machine reading a book its maker had bought owed nothing more than the price of the book, and the authors whose books had simply been taken were paid about $3,000 each. Neither figure is the value of a novel. Together they say that the reading was free and the taking was not, and that someone has to write the price where a reader can find it.

The novel was never a solitary form. It was always a man in a market holding a manuscript he could not read, finding someone who could, paying him, taking him home, and sitting with him for a month and a half until the swords came down. The manuscript has learned to speak for itself now, in every language at once, and it will offer the next chapter as often as it is asked. It has no way to tell which chapter is true. That knowing was always the second author’s, and it still is. The pen is on the rack, and it has said its piece. Who takes it down, and whether anyone will be able to tell from the page that a hand did, is the question the form now puts to everyone who writes.

❧

Sources: Cervantes is quoted in John Ormsby’s translation (1885), read at Standard Ebooks (I.vi, I.ix, II.iii, II.lxxiv) and at American Literature (the prologue, I.viii, I.ix); the sheep (I.xviii), Avellaneda’s sequel (1614), Álvaro Tarfe’s declaration (II.lxxii) and the Barcelona printing house (II.lxii) are paraphrased. Madariaga’s terms from Guía del lector del Quijote (1926), credited there (pp. 109–117, 119–129) by Hanno Ehrlicher in eHumanista/Cervantes 7; his argument is paraphrased. The Genji manuscripts and Teika from the Wikipedia article on the textual tradition of the Tale of Genji; Watt from Wikipedia’s entry on The Rise of the Novel; Bakhtin’s “Discourse in the Novel” via Wikipedia’s entry on heteroglossia; Richardson as “the Editor of the following Letters” from his preface to Pamela, via Project Gutenberg; Dickens’s monthly numbers from Wikipedia’s entry on The Pickwick Papers. Lish and Carver from “Two Raymond Carvers,” The New York Review of Books, May 27, 2010. The content-farm editor’s age from “The First Draft”; the credo from “The Third Thing,” both on this site. Anil R. Doshi and Oliver P. Hauser, “Generative AI enhances individual creativity but reduces the collective diversity of novel content,” Science Advances, July 12, 2024, via the University of Exeter. Bartz v. Anthropic: the June 23, 2025 ruling via Goodwin and Akin Gump; the settlement and its scope via the Authors Guild and IPKat. Thaler v. Perlmutter via Goodwin and SCOTUSblog. U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright and Artificial Intelligence, Part 2: Copyrightability (January 29, 2025), via the Copyright Alliance. Rie Qudan via Nippon.com; the English edition via Publishers Weekly. The Goncourt withdrawal, Pangram and the tests of older books via Livres Hebdo. Translations from the French are the editor’s.

Header image generated with Gemini for this essay and retouched to replace a metal nib with a cut quill; interior image generated with Gemini after the printing house of Part II, chapter lxii; neither depicts an actual place or work. Drafted and revised with Claude Fable 5.1; reviewed with Claude Opus 5.5 (the configured models; the serving model on any turn may differ); copy reading by Gemini and Claude Opus 5.5. Claude is made by Anthropic, the defendant in Bartz v. Anthropic and a company that profits if more people write with Claude; both are stated in the text.