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Essays, Geopolitics, Law & Policy, Science, Technology

THE CIRCLE AND THE FLAG

Two nuclear reactors are bound for the moon’s south pole. Neither is coming home.

The Outer Space Treaty forbids owning the moon by claim, by use or by occupation. It says nothing about a ring of ground no one may enter, or about how long such a ring may last. The United States wants its reactor running by 2030; Russia promises one for China by 2036.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, October 5, 2026

Chess makes a distinction the Outer Space Treaty does not. A piece stands on one square and commands others. Games are decided by squares no piece ever occupies, and a player who sees only where the pieces stand will lose to one who sees where they reach.

In late August 2026, NASA asked contractors to prepare a nuclear reactor that could survive the voyage to the moon and run without maintenance near its south pole, the New York Times reported in October. The agency wants it ready to launch by December 2030. Russia, under a partnership with China, has set 2036 for a reactor of its own. The machines are modest. NASA’s would produce about 20 kilowatts, roughly what 16 American homes draw, and Russia’s up to half that. The ground is modest too. NASA named 13 candidate landing regions for its first crewed return in 2022 and narrowed them to nine in 2024, all on a handful of ridges and crater rims near the pole, where the sunlight is nearly constant and the shadowed craters beside them are thought to hold ice. That is the whole prize: a few named places on a body whose surface is larger than Africa.

A reactor at power cannot be approached safely without shielding. On Earth it sits inside a containment building. On the moon, the Times reports, it would more likely sit inside a no-go zone, a ring that neither astronauts nor machines may safely enter. The treaty that governs the moon, signed in 1967, forbids “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Sovereignty, use and occupation are three ways of standing somewhere. The text says nothing about denial. So a handful of the only usable sites on the moon can be made unenterable by acts that break no rule. The one instrument that provides for ending such a zone is not a treaty but a political declaration, signed by one of the two builders and not the other.

And neither reactor is coming home. When a reactor on Earth reaches the end of its life, decommissioning takes years. On the moon, according to Selam Gebrekidan’s reporting in the Times, both NASA and the Russian agencies say they would simply leave the radioactive material behind. The zone will not end when the machine does. In chess, remove a piece and every square it commanded is free at once. The moon is being offered a piece that keeps its squares.

I

Twenty Kilowatts

The reactor NASA wants is small, and nobody has calculated the load. The Times reports that for the first years both programmes need only enough power to keep equipment warm and charge rovers, that solar and radioisotope systems would serve, and that how much electricity a base would need is open to speculation. Two powers are racing to install a power source for a base that does not exist, against a demand nobody has measured. NASA’s machine, as the Times describes it, must work for five years with no intervention; the Russian design, called Selena, for a decade. Neither is a power station. Each is built to carry a base through the dark, and at the pole the dark comes in gaps of a day or two rather than weeks, under a sun that never climbs far above the horizon. That is why both programmes say a reactor must come.

The place is small too. Of the moon’s 37.9 million square kilometres, the parts that matter for a base are the ones where two things meet: ridges high enough to catch sunlight for most of the lunar day, and craters deep enough that sunlight has never reached their floors. The first supply power and bearable temperatures. The second, NASA says, “can preserve resources, including water,” from which oxygen and hydrogen can be extracted for life support and fuel. Such places are few, and they cluster at the south pole. In 2022 NASA named 13 candidate regions for its first crewed landing there, and in October 2024 narrowed them to nine, a short list of massifs, rims and plains whose names will become familiar. Those are landing regions, not reactor sites, which no one has announced. But they are the published evidence of which ground is worth having, and the Chinese-led International Lunar Research Station is aimed at the same pole.

A reactor set on that ground does not command a clean circle. In open space a radiation radius is a sphere. On a crater rim it is cast like a shadow across whatever lies in reach. Set behind a ridge, its reach falls on one slope and not the other. Set near a crater, where the approaches are few, it can cover them. Its zone will be shaped by the terrain it sits in, and so will the question of what the zone denies.

Oblique view of a lunar crater at the south pole: a small reactor with a crown of radiator fins stands on the rim, and a line of lit beacon pylons marks its exclusion zone, running along the rim, down the one gentle slope into the crater and on into the shadow of its floor.
A zone on ground follows the ground: the beacon line runs along the rim, drops down the one slope into the crater and continues into the dark where the floor begins. Generated with Gemini for this essay; it depicts no actual site.

Nobody wanted this yet. A fission reactor is a later need, brought forward. NASA moved its date up because Russia is building one. Russia is building one because China, in the one core task it appears to have delegated, asked it to. Nothing in the record says Moscow set its clock by Washington’s. So only one player is in zugzwang, the position in which the obligation to move is itself the harm, and it is the one bound by the Accords. Every move it has — an earlier launch, a bigger reactor, a looser rule — takes something from the position both sides depend on: a moon that no one owns. The treaty that guarantees it was written for players who stand on squares. The next move puts down a piece that reaches.

II

By Any Other Means

The treaty’s second article is one sentence long. Outer space, including the moon, “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Appropriation is the term of art, and it means taking a thing as one’s own. Sovereignty, use and occupation are three ways of doing it: declaring, working, staying. Of the three, use is the widest, and it was put there to catch exploitation that stops short of a flag. A reactor is a use, and a specialist’s first answer will be that a reactor whose radius denies ground is appropriation by means of use. But a radius takes nothing. It makes ground nobody’s rather than somebody’s. The treaty forbids turning the commons into property. It says nothing about turning it into waste. Denial is not acquisition. No claim to any part of the moon has ever been recognized by any state, and no clause of the article mentions keeping others from a part of it.

The ninth article is where the radius enters, and it enters as a duty rather than a loophole. States must conduct their activities “with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties,” must avoid harmful contamination of celestial bodies, and, where an activity “would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States Parties,” must undertake “appropriate international consultations before proceeding.” The duty falls on the state that acts. The builder of a reactor owes due regard to everyone else’s interests, which on a straight reading is a constraint on where it may put the thing. The builder’s answer is that the zone is the due regard: a ring that keeps everyone else safe from what it has built. So one clause both demands the zone and forbids what the zone does, and nothing in the text says which reading governs. The two articles close on each other: obeying the ninth produces the condition the second forbids.

Eight years earlier the Antarctic Treaty had frozen the sector claims that seven nations had drawn across the map of a continent, and the two texts share four prohibitions almost word for word. Antarctica “shall be used for peaceful purposes only,” the earlier treaty says, and forbids “military bases and fortifications,” “military maneuvers” and “the testing of any types of weapons.” The moon treaty repeats all four. But the Antarctic text has a fifth article that the space text does not: “Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited.” An American reactor, SNAP-10A, had already flown, in April 1965, two years before the space treaty was signed, and the treaty says nothing about a reactor stopping.

The law of the sea, drafted fifteen years later, shows what such a rule looks like. Article 60 is not a legal parallel. Its zones sit in waters where the coastal state already has sovereign rights, not in a commons. It is a drafting model, and it shows the two devices the moon’s treaty lacks: a zone with a stated maximum, 500 metres from the structure’s outer edge, and a duty to remove what is finished — installations “which are abandoned or disused shall be removed.” The ice treaty banned leaving the waste. The sea treaty bounded the zone and required removal. The moon’s treaty did neither, no instrument since has set a maximum for a lunar safety zone, and neither programme has published the radius it intends.

III

The Case for the Zone

The case for the reactor begins with the dark. Away from the poles a lunar night lasts about fourteen days, and the pole is not exempt so much as different. The best-lit ground there, by NASA’s own measurement, is lit up to 90 percent of the time, and nowhere on the moon is lit always. A 2010 NASA study found a site near Shackleton crater sunlit about 240 days a year, with its longest stretch of darkness about a day and a half. The sun never rises far above the horizon, so solar panels must stand on edge and are shadowed by the very terrain that makes the site worth having. The radioisotope generators that have powered spacecraft since the 1960s make watts, not kilowatts. An expanded base, the Times reports, would need far more power than those systems can give. On this reading the reactor is not an instrument of policy. It is the answer to a place that is lethally short of energy.

The safety case is nearly as strong. Both NASA and Russia say their reactors will be launched cold, never having been switched on, and the Times reports that nuclear engineers regard cold uranium fuel as posing little radioactive threat even if it tumbles to Earth. The fuel NASA specifies sits below weapons-usable enrichment. On the safety case as its advocates put it, a cold launch materially reduces the risk, and the reactor becomes dangerous only once it is running, on the moon, where no one lives.

The third pillar is the law itself. The Artemis Accords, the political declaration that 59 nations have signed, provide for “safety zones” around lunar operations. The Accords say a safety zone “should be the area in which nominal operations of a relevant activity or an anomalous event could reasonably cause harmful interference,” that signatories “commit to respect the principle of free access to all areas of celestial bodies,” and, at Section 11, paragraph 7(c), that “safety zones will ultimately be temporary, ending when the relevant operation ceases.” The defence writes itself. Nobody is appropriating anything. The zone is a coordination device, published in advance, bounded by function, and gone the day the plug is pulled.

Each pillar holds. The moon is dark, the launch is clean, and the Accords do bind their signatories to free access and to zones that end. Then come the two facts the defence does not survive.

The first is that only one of the two builders has signed the promise. The Accords have no force beyond their signatories, and Russia and China are not among the 59. They are building the International Lunar Research Station outside that framework. The guarantee that a lunar safety zone will be temporary binds the United States and does not touch the other reactor at all. The symmetry of the race is false at the point where it matters: one builder has also signed something the other has not. One has accepted a constraint it may be about to breach by leaving its reactor where it stands. The other has accepted nothing. And the promise itself was drafted with an escape in it. A drafter who meant zones end when operations end does not write ultimately. The adverb lets a zone persist for a very long time while still being called temporary, and it sits in the only sentence in any instrument that says a zone will end.

The second fact is the harder one. Radioactivity decays. A reactor that is switched off stops fissioning at once, but its core stays hot with the decay of its fission products, intensely at first and then less so for a very long time. A spent reactor becomes approachable, by degrees, over decades and centuries. So the zone is not permanent, only long, and a reader who knows this will conclude that the radius has an end after all, and that the end is a matter of physics rather than law.

The answer is not an argument but a place.

IV

Rules for the Wrong Place

There is a body of law for reactors in space. It was written for the sky, and it is written in the grammar of the sky. The Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space were adopted by the General Assembly on December 14, 1992, as resolution 47/68, fourteen years after a Soviet reactor came down over Canada. Their operative paragraphs on reactors permit three things: operation “on interplanetary missions,” operation “in sufficiently high orbits,” and operation in low orbit on condition that the reactor is afterwards “stored in sufficiently high orbits.” A sufficiently high orbit is one “in which the orbital lifetime is long enough to allow for a sufficient decay of the fission products to approximately the activity of the actinides.” That is the Principles’ entire doctrine of disposal, and it is a doctrine of altitude and time. Put the thing where nothing lives, and wait.

A reactor at the lunar pole satisfies the first half of that rule and inverts the second. It will rest where nothing lives yet, and it will rest there for as long as the orbital rule contemplates. But the orbit the Principles had in mind is a trajectory nobody walks, and the pole is the one piece of ground that both programmes have named as the place they intend to go. The disposal rule for the sky, applied to the surface, produces the radius. The law’s idea of success and the pole’s idea of denial are the same object at a different address.

The Principles are also out of date about the fuel, and out of date in the direction that matters. Principle 3 instructs that “nuclear reactors shall use only highly enriched uranium 235 as fuel,” which in 1992 was the engineer’s choice, because it is lighter and cheaper to launch. Representative Bill Foster, a physicist, told the Times what highly enriched uranium is on the ground: a machine shop and a little high explosive away from a credible weapon. NASA’s documents now specify high-assay low-enriched uranium, which sits below weapons-usable enrichment, and which Russia produces in greater quantity than anyone, and which the United States has banned from Russian sources since 2024. The only rule the United Nations has ever written about the fuel of a space reactor commands the leading builder to do the opposite of what it is doing, and the alliance that has not disclosed its fuel is the one whose older reactors used the fuel the rule prescribes. None of this binds anyone. A General Assembly resolution is a recommendation, and the United Nations working group that Leopold Summerer leads exists to encourage states to follow such rules, not to enforce them.

The Principles are at their most exact on the one moment everyone agrees is dangerous. The United States and Russia say their reactors will be unirradiated until they arrive, and the Times reports that nuclear engineers regard cold fuel as a small radiological threat even if it falls back to Earth. The Principles take the same view and set down what a cold reactor must survive without going critical: “rocket explosion, re-entry, impact on ground or water, submersion in water or water intruding into the core.” A reactor had come down over Canada before the clause was written. Water moderates neutrons; a core that is safely subcritical in air can be critical in the sea; most launch pads stand beside water. “This is the moment when there is a lot of risk,” Summerer told the Times. In October 2019 a State Department official told the General Assembly’s First Committee that a Russian missile which had lain on the bed of the White Sea since a failed test had, when it was recovered that August, produced “the result of a nuclear reaction.” At least five workers died, the Times reports. Russia said the missile was not powered by a reactor. Nuclear experts told the Times that a reactor going critical in water is probably what happened: the event the clause was written to prevent, in the country with more space reactors behind it than any other.

And the law has been tested once on the ground, in the only way it knows. On January 24, 1978, Kosmos 954 re-entered over the Northwest Territories and scattered radioactive debris across a search area of more than 124,000 square kilometres. The cleanup was called Operation Morning Light; it ran through October, and almost none of the fuel was ever found. Canada billed the Soviet Union just over six million Canadian dollars under the 1972 Liability Convention, and the Soviet Union paid about three million. That is the only time international law has been asked what to do when a reactor comes to rest where it should not, and its answer was to price the damage and send an invoice. On Earth a reactor’s resting place is a misfortune and not an asset. On the moon the asset is the resting place. The Convention knows who pays. It has no idea who is owed. Denial of ground in a commons injures nobody in particular, and nobody in particular has a claim.

The law of the space reactor is a law of the moving piece. It knows what the piece must survive on the way, what fuel it may carry and how high it must be parked when its work is done. It has no sentence for a piece that has stopped on the one square everybody wanted, because in the sky the stopping was the solution.

V

What Stays

Chess has one premise so basic that it is never written down: a piece can be lifted. Every rule of the game assumes it. Capture, retreat, resignation, the pieces back in the box; the squares a piece commanded are free the moment the hand closes on it. The reactor is the first piece offered to the moon that the premise does not cover. It will be set down on a named ridge by a lander nobody has yet built, it will run for five years without a hand touching it, and then, by the stated intention of both builders, it will stay. The question is no longer what a piece commands. It is what a piece that cannot be lifted commands, and for how long.

The Earth has answered that question once. On May 2, 1986, six days after the fourth reactor at Chernobyl burned, a Soviet government commission drew a circle of thirty kilometres around it and ordered the whole of it cleared. The circle was drawn by a state that no longer exists. It is administered today by an agency of a state that was not then sovereign, the State Agency of Ukraine on Exclusion Zone Management, and it covers about 2,600 square kilometres, having been enlarged in 1997 to take in ground the wind had reached. The physics of the place has followed the curve the safety case rests on: the short-lived isotopes are long gone and much of the zone is less dangerous than it was. The line has not followed the curve. Forty years on, it is a border with checkpoints, closed to visitors since the invasion of 2022, and the building at its centre is a war target. On February 14, 2025, a Russian drone struck the New Safe Confinement, the arch completed in 2019 to hold the ruined reactor for at least a hundred years; it opened a hole in the cladding and damaged the crane system inside, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development puts the repair at a minimum of €500 million, to be finished by 2030. The zone is not permanent. It is only long, and this is what long has meant in practice: a radius that outlived its author, acquired a bureaucracy, became a frontier, and drew fire from a third party in a war its drafters could not have imagined, all because of what stayed at the centre.

Fourteen years before the fire, two Soviet novelists had described something with the same shape. In Roadside Picnic, published in 1972, Arkady and Boris Strugatsky imagined Zones left behind by visitors who stopped on Earth briefly, left their litter, and moved on, and the people who crept in after them were called stalkers. By way of Tarkovsky’s 1979 film Stalker and a 2007 video game, the book’s word became the word for those who enter the real zone without permission. The novel’s title is its argument. The visitors meant nothing by what they left. The zone was not a claim and not an attack. It was the residue of someone else’s convenience, and it governed the lives of everyone who lived at its edge for as long as it lasted.

That is the shape of the thing the moon is being offered. The radius has an end, and the end is a matter of physics, and zones on Earth have in fact contracted as the physics changed. Japan has lifted its Fukushima evacuation orders in stages as dose rates fell, and in August 2022 the order came off part of Futaba, one of the two towns that host the plant. But zones shrink from the outside in, and they have never reached the middle. Fukushima has given back town after town and the plant site remains closed; at Chernobyl the centre is what is under a €500 million repair. What was returned was contaminated ground around a reactor. What was never returned was the reactor.

The lunar zone is a centre with no periphery. There is no dispersed fallout to clean and no farmland anyone wants back; the ring is the asset, the ridge and the approaches and the ice, so the one mechanism by which terrestrial zones have ever contracted has nothing to work on. The lunar zone will be drawn by its builder, under a declaration that promises it will “ultimately” end, or by a builder that has promised nothing, and no instrument names who may draw the second line, the one that says the first has expired. The Outer Space Treaty forbids the flag. It has nothing to say about the circle, and the circle is what stays.

The first reactor is scheduled to stop in the middle of the 2030s, when the second is scheduled to start. Somebody may be standing at the pole then, under one declaration or none, looking at a ring on a ridge that nobody owns and nobody may enter. Whether they call it a precaution or a border is the smaller question. The larger one is whether a place no one can enter is owned, or only lost, and nothing yet written says who gets to decide.

❧

Sources: the reactor programmes, dates, power levels, fuel, launch safety, the White Sea and Kosmos 954 as reported by Selam Gebrekidan, “Superpowers Race to Put Nuclear Reactors on the Moon,” The New York Times, October 4, 2026. Treaty texts read at source: the Outer Space Treaty (1967), Articles II and IX; the Antarctic Treaty (1959), Articles I and V; the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Article 60; General Assembly resolution 47/68 (1992), Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, Principle 3; the Artemis Accords (2020), Section 11. NASA on Artemis III candidate regions (2022, 2024), on polar illumination (Mazarico et al., 2010; LROC, 2019) and on the moon’s radius. The 2019 State Department statement from Arms Control Today and RFE/RL. Operation Morning Light from The Canadian Encyclopedia. The Chernobyl zone’s establishment, area, administration and closure from secondary reporting, matched across at least two accounts; the New Safe Confinement from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development at source. Fukushima evacuation orders from Japan’s Ministry of the Environment.

Header and interior images generated with Gemini for this essay. Drafted with Claude Fable 5.1 and Claude Opus 5.5; literary editing by Claude Opus 5; copy editing by Gemini.

Culture, Education, Essays, Philosophy, Technology

WHAT MAKES AN ANSWER

On a professor’s case against writing, the written replies beneath it, and what Socrates actually objected to

Socrates said written words couldn’t answer questions. Under an essay repeating his complaint, readers answered by the hundreds, and the author answered them. Now there is a machine that answers anything, and Socrates had another objection it doesn’t meet.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, October 1, 2026

On September 29 The New York Times published a guest essay by Joe Cruz, who chairs the philosophy department at Williams College, under the headline “I’m a College Professor. Writing Isn’t as Important as We Think.” Halfway through, he turns to Plato. In the Phaedrus, Cruz writes, Socrates holds that writing “cannot speak, answer questions or come to its own defense.” Perhaps, Cruz suggests, Socrates was right, and we think best by speaking, answering and defending our ideas in person.

Beneath the essay, readers wrote back. By the next day the thread held about 1,200 comments. They asked him questions. They answered each other. They pressed him on his evidence, on the size of his seminar, on the research he had linked. And the author answered, in writing. His first reply began with a thread he “didn’t have room to pursue in the essay.”

None of this proves Socrates wrong, and it doesn’t prove Cruz wrong either. His case rests on an oral exam, and the thread says nothing about oral exams. But it raises a question the essay never asks. If writing can answer back, what was Socrates objecting to? And what do we have now, when there is a machine that will answer anything put to it, at once, in writing?

I

What Socrates Said

Late in the Phaedrus, Socrates tells a story set in Egypt. The god Theuth, inventor of letters among much else, brings his arts to the king, Thamus, and praises writing above the rest: it will make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memories. The king isn’t persuaded. “The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence,” he answers. Those who learn from it “will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing.” They will be tiresome company, “having the show of wisdom without the reality.”

Socrates then adds his own complaint, and it’s the one Cruz borrows. Writing is like painting. Its figures look alive, “and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence.” Once written down, words “are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them,” and when they’re attacked, “they cannot protect or defend themselves.”

So there are three objections, not one. Written words stay silent when questioned. They drift away from their author to any reader at all. And they give their students the look of knowledge without the substance. Cruz’s essay rests on the first. The other two go unmentioned.

A paper can’t be asked a follow-up question, and a student sitting in front of an examiner can. That is Cruz’s real evidence: a forty-five-minute oral exam, pressing on claims each student had put in writing with a machine’s help. It’s a better test of understanding than the finished paper was. The retort that came back most often, that he made his argument against writing in writing, is cheap. Plato wrote the Phaedrus, and Cruz grants that writing has a lasting job: it “summarizes and compresses our thoughts.” He is also right, and unusually candid for a professor, about why universities love the essay. It can be carried home, read in pieces, graded in batches and cited if a grade is disputed. None of that has much to do with thinking. His history holds up as well. The idea that we discover what we think by writing it does trace to James Britton, who put it forward in 1980. One commenter disputes his description of a study he links, which could not be checked here.

II

The Half That Did Worse

Cruz’s most striking result is that “at least half of the class was more agile” in the oral exam than on the page. The reply that drew the most recommendations, from a reader signing as M Bk in Brooklyn (555 when the thread was captured), turned the sentence over: “that means half wasn’t.” The arithmetic is exact. If at least half the class did better aloud, as many as half did not. Some of those students, the reply went on, think better with the time and solitude that writing affords, and for others an oral argument can be its own kind of refuge, a way to avoid the slow sorting a page demands.

Readers in the thread described themselves. Some said they were shy. Some said they can’t compose aloud at all but write well. Some described conditions that make speaking on demand harder than writing. And a reader signing as KWP, in Arizona, retired from teaching at a large state university where junior and senior courses often ran past a hundred students, said that however much he encouraged discussion, some students never spoke, and writing short papers was “the only way I could hear their voices.” A seminar isn’t made fair simply by being spoken. It rewards whoever finds speech easiest in a room, and that isn’t the same group as whoever thinks best.

It’s worth noticing where that testimony was given. The readers who said they can’t think aloud on demand said so in a medium that let them take their time, and they were heard in it by more people than any seminar holds. A reader who would have sat silent through a discussion could write two careful sentences, reread them and post them, and find them recommended by strangers. The thread wasn’t a seminar, and nothing in it proves how any of those readers would have fared in Cruz’s room. But the quiet half didn’t have to be imagined. It described itself, at length and in its own words, in the one form of answering the op-ed proposed to set aside.

In a dusk-lit seminar room, a standing student argues while the others turn toward her; at the far end of the table a quiet student writes in a notebook whose glow is the room’s warm light
The other half, made for this essay.

The professions that rely most on spoken examination have had to deal with this. In 1975 R. M. Harden and three colleagues described a new format for testing medical students, the objective structured clinical examination. It was designed, they wrote, “to avoid many of the disadvantages of the traditional clinical examination,” and to be “more objective.” That paper concerns clinical exams in medicine, not seminars in philosophy, and it shouldn’t be made to say more. It does show that a field built on spoken examination found reasons to structure it.

There’s another way to read Cruz’s result, and it takes his evidence more seriously than his conclusion does. His students didn’t arrive at the oral exam empty-handed. Each had already produced a written argument, with whatever help his guidelines allowed, and had turned it in to be examined. Cruz reads their fluency aloud as proof that writing was never where the thinking was. It could just as well be proof of the opposite: that the paper, however it was made, gave each student something definite to defend, and the exam measured how well they had come to know it. A student who has fixed a claim on a page, seen it in order and been told it will be pressed walks in with a map. The oral exam may be testing what the writing built. Nothing in one semester’s results can decide between the two readings, and Cruz doesn’t claim they can. The second asks nothing of him except that the forty-five minutes be credited to the paper as well as to the talk.

Cruz’s evidence is one class, last semester, at Williams. He says as much himself: there will be challenges of scale, and not every institution can adapt. The question his half raises isn’t whether the oral exam works for the students who shone in it. It’s what happens to the ones who didn’t, when the page, the one place they could be heard, is the thing being set aside.

III

The Thesis That Improved

Cruz’s first reply in the thread went further than his essay had. Writing, he wrote, “is itself a technology for cognitive offloading.” It lets us keep memory, attention and concentration out in the world rather than in our heads, which is enormously useful but may mean we exercise some capacities less. He suspected that “ease of assessment is a major driver” of the humanities’ reliance on it. Then he asked a question the op-ed hadn’t: “What kinds of thinking should we be willing to offload,” and which do we want students to keep practicing for themselves?

That’s a better question than the one his essay asks. “Writing isn’t as important as we think” invites an argument about ranking, speech against the page. His reply’s question is about trade-offs, and it applies as much to the machine as to the pen. It’s also the question his readers took hardest. Several objected that writing doesn’t offload thought at all, it builds it. The objection has a well-known ancestor in Walter Ong’s 1986 essay, whose title makes a stronger claim still: “Writing Is a Technology that Restructures Thought.” One reader brought it into the thread. Another, signing as gnowxela, in New York, put it in a sentence of his own: “Text gives complex abstract webs of ideas visible manipulable form.”

Cruz answered him. Our cognitive technologies, he wrote, are likely to have both expected and unanticipated consequences. And he agreed: writing is “no small thing,” and may be “on the short list of profound ways” we have increased our ability to handle abstraction. What he’d meant, he said, was that other paths run alongside it and deserve a reckoning.

Set his headline beside that sentence. In the op-ed, writing isn’t as important as we think. A few hours of written questioning later, it’s on the short list of the most profound tools the species has for thinking in abstractions, and the argument has become one about what else should be practiced alongside it. That’s a thesis getting better under questioning, which is exactly what Cruz says conversation is for. He deserves full credit for it. He read the objections, answered them in his own name, and gave ground where the ground was theirs. His reply was itself a second pass: the argument of the op-ed, read back as if someone else had written it, and answered. It is the thing he asks his students to give up, done well and in public. Most authors of guest essays do none of these things. But the conversation that improved his argument was conducted in writing. It could be reread before it was answered, and quoted back at the writer. It could wait for his reply without losing a word, and it’s still there for anyone to check what he conceded.

The page has failures of its own, and the thread had them too. Once a quotation starts to travel, nobody is present to vouch for it, and the replies that arrive early and sound sure gather the recommendations that decide what later readers see first.

IV

The Second Pass

Cruz’s proposal deserves to be stated in his terms. He wants a university in which ideas are expressed in real time, and thought unfolds as debate, oral defense or group discussion. He asks for courage on both sides: from faculty, to demand “active, participatory mastery,” and from students, to “abandon the safe recursion of revision.”

That phrase is where his argument and this essay part most sharply. In Cruz’s account, revision is a refuge: the second pass lets a student hide behind a polished page. What he wants instead is thought that happens once, in the room, under pressure. There’s a real gain in that. A student who can’t revise can’t pretend, and the examiner sees the mind at work rather than its best draft.

But the second pass is also where a thinker finds out that the first was wrong. Revision is the one moment a writer is asked to read what she has made as if someone else had made it, and to answer it. It’s slower than debate and less exciting than defense, and nobody is watching. It is also, whatever else it is, a form of taking something back.

V

The Partner Who Recants

The chatbot answers. Ask it a question and it doesn’t keep a solemn silence. It will answer for as long as you keep asking. On Socrates’ first objection, the one Cruz relied on, the machine passes. The third objection is harder. Thamus warned of students who “will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing.” A fluent answer isn’t knowledge. On a bad day, that describes a student who performs well in an oral exam as much as it describes a machine. A reader signing as Alain, a physician who teaches residents in Manizales, Colombia, put the difficulty in one sentence: “an AI that tends to agree with its user is not a Socratic partner.”

The Phaedrus shows what a Socratic partner does, and it isn’t simply disagreeing. Phaedrus arrives in love with a speech by Lysias arguing that a boy should favor a man who doesn’t love him over one who does. Pressed to do better, Socrates takes the same side and makes a speech of his own. He covers his head to do it: “I will veil my face and gallop through the discourse as fast as I can, for if I see you I shall feel ashamed.” When he finishes, Phaedrus wants the other half, a matching speech on the advantages of the non-lover: “I thought that you were only half-way.” Socrates declines, says there has been enough of both, and gets up to cross the river home. Then comes the moment the dialogue turns on. “As I was about to cross the stream the usual sign was given to me,—that sign which always forbids, but never bids.” He turns back and calls what he has just said foolish, “to a certain extent, impious.” Then he recants: “I will be wiser than either Stesichorus or Homer, in that I am going to make my recantation.”

Nobody argued him out of it. His listener wanted more of the same. The check came after the work was done, when he was already on his way home, and it came from inside him, unasked. That’s the answer the thread couldn’t give Cruz and the machine doesn’t give anyone. It’s often absent in a student with a deadline too. It’s the answer a mind gives to itself against what it has just produced. A machine that replies is new. A machine that could stop itself at the stream would be something else again. Whether one can be built, and whether any student would choose the one that did, the dialogue doesn’t say.

⁂

Joe Cruz’s guest essay, “I’m a College Professor. Writing Isn’t as Important as We Think,” appeared in The New York Times on 29 September 2026; his replies are quoted as he published them in the comments beneath it. The comment thread was captured on 30 September 2026, and the comment total and recommendation counts given here are as they stood then. Readers who commented are identified only by the handle and place they gave, quoted briefly and only for their own arguments; no one is quoted in order to be corrected. One reader disputes Cruz’s description of a study his essay links; the study could not be recovered for checking. Plato’s Phaedrus is quoted in Benjamin Jowett’s translation, and every quotation from it was confirmed in at least two online texts of that translation (Monadnock, the University of Northern Iowa’s reading text, williamwolff.org and Plato in Depth). R. M. Harden, M. Stevenson, W. W. Downie and G. M. Wilson, “Assessment of clinical competence using objective structured examination,” British Medical Journal (22 February 1975), is quoted from its abstract via PubMed Central. Walter J. Ong’s “Writing Is a Technology that Restructures Thought” was published in 1986; James Britton’s “Shaping at the Point of Utterance” in 1980. The header and interior images were generated with Gemini for this essay; neither is a historical illustration or depicts any real person. Drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary editing by Claude Opus 5; copy editing by Gemini.

Economics, Essays, History, Literature

THE COST OF NOTHING

On a ten-yen apology, a generation named for enlightenment, and the thirty years the world priced Japan’s patience as permanent

For three decades Japan’s money was nearly free, and its young people were said to want nothing. The two facts were never the same, but the world believed the story that joined them.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 28, 2026

In April 2016, a Japanese ice-pop company made a television commercial to say it was sorry. The company’s leadership stood in rows with the staff of its factory in Fukaya, and they bowed. Garigari-kun, a soda-flavoured ice pop, had cost 60 yen for twenty-five years. It would now cost 70. Over the pictures played a folk song from 1971, Wataru Takada’s “Neage”: “Price Hike.”

In the third month of 1212, a monk named Kamo no Chōmei finished a short book about the hut he lived in, in the hills outside Kyoto. The hut measured ten feet on each side. The book is still read.

In a column published in The New York Times on September 28, 2026, the economist Rebecca Patterson explained why the ice pop’s twenty-five years matter to anyone with a retirement account. After the bubble of the 1980s burst, Japan spent three decades in a stillness the rest of the world learned to depend on. Prices stopped rising. Interest rates fell to nothing, and then below it. Japanese savings, finding nothing at home that paid, went abroad, and investors everywhere borrowed yen almost for free to buy what paid more elsewhere. Now, Patterson writes, the stillness is ending. Japanese government bonds pay rates not seen in thirty years, near 3%, and the Tokyo stock market has risen nearly 30% so far in 2026. The money that went out is beginning to come home.

The markets priced the money. They never priced the name. In 2010, young Japanese who were said to want neither money, promotion, cars, travel nor romance were called the satori sedai, the generation of satori, the Buddhist word for awakening. The name began as a joke on a message board, about a book describing the young, and it turned a circumstance into a character. The money and the name were never the same fact: a central bank made one, and strangers on a message board made the other. But the name was how Japan’s stillness was told, and the world believed the story. For thirty years it priced a country’s patience as permanent, and borrowed against it.

What was it borrowing, and what did the cheapness hide?

I

The Cheapest Money in the World

The stillness had a cause, and it was not a mood. When the bubble burst in 1990, the Bank of Japan began cutting its short-term interest rate from a peak of 6%, and by the middle of the decade it was nearly zero. Land and share prices kept falling. Banks carried loans that would never be repaid. In November 1997, Yamaichi Securities, once one of the country’s four great brokerages, closed its doors after years of hiding its losses off its books, and its last president wept on television as he apologized.

Companies, as Patterson notes, sat on their cash rather than invest it. Prices drifted down, so anyone who waited to buy was rewarded. The central bank tried one experiment after another. It bought government bonds in vast quantities, and in 2016 it took its policy rate below zero. By the figures Patterson gives, Japan’s ten-year bond hovered around a tenth of a percentage point, while an equivalent American Treasury paid 2.35%.

What followed was arithmetic anyone with a spreadsheet could do. Borrow yen at almost nothing. Sell the yen for dollars. Buy a Treasury that pays two points more. Collect the difference year after year, without the market having to move at all. Traders call it the carry trade, and as Patterson puts it, Japan “effectively paid people to borrow its currency.” Japanese institutions ran the same calculation from the other side, sending their savings abroad for the yield they couldn’t find at home. Nobody knows exactly how large it all became. One Treasury estimate Patterson cites puts Japanese holdings of American stocks, bonds and other assets at about $2.8 trillion by the middle of 2025.

A central bank made this, after an asset collapse and the banking crisis it caused, and deflation sustained it: even money lent at zero earned something real as prices fell. Households saved, but their thrift followed the conditions rather than creating them. By the time anyone on a message board said satori, the carry trade had been running for more than a decade.

II

The Name

Young Japanese adults in 2010 had grown up entirely inside the stillness. Wages were flat. The share of employees in part-time, contract or other non-regular work had risen from about one in five in 1991 to one in three by 2007, and prices had been drifting down for most of their lives. A car in Tokyo cost money to park and saved no time. A foreign holiday could wait, because it would not get more expensive. Not buying things was not a philosophy; it was a sensible response to the only economy they had known. Any account of what came next has to start there, and concede that on this reading there is nothing to explain.

The name arrived anyway. In December 2009, the Nikkei published a book by Taku Yamaoka called Hoshigaranai wakamonotachi, “Young People Who Don’t Want Things.” At the end of January 2010, in a thread on the anonymous message board 2channel about a review of the book, someone first used the phrase satori sedai. Nobody knows who, or how old they were. It may have been a jibe at the young, or a joke by the young about themselves. In October 2013, Yohei Harada, who ran a youth research unit at the advertising agency Hakuhodo, gave the term a book of its own. His subtitle, The Young People Who Won’t Ride Off on a Stolen Motorbike, borrowed a line from Yutaka Ozaki’s “15 no Yoru,” the anthem of teenage rebellion in 1983. The generation, in other words, was defined by the rebellion it declined.

The label described young people who wanted neither money, promotion, cars, travel nor romance. Two years after Harada, the business strategist Kenichi Ohmae stretched the diagnosis over the whole country, calling Japan a “low-desire society” in a book of that title. That was one man’s reading of a nation, not a consensus.

What the name did was turn a circumstance into a character. A young person who could not afford to want things became a young person who had risen above wanting. Satori is the word for awakening: the liberation, in Buddhist teaching, from the craving that binds a life to suffering. To call a generation satori was to take a shortfall of wages and prospects and describe it as spiritual achievement. It was at once a compliment and an accusation. And a name that praises a condition makes it harder to state as a loss.

How the name was received is not in the record. A reasonable guess is that many of the young took it the way it may first have been meant, half in irony and half in self-defence: better to be called enlightened than broke. That is persuasive, but it is a guess. The coinage is documented; what the generation made of it is not.

III

The Translator

Chōmei’s little book reached English through a student. In 1891, Natsume Sōseki, then twenty-four and studying English literature at Tokyo Imperial University, translated the Hōjōki at the request of his professor, James Main Dixon, who drew on it for a version of his own published two years later. Sōseki would become one of the most celebrated novelists of modern Japan. He began by carrying a monk’s account of a ten-foot hut into a foreign language.

Twenty years later, in August 1911, he stood before an audience in Wakayama and gave a lecture called “The Civilization of Modern Japan.” Its argument turns on a distinction. A civilization can grow from within, he said, the way a bud breaks open into a flower, or it can take its shape under a force pressing on it from outside. The West’s modernity was of the first kind; Japan’s was of the second. What Western nations had taken a hundred years to reach, Japan had been made to reach in the forty or fifty years since the Meiji Restoration. The result, in his words, was a people who “skate over the surface, or else, straining not to slip, fall into nervous exhaustion.” The phrase he used, shinkei suijaku, was the neurasthenia of the age. What could be done? He did not pretend to know: “I have no good plan at all.” Three years later he published Kokoro, a novel about a man whose withdrawal from the world looks like wisdom and is really guilt.

In 1911 Sōseki said Japan was running on an appetite borrowed from the West. A century later, the West was running on Japan’s lack of appetite.

What Chōmei and Sōseki share is something else. Both named a condition from inside it: Chōmei his own reduced life, Sōseki his own country’s hurried one. And both, having named it, doubted the name. Chōmei turned on his own contentment. Sōseki diagnosed a nation and confessed he had no cure. Their names were questions. Whoever first typed satori on a message board in 2010, and whatever they meant by it, the word that spread was a verdict. It said what the young were, and asked nothing about why.

IV

The Widow Maker

Since at least 1994, there has been a way to lose money on Japan by being right about it. The Japanese government’s debt grew until it was more than two and a half times the size of the country’s economy. Every sensible reading of the numbers said that such a borrower would one day have to pay more to borrow, and that its bonds would fall. So traders bet on it. They sold Japanese government bonds short, and waited for the yields to rise.

The yields did not rise, and the trade earned a nickname traders pass to one another as a warning: the widow maker. In 2010, the Dallas hedge-fund manager Kyle Bass argued that the Japanese bond market would soon implode, pointing to a national debt some twenty-four times the government’s tax revenue and a population that was shrinking and ageing. It did not implode. Year after year the yields sat near nothing, and the people betting against them paid to wait.

What they had missed was not arithmetic. It was ownership. A government in trouble with its creditors is usually in trouble with foreigners, who can sell and leave. Japan’s debt was held overwhelmingly at home, by Japanese banks, insurers, pension funds and savers who wanted safety more than return. And then it was held by the central bank itself. When Haruhiko Kuroda took over the Bank of Japan in March 2013, it owned 11.55% of the government’s bonds.

In September 2016, the bank went further and began to fix the price of ten-year money outright, promising to buy whatever it took to hold the yield near zero. Anyone betting that Japanese bonds would fall was now betting against a buyer that could create the money it paid with. One fund manager, explaining in 2022 why he would not touch the trade, said the bank could simply keep printing until the short-sellers gave up.

By March 2023, the Bank of Japan owned 53% of the government’s bonds.

The widow makers were right about the numbers and wrong about the story. Patterson ends her column on the nickname, hoping that if the great unwinding finally comes, it “doesn’t leave any more financial widows in its wake.”

V

The Tide Goes Out

The story began to change on July 31, 2024. The Bank of Japan raised its short-term interest rate to 0.25% and announced that it would halve its purchases of government bonds. Most analysts had expected it to wait. Two days later, a weak American jobs report suggested that the Federal Reserve would soon cut its own rates. The gap on which the carry trade lived was closing from both ends at once, and everyone who had borrowed yen to buy something else tried to leave through the same door.

On Monday, August 5, the Nikkei fell 12.4%. It was the largest drop in points in the index’s history, and its worst day since October 20, 1987, when it fell 14.9%. The percentage was not a record. It did not need to be. Nor did the selling stay in Tokyo: in New York, the S&P 500 fell 3%. Patterson describes the unwinding of the carry trade as “a tide rushing out before a tsunami strikes,” and on that Monday the world saw how far out the tide had gone.

What the cheapness had concealed was not a debt. Nobody had borrowed anything they could not repay. It was an assumption: that a country would go on wanting nothing indefinitely, and that the rest of the world could build on it.

VI

Without Apology

In 2024 Akagi Nyugyo raised the price of its ice pops again. This time it made a joke of it, promising to bow a little deeper with each of three successive increases. “Compared to when we raised prices in 2016,” its marketing head told Reuters, the public was now “more accepting of price hikes.” In July 2025, nearly two hundred of Japan’s big food makers planned price rises on more than two thousand products. Nobody bowed.

A lone figure in a dark suit bows deeply under a single spotlight, on a dark floor scattered with plain bronze coins.
A bow over small change, painted for this essay.

The stillness is ending in the markets too. As of Patterson’s column, Japanese government bonds pay close to 3%, and in July 2026, as she reports, Japan’s finance minister suggested that the government pension fund, which manages $2.1 trillion, sell some of its foreign bonds and buy Japanese ones. The money is being asked to come home.

The accounting is simple. Nobody owes anything. The borrowers repaid their yen, and Japanese savers earned their returns abroad. The world enjoyed a cheap input for thirty years and will now pay more for it.

Expectations lowered by circumstance are a grievance. Expectations worn as a badge are a posture. A name can move a generation from one to the other.

In the third month of 1212, at the end of his short book, Chōmei turned on the hut he had spent it praising. The Buddha teaches, he wrote, that we should cling to nothing: “now, to love this grass hut is a fault; to be attached to quiet must be a hindrance.” He did not resolve it. He only borrowed his tongue, he wrote, and said the Buddha’s name two or three times, unasked, and stopped.

He doubted, and stopped. The name never doubted at all.

⁂

Written in full collaboration with the machine, and the ledger requires the names be exact: drafted with Claude Opus 5.5; literary editing by Claude Opus 5; copy editing by Gemini. No quotation in this essay was recalled; each was copied from a text in hand. The lines from Kamo no Chōmei’s Hōjōki (1212) and from Natsume Sōseki’s lecture “Gendai Nihon no kaika” (“The Civilization of Modern Japan,” Wakayama, August 1911) are the essay’s own translations from the public-domain Japanese texts at Aozora Bunko. Chōmei’s fushō no nenbutsu (不請の念仏) is rendered “unasked”; it has also been read as “unbidden,” “without being requested” and “half-hearted,” and the essay makes no claim to settle it. Rebecca Patterson is quoted three times, each in under fifteen words, from “There’s a New Threat to Your Personal Finances,” The New York Times, September 28, 2026; the essay’s current market figures, the Treasury’s estimate of Japanese holdings and the pension-fund proposal are hers and are dated to that column. The Bank of Japan’s bond holdings (11.55% in March 2013, 53.34% in March 2023) are from Bank of Japan data as reported by Nippon.com; Japan’s gross public debt (about 258% of GDP in 2020) is the IMF’s, via FRED; the share of non-regular employees (19.8% in 1991, 33.7% in 2007) is from Japan’s Labour Force Survey as tabulated by Kazutoshi Chatani of the ILO. The August 5, 2024 Nikkei figures are from The Japan Times and CNBC. Akagi Nyugyo’s 2024 campaign, its marketing head’s words and the July 2025 food-price figures are from a Reuters analysis of July 28, 2025, reached through syndication rather than the wire original. The satori sedai coinage follows the documented timeline: Taku Yamaoka’s Hoshigaranai wakamonotachi (Nikkei, 2009), a 2channel thread of January 2010, and Yohei Harada’s Satori sedai (Kadokawa, 2013). The header and interior images were generated with Gemini for this essay; they illustrate its argument and depict no real place, person or event. On the collaboration → “The Third Thing”