Tag Archives: Literature

Arts & Literature, Essays, Literature, Poetry

LIFE, COMPOSED OF NOWS

Emily Dickinson, Zhuangzi, and the art of leaving the self unfinished

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 5, 2025

The village is still asleep. The moon, a chipped and patient sickle, hangs low over the trees. You feel the cold in your fingertips as you raise the old metal lantern, its flame a solitary heart beating against the glass. You are not on a street in Amherst, of course, but the quiet—the palpable, pre-dawn quiet—feels the same. And it is here, in this hush, that a question, ancient and unnerving, begins to follow you like your own shadow: where is the self, and what does it mean to find it? Emily Dickinson asked it before you, though she rarely left her Amherst room. She held her lanterns in the form of poems, brief and blazing. She never promised answers, only the strangeness of the search.

You begin in secrecy, because secrecy is her element. “I’m Nobody! Who are you? / Are you – Nobody – too?” she whispers to you, conspiratorial. You feel the relief of it — to be Nobody is to escape the demand of being Somebody, of putting on the uniform that the world presses upon you. She invites you into her society of Nobodies, the ones who slip definitions, who resist enclosure. To be Nobody, she suggests, is not emptiness but freedom.

Her room was small but immense. A narrow writing desk beneath the window, where sheets of paper lay scattered like new snow on the dark wood. Ink darkened the edge of her thumb, a tiny bruise of discipline. Beyond the window stretched the orchard, where in spring the blossoms flared white and the bees hummed. On the table beside her were her companions: Shakespeare’s folio with its ragged spine, Wordsworth’s meditations worn soft from handling, Emerson’s essays marked by penciled lines, Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s verses folded into her own books, George Eliot’s novels left open at scenes of moral entanglement.

These were not simply books; they were neighbors, interlocutors, voices she returned to daily. Amherst might have seemed provincial to others, but to Dickinson it was circumference enough: a stage large enough for Shakespeare’s disguises, for Wordsworth’s clouds, for Emerson’s transcendence, for Barrett Browning’s ardor, for Eliot’s fractured heroines. The room itself became a parliament of selves.

Shakespeare was her “Kinsman of the Shelf.” He showed her — and now shows you — how masks both reveal and conceal. Hamlet’s hesitations, Viola’s disguises, Lear’s undoing of self: these are not dramas on a stage but lessons for your own becoming. Hamlet confessed, “I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space.” Dickinson seizes the line, turning it into proof that the mind is immeasurable, that confinement is no barrier to infinity. Shakespeare reminds you that the self is always a performance, and Dickinson presses the point: why pretend the performance ends when the curtain falls?

You follow her into Wordsworth’s solitude. He wandered lonely as a cloud; she among corridors. His belief was that memory could bind the self into unity, that recollection could weave a continuous thread across time. But she never trusted unity. “Forever is composed of nows,” she tells you. The line falls sharp. Each moment breaks from the last. The self is not stitched across years but scattered, provisional, as fragile as dew on grass. Wordsworth offers you continuity; Dickinson offers you fragments. Which feels truer in your own bones?

She leads you toward Emerson next. He believed the soul was porous, connected with nature, radiant with divinity. She nods. “The soul should always stand ajar,” she confides. Ajar, never shut. You realize that for her, as for Emerson, the self is not an essence to guard but a threshold to keep open. She urges you to feel the draft, to allow uncertainty to pass through you, to leave the latch unfastened. Emerson would call it “self-reliance”; she calls it slant openness, an interior door that refuses to close.

Elizabeth Barrett Browning gives you another lesson. She wrote from the margins but spoke to the center, with an intensity Dickinson admired and absorbed. “How do I love thee? Let me count the ways—” but Dickinson is wary of counting. Love and self both resist enumeration. From Browning she learns that vulnerability need not weaken authority; it can sharpen it. To be obscure, unseen, or marginal is not to be powerless. Sometimes it is the condition of the truest voice.

And then George Eliot. Dickinson asks you to imagine Dorothea or Maggie — characters entangled in duty, yearning, and transformation. Eliot’s realism feels psychological, but it points beyond itself: the self is not whole but splintered. Dickinson makes you see that your own splintering is not failure but form. “I am out with lanterns,” she repeats, and you know she means that the search is endless, the light always partial.

Yet still the question: what if the self cannot be found? Here she startles you with an echo from far away, across centuries and continents: Zhuangzi. She never read him, could not have, but she might have been his twin in thought. He dreamed he was a butterfly and then wondered if he was a man dreaming a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming a man. He laughed at the impossibility of deciding. Dickinson smiles slantwise and tells you: “Not knowing when the dawn will come / I open every door.” The butterfly, the door — both insist on openness, on the refusal to foreclose.

And now, as you stand in her parlor of words, you hear it — a dialogue across time.

Dickinson: I am Nobody. Yet they wish to make me Somebody. What is safer: to vanish, or to accept their gaze?
Zhuangzi: Once there was a great tree, twisted and useless. The carpenters passed it by, for it could not be carved into planks. Because it was useless, it lived. Be useless, and you will be free.

Dickinson: Then to be Nobody is to be spared the axe? But tell me, is not even Nobody still a name, a disguise of another sort?
Zhuangzi: The butterfly does not ask if it is a man. The man does not ask if he is a butterfly. Who names them? Who cares?

Dickinson: And yet I write letters to the World — “That never wrote to Me –.” What am I, if no answer comes? Is identity only formed in reply?
Zhuangzi: A bell stands silent until struck. But its silence is still its music. Do not wait for the world to strike you; your sound is already within.

Dickinson: You tempt me toward silence. Yet my discipline is not silence but poems. Shakespeare speaks in soliloquies, Wordsworth in recollections, Emerson in sermons. I speak in fragments, dashes. Is fragmentation a way of freedom, or only proof that I fail to hold myself together?
Zhuangzi: The fish trap exists to catch the fish. When the fish is caught, forget the trap. Words exist to catch meaning. When the meaning is caught, forget the words. Why should your dashes not be your freedom?

Dickinson: And contradiction? “Do I contradict myself?” Whitman booms across the meadow. “Very well then I contradict myself.” I too contradict, though softly. “Forever is composed of nows.” Each now undoes the last. Is contradiction a crime?
Zhuangzi: The Way is crooked. Straightness is an illusion. Contradiction is the only truth.

Dickinson: Then I need not bind the self with thread. I may let it splinter. Yet I ask again: is there a self at all? Emerson insists it is divine. George Eliot sketches it in moral struggle. Elizabeth Barrett Browning pours it into love. What say you?
Zhuangzi: The self is like the reflection in water. Touch it, and it ripples. Chase it, and it vanishes. Sit quietly, and it returns of its own accord.

Dickinson: Then perhaps my lantern is foolish. To be “out with lanterns, looking for myself” — am I lighting only shadows?
Zhuangzi: Light or shadow, both are passing. The lantern is not to find the self, but to remind you that the dark is endless.

Dickinson: Then let us agree — the self is not to be found but to be left ajar, like the door. Yet how shall the poem live, if it refuses to close?
Zhuangzi: The cicada sings and dies. Its song does not last, yet summer is filled with it. Your fragments are cicadas. Do not grieve their brevity; rejoice their season.

You step back, startled by the ease with which their voices intertwine. Dickinson with her dashes, Zhuangzi with his parables, both circling the same question from opposite corners of the world. She insists that “The soul should always stand ajar”; he insists that the consummate person has no self. She opens every door; he dreams every dream. Both resist the foreclosure of identity.

But Dickinson feels the ache of her unanswered letters. You sense it in the quiver of her lines: the longing for reply, for recognition. “This is my letter to the World / That never wrote to Me –.” For Zhuangzi, the silence is natural, even welcome — the useless tree lives precisely because it receives no attention. For her, the silence is double-edged: both protection and wound. And yet perhaps her unanswered letter is itself a butterfly dream — written, released, never knowing if it lands. What she sought was not a reply but the freedom of sending. To write without guarantee is to live ajar.

You picture Dickinson again in her Amherst room. The parlor is quiet, but her books lie open like other selves she tried on: Shakespeare, with his disguises; Wordsworth, with his recollections; Emerson, with his transcendental openness; Browning, with her fierce intimacy; Eliot, with her moral fractures. They were her chorus, the voices she carried in her narrow chamber. She argued with them, borrowed from them, contradicted them, as she now contradicts Zhuangzi. Her soul was never empty, only ajar.

She asks you now to imagine the butterfly hovering at her window, wings trembling in a New England dusk. She does not know whether she is woman or butterfly, Nobody or Somebody, poet or recluse. But she does know this: “Tell all the truth but tell it slant.” And truth — like the self — can only be glimpsed in slant light, never seized in full.

The lantern in your hand trembles, and she smiles. “Not knowing when the dawn will come,” she repeats, “I open every door.” You realize now that the dawn is not the goal; the opening is. The self is not the prize; the refusal to close is. She never read Zhuangzi, but she lived as if his butterfly had hovered at her window.

And so the essay of her life remains unfinished, because it cannot be concluded. Like the butterfly, she slips out of the net, leaving you only with the shimmer of wings. Her identity is not a truth to be nailed down but a truth to be lived ajar. Forever, she reminds you, is composed of nows.

And what of you? To walk with her is to feel the temptation to fix yourself: to declare, to brand, to belong. But Dickinson leans close and whispers otherwise. Do not be Somebody. Do not close the soul. Do not chase coherence. To be Nobody is not despair but possibility. To keep the lantern lit is not to find but to seek. Your task is not to seize identity but to hold the door ajar, to live in fragments, to write letters without reply, to be both butterfly and man, woman and dream, Nobody and all.

You stand at her threshold, lantern in hand, and you hear her question ripple across time, through Zhuangzi’s laughter and her own slant whispers: Who are you? Nobody? Somebody? Both? Neither? Perhaps the self is not meant to be found at all. Perhaps it is meant only to flicker, like a butterfly’s wings in dream, or like a soul forever leaning toward the open door.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Artificial Intelligence, Essays, Literature, Performing Arts, Theater

THE GHOST IN THE SYNTAX

Why Shakespeare’s lines demand intention, not imitation—and why machines can only echo sound.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 3, 2025

The rehearsal room was cold enough that the young actor’s breath lingered in the air. He stood on the stage with a copy of Macbeth, its pages soft from use, and whispered the line under his breath before daring it aloud: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow. The words fell flat the first time. Too rehearsed. Too conscious. He shook his head, tried again, letting the syllables drag as if they themselves were weary from carrying time. Creeps in this petty pace from day to day… The repetition was not just fatalism; it was the sound of a man unraveling, his will eroded by grief and futility. The rhythm itself had to ache.

A machine could, of course, manage the cadence. A program could be tuned to repeat the word “tomorrow” with perfect solemnity, to stretch the vowels just so. Google’s WaveNet system can produce uncanny variations of stress, hesitation, even sighs—digital sighs—at precisely calculated intervals. DeepMind’s recent work on “expressive TTS” allows a line to be rendered in tones of grief, anger, joy, or boredom. There are demo reels online where Shakespeare is fed through these systems, and the result is surprisingly competent. But competency is not intention. What the young actor does—searching for futility in his own chest, summoning weariness from his own private reservoir—cannot be coded. Intent is not in the sound of the line; it’s in the act of dying a little as you speak it.

This is what Shakespeare demands, again and again: not just language, but will. His characters live on the knife-edge of consequence, their words pressed out by motive. Romeo, stumbling over Tybalt’s body, gasps, O, I am fortune’s fool! He has just killed his wife’s cousin, wrecked his future, and tasted blood he never meant to spill. It isn’t just regret—it’s horror, the shock of realizing you’ve become the villain in your own love story. No algorithm can know the sting of unintended consequence. An AI might shout the words, might even deliver them with trembling emphasis, but the cry comes from a boy watching his own destiny collapse. The line does not live without that recognition.

The experiment has been tried. In 2022, an AI-generated voice performed Romeo’s balcony scene at a conference in Vienna. Listeners were impressed—some even moved. But when the line O, I am fortune’s fool! rang out, the room chuckled. It wasn’t just that the intonation was slightly off; it was that the cry lacked stakes. It was Romeo without a pulse, Romeo without a body to bear the guilt. The line did not fall short technically—it fell short existentially.

Hamlet’s soliloquies are the most treacherous test. In Act II he marvels and recoils at the same time: What a piece of work is man… How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty. It sounds like admiration, but it isn’t pure. The words turn over themselves—what ought to inspire awe instead curdles into disgust. He sees hypocrisy in every supposed nobility, futility in every faculty. An actor must carry the irony in his voice, lacing admiration with loathing, as though the words taste bitter even as they sound grand. An AI might deliver a clean, almost clinical balance—“admiration” followed by “disgust”—like toggling sliders on a mixing board. But irony is not a switch. It’s a wound dressed in velvet.

When DeepMind released an expressive model that could generate “sarcasm,” the tech press hailed it as proof that machines could finally do subtlety. Yet what we heard was not a fractured human voice, but a pristine and empty performance. The algorithm delivered a raised-eyebrow cadence, the verbal equivalent of a painted-on smile—a gesture without the impulse to conceal. This is the core of the paradox: sarcasm and irony are built on a bedrock of paradox—they require a speaker to mean two things at once, to hold a contradictory feeling in their voice and body. A computer cannot hold a contradiction. It can only cycle between two different outputs. It cannot fracture its own will; it can only mask its lack of will with a calculated pose. It’s a perfect pantomime of motive, but it is not the thing itself.

John Barton, co-founder of the Royal Shakespeare Company, once said that “Shakespeare is inexhaustible because he leaves space for the actor’s choice. Every pause, every stress opens a door.” The line is telling: it is choice that keeps the plays alive, not just rhythm. Machines can render a pause, but they cannot choose it. They have no sense of opening a door.

Brook went further. In The Empty Space, he wrote: “A word, a movement, a gesture is empty until it is filled with the life of the actor who chooses it in the moment. That life cannot be faked.” Brook believed theatre was only alive because of its fragility—the possibility of collapse at any instant. An AI-generated Lear might roar flawlessly through every line, but the roar would lack the pulse of possible failure. For Brook, this pulse was theatre itself.

The question of intention extends far beyond Shakespeare. What of a writer like Samuel Beckett, whose characters mutter their way through a landscape of despair? Molloy, in his absurdist journey, seems driven by nothing but habit. Yet even his rambling, fragmented speech is an act of will. He confesses, he tries to make sense, he fails. The very act of muttering is a defiant choice against silence and nonexistence. The words tumble out of him not because of a calculation of probability, but because he is compelled by the fundamental, human need to bear witness to his own suffering. He wants to be heard, even if he doesn’t know why. The machine, by contrast, cannot be propelled by such need; it does not hunger or fear silence.

Borges provides another mirror. In “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” he imagines a modern writer who painstakingly rewrites Don Quixote word for word—identical to Cervantes, yet different in meaning because of intention. The same words in a different century become charged with irony. Borges understood that words are never just words; they are vessels for will, for history, for desire. An AI could reproduce Shakespeare endlessly, but reproduction is not creation. The ghost of intent makes the difference.

Shakespeare writes as if to test whether a human voice can hold the charge of intention. Lear’s roar against the storm is the most elemental: Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! It is not just noise; it is betrayal breaking loose. A father disowned, a king humiliated, Lear rages not only at the storm but at the cosmos for his madness and grief. It is a voice already fractured, demanding nature itself collapse. A machine can roar, yes. It can pump bass through speakers, crack like thunder. But it cannot bleed. To speak Lear’s line without the tremor of betrayal is to strip it bare of meaning.

The theater knows this well. In 2019, the Royal Shakespeare Company tested an AI-generated “co-performer” in an experimental production. The system generated lines in response to actors’ improvisations, its voice projected from a disembodied orb above the stage. The critics were fascinated, but they noted the same flaw: the AI could surprise, but it could not intend. The actors on stage carried the burden of consequence; the machine was a clever ghost.

Harold Bloom once wrote that Shakespeare “invented the human as we know it.” What he meant was not that Shakespeare created humanity, but that he revealed in language the contradictions, desires, and paradoxes that shape us. Bloom’s point makes the AI test more daunting: if Shakespeare gave us the map of interiority, then any performance that lacks interiority—any performance without stakes—is not merely deficient, but disqualified.

And then there is Portia, standing in the court of The Merchant of Venice, her voice softening into moral persuasion: The quality of mercy is not strained… It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven. Here intent is everything. Portia is not just lawyering; she is pleading with the very idea of justice, urging her audience to see mercy as divine, inexhaustible. Her belief must be palpable. A machine could roll the syllables like pearls, but eloquence without conviction is nothing but polish. What gives the line its power is the speaker’s faith that mercy belongs to the order of heaven. Without that belief, it’s rhetoric without heart.

Here the cultural anecdote is darker: in 2021, an AI-generated voice was used in a court training exercise to deliver witness testimony. The experiment was intended to test jurors’ susceptibility to persuasion by machine voices. The results were mixed: some jurors reported being swayed, others reported discomfort. What unsettled them was not the quality of the performance but the absence of belief behind it. To be persuaded by words without will felt like manipulation, not argument. One legal scholar described the prospect as “trial by ventriloquism”—justice bent not by human persuasion, but by hollow eloquence.

The ghost in the syntax grows clearest here. Machines can offer us form—eloquence, cadence, even dramatic surprise. What they cannot provide is risk. An actor saying The quality of mercy risks hypocrisy if he fails to embody belief. The line costs him something. A machine, by contrast, cannot fail. Every performance is safe, repeatable, consequence-free. And it is precisely consequence that makes Shakespeare’s words ache.

The paradox is that we, as listeners, are complicit. We project intention onto anything that speaks. We hear a chatbot offer sympathy, and we feel soothed. We hear an AI-generated sonnet, and we marvel at its poignancy. We want to find meaning. We bring the ghost with us. The ELIZA effect—named for one of the earliest chatbots—was discovered in the 1960s: people poured out their souls to a crude program that only echoed their words back. If we can believe that, we can certainly believe in an AI Lear. But the belief is ours, not the machine’s.

Could AI ever cross the threshold? Some technologists argue that with enough layers, enough feedback loops, emergent properties might arise that resemble motive. Perhaps one day a synthetic voice will “choose” to pause differently, to inflect a line with bitterness not because a human trained it so, but because its internal processes made that choice inevitable. If so, would that be intent—or the perfect illusion of intent? The philosophers divide: John Searle insists that no simulation, however perfect, ever achieves the thing itself; Daniel Dennett argues that if behavior is indistinguishable from intent, the distinction may not matter. The stage, however, resists the reduction. A pause can be “indistinguishable” only if we do not ask what it costs the speaker to pause.

The Royal Shakespeare Company, now experimenting with immersive technologies, has been clear-eyed about the limits. Sarah Ellis, their director of digital development, called the company’s work with Intel’s motion capture in The Tempest “21st-century puppetry.” She explained: “The actor is always driving the performance. The technology amplifies, but it cannot replace.” The line could have been written as a manifesto for the AI age: amplification without intention is echo, not expression.

Back in the rehearsal room, the young actor stumbles. His voice cracks slightly on a word, a small imperfection that carries more meaning than a perfect rendition ever could. The director, sitting at the edge of the stage, leans forward, attentive. The line is not flawless, but it is alive. The risk of failure is what makes the moment vibrate.

A machine could reproduce the monologue flawlessly. It could echo a thousand performances until the averages smoothed every edge. But what it could never offer is that tremor. The possibility of failure. The risk that gives intention its bite. For intention is always wager, always consequence, always stake. Without it, words are only words, no matter how well they trip on the tongue.

And that is Shakespeare’s test. Could AI ever deliver his lines with intent? Not unless it learns to bleed, to risk, to believe. Until then, it will remain what it is: syntax without a ghost. We may listen, we may marvel, we may even project a soul into the sound. But when the storm clears, when Romeo cries out, when Portia pleads, it will not be the machine we hear. It will be ourselves, searching for meaning where none was meant.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Essays, History, Literature, Opinion

The Man Who Invented the Modern Thriller

Before Hitchcock or Highsmith, there was Pietro Aretino—Renaissance Venice’s scandalous satirist who turned gossip into cliffhangers and obscenity into art. The man who terrified popes may also have invented the modern thriller.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 29, 2025

Venice, 1537

The candle gutters in its brass dish, casting a crooked halo on the damp walls of a salon off the Grand Canal. Pietro Aretino leans back in his chair, one boot propped on a velvet footstool, his voice curling through the smoke like a blade. He does not write—he dictates. A scribe, young and ink-stained, hunches over parchment, trying to keep pace. The letter—addressed, perhaps, to a cardinal, perhaps to a painter—will contain more than pleasantries. It will contain a threat, veiled as an observation, wrapped in a joke.

“Princes fear me more than the plague,” Aretino murmurs, eyes half-lidded. “For I do not kill bodies—I murder reputations.”

The scribe pauses, startled. Aretino waves him on. “Write it. Let them tremble.”

Tomorrow, this page will cross the lagoon, board a courier’s horse, and ignite tremors in Rome or Paris. It may be copied, whispered, condemned. It may be burned. But it will be read.

It was Aretino’s genius to recognize that scandal was not merely gossip—it was architecture. A scaffolding of insinuation and revelation designed to leave its victim dangling. In his six volumes of Lettere (1537–1557), he sharpened that architecture to a fine point. Written to popes, kings, artists, and courtesans, the letters are part autobiography, part political commentary, and wholly performance. “I speak to the powerful as I would to a neighbor,” he crowed, “for truth makes no bow.” What terrified his recipients was not what he said but what he withheld. His words worked like cliffhangers: each letter a suspense novel in miniature.

Aretino liked to imagine himself not born in Arezzo, as the records claimed, but in his own tongue. The myth suited him: a man conjured out of ink and scandal rather than flesh and baptismal water. By the 1520s, he was notorious as the flagello dei principi—the scourge of princes. The title was not a label pinned on him by enemies; it was one he cultivated, polished, and wore like armor. “I carry more lives in my inkpot than the hangman in his noose,” he declared, and few doubted it.

His life was a play in which he cast himself as both author and protagonist. When Pope Clement VII hesitated to pay him, Aretino wrote slyly, “Your Holiness, whose charity is beyond compare, surely requires no reminder of the poverty that afflicts your devoted servant.” In another letter, he praised the Pope’s mercy while threatening to reveal “those excesses which Rome whispers but dares not record.” He lived by double edge: each compliment a prelude, each benediction a warning.

The tactic was not confined to popes. To Michelangelo he sent fulsome admiration: “Your brush moves like lightning, striking down the pride of the ancients.” To Titian he became impresario, writing to Francis I of France that no royal gallery could be complete without Titian’s brush. But the same pen could turn against friend or patron in an instant. A single phrase from Aretino could undo a reputation; a withheld rumor could ruin a night’s sleep.

His enemies often answered with violence. In Rome, in 1525, mercenaries burst into his lodgings after he lampooned the papal indulgence sellers in his Frottole. They dragged him into the street and beat him nearly to death. Neighbors recalled him crawling, bloodied, back to his rooms. Later, when asked why he returned to writing almost immediately, he grinned through broken teeth: “Even death cannot silence a tongue as sharp as mine.” The scars became his punctuation. “My scars,” he wrote in the Lettere, “are the punctuation marks of my story.”

Aretino’s letters functioned like serialized thrillers. Each installment built tension, each cliffhanger left its audience half-terrified, half-delighted. He understood that suggestion could be more devastating than revelation, that anticipation was more dangerous than disclosure. He used ambiguity as a weapon, seeding his pages with conditional phrases: “It is said,” “One hears,” “Were I less discreet…” They were not evasions. They were traps.

One courtier compared the experience to “sitting at supper and finding the meat still bleeding.” The reader was implicated, made complicit in the scandal’s unfolding. Aretino’s genius lay in turning the audience into co-conspirators.

And Venice—city of masks, labyrinths, and whispered betrayals—was practically designed as the birthplace of the thriller. Long before the genre had a name, its ingredients were already steeping in the canals: duplicity, desire, surveillance, and the ever-present threat of exposure. Aretino didn’t write thrillers in form, but he mastered their emotional architecture. His letters were suspenseful, his dialogues scandalous, his persona a walking cliffhanger. Venice gave him the perfect mise-en-scène: a place where truth wore a disguise and reputation was currency. The city itself functioned like a thriller plot—beautiful on the surface, treacherous underneath.

And consider the mechanics: the masked ball becomes the thriller’s false identity. The gondola ride at midnight becomes the covert rendezvous. The whispered rumor in a candlelit salon becomes the inciting incident. The Contarini garden becomes the secret meeting place where alliances shift and truths unravel. It is no accident that Henry James, Daphne du Maurier, Patricia Highsmith, and Donna Leon all returned to Venice when they wanted to explore psychological tension and moral ambiguity. The city doesn’t just host thrillers—it is one.

Imagine a summer evening in 1537. The garden is fragrant with jasmine and fig. Aretino reclines beneath a pergola, flanked by Titian and a Greek scholar from Crete. A courtesan named Nanna pours wine into silver cups.

“You paint gods,” Aretino says to Titian, “but I paint men. And men are far more dangerous.”

Titian chuckles. “Gods do not pay commissions.”

The scholar leans in. “And men do not forgive.”

Nanna smirks, leaning on the marble balustrade. “And yet men pay both of you—in gold for their portraits, in secrets for his letters.”

Aretino raises his cup. “Which is why I never ask forgiveness. Only attention.”

Venice itself became a character: beautiful, deceptive, morally ambiguous. Its canals mirrored the duplicity of its citizens. Its masks—literal and figurative—echoed Aretino’s own performative identity.

But letters were only one weapon. In 1527, Aretino detonated another: the Sonetti lussuriosi, written to accompany Giulio Romano’s engravings known as I Modi. The sonnets made no attempt at discretion. In one, a woman gasps mid-embrace, “Oh God, if this be sin, then let me sin forever!” In another, a lover interrupts her partner’s poetic boasting with the sharp command: “Speak less and thrust more.” The verses shocked even worldly Rome. Pope Clement VII banned the work, copies were burned, and Aretino’s name became synonymous with obscenity. Yet suppression only heightened its allure. “My verses are daggers,” he later said, “that caress before they strike.”

He followed with the Ragionamenti (1534–1536), dialogues between prostitutes and matrons that turned confession into carnival. In the Dialogo della Nanna e della Antonia, one woman scoffs, “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.” In the Dialogo nel quale la Nanna insegna a la Pippa, the older courtesan instructs a young girl in survival: “A woman must learn to wield her body as men wield their swords.” These were not just bawdy jokes but philosophical inversions. They exposed hypocrisy with laughter and turned vice into discourse.

His comedies struck with equal force. In La Cortigiana (1534), a satire of Roman society, a friar assures his audience: “Do as I say, not as I do—for my sins are a privilege of office.” In Il Marescalco, a groom forced into marriage laments, “Better to wed a sword than a wife, for steel at least does not betray.” In La Talanta, he boasted with characteristic swagger: “My tongue is the scourge of princes and the trumpet of truth.” These plays were not staged fantasies but mirrors held to the world. Rome and Venice recognized themselves, and recoiled.

Even his occasional pieces carried teeth. During the sack of Rome, he penned the Frottole (1527), short verses filled with bitter humor: “The Germans loot the altars, the Spaniards strip the nuns, and Christ hides his face behind the clouds.” Earlier still, in Il Testamento dell’Elefante Hanno (1516), he composed a mock will for Pope Leo X’s pet elephant. The beast bequeathed its tusks to the cardinals and its dung to the faithful: “For the people, my eternal gift, what Rome already feeds them daily.” Juvenile, grotesque, and brilliant, it set the tone for a lifetime of satiric violence.

Was Aretino a moralist or a manipulator? The question haunts his legacy. Like Machiavelli, he understood power. Like Montaigne, he understood performance. His satire was not disinterested—it was strategic. He exposed corruption, yes, but he also profited from it. His critics accused him of blackmail, of cruelty, of vulgarity. But Aretino saw himself as a mirror. “I do not invent,” he wrote, “I reflect.” The discomfort lay not in his words, but in their accuracy.

The dilemma still feels modern. When does exposure serve truth, and when does it become spectacle? Is scandal a form of justice—or just another form of entertainment? To read Aretino is to feel that question sharpen into relevance. He knew the intoxicating pleasure of watching a hypocrite stripped bare, but he also knew the profit of keeping the knife just shy of the skin.

For centuries, Aretino was dismissed as a pornographer and blackmailer, an obscene footnote beside Petrarch and Ariosto. But scandal has a way of surviving. Nineteenth-century Romantics rediscovered him as a prophet of modernity. Today, critics trace his fingerprints across satire, reportage, and fiction. Balzac’s Parisian intrigues, Wilde’s aesthetic scandals, Patricia Highsmith’s Venetian thrillers—all echo Aretino’s mix of desire and dread.

And then there are the heirs who claimed him outright. The Marquis de Sade, that relentless anatomist of transgression, drew directly from Aretino’s playbook. Sade’s philosophical obscenities echo the structures of the Ragionamenti and the Sonetti lussuriosi: dialogues in which sexuality becomes both performance and interrogation, the bed a courtroom, the embrace a cross-examination. Like Aretino, Sade deployed eroticism not only to shock but to dismantle. Both men wielded obscenity as an intellectual weapon, stripping religion and politics of their sanctity by exposing their hypocrisies in the stark light of desire. When Sade has his libertines sneer at clerics who preach chastity while gorging on pleasure, he repeats Aretino’s barbed observation from a century earlier: “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.”

Sade shared Aretino’s radical anti-clericalism, his love of dialogue as a tool of exposure, and his cultivation of notoriety as a literary strategy. The “Divine Marquis” may have been locked in the Bastille, but he carried in his cell Aretino’s scandalous legacy: the belief that obscenity could be philosophy, that provocation itself could be a mode of truth-telling.

Three centuries later, Guillaume Apollinaire would rediscover Aretino with a different eye. In the early twentieth century, Apollinaire praised him as a master who combined “the obscene with the sublime.” In works like Les Onze Mille Verges (The Eleven Thousand Rods), Apollinaire blurred the line between pornography and poetry, scandal and art, just as Aretino had done in his Venetian salons. He admired Aretino’s ability to turn audacity into literature, to make provocation itself a kind of aesthetic. “There is,” Apollinaire wrote of Aretino, “a grandeur in obscenity when it reveals the soul of an age.”

Apollinaire saw in Aretino a precedent for his own experiments: erotic audacity, satirical edge, literary innovation, and a fascination with scandal as aesthetic principle. Where Aretino staged dialogues between courtesans and matrons, Apollinaire crafted delirious erotic parables; where Aretino mocked clerics in his comedies, Apollinaire mocked bourgeois morality with surreal extravagance. Both men made literature dangerous again—texts that could be banned, burned, whispered, yet still survive.

In this long genealogy, Aretino is less a Renaissance curiosity than the origin point of a scandalous tradition that threads through Sade’s prisons, Apollinaire’s Paris, and our own scandal-hungry media. Each recognized that literature need not be safe, that scandal could be structure, that provocation could outlast sermons.

Most uncanny is how current Aretino feels. “What is whispered,” he mused in the Ragionamenti, “weighs more than what is spoken.” That line could be Twitter’s motto, or the tagline of an exposé-driven news cycle. Aretino would have thrived online: the cryptic tweet, the artful insinuation, the screenshot without context. He would have understood the logic of cancel culture, the way scandal circulates as performance, the way innuendo becomes currency.

Imagine him at the end, older now, dictating one last letter. The room is quieter, the scars deeper, the city outside still murmuring with intrigue. He knows his enemies wait for him to fall silent, but he also knows the page will outlive him. The candlelight no longer dances—it trembles. His scribe, older now too, no longer rushes. They have learned the rhythm of Aretino’s menace: slow, deliberate, inevitable.

He pauses mid-sentence, gazing out toward the lagoon. The bells of San Zanipolo toll the hour. A gondola glides past, its oars whispering against the water. Somewhere in the Palazzo Contarini dal Zaffo garden, jasmine blooms in the dark.

“Write this,” he says finally. “To be feared is to be remembered. To be remembered is to be read.”

The scribe hesitates. “And to be read?”

Aretino smiles. “Is to survive.”

He signs his name with a flourish—Pietro Aretino—and sets the quill down. The letter will travel, as they always have, faster than truth and deeper than rumor. It will be copied, misquoted, condemned, and preserved. It will be read by those who hate him and those who become him.

Centuries later, in a world of digital whispers and algorithmic outrage, his voice still echoes. In every scandal that unfolds like a story, in every tweet that wounds like a dagger, in every exposé that trembles with withheld revelation—Aretino is there. Not as ghost, but as architect. He understood what we are still learning: that scandal is not the opposite of art. It is one of its oldest forms. And in the hands of a master, it becomes not just spectacle, but structure. Not just provocation, but prophecy.

The trumpet still sounds. The question is not whether we hear it. The question is whether we recognize the tune.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Augmented Reality, Essays, Literature, Opinion, Travel

Möbius Dreams: A Journey Of Identity Without End

From Nietzsche’s wanderings to Brodsky’s winters in Venice, identity loops like a Möbius strip—and augmented reality may carry those returns to us all.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 25, 2025

It begins, as so many pilgrimages of mind and imagination do, in Italy. To step into one of its cities—Florence with its domes, Rome with its ruins, Venice with its waters—is to experience time folding over itself. Stones are worn by centuries of feet; bells still toll hours as they did five hundred years ago; water mirrors façades that have witnessed empires rise and fall. Italy resists linearity. It does not advance from one stage to another; it loops, bends, recurs. For those who enter it, identity itself begins to feel less like a straight line than like a Möbius strip—a single surface twisting back on itself, where past and present, memory and desire, fold into one another.

Friedrich Nietzsche felt that pull most keenly. His journeys through Italy in the 1870s and 1880s were more than therapeutic sojourns for his fragile health; they were laboratories for thought. He spent time in Sorrento, where the Mediterranean air and lemon groves framed his writing of Human, All Too Human. In Genoa, he walked the cliffs above the port, watching the sun rise and fall in a rhythm that struck him as recurrence itself. In Turin, under its grand porticoes, he composed letters and aphorisms before his final collapse in 1889. And in Venice, he found a strange equilibrium between the city’s music, its tides, and his own restlessness. To his confidant Peter Gast, he wrote: “When I seek another word for ‘music,’ I never find any other word than ‘Venice.’” The gondoliers’ calls, the bells of San Marco, the lapping water—all repeated endlessly, yet never the same, embodying the thought that came to define him: the eternal return.

For Nietzsche, Italy was not a backdrop but a surface on which recurrence became tangible. Each city was a half-twist in the strip of his identity: Sorrento’s clarity, Genoa’s intensity, Turin’s collapse, Venice’s rhythm. He sensed that to live authentically meant to live as though each moment must be lived again and again. Italy, with its cycles of light, water, and bells, made that philosophy palpable.

Henry James —an American expatriate author with a different temperament—also found Italy less a destination than a structure. His Italian Hours (1909) reveals both rapture and unease. “The mere use of one’s eyes in Italy is happiness enough,” he confessed, yet he described Venice as “half fairy tale, half trap.” The city delighted and unsettled him in equal measure. He wandered Rome’s ruins, Florence’s galleries, Venice’s piazzas, and found that they all embodied a peculiar temporal layering—what he called “a museum of itself.” Italy was not history frozen; it was history repeating, haunting, resurfacing.

James’s fiction reflects that same looping structure. In The Aspern Papers, an obsessive narrator circles endlessly around an old woman’s letters, desperate to claim them, caught in a cycle of desire and denial. In The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer discovers that the freedom she once thought she had secured returns as entrapment; her choices loop back on her with tragic inevitability. Even James’s prose mirrors the Möbius curve: sentences curl and return, digress and double back, before pushing forward. Reading James can feel like walking Venetian alleys—you arrive, but only by detour.

Joseph Brodsky, awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize in Literature after being exiled from the Soviet Union in 1972, found in Venice a winter refuge that became ritual. Each January he returned, until his death in 1996, and from those returns came Watermark (1992), a prose meditation that circles like the canals it describes. “Every January I went to Venice, the city of water, the city of mirrors, perhaps the city of illusions,” he wrote. Fog was his companion, “the city’s most faithful ghost.” Brodsky’s Venice was not Nietzsche’s radiant summer or James’s bustling salons. It was a city of silence, damp, reflection—a mirror to exile itself.

He repeated his returns like liturgy: sitting in the Caffè Florian, notebook in hand, crossing the Piazza San Marco through fog so dense the basilica dissolved, watching the lagoon become indistinguishable from the sky. Each January was the same, and yet not. Exile ensured that Russia was always present in absence, and Venice, indifferent to his grief yet faithful in its recurrence, became his Möbius surface. Each year he looped back as both the same man and someone altered.

What unites these three figures—Nietzsche, James, Brodsky—is not their similarity of thought but their recognition of Italy as a mirror for recurrence. Lives are often narrated as linear: childhood, youth, adulthood, decline. But Italy teaches another geometry. Like a Möbius strip, it twists perspective so that to move forward is also to circle back. An old anxiety resurfaces in midlife, but it arrives altered by experience. A desire once abandoned returns, refracted into new form. Nietzsche’s eternal return, James’s recursive characters, Brodsky’s annual exiles—all reveal that identity is not a line but a fold.

Italy amplifies this lesson. Its cities are not progressions but palimpsests. In Rome, one stands before ruins layered upon ruins: the Colosseum shadowed by medieval houses, Renaissance palaces built into ancient stones. In Florence, Brunelleschi’s dome rises above medieval streets, Renaissance paintings glow under electric light. In Venice, Byzantine mosaics shimmer beside Baroque marble while tourists queue for modern ferries. Each city is a surface where centuries loop, never erased, only folded over.

Philosophers and writers have groped toward metaphors for this looping. Nietzsche’s eternal return insists that each moment recurs infinitely. Derrida’s différance plays on the way meaning is always deferred, never fixed, endlessly circling. Borges imagined labyrinths where every turn leads back to the start. Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands describes identity as hybrid, cyclical, recursive. Italy stages all of these. To walk its piazzas is to feel history as Möbius surface: no beginning, no end, only continuous return.

But the Möbius journey of return is not without strain. Increasing overcrowding in Venice has made Piazza San Marco feel at times like a funnel for cruise-ship day trippers, raising questions of whether the city can survive its admirers. Rising costs of travel —inflated flights, pricier accommodations, surcharges for access—place the dream of pilgrimage out of reach for many. The very recurrence that writers once pursued with abandon now risks becoming the privilege of the few. And so the question arises: if one cannot return physically, can another kind of return suffice?

The answer is already being tested. Consider the Notre-Dame de Paris augmented exhibition, created by the French startup Histovery. Visitors carry a HistoPad, a touchscreen tablet, and navigate 850 years of the cathedral’s history. Faux stone tiles line the floor, stained-glass projections illuminate the walls, recordings of tolling bells echo overhead. With a swipe, one moves from the cathedral’s medieval construction to Napoleon’s coronation, then to the smoke and flames of the 2019 fire, then to the scaffolds of its restoration. It is a Möbius strip of architecture, looping centuries in minutes. The exhibition has toured globally, making Notre-Dame accessible to millions who may never step foot in Paris.

Italy, with its fragile architecture and layered history, is poised for the same transformation. Imagine a virtual walk through Venice’s alleys, dry and pristine, free of floods. A reconstructed Pompeii, where one can interact with residents moments before the eruption. Florence restored to its quattrocento brilliance, free of scaffolding and tourist throngs. For those unable to travel, AR offers an uncanny loop: recurrence of experience without presence.

Yet the question lingers: if one can walk through Notre-Dame without smelling the stone, without hearing the echo of one’s own footsteps, have they truly arrived? Recurrence, after all, has always been embodied. Nietzsche needed the Venetian fog to sting his lungs. James needed to feel the cold stones of a Florentine palazzo. Brodsky needed the damp silence of January to write his Watermark. The Möbius loop of identity was sensory, mortal, physical. Can pixels alone replicate that?

Perhaps this is too stark a contrast. Italy itself has always been both ruin and renewal, both stone and scaffolding, both presence and representation. Rome is simultaneously crumbling and rebuilt. Florence is both painted canvas and postcard reproduction. Venice is both sinking and endlessly photographed. Italy has survived by layering contradictions. Augmented reality may become one more layer.

Indeed, there is hope in this possibility. Technology can democratize what travel once restricted. The Notre-Dame exhibition allows a child in Kansas to toggle between centuries in an afternoon. It lets an elder who cannot fly feel the weight of medieval Paris. Applied to Italy, AR could make the experience of recurrence more widely available. Brodsky’s fog, Nietzsche’s bells, James’s labyrinthine sentences—these could be accessed not only by the privileged traveler but by anyone with a headset. The Möbius strip of identity, always looping, would expand to include more voices, more bodies, more experiences.

And yet AR is not a replacement so much as an extension. Those who can still travel will always seek stone, water, and bells. They will walk the Rialto and feel the wood beneath their feet; they will stand in Florence and smell the paint and dust; they will sit in Rome’s piazzas and feel the warmth of stone in the evening. These are not illusions but recurrences embodied. Technology will not end this; it will supplement it, add folds to the Möbius strip rather than cutting it.

In this sense, the Möbius book of identity continues to unfold. Nietzsche’s Italian sojourns, James’s expatriate wanderings, Brodsky’s winter rituals—all are chapters inscribed on the same continuous surface. Augmented reality will not erase those chapters; it will add marginalia, footnotes, annotations accessible to millions more. The loop expands rather than contracts.

So perhaps the hopeful answer is that recurrence itself becomes more democratic. Italy will always be there for those who return, in stone and water. But AR may ensure that those who cannot return physically may still enter the loop. A student in her dormitory may don a headset and hear the same Venetian bells that Nietzsche once called music. A retiree may walk through Florence’s restored galleries without leaving her home. A child may toggle centuries in Notre-Dame and begin to understand what it means to live inside a Möbius strip of time.

Identity, like travel, has never been a straight line. It is a fold, a twist, a surface without end. Italy teaches this lesson in stone and water. Technology may now teach it in pixels and projections. The Möbius book has no last page. It folds on—Nietzsche in Turin, James in Rome, Brodsky in Venice, and now, perhaps, millions more entering the same loop through new, augmented doors.

The self is not a line but a surface, infinite and recursive. And with AR, more of us may learn to trace its folds.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Criticism, Essays, Literature, Philosophy, Profiles

Cervantes in the Cave — The Art of Illusion

From Lepanto to Algiers to Seville, he recast Plato’s cave: instead of fleeing, he trimmed the wick—using comedy and narrative to make honest light out of shadow.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 22, 2025

In a cave in Argamasilla de Alba, Spain, a man sits hunched over a manuscript. The air is damp; the light keeps deciding what to keep. He writes not with the flourish of a court poet but with the urgency of someone who has known confinement—who has lived among shadows and learned to speak their language. The man is Miguel de Cervantes. The cave, according to local legend, is where he began Don Quixote. Whether the story is true hardly matters. The image endures: Cervantes, imprisoned, wounded, obscure, writing the book that would fracture the very idea of literary realism.

He breaks the silence first, as if talking to the walls. “Engendrado en una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento,” he says—begotten in a prison, where every discomfort keeps its chair. He smiles at his own choice of verb. Begotten. It gives hardship hands.

A foot scuffs the threshold. Mateo steps into the half-light, a fellow freed captive from a life the two men still carry like a watermark. He takes the cave in at a glance—the whitewash, the barred slit of window, the stone bench that knows the shape of a tired back.

“You write in the dark, Miguel,” Mateo says. “Still chasing shadows?”

“Not chasing,” Cervantes replies, without looking up. “Refracting. These shadows are more honest than the sunlit lies of court and empire.”

Plato’s prisoners mistook flicker for fact. Cervantes has no such innocence; he knows exactly what light can do and what it cannot. In Algiers he learned the cost of sunlight and the uses of a candle. “We invented stories to survive,” he says. “We imagined rescue. We became authors of unreality. And in doing so, we learned how unreality works.”

He had boarded a homeward ship in 1575 and sailed straight into a profession he did not apply for. Corsairs took the vessel. Letters of recommendation—ironically the very proof of his merit—made him valuable. Algiers swallowed him for five years. Four escape attempts, each with its choreography of bribes, whispers, and night boats, failed in turn; punishments followed with bureaucratic punctuality. In the baños he organized fellow captives, staged plays that felt like oxygen rations, and discovered a kind of command that requires neither rank nor drumrolls. The lesson was not transcendence. It was texture. Captivity did not reveal some pure, sunlit truth; it revealed illusion’s machinery: how shadows are cast, how they persuade, how they can be turned from weapon into instrument.

“So you believe captivity reveals truth?” Mateo asks.

“No,” Cervantes says. “It reveals illusion. But if you know you’re in a cave, illusion can be honest about itself.”

He speaks like a man who has balanced too many ledgers and decided to keep one for the soul. In his prologue to the Exemplary Novels he would boast with a craftsman’s pride: mías propias, no imitadas ni hurtadas—my own pieces, not imitated or stolen. After a life in which other people held the keys, authorship felt like a kind of lawful possession. He is not naïve about it; theft will come in a thousand copies. Still, he plants his flag in sentences.

Mateo lowers himself onto the bench. The cave keeps its cool.

“Begin earlier,” Mateo says softly. “Begin with the wound.”

Cervantes nods, as if paging back. “Lepanto,” he says. “Two shots to the chest, one to the hand. El mayor bien que me vino. The greatest favor that came to me.”

Mateo laughs—a short, incredulous bark. “Favor?”

“A hand is a tool,” Cervantes says, flexing his right, letting the left sleeve fall into its gentle emptiness. “So is a story. One broke and taught the other its work. I learned that honor is not trumpets; it is the bruise that stays after the sound goes.”

“What did it smell like—the battle?” Mateo asks, because some questions insist.

“Oak and salt and a fire that wandered,” Cervantes says. “The sea keeps bad accounts—always debits, never balance. We threw our bodies at its ledger and called it glory. I got a bill I could live with.”

The cave changes its mind about brightness by a single shade. Light climbs a little higher on the wall, as if memory has a temperature.

“After Algiers,” Mateo says, “you came home to paper.”

“To paper and suspicion,” Cervantes answers. “Spain wanted receipts more than epics.” He became a purchasing agent, then a tax collector—the sort of work that presses humility into a man’s pockets and takes the lint besides. A banker fell in Seville and the ground gave way beneath him. Jail happened the way weather happens. Bureaucracy, he discovered, is a prison with nicer pens.

He thumps the palm of his right hand on the bench, a quiet imitation of a ledger closing. “Always the same sum,” he says. “Loyalty plus wounds equals suspicion.”

“That arithmetic,” Mateo says, “taught you comedy.”

“It taught me instruments,” Cervantes corrects gently. “Comedy is a surgeon’s knife you can carry in public.”

He had tried other rooms. La Galatea (1585), a pastoral romance, sighs under painted trees and speaks expertly in a fashionable voice—too expertly for a man who had learned to breathe in iron. “A ceiling too low for the lungs,” he says. Failure did not embarrass him; it emancipated him. “I loved what books promised. I wrote the promise’s correction.”

“And then you choose another cave,” Mateo says, looking around.

“This time I brought the candle.” Cervantes nods at the stub trembling in its dish. “The cave is not a prison if you know you’re inside it. Fiction is not delusion if you wield it knowingly.”

“Is that freedom?” Mateo asks. “To live in fiction?”

Cervantes answers with a line he will later put in a knight’s mouth because knights carry sentences farther than taxmen do. “La libertad, Sancho, es uno de los más preciosos dones…” Freedom, Sancho, is one of the most precious gifts. He lets the clause hang and then adds the counterweight: captivity is the greatest evil. “But there is a third thing,” he says. “The discipline of the wick. Not everyone reaches the sun. Many of us live by hearth-light. So make the hearth honest.”

He laughs, not kindly but not unkindly, at the memory of a barber’s basin mistaken for a helmet. “A basin can be a helmet,” he says, “if the story is honest about the trick.” The joke is not cruelty; it’s consent. Illusions that confess their wages are allowed to work.

“You sound like Plato’s least obedient pupil,” Mateo says. “He wants the prisoner out of the cave. You stay.”

“Plato had less practice with caves,” Cervantes says. “I stay and trim the wick.”

The man who stays in the cave can tell you about the cost of zeal. He knows what happens when mercy runs faster than attention: chaos dresses up as freedom. He has written a scene in which a knight frees a chain gang of galley slaves with a fine speech and a flash of temper, and the liberated—unbriefed on narrative responsibility—repay the favor with stones. “Pity without comprehension,” he says, “is a door swinging in a storm. Freedom without narrative becomes a mess that lets tyrants say, ‘You see? Chains keep order.’”

Mateo’s eyes drift toward a wooden head in the corner, painted eyes arrested mid-glance. “Master Pedro,” Cervantes says, amused at the prop the cave has supplied. He tells the story of a puppet theater, a knight who cannot bear strings, a sword that corrects an illusion into splinters. Even illusions keep accounts, he reminds Mateo. Someone pays for the pleasure. “In that scene,” he says, “I taxed zeal. I sent the bill to laughter.”

“So your book is a theater?” Mateo asks.

“A theater that shows its ropes,” Cervantes says. “A historian with a wink in his ink. A narrator who argues with me, and I with him. A false sequel enters the room, and I absorb him into the play. If illusion is a crime, let the evidence be visible. If it is a craft, let the strings show and the audience decide.”

He keeps his quotes short and to the point, letting them behave like tools rather than trophies. “Yo sé quién soy,” he says, not to boast but to set a boundary—I know who I am. “And I know what I am not. I am not the sun. I am a candle with a good memory.”

Memory is a troublesome servant. “¡Oh memoria, enemiga mortal de mi descanso!,” he mutters with theatrical exasperation—Oh memory, mortal enemy of my rest—knowing full well he cannot do without her. In the deepest fold of the book he is writing, he lowers his knight into the Cave of Montesinos and gives him a private vision no one can verify. Minutes pass in the world; days unfold in the cave. Readers will fight about that descent for centuries: lie or parable? He shrugs. The rope held. The telling is what matters.

“What about truth?” Mateo asks. “You dodge it like a matador.”

“Truth is errant,” Cervantes says. “Like my knight. It wanders, stumbles, reinvents itself. La verdad adelgaza y no quiebra—truth thins but does not break. It lives in the flicker between shadow and flame.” He aims for a truth you can sit with, not a blaze you must worship. Even now, when the cave dims or brightens by a breath, he adjusts nothing in his voice. He trusts the room to keep up.

The room has heard other versions of this life. Soldier, captive, clerk, failed author—the catalogue is accurate and useless until you give it breath. He has learned that a life of refusals and humiliations can be rearranged into a lamp. “El que lee mucho y anda mucho, ve mucho y sabe mucho,” he says with a grin—he who reads much and travels much sees much and knows much—and Mateos’s chuckle bounces off the whitewash and returns as agreement.

If the cave is a theater, it is also a workshop. He places three objects on the bench as if laying out tools: a frayed rope (failed escape; lesson kept), a ledger (bureaucracy’s Bible, now a prop for comedy), and the puppet head (illusion, demystified and retained). He sets the rope across the ledger like a sash and props the puppet against both like a child asleep between two patient adults.

“You’re staging your own life,” Mateo says.

“Everything I own appears in my books,” Cervantes answers. “Better to put them to work than let them gather dust.”

He will put even injury to work. He has already done it. “There is no book so bad that it does not have something good,” he says—No hay libro tan malo que no tenga algo bueno—and he means, among other things, his own early efforts. He tried the fashion and failed; he learned to write beyond it. The failure cleared the room.

“And the counterfeit?” Mateo asks. “The other Quixote?”

“I made room,” Cervantes says, not quite happily. He doesn’t bother to call the rival by name. “I let the counterfeit into Part II and gave him the dignity of being wrong on the page. It is the politest way to win.”

Outside, late afternoon arranges itself. Inside, the candle practices its small weather. The conversation acquires the unhurried gravity of men who have been forced to wait before and know that waiting can be made useful. They speak of the Información de Argel—the sworn testimonies that stitched a biography out of scars and courage; of the petition to the Council of the Indies that asked for four possible offices across the ocean and delivered no; of Seville’s auditoriums of suspicion where a man could do arithmetic all day and still owe.

“You turned all that into a style,” Mateo says.

“I turned it into a temperament,” Cervantes corrects. Style is the residue. The temperament is the choice: to stay in the cave and make the light adjustable; to refuse the panic of transcendence in favor of the patience of attention; to let laughter be a form of moral accounting. “I wanted a book in which the strings show,” he says. “So when someone pulls, we know who is moving what.”

He reaches for the candle with wetted fingers and trims the wick. The flame tightens, steadies, sharpens the edges of the room with a surgeon’s manners. The gesture is mundane and feels like a thesis.

“Why not flee?” Mateo asks one last time, because some questions return until answered in the body.

“Because someone must tend the flame,” Cervantes says. “Because most people live by hearth-light. Because the cave tells the truth about limits, and I prefer honest rooms to lying palaces.”

He stands, and the bench acknowledges the change with a creak that has learned both complaint and loyalty. He touches the stone with the backs of his fingers, as one does a sleeping child. The puppet keeps its round attention. The rope adopts its length. The ledger decides to be heavy again.

“Begin,” Mateo says, suddenly shy of making a ceremony of it.

“I did,” Cervantes answers, and returns to his page.

He writes the opening lines of Don Quixote as the candle throws a peninsula of light bordered by ink. A poor gentleman with a head full of books starts out into a world that will bruise him into philosophy. A squire with a sack of proverbs learns to spend them one by one, after listening. Windmills declare their innocence; a basin negotiates a new title. Dukes turn out to be children who have learned cruelty by playing. Priests explain themselves into farce. Puppets are freed to their ruin, then repaired by a writer who has learned to apologize with laughter.

Cervantes does not flee illusion; he illuminates it. He does not reject reality; he reframes it. He does not promise truth; he escorts it, errant and sturdy, through rooms with honest walls. He turns shadows into stories and stories into a way of seeing that does not blind. He has stayed where Plato urged ascension and found, by staying, a different kind of ascent: the climb of attention, the charity of proportion, the courage to let strings show and still believe in the show.

Unlike Plato’s prisoner, Cervantes remains in the cave. He writes. He refracts. He talks to the walls and to the future, and both answer. His broken hand, his captive mind, his errant knight—everything he survived and everything he invented—gathers in the small weather of a candle and becomes, against all instruction, a form of daylight.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Essays, Literature, Reviews, Society, Theater

Passion Unleashed Or Reason Restrained: The Tale Of Two Theaters

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 6, 2025

The theatrical landscapes of England and France, while both flourishing in the early modern period, developed along distinct trajectories, reflecting their unique cultural, philosophical, and political climates. The English Renaissance stage, exemplified by the towering figures of Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare, embraced a sprawling, often chaotic, exploration of human experience, driven by individual ambition and psychological depth. In contrast, the French Neoclassical theatre, championed by masters like Molière and Jean Racine, championed order, reason, and a more focused examination of societal manners and tragic passions within a stricter dramatic framework.

This essay will compare and contrast these two powerful traditions by examining how Marlowe and Shakespeare’s expansive and character-driven dramas differ from Molière’s incisive social comedies and Racine’s intense psychological tragedies. Through this comparison, we can illuminate the divergent artistic philosophies and societal preoccupations that shaped the dramatic arts in these two influential European nations.

English Renaissance Drama: The Expansive Human Spirit and Societal Flux

The English Renaissance theatre was characterized by its boundless energy, its disregard for classical unities, and its profound interest in the multifaceted human psyche. Playwrights like Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare captured the era’s spirit of exploration and individualism, often placing ambitious, flawed, and deeply introspective characters at the heart of their narratives. These plays, performed in bustling public theaters, offered a mirror to an English society grappling with rapid change, shifting hierarchies, and the exhilarating—and terrifying—potential of the individual.

Christopher Marlowe (1564–1593), a contemporary and rival of Shakespeare, pioneered the use of blank verse and brought a new intensity to the English stage. His plays often feature protagonists driven by overwhelming, almost superhuman, desires—for power, knowledge, or wealth—who challenge societal and divine limits. In Tamburlaine the Great, the Scythian shepherd rises to conquer empires through sheer force of will, embodying a ruthless individualism that defied traditional hierarchies. Marlowe’s characters are often defined by their singular, often transgressive, ambition.

“I hold the Fates bound fast in iron chains, / And with my hand turn Fortune’s wheel about.” — Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great

Similarly, Doctor Faustus explores the dangerous pursuit of forbidden knowledge, with its protagonist selling his soul for intellectual mastery and worldly pleasure. Marlowe’s drama is characterized by its grand scale, its focus on the exceptional individual, and its willingness to delve into morally ambiguous territory, reflecting a society grappling with new ideas about human potential and the limits of authority. His plays were often spectacles of ambition and downfall, designed to provoke and awe, suggesting an English fascination with the raw, unbridled power of the individual, even when it leads to destruction. They spoke to a society where social mobility, though limited, was a potent fantasy, and where traditional religious and political certainties were increasingly open to radical questioning.

William Shakespeare (1564–1616) built upon Marlowe’s innovations, expanding the scope of English drama to encompass an unparalleled range of human experience. While his historical plays and comedies are diverse, his tragedies, in particular, showcase a profound psychological realism. Characters like Hamlet, Othello, and King Lear are not merely driven by singular ambitions but are complex individuals wrestling with internal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and the unpredictable nature of fate. Shakespeare’s plays often embrace multiple plots, shifts in tone, and a blend of prose and verse, reflecting the messy, unconstrained reality of life.

“All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players; / They have their exits and their entrances; / And one man in his time plays many parts…” — William Shakespeare, As You Like It

Hamlet’s introspection and indecision, Lear’s descent into madness, and Othello’s tragic jealousy reveal a deep fascination with the inner workings of the human mind and the devastating consequences of human fallibility. Unlike the French emphasis on decorum, Shakespeare’s stage could accommodate violence, madness, and the full spectrum of human emotion, often without strict adherence to classical unities of time, place, or action. This freedom allowed for a rich, multifaceted exploration of the human condition, making his plays enduring studies of the soul. These plays vividly portray an English society grappling with the breakdown of traditional order, the anxieties of political succession, and the moral ambiguities of power. They suggest a national character more comfortable with contradiction and chaos, finding truth in the raw, unfiltered experience of human suffering and triumph rather than in neat, rational resolutions.

French Neoclassical Drama: Order, Reason, and Social Control

The French Neoclassical theatre, emerging in the 17th century, was a reaction against the perceived excesses of earlier drama, favoring instead a strict adherence to classical rules derived from Aristotle and Horace. Emphasizing reason, decorum, and moral instruction, playwrights like Molière and Jean Racine crafted works that were elegant, concentrated, and deeply analytical of human behavior within a structured society. These plays offered a reflection of French society under the centralized power of the monarchy, particularly the court of Louis XIV, where order, hierarchy, and the maintenance of social appearances were paramount.

Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, 1622–1673), the master of French comedy, used wit and satire to expose the follies, hypocrisies, and social pretensions of his contemporary Parisian society. His plays, such as Tartuffe, The Misanthrope, and The Miser, feature characters consumed by a single dominant passion or vice (e.g., religious hypocrisy, misanthropy, avarice). Molière’s genius lay in his ability to create universal types, using laughter to critique societal norms and encourage moral rectitude. His comedies often end with the restoration of social order and the triumph of common sense over absurdity.

“To live without loving is not really to live.” — Molière, The Misanthrope

Unlike the English focus on individual transformation, Molière’s characters often remain stubbornly fixed in their vices, serving as satirical mirrors for the audience. The plots are tightly constructed, adhering to the classical unities, and the language is precise, elegant, and witty, reflecting the French emphasis on clarity and rational thought. His plays were designed not just to entertain, but to instruct and reform, making them crucial vehicles for social commentary. Molière’s comedies reveal a French society deeply concerned with social decorum, the perils of pretense, and the importance of maintaining a rational, harmonious social fabric. They highlight the anxieties of social climbing and the rigid expectations placed upon individuals within a highly stratified and centralized court culture.

Jean Racine (1639–1699), the preeminent tragedian of the French Neoclassical period, explored the destructive power of human passions within a highly constrained and formal dramatic structure. His tragedies, including Phèdre, Andromaque, and Britannicus, focus intensely on a single, overwhelming emotion—often forbidden love, jealousy, or ambition—that inexorably leads to the protagonist’s downfall. Racine’s plays are characterized by their psychological intensity, their elegant and precise Alexandrine verse, and their strict adherence to the three unities (time, place, and action).

“There is no greater torment than to be consumed by a secret.” — Jean Racine, Phèdre

Unlike Shakespeare’s expansive historical sweep, Racine’s tragedies unfold in a single location over a short period, concentrating the emotional and moral conflict. His characters are often members of the aristocracy or historical figures, whose internal struggles are presented with a stark, almost clinical, precision. The tragic outcome is often a result of an internal moral failing or an uncontrollable passion, rather than external forces or a complex web of events. Racine’s work reflects a society that valued order, reason, and a clear understanding of human nature, even when depicting its most destructive aspects. Racine’s tragedies speak to a French society that, despite its pursuit of order, recognized the terrifying, almost inevitable, power of human passion to disrupt that order. They explore the moral and psychological consequences of defying strict social and religious codes, often within the confines of aristocratic life, where reputation and controlled emotion were paramount.

Divergent Stages, Shared Human Concerns: A Compelling Contrast

The comparison of these two dramatic traditions reveals fundamental differences in their artistic philosophies and their reflections of national character. English Renaissance drama, as seen in Marlowe and Shakespeare, was expansive, embracing complexity, psychological depth, and a vibrant, often chaotic, theatricality. It reveled in the individual’s boundless potential and tragic flaws, often breaking classical rules to achieve greater emotional impact and narrative freedom. The English stage was a mirror to a society undergoing rapid change, where human ambition and internal conflict were paramount, and where the individual’s journey, however tumultuous, was often the central focus.

French Neoclassical drama, in contrast, prioritized order, reason, and decorum. Molière’s comedies satirized social behaviors to uphold moral norms, while Racine’s tragedies meticulously dissected destructive passions within a tightly controlled framework. Their adherence to classical unities and their emphasis on elegant language reflected a desire for clarity, balance, and a more didactic approach to theatre. The French stage was a laboratory for examining universal human traits and societal structures, often through the lens of a single, dominant characteristic or emotion, emphasizing the importance of social harmony and rational control.

The most compelling statement arising from this comparison is that while English drama celebrated the unleashing of the individual, often leading to magnificent chaos, French drama sought to contain and analyze the individual within the strictures of reason and social order. The English stage, with its public accessibility and fewer formal constraints, became a crucible for exploring the raw, unvarnished human condition, reflecting a society more comfortable with its own contradictions and less centralized in its cultural authority. The French stage, often patronized by the monarchy and adhering to strict classical principles, became a refined instrument for social critique and the dissection of universal passions, reflecting a society that valued intellectual control, social hierarchy, and the triumph of reason over disruptive emotion.

Despite these significant stylistic and philosophical divergences, both traditions ultimately grappled with universal human concerns: ambition, love, betrayal, morality, and the search for meaning. Whether through the grand, sprawling narratives of Shakespeare and Marlowe, or the concentrated, analytical dramas of Molière and Racine, the theatre in both nations served as a vital arena for exploring the human condition, shaping national identities, and laying groundwork for future intellectual movements. The “stages of the soul” in the Renaissance and Neoclassical periods, though built on different principles, each offered profound insights into the timeless complexities of human nature.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Book Reviews, Essays, Literature, Reviews

Moby-Dick, Perpetual Inquiry, and the Sublime

“Call me Ishmael.”

This iconic first line anchors one of the most enduring openings in American literature. Yet before it is spoken, before Ishmael’s voice emerges on the page, we encounter something more unusual: a kind of literary invocation. The opening pages of Moby-Dick—those dense, eclectic “Extracts” quoting scripture, classical literature, scientific treatises, and forgotten travelogues—do not serve as a traditional preface. Instead, they operate like a ritual threshold. They ask us to enter the novel not as a narrative, but as a vast textual cosmos.

Melville’s fictional “sub-sub-librarian” gathers fragments from Job to Shakespeare to obscure whaling reports, assembling a chorus of voices that have, across centuries, spoken of the whale. This pre-narrative collage is more than ornamentation. It proposes a foundational idea: that the whale lives not only in the ocean, but in language. Not only in myth, but in memory. Not only in flesh, but in thought.

Before the Pequod ever sets sail, Melville has already charted his central course—into the ocean of human imagination, where the whale swims through texts, dreams, and questions that refuse easy resolution.

Proof of Two Lives

“There’s something I find strangely moving about the ‘Extracts’ section,” remarks literary critic Wyatt Mason on The World in Time, a podcast hosted by Lewis Lapham. “It’s proof of two kinds of life. The life of the creature itself, and the life of the mind—the attention we pay over time to this creature.”

Mason’s comment offers a keel for the voyage ahead. In Moby-Dick, the whale is not simply an animal or antagonist. It becomes a metaphysical magnet, a mirror for human understanding, a challenge to the limits of knowing. The “Extracts” and “Etymologies,” often dismissed as digressions, are in fact sacred rites—texts that beg to be read with reverence.

In teaching the novel to incarcerated students through the Bard Prison Initiative, Mason and fellow writer Donovan Hohn describe how these obscure, labyrinthine sections are received not as trivia but as scripture. The students descend into the archive as divers into a shipwreck—recovering fragments of forgotten wisdom, learning to breathe in the pressure of incomprehensibility. “The whale,” Mason repeats, “resides or lives in texts.” And what a library it is.

The Whale as Philosophy

“All my means are sane, my motive and my object mad.”

Harold Bloom, the late sage of literary criticism, would have nodded at Mason’s insight. For Bloom, Moby-Dick was not merely a novel, but “a giant Shakespearean prose poem.” Melville, he believed, was a tragedian of the American soul. Captain Ahab, mad with self-reliance, became for Bloom a Promethean figure—bound not by divine punishment, but by his own obsessive will.

In Bloom’s classroom at Yale in 2011, there were no lecture notes. He taught Moby-Dick like a jazz solo—improvised, living, drawn from a lifetime of memory and myth. “It’s very unfair,” he said, reflecting on the whale hunts—great mammals hunted with harpoons and lances. Yet the Pequod’s most moral man, Starbuck, is also its most proficient killer. A Quaker devoted to peace, he is also the ship’s deadliest lance. This contradiction—gentleness and violence braided together—is the essence of Melville’s philosophy.

The whale, in Bloom’s reading, is sublime not because it symbolizes any one thing—God, evil, justice, nature—but because it cannot be pinned down. It is an open question. An unending inquiry. A canvas for paradox. “Heaven help them all,” Bloom said of the Pequod’s doomed crew. “And us.”

Melville the Environmentalist

“There she blows! There she blows! A hump like a snow-hill! It is Moby Dick!”

Where Bloom heard Melville’s music in metaphor and myth, Richard J. King hears it in science. In Ahab’s Rolling Sea: A Natural History of Moby-Dick (2019), King charts a different map—overlaying Melville’s imagined ocean onto real tides, real whales, real voyages. He sails replica whalers, interviews marine biologists, pores over Melville’s notebooks.

His inquiry begins with a straightforward question: could a sperm whale really destroy a ship? Historical records suggest yes. But King doesn’t stop at anatomy. His portrait of Melville reveals a proto-environmentalist, someone who revered the sea not just as symbol but as system. Melville’s whale, King argues, is a creature of wonder and terror, not just prey but presence.

In an age of ecological crisis, King reframes Moby-Dick as a book not just of metaphor but of environmental ethics. Ishmael’s meandering digressions become meditations on the ocean as moral agent—an entity capable of sustaining and destroying. The sea is no backdrop; it is a character, a god, an intelligence. Melville’s ocean, King suggests, humbles the hubris of Ahab and calls readers to ecological humility.

Rediscovery in Dark Times

“Strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall?”

Aaron Sachs, in Up From the Depths: Herman Melville, Lewis Mumford, and Rediscovery in Dark Times (2022), picks up the whale’s trail in the 20th century. In 1929, as the world plunged into the Great Depression, the writer and historian Lewis Mumford resurrected Melville from literary oblivion. His biography of the long-forgotten author recast Melville not as a failure, but as a visionary.

For Mumford, Melville was a kindred spirit—a man who, long before the term “modernity” took hold, had already seen its psychic cost. As Mumford watched the rise of industry, mass production, and spiritual exhaustion, he found in Melville a dark prophet. Ahab’s fury was not personal—it was civilizational.

Critics have praised Sachs’s biography as timely and thoughtful. Its thesis is clear: in times of disorientation, literature does more than reflect the world—it refracts it. It preserves vital truths, repurposing them when our present crises demand older insights.

In Sachs’s telling, Moby-Dick is not just a classic; it’s a living text. A lighthouse in the storm. A warning bell. A whale-shaped mirror reflecting our fears, failures, and persistent hope.

The Whale in the Classroom

“Ignorance is the parent of fear.”

The classroom, as Sachs and Mason both suggest, becomes a site of literary resurrection. In prison education programs, students discover themselves in the “Extracts”—not despite their difficulty, but because of it. The very act of grappling with Melville’s arcane references, strange structures, and encyclopedic digressions becomes an act of reclamation.

To teach Moby-Dick in a prison is to raise a sunken ship. Its sentences, like salvaged artifacts, reveal new meaning. Forgotten knowledge becomes fuel for rediscovery. Students, many of whom have been dismissed by society, see in Melville’s endless inquiry a validation of their own intelligence and complexity.

Harold Bloom taught Moby-Dick the same way. Every reading was new. No fixed script, only the swell of thought. He modeled Melville’s method: trust the reader, trust the text, trust the mystery.

The whale resists capture—literal and interpretive. It is not a symbol with a key, but a question without an answer. That resistance is what makes Moby-Dick enduring. It insists on being re-read. Re-thought. Re-discovered.

The Archive That Breathes

“It is not down in any map; true places never are.”

Taken together, the voices of Wyatt Mason, Harold Bloom, Richard J. King, and Aaron Sachs reveal Moby-Dick as something more than literature. It is a breathing archive—a repository of imagination, inquiry, and paradox.

Within its pages dwell theologies and taxonomies, drama and digression, sermons and sea shanties. It houses the ethical weight of ecology, the fury of Ahab, the wonder of Ishmael, and the ghosts of Melville’s century. It defies genre, resists reduction, and insists on complexity.

Melville did not write to close arguments but to open them. He did not believe in neat endings. His whale is the quintessential “true place”: uncapturable, immeasurable, endlessly sublime.

And yet we return. We keep hunting—not with harpoons, but with attention. With interpretation. With awe.

A Final Breach

What, then, do we do with Moby-Dick in the twenty-first century? How do we reconcile Ahab’s consuming fury with Ishmael’s contemplative awe? How do we carry Bloom’s Prometheus, King’s Leviathan, Sachs’s resurrected Melville, and Mason’s classroom in a single imagination?

We read. We reread. We become “sub-sub-librarians”—archivists of ambiguity, curators of complexity. We do not read Moby-Dick for closure. We read it to learn how to remain open—to contradiction, to paradox, to mystery.

But what if we, like Captain Ahab, set off to find Moby Dick and never found the whale?

What if all our intellectual harpoons missed their mark? What if the whale was never there to begin with—not as symbol, not as certainty, not as prize?

Would we call that failure?

Or might we discover, like Ishmael adrift on the coffin-raft, that survival is not about conquest, but endurance? That truth lives not in the kill, but in the quest?

Perhaps Melville’s greatest lesson is that the whale must never be caught. Its sublimity lies in its elusiveness—in its capacity to remain just beyond the reach of definition, control, and meaning. It breaches in metaphor. It disappears in digression. It waits—not to be captured, but to be considered.

We will never catch it. But we must keep following.

For in the following, we become something more than readers.
We become seekers.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN BY INTELLICUREAN UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Books, Essays, Literature, Reviews

Literary Essay: “Infinite Interiors – On the Twenty Best Novels of All Time”

The following essay was written by ChatGPT and edited by Intellicurean from an article titled “The 20 best novels of all time” written by Claire Allfree and published in The Telegraph book section on July 6, 2025.

When a culture attempts to consecrate a definitive list of its greatest novels, it risks both an admirable arrogance and a kind of elegiac futility. The recent selection of The 20 Best Novels of All Time, published by The Telegraph, seems at once a celebration of the novel’s inexhaustible possibility and an implicit acknowledgment of our own waning capacity for reading with genuine urgency. It is as though we assemble these canons less to instruct our descendants than to reassure ourselves that we have not entirely forgotten how literature once moved the soul.

One cannot help but admire the breadth and seriousness of this catalogue. It stretches from the dreamlike elegance of The Tale of Genji—a work whose thousand-year distance intensifies its immediacy—to the compulsive self-dissection of Knausgaard’s My Struggle, a testament to our age’s faith that self-disclosure can substitute for narrative shape. What holds these disparate texts together is not merely their historical significance but their shared aspiration to render life in all its unmastered perplexity.

If Harold Bloom were to begin here, he might call attention to The Tale of Genji as an early demonstration of what he once termed the “internalization of romance.” It is a book that transcends its courtly gossip to become an inexhaustible study in desire’s transformations, a mirror to the reader’s own fluctuations of attachment and estrangement. We encounter Genji’s erotic restlessness as both scandalous and poignantly familiar, for the novel’s true subject is the incommensurability between longing and fulfillment—an incommensurability that modern fiction has inherited as its principal obsession.

James Wood, by contrast, might focus on Middlemarch as the novelistic apogee of moral realism. Eliot’s genius lay in her refusal to reduce her characters to mere emblems of ideology or historical process. Instead, she endowed them with what Wood has called “free indirect style’s psychic oscillation,” a prose capable of inhabiting and exposing consciousness in the same instant. It is a book that dares to be both panoramic and exquisitely local, to weigh the ambitions of a nation against the disappointments of a single marriage bed. If there is a single argument to be made for the continued relevance of the realist novel, it is that Middlemarch remains more acute about our interiority than any contemporary memoir.

And yet one cannot ignore how this list gestures toward the novel’s capacity for formal subversion. Ulysses, with its irreverent transformations of the Homeric epic into the trivial routines of Dublin, still feels scandalous in its abundance. Joyce’s genius is not only in his linguistic pyrotechnics but in his suspicion that consciousness itself can never be adequately represented. His prose, that shifting mosaic of styles and registers, offers no comfort to the reader who seeks transparency. Instead, it confronts us with the knowledge that the novel’s greatest power may reside in its refusal to cohere.

This refusal—to simplify, to console, to moralize—animates many of the twenty selections. Invisible Man is less a conventional narrative than a hallucinatory initiation into the American underworld of racial invisibility. Ellison’s rhetorical bravado, his blending of surrealism and jeremiad, still outpaces the efforts of more contemporary chroniclers of identity. To read Invisible Man today is to recognize how easily literary radicalism becomes cultural commonplace, but also to remember how singular its achievement remains.

Nor does the list shy from novels that embrace the uncanny. Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita may be the most exuberant refutation of realist pieties ever composed. Its supernatural comedy is both a rebuke to Stalinist orthodoxy and a reminder that the imagination is an inherently seditious faculty. If much of the 20th-century novel sought to dismantle the illusions of bourgeois life, Bulgakov’s masterpiece demonstrates that irony and enchantment can be revolutionary forces.

Yet if Bloom were to caution us, he would do so against the temptation to read these novels exclusively as instruments of social critique. Literature endures precisely because it exceeds its momentary political applications. War and Peace is indeed an anatomy of the Napoleonic Wars, but it is more crucially a demonstration of how historical consciousness itself can become an object of artistic inquiry. Tolstoy’s genius was to discover that the novelist’s truest fidelity is not to facts but to the felt perplexity of lived experience.

It is striking how Robinson Crusoe stands at the inception of the English novel, bearing within it the seeds of many later contradictions. Defoe’s narrative is, on the surface, a hymn to industry and resourcefulness. But the same story—of a man claiming dominion over an island—also encodes the imperial impulse, the confidence that the world exists to be measured, catalogued, and possessed. What once seemed the purest adventure has become, to modern readers, an uneasy parable of conquest.

One also encounters here the severe naturalism of Thérèse Raquin, a work whose lurid determinism feels almost an affront to Victorian piety. Zola’s lovers are not tragic in any redemptive sense; they are specimens trapped in an experiment of their own appetites. And yet there is a perverse grandeur in the novel’s refusal to pretend that desire leads anywhere but into the pit.

New Grub Street too is a novel about entrapment—this time not by passion but by commerce. Gissing’s weary chronicling of literary London feels uncannily prophetic, as if he anticipated the rise of every ghostwritten bestseller and every writer forced to commodify a persona. What is most unsettling is that he offers no counterexample: no heroic idealist who transcends the marketplace, no unspoiled domain of “pure” art. In this sense, the book remains an indispensable autopsy of cultural production.

If Zola and Gissing reveal the suffocating material conditions of life, Moby-Dick reveals the existential abyss. No novel is more saturated with the terror of cosmic indifference. Melville’s prose—sometimes biblical, sometimes madcap—collapses the distance between metaphysics and anatomy, making the whale not merely an animal but an emblem of the universe’s mute resistance to comprehension. In Bloom’s phrase, it is the American epic that devours all interpretations, a text that renders the critic humble before its incommensurate ambition.

One finds a different kind of ambition in Party Going, where Henry Green distills modernist unease into something almost glacial. Its stranded revellers, imprisoned in their own frivolity while fog swallows the city below, seem to embody an entire civilization’s failure to apprehend its own decline. The novel is both slight in incident and inexhaustible in implication—a reminder that the modernist fascination with stasis can be as provocative as any narrative pyrotechnics.

Proust’s In Search of Lost Time remains the most exhaustive testimony to literature’s faith in consciousness as a world unto itself. No novel before or since has so patiently mapped the minute inflections of memory, the subtle humiliations and triumphs of social life. It is a book that tests the limits of our attention but also rewards it with an intimacy that becomes, paradoxically, universal.

The Great Gatsby, meanwhile, retains its status as a parable of aspiration’s inevitable corrosion. Fitzgerald’s sentences are so lapidary that their loveliness can almost distract from the novel’s acrid judgment. Gatsby’s dream—at once romantic and predatory—has become the template for American self-mythology. That the dream collapses under the weight of its illusions is precisely what grants it the force of prophecy.

It is striking, too, how many of these novels seek to articulate the experience of cultures in collision. Things Fall Apart is the most lucid demonstration of Achebe’s conviction that narrative authority must be reclaimed by those whom empire has consigned to silence. Okonkwo’s tragedy is not only that he fails to adapt but that his story has been written over by the conqueror’s language. Achebe’s triumph is to create a form that both inhabits and transforms that language.

Closer to our own era, The Country Girls quietly ignited a literary insurrection. O’Brien’s candid portrayal of female desire and disillusionment, so scandalous in 1960s Ireland, now seems almost decorous in its gentleness. Yet its influence remains incalculable. It taught a generation of writers that the domestic could be radical, that the most private confessions might unsettle entire cultures.

No less ambitious, though in a different register, is The Golden Notebook. Lessing’s formal fragmentation enacts the very psychic disintegration it describes. Anna Wulf’s notebooks—political, personal, artistic—refuse to reconcile into any coherent identity. In this refusal, Lessing anticipates the confessional experiments of Knausgaard and the autofiction that now dominates so much literary discourse.

The Rings of Saturn, by W.G. Sebald, is a late testament to literature’s capacity to hover between genres—memoir, travelogue, essay—and to become, in that ambiguity, something more resonant than any of them alone. Sebald’s melancholy is not performative but almost geological: the sorrow of civilizations grinding into dust, of memory dissolving into rumor.

If Sebald writes out of mourning, Knausgaard writes out of a hunger so relentless it often seems pathological. My Struggle is both monument and provocation: an assertion that the granular details of ordinary life deserve the same attention Proust once gave to aristocratic salons. Whether this is a triumph of honesty or a capitulation to narcissism is a question the reader must answer alone.

And then there is Conversations with Friends, whose subdued prose and emotional diffidence reflect an era uneasy with grandeur. Rooney’s novel is not so much plotted as observed: a record of glancing attachments, tentative betrayals, and the provisional negotiations of millennial intimacy. Some will dismiss it as slight, but its cool detachment has a disquieting relevance. It suggests that the novel no longer needs epic ambition to be significant; it need only be exact.

A Closing Reflection

Surveying these twenty novels, we see not a single tradition but a plurality of experiments—each one extending the novel’s reach. To read them is to join a conversation that has never ended, in which each new book answers its predecessors with admiration, dissent, or surpassing ambition. Perhaps that is the most heartening lesson: that literature, in all its contradictions, remains the most durable form we possess for contemplating the inexhaustible strangeness of being alive.

A LIST OF THE BOOKS FROM THE ESSAY AND REVIEW IS BELOW:

  1. The Tale of Genji (1021) – Murasaki Shikibu
    Often called the first novel ever written, this thousand-year-old Japanese masterpiece recounts the romantic adventures of Prince Genji and the inner lives of the women he pursues, offering an exquisite portrayal of courtly love and social intrigue.
  2. The Pilgrim’s Progress (1678) – John Bunyan
    A religious allegory composed in prison, telling the story of Christian’s perilous journey to the Celestial City. Simultaneously quest narrative, moral parable, and spiritual confession, it became one of English literature’s most influential texts.
  3. Robinson Crusoe (1719) – Daniel Defoe
    A castaway narrative presented as a true account, blending adventure and colonial ideology. Crusoe’s survival on an island and mastery over his domain has sparked both admiration and fierce debates over its imperialist assumptions.
  4. Moby-Dick (1851) – Herman Melville
    Captain Ahab’s vengeful pursuit of the white whale becomes an existential epic exploring obsession, fate, and humanity’s place in the cosmos. Famous for its lyrical prose and encyclopedic digressions on whales and whaling.
  5. Thérèse Raquin (1867) – Émile Zola
    A grim study of adultery and guilt, depicting the murderous passion between Thérèse and her lover, Laurent. Their crime leads to psychological disintegration and ghostly hauntings in this early work of French naturalism.
  6. War and Peace (1867) – Leo Tolstoy
    Tolstoy’s sprawling saga of Russian aristocrats during the Napoleonic Wars interweaves personal transformation with sweeping history, offering a masterful portrait of love, fate, and the forces that shape nations.
  7. Middlemarch (1871) – George Eliot
    Set in a provincial English town, this realist masterpiece follows the intellectual and emotional struggles of Dorothea Brooke and other characters as they confront marriage, ambition, and disappointment.
  8. New Grub Street (1891) – George Gissing
    An unflinching look at the late-Victorian literary marketplace, chronicling the rivalry between idealistic writers and pragmatic hacks, and exploring the compromises required to survive as a professional author.
  9. Ulysses (1922) – James Joyce
    A modernist reimagining of Homer’s Odyssey, set over a single day in Dublin. Famous for its stream-of-consciousness style, linguistic experimentation, and celebration of ordinary life’s hidden richness.
  10. In Search of Lost Time (1913–1927) – Marcel Proust
    A monumental seven-volume exploration of memory, time, and desire, chronicling the narrator’s life and the decline of French aristocracy with lush psychological and social detail.
  11. The Great Gatsby (1925) – F. Scott Fitzgerald
    A glittering tragedy of the Jazz Age, centering on the mysterious Jay Gatsby’s doomed pursuit of wealth and love, and exposing the hollowness of the American Dream.
  12. Party Going (1939) – Henry Green
    A surreal, modernist novel about a group of privileged young people stranded in a railway hotel, whose trivial gossip masks a pervasive sense of dread as Europe hovers on the brink of war.
  13. Invisible Man (1952) – Ralph Ellison
    An unnamed Black narrator journeys through racism and disillusionment in America, blending surreal episodes, biting satire, and profound reflections on identity and invisibility.
  14. Things Fall Apart (1958) – Chinua Achebe
    Set in a 19th-century Igbo village, this landmark postcolonial novel traces the cultural collision between indigenous African traditions and British missionaries, through the tragic story of Okonkwo.
  15. The Country Girls (1960) – Edna O’Brien
    The coming-of-age story of two Irish girls escaping their repressive Catholic upbringing, whose quest for independence transformed Irish literature and scandalized conservative audiences.
  16. The Golden Notebook (1962) – Doris Lessing
    An ambitious, formally fragmented narrative about a woman writer dividing her life into separate notebooks—political, personal, creative—and attempting to reconcile them during a breakdown.
  17. The Master and Margarita (1966) – Mikhail Bulgakov
    A satirical fantasy in which the Devil arrives in Stalinist Moscow with a retinue that includes a giant talking cat, exposing the absurdity and cruelty of totalitarian society.
  18. The Rings of Saturn (1995) – W.G. Sebald
    A genre-defying meditation combining travelogue, memoir, history, and philosophy, as a narrator’s walk along the English coast sparks digressions on decay, memory, and loss.
  19. My Struggle (2009–2011) – Karl Ove Knausgaard
    A six-volume autofiction epic chronicling the author’s life in exhaustive detail, from childhood to fatherhood, redefining confessional writing and stirring controversy over privacy and truth.
  20. Conversations with Friends (2017) – Sally Rooney
    A millennial love story about a young Dublin student entangled in an affair with an older married man, written in Rooney’s lucid, understated style that captures the textures of contemporary intimacy.
Literature, Reviews

‘The Restless Analyst’

LITERARY REVIEW (April 1, 2025) by Peter Rose:

In 1904, Henry James decided to return to America. He was feeling isolated at Lamb House in Rye. In a letter to Grace Norton, he wrote: ‘The days depart and pass, laden somehow like processional camels – across the desert of one’s solitude.’ Since the flop of Guy Domville, his dreams of success as a dramatist had been dashed. The Wings of the Dove had been published in 1902, followed by The Ambassadors in 1903, in serial form. The Golden Bowl – written in little more than a year and, for many, his sovereign achievement – was almost finished. Now, after this awesome outpouring, he was ready to review his homeland, last visited in 1882.

James’s reasons for returning were complex, some obvious and professional, others psychological and obscure. Family drew him back, just as it had subtly hurried him on his way in 1875, when he left America, first for Paris, then for London. Planning his itinerary, James wrote to his nephew Harry: ‘I can’t tell you how I thank you for offering me your manly breast to hurl myself upon in the event of my alighting on the New York dock, four or five weeks hence, in abject and craven terror.’ (One can only imagine the tremulations this caused in young Harry’s manly breast.)

He also began work on what he pointedly called the New York Edition of his preferred writings. The commercial failure of this work, with its ruminative prefaces and startling omissions, led to years of clinical depression. In a letter to Morton Fullerton, one of his late passions, James wrote: ‘The port from which I set out was, I think, that of the essential loneliness of my life … This loneliness (since I mention it!) – what is it still but the deepest thing about one?’ For this noblest of modernists, it was the saddest confession.

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Essays, Literature

The Unbearable Weight Of The Literary Canon

THE NEW STATESMAN MAGAZINE (March 19, 2025):

Nick Guest, from Alan Hollinghurst’s The Line of Beauty, is a consummate English protagonist: both an insider and an outsider, embarrassed by his provincial past, unsteady on his feet among the upper echelons of society, open in his distaste for the elite while desperate to be one of them. He has just graduated from Oxford with a first in English literature, and finds himself in the private library of Lord Kessler for a glittering moment of mid-bourgeois insecurity. Feeling “disqualified by his complete ignorance of money and aesthetic prejudice” Nick muses on his literary horizons: “Sometimes his memory of books he pretended to have read became almost as vivid as that of books he had read and half-forgotten.”

I haven’t pretended to have read something since I got caught out at college by a teacher over Aristotle’s Physics, Volume II. (Extraordinarily hard to blag your way through that one.) Still, I am sympathetic to Nick’s instincts. He is well read, and mildly anxious to admit to Kessler that he doesn’t know so much about the Victorian novelist Anthony Trollope. In the centuries-deep Western literary canon, Trollope might be a defensible blind spot for a 21-year-old. But in a universe in which Nick cannot signal aristocratic insideriness (he is from a run-of-the-mill market town) nor impress with wealth (his father is an antiques salesman), the literary realm has to suffice as his key-card to the British elite. The sound you hear is me cracking the spine of The Way We Live Now with studied determination.

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 But there are more antagonists than ever to contend with: the internet, performative anti-intellectualism, suspicion of intellectual ambition. I suspect the solution is to accept these forces exist and to carry on anyway, as though the ghost of Harold Bloom is haunting me: come on, young lady, Ulysses will not read itself!  

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Finn McRedmond is a commissioning editor and writer at the New Statesman.