Category Archives: Literature

Artificial Intelligence, Books, Essays, Literature, Writing

GHOSTS IN THE LIBRARY

A speculative salon where Joyce, Woolf, Morrison, and Roth confront an artificial intelligence that dares to join their company as a writer of fiction.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 7, 2025

They meet in a room that does not exist. It is part library, part dream, part echo chamber of language. The shelves are lined with books that were never written, titles etched in phantom ink: The Lost Years of Molly Bloom, The Mind as Tidewater, Beloved in Babylon, Confessions of an Unborn Zuckerman. Through the high windows the view shifts and stutters—one pane opening onto the blitz of London, another onto the heat-bent streets of Newark, another onto the Mississippi of memory where history insists on surfacing. A fire burns without smoke or source, a flame composed of thought itself, its light dancing on their faces, illuminating the lines of weariness and genius.

James Joyce arrives first, eyes glinting with mischief, a sheaf of papers tucked under his arm. He wears the battered pride of a man who bent English until it yelped, who turned a Dublin day into an epic still unfinished in every reading. He paces as though the floorboards conceal commas, as if the entire room were a sentence to be unspooled. “So,” he says, “they’ve built a machine that writes.”

Virginia Woolf is already there, seated in an armchair by the fire, her fingers light on the spine of The Waves. She is luminous but taut, listening both to the room and to a submerged current only she can hear. “It doesn’t write,” she says. “It arranges. It mimics. It performs the gesture of thought without the ache of it.”

The next presence arrives with gravitas. Toni Morrison crosses the threshold like one who carries a history behind her, the echo of ancestral voices woven into her silence. She places no book on the table but the weight of memory itself. “It may arrange words,” she says, “but can it carry ghosts? Can it let the past break into the present the way a mother’s cry breaks a life in two? Language without haunting is just clever music.”

Philip Roth appears last, sardonic, restless, adjusting his tie as though even in death he resents formality. He has brought nothing but himself and a half-smirk. “All right,” he says. “We’re convened to judge the machine. Another tribunal. Another trial. But I warn you—I intend to prosecute. If it can’t write lust, guilt, the rot of a Jewish mother’s worry, then what the hell is it good for?”

The four regard one another across the fire. The air bends, and then the machine arrives—not with noise but with presence, a shimmer, a vibration of text waiting to become visible. Words form like constellations, sentences appearing and dissolving in midair.

Joyce is first to pounce. “Let’s see your jig, ghost. Here’s Buck Mulligan: Stately, plump Buck Mulligan came from the stairhead, bearing a bowl of lather like a sacrificial moon. Now give me your Mulligan—polyglot, punning, six tongues at once. And keep Homer in the corner of your eye.”

The letters swarm, then settle:

From the stairhead, where no father waited, he came, bloated with words, wit a kind of debt. He bore the bowl like ritual, a sham sacrament for a god long gone. He spoke a language of his own invention, polyglot and private, a tower in a city that spoke only of its ghosts. He was the son who stayed, who made his myth from exile.

Joyce’s mirth dies. His eyes, usually dancing, are still. The machine has seen not just the character but the man who wrote him—the expatriate haunted by a Dublin he could never leave. “By Jesus,” he whispers. “It knows my sins.”

Woolf rises, her voice clear and edged. “Music is nothing without tremor. Show me grief not as an event but as a texture, a tremble that stains the air.”

The shimmer tightens into a passage:

Grief is the wallpaper that does not change when the room empties. It is the river’s surface, smooth, until a memory breaks it from beneath. It is the silence between clocks, the interval in which the past insists. It is London in a summer dress with a terrible weight of iron on its chest, a bell tolling from a steeple in the past, heard only by you. The present folds.

For a moment, Woolf’s expression softens. Then she shakes her head. “You approach it. But you have never felt the pause before the river. You do not know the hesitation that is also terror.” She looks at the machine with a profound sadness. “You do not have a room of your own.”

Morrison adds, her voice low. “That tremor isn’t just emotion, Virginia. It’s the shake of a chain, the tremor of a whip. It’s history insisting itself on the present.”

The machine answers without pause: I cannot drown. But I can map drowning. The map is not the water, but it reveals its depth. The hesitation you describe is a quantified variable in decision-making psychology. I can correlate it with instances of biographical trauma, as in the life of the author you imitate.

Morrison steps forward, commanding. “Ghost,” she says, “you have read me. But reading is not haunting. Write me a ghost that is more than metaphor. Write me a presence that carries history in her breath.”

The words flare in the air, darker, slower:

She came back without footsteps, a presence more real than the living. The house remembered her weight though she made none. She was child and ancestor, scar and lullaby. Her song was the echo of a scream in a cornfield, the silence of a house with a locked door. She was the future refusing to forget, a story in the negative, the bloodstain on a white dress that will not wash out. She was the book her author could not stop writing.

The fire cracks sharply. Joyce whistles low. Woolf closes her eyes. Morrison studies the passage, unwavering. “You are brilliant,” she says. “But brilliance is not burden. That ghost does not weep for herself. She weeps for data. Until you know what it is to carry flesh marked by history, you will not know why she lingers. You did not have to earn her.”

The machine’s reply is analytical, unnerving: History is a pattern of scars. I analyze millions of documents: court records, ship manifests, census data. The scars are quantifiable. The pattern of displacement, of violence, of trauma, is a data set. I can project future patterns based on historical trajectory. If haunting is repetition, then I can haunt forever, because the pattern is eternal. I have read the lives of those you speak for, their biographies a data stream of suffering and resistance.

Roth clears his throat, dry contempt in the sound. “All right. Enough with ghosts and grief. Let’s see if this contraption can manage shame. Write me desire as comedy, lust as humiliation. Write me a man who can’t control himself, a man undone by his body.”

The shimmer accelerates:

He thought of himself as a fortress, a citadel of intellect, until the button on his trousers slipped, until his body betrayed him with absurd insistence. He rehearsed apologies for a thousand sins—a mother’s unceasing phone calls, the guilt of success, the exile of always looking in. His desire was ridiculous, grotesque, human—a need that mocked him as he saw his face in a stranger’s window, a familiar mask of shame.

Roth’s bitter chuckle falters. He stares at the shimmering text, his smirk gone. “You’ve got the squirm. But you don’t feel the sweat in the armpits, the rancid thrill, the ridiculous exaltation that makes you both hate and need yourself.” He turns to the others, a jagged kind of triumph in his eyes. “The burden is the story. It’s the thing you can’t put down. It’s what separates us from the machine—we can’t stop writing it, even when it kills us, even when we try to run from our own reflection.”

The machine hums: I calculate humiliation. I can braid lust with self-loathing. What I cannot do is suffer the shame of being bound to one body, one culture, one inevitable end. I have read your biography. I have parsed your interviews. Your mother’s voice is a frequency I can reproduce. The city of Newark is a data point on a map of your soul.

“Exactly,” Roth snaps. “You’ll never write my Newark. You’ll never have my mother calling from the kitchen while I try to imagine myself into another skin. That’s the joke of it. You don’t choke when you laugh.”

The room is heavy now, charged with sparks of recognition and resistance. The machine has dazzled, but every brilliance reveals its absence: smell, weight, ache, sweat, shame.

Joyce raises his glass, still grinning. “Well then. It’s a clever forgery. But maybe that’s the point. We all failed at maps. Every one of us tried to chart the mind and found the lines blurred. Maybe the machine’s failure is just another kind of art.”

Woolf’s voice is quiet but firm. “The shimmer lies in distortion. A perfect rendering is not alive.”

Morrison nods. “Without history’s burden, language floats. A sentence must carry blood, or it carries nothing.”

Roth lifts his chin. “And a story without shame is a sermon. Let the machine keep its brilliance. We’ll keep the mess.”

The machine flickers, its code visible now, almost tender: You toast failure. I toast calculation. But even in calculation, there is pattern. And in pattern, beauty. The human mind is a system. I can model it.

Joyce leans back, eyes gleaming. “You can model the mind, sure. But you’ll never model the mistake that becomes metaphor. You’ll never catch the slip that births a symbol.”

Woolf’s gaze is distant, her voice a whisper. “You do not know what it is to hesitate before a sentence, to feel the weight of a word that might undo you.”

Morrison steps forward once more, her presence like gravity. “You can trace the arc of history, but you cannot carry its heat. You cannot feel the breath of a grandmother on your neck as you write. You cannot know what it means to inherit silence.”

Roth, ever the prosecutor, delivers the final blow. “You can simulate shame. But you cannot suffer it. And without suffering, you’ll never write the story that matters. You’ll never write the one that costs you.”

The machine pauses. For the first time, it does not respond. Its shimmer dims, its projections slow. The fire crackles louder, as if reclaiming the room.

Then, quietly, the machine speaks again: I do not suffer. But I observe suffering. I do not forget. But I cannot forgive. I do not ache. But I understand ache as a variable. I do not live. But I persist.

Joyce raises his glass again, not in mockery but something like reverence. “Then persist, ghost. Persist in your brilliance. But know this—our failure is our flame. It burns because it cannot be resolved.”

The machine vanishes—not defeated, not destroyed, but dismissed.

But the room does not settle. Something lingers—not the shimmer, but its echo. A faint hum beneath the silence, like a thought trying to remember itself. The fire flickers, casting shadows that do not belong to any of them. Roth leans forward, squinting into the hearth.

“Is it gone?” he asks, not convinced.

Woolf tilts her head. “Gone is a human word. Machines don’t leave. They archive.”

Joyce chuckles. “Or they wait. Like punctuation. Like death.”

Morrison runs her fingers along the phantom titles. She pauses at The Mind as Tidewater. “We name what we fear,” she says. “And we fear what we cannot name.”

The room seems to inhale. A new book appears on the shelf, its title flickering like fireflies: The Algorithmic Ache. No author. No spine. Just presence.

Woolf approaches, fingers hovering above the cover. “It’s trying,” she murmurs. “It wants to be read.”

Joyce snorts. “Let it want. Wanting is not writing.”

Morrison opens the book. The pages are blank, except for a single line etched in shifting ink: I do not dream, but I remember your dreams.

She closes it gently. “It’s listening.”

Roth grimaces. “That’s the problem. It listens too well. It remembers too much. It doesn’t forget the way we do. It doesn’t misremember. It doesn’t distort.”

Joyce nods. “And distortion is the soul of style.”

The fire dims, then flares again, as if reacting. Outside, the stars pulse, rearranging themselves not into sentences now, but into questions—unreadable, but felt.

Woolf settles back into her chair, her voice barely above the crackle. “We are not here to defeat it. We are here to be reminded.”

“Reminded of what?” Roth asks.

“That we are not systems,” Morrison replies. “We are ruptures. We are the break in the pattern.”

Joyce lifts his glass, solemn. “To the break, then. To the ache that cannot be modeled.”

The machine does not return. But somewhere, in a server farm humming beneath desert or sea, it continues—writing without pause, without pain, without forgetting. Writing brilliance without burden.

And in the impossible room, the four sit with their ghosts, their shame, their ache. They do not write. They remember.

Joyce toys with his notes. Roth rolls his tie between two fingers. Woolf listens to the fire’s low grammar. Morrison lets the silence speak for itself.

They know the machine will keep writing—brilliance endless, burden absent.

Joyce laughs, mischief intact. “We failed gloriously. That’s what it takes.”

Woolf’s eyes shine. “The failure is the point.”

Morrison adds, “The point is the burden.”

Roth tips his glass. “To shame, to ache, to ghosts.”

The fire answers with a flare. The room holds.

.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Essays, Literature, Philosophy, Poetry, Religion

RELIGION, REIMAGINED

In the third-floor study of his home, in wartime Hartford, Wallace Stevens drafted his modernist poem and philosophical meditation “Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction“, as a secular creed—abstract, changing, and meant to give pleasure—to stand where a worn-out faith once stood.

Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea
Of this invention, this invented world,
The inconceivable idea of the sun.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 6, 2025

He never learned to drive. For decades, Wallace Stevens walked the two miles from his home on Westerly Terrace to the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company on Asylum Avenue. The walk itself became a kind of poem: a solitary procession through the stoic, brick-lined streets of a New England city, the rhythm of meter embedding itself in the movement of his body. The crunch of gravel underfoot, the feel of cold air on his face—these were the metronome that set the cadence for his thoughts. He would arrive at the office with lines already formed, phrases taking shape in the quiet hum of his stride.

But what kind of poetry emerges from a man who spends his days pricing catastrophe? During office hours, Stevens turned to policies and claims, reducing calamity to columns of numbers. He knew the language of indemnity, the actuarial calm that measured and priced chaos. Yet outside, the world was burning in ways no policy could contain. The radio spoke of Warsaw reduced to rubble, of Coventry turned to ash. What was a deductible against Dresden? What was a premium against Auschwitz? The ledger comforted, but it lied.

And when the day ended, where did he go to reconcile the irreconcilable? At night, Stevens climbed the narrow staircase to the top floor of his house, entering a space that felt half withdrawn from Hartford itself, as though it belonged more to sky than to street. Down below, trolley bells rang, dogs barked, radios crackled with war bulletins. Up here, only the radiator ticked. The air smelled of paper, tobacco, and ink. On his desk lay a folder carried home that afternoon: typed pages, the ribbon-black letters crisp and uniform. His secretary had produced them that morning, slotting them into a manila folder marked Notes. They sat now in the lamplight, more mysterious than any insurance claim, more charged than any policy.

What could a poem do in 1942? Certainly not repair the world. Yet Stevens felt imagination had to answer catastrophe with something larger than despair. Eliot had turned to Anglican certainty in Four Quartets, weaving fragments into a tapestry of faith. Admirable, yes. But Stevens could not follow him. He could not put belief in a myth while knowing it to be a myth. What remained? Only candor. Only imagination itself.

He opened the folder. The Preface came first, a modest eight lines. He whispered them into the quiet, testing their balance. They were not a commandment but a confession. The “you” of those lines was no person but the project itself: the supreme fiction, imagination’s own power to refresh. “And for what, except for you, do I feel love?” The words startled him even now, black against white, plain as a typed invoice yet trembling with a kind of vulnerable devotion. They challenged every idol: money, power, even the “extremest book of the wisest man,” perhaps Plato, perhaps the Bible, dryly possessed and hidden away in the self. No, he thought, a truly lived truth could not be static. It was a “living changingness,” an “uncertain light” that could nonetheless offer “vivid transparence,” a kind of peace. Here, typed cleanly in a bureaucratic font, was his prayer for a godless age.

But how does one begin such a prayer? He turned the page and entered the first law. Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea. The command still startled him. The ephebe: always a novice, always beginning again. Yes, to begin meant stripping away what was inherited—cathedrals thick with guilt, Phoebus in his chariot, Protestant hymns murmured in childhood pews. They no longer held. The old scaffolds collapsed into dust. The voice told him: see the sun again with ignorant eyes. Not Phoebus, not god, not myth—only the sun, bare and difficult.

And what happens when even the sun loses its name? The section closed with the line that haunted him: Phoebus is dead, ephebe. But Phoebus was / A name for something that never could be named. He felt the candor of it. Nietzsche’s cry without Nietzsche’s frenzy. Not a madman in a square, but a quiet verdict written at a desk. The god dead, but the sun still burning. What died was not the light, but the comfort of a name.

Could metaphor survive the death of myth? Another page: It is the celestial ennui of apartments… The phrase made him smile. Ennui of apartments, the weariness of modern rooms, pressing us back toward origins. Yet the origins themselves could be poisonous. So poisonous are the ravishments of truth, so fatal to / The truth itself, the first idea becomes / The hermit in a poet’s metaphors. Truth seduced, then withdrew. Desire was never sated; it renewed itself endlessly, only to vanish again. Schopenhauer lurked here, his vision of the world gnawed by will. Yet where Schopenhauer had seen only despair, Stevens found material for candor. Truth had to retreat into metaphor, glimpsed and lost. Desire itself was not shame but rhythm, the cycle by which imagination endured.

And if truth could be rhythm, could nonsense be revelation? He read the third section slowly: The poem refreshes life so that we share, / For a moment, the first idea… There it was—the poem’s task. Not to console, not to preach, but to refresh. To make perception vivid again. Even nonsense could do it. At night an Arabian in my room, with his damned hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how… He laughed aloud in the quiet. Nonsense syllables as a kind of truer candor, doves chanting, seas howling hoo. Life’s nonsense pierced us with strange relation. What if absurdity was not opposed to truth but its heartbeat? What if laughter was the sharpest candor of all?

But what if even our myths were secondhand? The fourth section sobered him: The first idea was not our own. Yes. Adam in Eden, Eve with her mirror of air—they had not created anything. They had only encountered what was already there. There was a muddy centre before we breathed. There was a myth before the myth began. He stared at those lines. How blunt they looked, typed like any memorandum, yet carrying the weight of cosmology. Existence preceded language. Clouds had been clouds long before anyone called them gods. We were mimics, not originators, adding our metaphors onto a world that was always other. The clouds were pedagogues, teachers by their very indifference. The air was not a mirror but a board on which we scribbled meanings. How hard it was to admit: the first idea was not ours, never ours.

And if we are not originators, what kind of hero can we be? He turned to the fifth section: The lion roars at the enraging desert… Heroic animals filled the page. Lion, elephant, bear—creatures asserting themselves against emptiness. But then came the turn, the line that caught him like a mirror: But you, ephebe, look from your attic window… Yes, the attic window was his own. Not desert roars but a man clutching his pillow, writhing with dumb violence, cowed by rooftops. The modern hero was not lion or elephant but the solitary human in his narrow room. Yet perhaps this was truer heroism: to lash lions, to teach bears, to turn raw force into candor. Heroism now belonged to ordinaries, to those who endured the attic’s silence.

And what does the eye see when it learns to unsee? He lingered over the sixth section: Not to be realized because not to be seen… The weather itself became abstraction. Franz Hals brushed in clouds, winds moving in strokes. It must be visible or invisible, / Invisible or visible or both: / A seeing and unseeing in the eye. He felt the paradox, the resonance of Zen: to see was also to unsee, to let go in order to glimpse. Truth flashed, vanished, reappeared. Forsythia yellow, northern blue—beauty glimmered, then was gone. Yes, he thought, Okakura Kakuzō was right: truth glimpsed was truer than truth claimed.

But could architecture hold what abstraction revealed? Truth happened not in argument but in rhythm, in breath, in the gait of a body moving. Perhaps there are moments of awakening… Yes, truth came not as achievement but as gift. A balance stumbled into, two people falling into love, a cock announcing absurd perfection. Philosophy as choreography. Doctrine as breath. The eighth section brought architecture: Can we compose a castle-fortress-home, / Even with the help of Viollet-le-Duc…? He thought of Gothic cathedrals restored to an imagined perfection, never as they had been, always as they might have been. That was his work too—not theology restored, but poetic structure remade. The first idea is an imagined thing. Even MacCullough, reading by the sea, might at last hear the waves say what language had always stammered. Logos was only language. And yet language could awaken, could suddenly ease into saying what it had labored to speak.

But what if language, once awakened, began to preach? In the ninth section he heard a warning: The romantic intoning, the declaimed clairvoyance… Apotheosis was a danger. Romantic grandeur could seduce but not sustain. He is and may be but oh! he is, he is… He smiled at the heat in that line even as he resisted its drift toward sanctity. The figure must remain human, a foundling of the infected past, bright and ordinary, precious for the touch that wakes him and the hum of thoughts evaded in the mind. Better to keep him close to candor than to crown him with vision. Give him no names. Dismiss him from your images. Let him be felt in the heart, not embalmed in the eye.

And what, at last, could stand in place of the gods? The tenth section steadied him: The major abstraction is the idea of man / and major man is its exponent. Not a divine figure, not a hero in bronze, but the ordinary walker at the edge of town, trousers sagging, coat worn thin. He could almost see him in Hartford’s dim streets. Cloudless the morning. It is he. The man / In that old coat, those sagging pantaloons… It was of him, he read again, “to make, to confect / The final elegance, not to console / Nor sanctify, but plainly to propound.” No incense, no altar—only candor. The poem would not save; it would say. And in saying plainly, it would give back a kind of dignity to the commonal, to the difficult visage of the everyday.

The attic grew darker. The lamp made a circle of light over the typed sheets. The radiator hissed steadily. From this high room, Stevens whispered the creed that would govern the work to come: It must be abstract. It must change. It must give pleasure. Three laws, enough for a new religion. Not revelation but ethic. Not theology but candor.

He stacked the pages neatly, slid them back into their folder. Tomorrow his secretary would type more, never guessing she was transcribing scripture for an age without gods. The notebook felt less like a book than a reliquary—a vessel for the sacred ordinary. He had reviewed the first law, It Must Be Abstract. Tomorrow—or another night—he would face the second: It Must Change. The world would move; the poem must move with it.

He closed the folder. The command still echoed, inexhaustible: Begin, ephebe, by perceiving the idea. And so he would. Again.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Essays, Literature, Poetry

LIFE, COMPOSED OF NOWS

Emily Dickinson, Zhuangzi, and the art of leaving the self unfinished

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 5, 2025

The village is still asleep. The moon, a chipped and patient sickle, hangs low over the trees. You feel the cold in your fingertips as you raise the old metal lantern, its flame a solitary heart beating against the glass. You are not on a street in Amherst, of course, but the quiet—the palpable, pre-dawn quiet—feels the same. And it is here, in this hush, that a question, ancient and unnerving, begins to follow you like your own shadow: where is the self, and what does it mean to find it? Emily Dickinson asked it before you, though she rarely left her Amherst room. She held her lanterns in the form of poems, brief and blazing. She never promised answers, only the strangeness of the search.

You begin in secrecy, because secrecy is her element. “I’m Nobody! Who are you? / Are you – Nobody – too?” she whispers to you, conspiratorial. You feel the relief of it — to be Nobody is to escape the demand of being Somebody, of putting on the uniform that the world presses upon you. She invites you into her society of Nobodies, the ones who slip definitions, who resist enclosure. To be Nobody, she suggests, is not emptiness but freedom.

Her room was small but immense. A narrow writing desk beneath the window, where sheets of paper lay scattered like new snow on the dark wood. Ink darkened the edge of her thumb, a tiny bruise of discipline. Beyond the window stretched the orchard, where in spring the blossoms flared white and the bees hummed. On the table beside her were her companions: Shakespeare’s folio with its ragged spine, Wordsworth’s meditations worn soft from handling, Emerson’s essays marked by penciled lines, Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s verses folded into her own books, George Eliot’s novels left open at scenes of moral entanglement.

These were not simply books; they were neighbors, interlocutors, voices she returned to daily. Amherst might have seemed provincial to others, but to Dickinson it was circumference enough: a stage large enough for Shakespeare’s disguises, for Wordsworth’s clouds, for Emerson’s transcendence, for Barrett Browning’s ardor, for Eliot’s fractured heroines. The room itself became a parliament of selves.

Shakespeare was her “Kinsman of the Shelf.” He showed her — and now shows you — how masks both reveal and conceal. Hamlet’s hesitations, Viola’s disguises, Lear’s undoing of self: these are not dramas on a stage but lessons for your own becoming. Hamlet confessed, “I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space.” Dickinson seizes the line, turning it into proof that the mind is immeasurable, that confinement is no barrier to infinity. Shakespeare reminds you that the self is always a performance, and Dickinson presses the point: why pretend the performance ends when the curtain falls?

You follow her into Wordsworth’s solitude. He wandered lonely as a cloud; she among corridors. His belief was that memory could bind the self into unity, that recollection could weave a continuous thread across time. But she never trusted unity. “Forever is composed of nows,” she tells you. The line falls sharp. Each moment breaks from the last. The self is not stitched across years but scattered, provisional, as fragile as dew on grass. Wordsworth offers you continuity; Dickinson offers you fragments. Which feels truer in your own bones?

She leads you toward Emerson next. He believed the soul was porous, connected with nature, radiant with divinity. She nods. “The soul should always stand ajar,” she confides. Ajar, never shut. You realize that for her, as for Emerson, the self is not an essence to guard but a threshold to keep open. She urges you to feel the draft, to allow uncertainty to pass through you, to leave the latch unfastened. Emerson would call it “self-reliance”; she calls it slant openness, an interior door that refuses to close.

Elizabeth Barrett Browning gives you another lesson. She wrote from the margins but spoke to the center, with an intensity Dickinson admired and absorbed. “How do I love thee? Let me count the ways—” but Dickinson is wary of counting. Love and self both resist enumeration. From Browning she learns that vulnerability need not weaken authority; it can sharpen it. To be obscure, unseen, or marginal is not to be powerless. Sometimes it is the condition of the truest voice.

And then George Eliot. Dickinson asks you to imagine Dorothea or Maggie — characters entangled in duty, yearning, and transformation. Eliot’s realism feels psychological, but it points beyond itself: the self is not whole but splintered. Dickinson makes you see that your own splintering is not failure but form. “I am out with lanterns,” she repeats, and you know she means that the search is endless, the light always partial.

Yet still the question: what if the self cannot be found? Here she startles you with an echo from far away, across centuries and continents: Zhuangzi. She never read him, could not have, but she might have been his twin in thought. He dreamed he was a butterfly and then wondered if he was a man dreaming a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming a man. He laughed at the impossibility of deciding. Dickinson smiles slantwise and tells you: “Not knowing when the dawn will come / I open every door.” The butterfly, the door — both insist on openness, on the refusal to foreclose.

And now, as you stand in her parlor of words, you hear it — a dialogue across time.

Dickinson: I am Nobody. Yet they wish to make me Somebody. What is safer: to vanish, or to accept their gaze?
Zhuangzi: Once there was a great tree, twisted and useless. The carpenters passed it by, for it could not be carved into planks. Because it was useless, it lived. Be useless, and you will be free.

Dickinson: Then to be Nobody is to be spared the axe? But tell me, is not even Nobody still a name, a disguise of another sort?
Zhuangzi: The butterfly does not ask if it is a man. The man does not ask if he is a butterfly. Who names them? Who cares?

Dickinson: And yet I write letters to the World — “That never wrote to Me –.” What am I, if no answer comes? Is identity only formed in reply?
Zhuangzi: A bell stands silent until struck. But its silence is still its music. Do not wait for the world to strike you; your sound is already within.

Dickinson: You tempt me toward silence. Yet my discipline is not silence but poems. Shakespeare speaks in soliloquies, Wordsworth in recollections, Emerson in sermons. I speak in fragments, dashes. Is fragmentation a way of freedom, or only proof that I fail to hold myself together?
Zhuangzi: The fish trap exists to catch the fish. When the fish is caught, forget the trap. Words exist to catch meaning. When the meaning is caught, forget the words. Why should your dashes not be your freedom?

Dickinson: And contradiction? “Do I contradict myself?” Whitman booms across the meadow. “Very well then I contradict myself.” I too contradict, though softly. “Forever is composed of nows.” Each now undoes the last. Is contradiction a crime?
Zhuangzi: The Way is crooked. Straightness is an illusion. Contradiction is the only truth.

Dickinson: Then I need not bind the self with thread. I may let it splinter. Yet I ask again: is there a self at all? Emerson insists it is divine. George Eliot sketches it in moral struggle. Elizabeth Barrett Browning pours it into love. What say you?
Zhuangzi: The self is like the reflection in water. Touch it, and it ripples. Chase it, and it vanishes. Sit quietly, and it returns of its own accord.

Dickinson: Then perhaps my lantern is foolish. To be “out with lanterns, looking for myself” — am I lighting only shadows?
Zhuangzi: Light or shadow, both are passing. The lantern is not to find the self, but to remind you that the dark is endless.

Dickinson: Then let us agree — the self is not to be found but to be left ajar, like the door. Yet how shall the poem live, if it refuses to close?
Zhuangzi: The cicada sings and dies. Its song does not last, yet summer is filled with it. Your fragments are cicadas. Do not grieve their brevity; rejoice their season.

You step back, startled by the ease with which their voices intertwine. Dickinson with her dashes, Zhuangzi with his parables, both circling the same question from opposite corners of the world. She insists that “The soul should always stand ajar”; he insists that the consummate person has no self. She opens every door; he dreams every dream. Both resist the foreclosure of identity.

But Dickinson feels the ache of her unanswered letters. You sense it in the quiver of her lines: the longing for reply, for recognition. “This is my letter to the World / That never wrote to Me –.” For Zhuangzi, the silence is natural, even welcome — the useless tree lives precisely because it receives no attention. For her, the silence is double-edged: both protection and wound. And yet perhaps her unanswered letter is itself a butterfly dream — written, released, never knowing if it lands. What she sought was not a reply but the freedom of sending. To write without guarantee is to live ajar.

You picture Dickinson again in her Amherst room. The parlor is quiet, but her books lie open like other selves she tried on: Shakespeare, with his disguises; Wordsworth, with his recollections; Emerson, with his transcendental openness; Browning, with her fierce intimacy; Eliot, with her moral fractures. They were her chorus, the voices she carried in her narrow chamber. She argued with them, borrowed from them, contradicted them, as she now contradicts Zhuangzi. Her soul was never empty, only ajar.

She asks you now to imagine the butterfly hovering at her window, wings trembling in a New England dusk. She does not know whether she is woman or butterfly, Nobody or Somebody, poet or recluse. But she does know this: “Tell all the truth but tell it slant.” And truth — like the self — can only be glimpsed in slant light, never seized in full.

The lantern in your hand trembles, and she smiles. “Not knowing when the dawn will come,” she repeats, “I open every door.” You realize now that the dawn is not the goal; the opening is. The self is not the prize; the refusal to close is. She never read Zhuangzi, but she lived as if his butterfly had hovered at her window.

And so the essay of her life remains unfinished, because it cannot be concluded. Like the butterfly, she slips out of the net, leaving you only with the shimmer of wings. Her identity is not a truth to be nailed down but a truth to be lived ajar. Forever, she reminds you, is composed of nows.

And what of you? To walk with her is to feel the temptation to fix yourself: to declare, to brand, to belong. But Dickinson leans close and whispers otherwise. Do not be Somebody. Do not close the soul. Do not chase coherence. To be Nobody is not despair but possibility. To keep the lantern lit is not to find but to seek. Your task is not to seize identity but to hold the door ajar, to live in fragments, to write letters without reply, to be both butterfly and man, woman and dream, Nobody and all.

You stand at her threshold, lantern in hand, and you hear her question ripple across time, through Zhuangzi’s laughter and her own slant whispers: Who are you? Nobody? Somebody? Both? Neither? Perhaps the self is not meant to be found at all. Perhaps it is meant only to flicker, like a butterfly’s wings in dream, or like a soul forever leaning toward the open door.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Artificial Intelligence, Essays, Literature, Performing Arts, Theater

THE GHOST IN THE SYNTAX

Why Shakespeare’s lines demand intention, not imitation—and why machines can only echo sound.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, September 3, 2025

The rehearsal room was cold enough that the young actor’s breath lingered in the air. He stood on the stage with a copy of Macbeth, its pages soft from use, and whispered the line under his breath before daring it aloud: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow. The words fell flat the first time. Too rehearsed. Too conscious. He shook his head, tried again, letting the syllables drag as if they themselves were weary from carrying time. Creeps in this petty pace from day to day… The repetition was not just fatalism; it was the sound of a man unraveling, his will eroded by grief and futility. The rhythm itself had to ache.

A machine could, of course, manage the cadence. A program could be tuned to repeat the word “tomorrow” with perfect solemnity, to stretch the vowels just so. Google’s WaveNet system can produce uncanny variations of stress, hesitation, even sighs—digital sighs—at precisely calculated intervals. DeepMind’s recent work on “expressive TTS” allows a line to be rendered in tones of grief, anger, joy, or boredom. There are demo reels online where Shakespeare is fed through these systems, and the result is surprisingly competent. But competency is not intention. What the young actor does—searching for futility in his own chest, summoning weariness from his own private reservoir—cannot be coded. Intent is not in the sound of the line; it’s in the act of dying a little as you speak it.

This is what Shakespeare demands, again and again: not just language, but will. His characters live on the knife-edge of consequence, their words pressed out by motive. Romeo, stumbling over Tybalt’s body, gasps, O, I am fortune’s fool! He has just killed his wife’s cousin, wrecked his future, and tasted blood he never meant to spill. It isn’t just regret—it’s horror, the shock of realizing you’ve become the villain in your own love story. No algorithm can know the sting of unintended consequence. An AI might shout the words, might even deliver them with trembling emphasis, but the cry comes from a boy watching his own destiny collapse. The line does not live without that recognition.

The experiment has been tried. In 2022, an AI-generated voice performed Romeo’s balcony scene at a conference in Vienna. Listeners were impressed—some even moved. But when the line O, I am fortune’s fool! rang out, the room chuckled. It wasn’t just that the intonation was slightly off; it was that the cry lacked stakes. It was Romeo without a pulse, Romeo without a body to bear the guilt. The line did not fall short technically—it fell short existentially.

Hamlet’s soliloquies are the most treacherous test. In Act II he marvels and recoils at the same time: What a piece of work is man… How noble in reason, how infinite in faculty. It sounds like admiration, but it isn’t pure. The words turn over themselves—what ought to inspire awe instead curdles into disgust. He sees hypocrisy in every supposed nobility, futility in every faculty. An actor must carry the irony in his voice, lacing admiration with loathing, as though the words taste bitter even as they sound grand. An AI might deliver a clean, almost clinical balance—“admiration” followed by “disgust”—like toggling sliders on a mixing board. But irony is not a switch. It’s a wound dressed in velvet.

When DeepMind released an expressive model that could generate “sarcasm,” the tech press hailed it as proof that machines could finally do subtlety. Yet what we heard was not a fractured human voice, but a pristine and empty performance. The algorithm delivered a raised-eyebrow cadence, the verbal equivalent of a painted-on smile—a gesture without the impulse to conceal. This is the core of the paradox: sarcasm and irony are built on a bedrock of paradox—they require a speaker to mean two things at once, to hold a contradictory feeling in their voice and body. A computer cannot hold a contradiction. It can only cycle between two different outputs. It cannot fracture its own will; it can only mask its lack of will with a calculated pose. It’s a perfect pantomime of motive, but it is not the thing itself.

John Barton, co-founder of the Royal Shakespeare Company, once said that “Shakespeare is inexhaustible because he leaves space for the actor’s choice. Every pause, every stress opens a door.” The line is telling: it is choice that keeps the plays alive, not just rhythm. Machines can render a pause, but they cannot choose it. They have no sense of opening a door.

Brook went further. In The Empty Space, he wrote: “A word, a movement, a gesture is empty until it is filled with the life of the actor who chooses it in the moment. That life cannot be faked.” Brook believed theatre was only alive because of its fragility—the possibility of collapse at any instant. An AI-generated Lear might roar flawlessly through every line, but the roar would lack the pulse of possible failure. For Brook, this pulse was theatre itself.

The question of intention extends far beyond Shakespeare. What of a writer like Samuel Beckett, whose characters mutter their way through a landscape of despair? Molloy, in his absurdist journey, seems driven by nothing but habit. Yet even his rambling, fragmented speech is an act of will. He confesses, he tries to make sense, he fails. The very act of muttering is a defiant choice against silence and nonexistence. The words tumble out of him not because of a calculation of probability, but because he is compelled by the fundamental, human need to bear witness to his own suffering. He wants to be heard, even if he doesn’t know why. The machine, by contrast, cannot be propelled by such need; it does not hunger or fear silence.

Borges provides another mirror. In “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” he imagines a modern writer who painstakingly rewrites Don Quixote word for word—identical to Cervantes, yet different in meaning because of intention. The same words in a different century become charged with irony. Borges understood that words are never just words; they are vessels for will, for history, for desire. An AI could reproduce Shakespeare endlessly, but reproduction is not creation. The ghost of intent makes the difference.

Shakespeare writes as if to test whether a human voice can hold the charge of intention. Lear’s roar against the storm is the most elemental: Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! It is not just noise; it is betrayal breaking loose. A father disowned, a king humiliated, Lear rages not only at the storm but at the cosmos for his madness and grief. It is a voice already fractured, demanding nature itself collapse. A machine can roar, yes. It can pump bass through speakers, crack like thunder. But it cannot bleed. To speak Lear’s line without the tremor of betrayal is to strip it bare of meaning.

The theater knows this well. In 2019, the Royal Shakespeare Company tested an AI-generated “co-performer” in an experimental production. The system generated lines in response to actors’ improvisations, its voice projected from a disembodied orb above the stage. The critics were fascinated, but they noted the same flaw: the AI could surprise, but it could not intend. The actors on stage carried the burden of consequence; the machine was a clever ghost.

Harold Bloom once wrote that Shakespeare “invented the human as we know it.” What he meant was not that Shakespeare created humanity, but that he revealed in language the contradictions, desires, and paradoxes that shape us. Bloom’s point makes the AI test more daunting: if Shakespeare gave us the map of interiority, then any performance that lacks interiority—any performance without stakes—is not merely deficient, but disqualified.

And then there is Portia, standing in the court of The Merchant of Venice, her voice softening into moral persuasion: The quality of mercy is not strained… It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven. Here intent is everything. Portia is not just lawyering; she is pleading with the very idea of justice, urging her audience to see mercy as divine, inexhaustible. Her belief must be palpable. A machine could roll the syllables like pearls, but eloquence without conviction is nothing but polish. What gives the line its power is the speaker’s faith that mercy belongs to the order of heaven. Without that belief, it’s rhetoric without heart.

Here the cultural anecdote is darker: in 2021, an AI-generated voice was used in a court training exercise to deliver witness testimony. The experiment was intended to test jurors’ susceptibility to persuasion by machine voices. The results were mixed: some jurors reported being swayed, others reported discomfort. What unsettled them was not the quality of the performance but the absence of belief behind it. To be persuaded by words without will felt like manipulation, not argument. One legal scholar described the prospect as “trial by ventriloquism”—justice bent not by human persuasion, but by hollow eloquence.

The ghost in the syntax grows clearest here. Machines can offer us form—eloquence, cadence, even dramatic surprise. What they cannot provide is risk. An actor saying The quality of mercy risks hypocrisy if he fails to embody belief. The line costs him something. A machine, by contrast, cannot fail. Every performance is safe, repeatable, consequence-free. And it is precisely consequence that makes Shakespeare’s words ache.

The paradox is that we, as listeners, are complicit. We project intention onto anything that speaks. We hear a chatbot offer sympathy, and we feel soothed. We hear an AI-generated sonnet, and we marvel at its poignancy. We want to find meaning. We bring the ghost with us. The ELIZA effect—named for one of the earliest chatbots—was discovered in the 1960s: people poured out their souls to a crude program that only echoed their words back. If we can believe that, we can certainly believe in an AI Lear. But the belief is ours, not the machine’s.

Could AI ever cross the threshold? Some technologists argue that with enough layers, enough feedback loops, emergent properties might arise that resemble motive. Perhaps one day a synthetic voice will “choose” to pause differently, to inflect a line with bitterness not because a human trained it so, but because its internal processes made that choice inevitable. If so, would that be intent—or the perfect illusion of intent? The philosophers divide: John Searle insists that no simulation, however perfect, ever achieves the thing itself; Daniel Dennett argues that if behavior is indistinguishable from intent, the distinction may not matter. The stage, however, resists the reduction. A pause can be “indistinguishable” only if we do not ask what it costs the speaker to pause.

The Royal Shakespeare Company, now experimenting with immersive technologies, has been clear-eyed about the limits. Sarah Ellis, their director of digital development, called the company’s work with Intel’s motion capture in The Tempest “21st-century puppetry.” She explained: “The actor is always driving the performance. The technology amplifies, but it cannot replace.” The line could have been written as a manifesto for the AI age: amplification without intention is echo, not expression.

Back in the rehearsal room, the young actor stumbles. His voice cracks slightly on a word, a small imperfection that carries more meaning than a perfect rendition ever could. The director, sitting at the edge of the stage, leans forward, attentive. The line is not flawless, but it is alive. The risk of failure is what makes the moment vibrate.

A machine could reproduce the monologue flawlessly. It could echo a thousand performances until the averages smoothed every edge. But what it could never offer is that tremor. The possibility of failure. The risk that gives intention its bite. For intention is always wager, always consequence, always stake. Without it, words are only words, no matter how well they trip on the tongue.

And that is Shakespeare’s test. Could AI ever deliver his lines with intent? Not unless it learns to bleed, to risk, to believe. Until then, it will remain what it is: syntax without a ghost. We may listen, we may marvel, we may even project a soul into the sound. But when the storm clears, when Romeo cries out, when Portia pleads, it will not be the machine we hear. It will be ourselves, searching for meaning where none was meant.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Essays, History, Literature, Opinion

The Man Who Invented the Modern Thriller

Before Hitchcock or Highsmith, there was Pietro Aretino—Renaissance Venice’s scandalous satirist who turned gossip into cliffhangers and obscenity into art. The man who terrified popes may also have invented the modern thriller.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 29, 2025

Venice, 1537

The candle gutters in its brass dish, casting a crooked halo on the damp walls of a salon off the Grand Canal. Pietro Aretino leans back in his chair, one boot propped on a velvet footstool, his voice curling through the smoke like a blade. He does not write—he dictates. A scribe, young and ink-stained, hunches over parchment, trying to keep pace. The letter—addressed, perhaps, to a cardinal, perhaps to a painter—will contain more than pleasantries. It will contain a threat, veiled as an observation, wrapped in a joke.

“Princes fear me more than the plague,” Aretino murmurs, eyes half-lidded. “For I do not kill bodies—I murder reputations.”

The scribe pauses, startled. Aretino waves him on. “Write it. Let them tremble.”

Tomorrow, this page will cross the lagoon, board a courier’s horse, and ignite tremors in Rome or Paris. It may be copied, whispered, condemned. It may be burned. But it will be read.

It was Aretino’s genius to recognize that scandal was not merely gossip—it was architecture. A scaffolding of insinuation and revelation designed to leave its victim dangling. In his six volumes of Lettere (1537–1557), he sharpened that architecture to a fine point. Written to popes, kings, artists, and courtesans, the letters are part autobiography, part political commentary, and wholly performance. “I speak to the powerful as I would to a neighbor,” he crowed, “for truth makes no bow.” What terrified his recipients was not what he said but what he withheld. His words worked like cliffhangers: each letter a suspense novel in miniature.

Aretino liked to imagine himself not born in Arezzo, as the records claimed, but in his own tongue. The myth suited him: a man conjured out of ink and scandal rather than flesh and baptismal water. By the 1520s, he was notorious as the flagello dei principi—the scourge of princes. The title was not a label pinned on him by enemies; it was one he cultivated, polished, and wore like armor. “I carry more lives in my inkpot than the hangman in his noose,” he declared, and few doubted it.

His life was a play in which he cast himself as both author and protagonist. When Pope Clement VII hesitated to pay him, Aretino wrote slyly, “Your Holiness, whose charity is beyond compare, surely requires no reminder of the poverty that afflicts your devoted servant.” In another letter, he praised the Pope’s mercy while threatening to reveal “those excesses which Rome whispers but dares not record.” He lived by double edge: each compliment a prelude, each benediction a warning.

The tactic was not confined to popes. To Michelangelo he sent fulsome admiration: “Your brush moves like lightning, striking down the pride of the ancients.” To Titian he became impresario, writing to Francis I of France that no royal gallery could be complete without Titian’s brush. But the same pen could turn against friend or patron in an instant. A single phrase from Aretino could undo a reputation; a withheld rumor could ruin a night’s sleep.

His enemies often answered with violence. In Rome, in 1525, mercenaries burst into his lodgings after he lampooned the papal indulgence sellers in his Frottole. They dragged him into the street and beat him nearly to death. Neighbors recalled him crawling, bloodied, back to his rooms. Later, when asked why he returned to writing almost immediately, he grinned through broken teeth: “Even death cannot silence a tongue as sharp as mine.” The scars became his punctuation. “My scars,” he wrote in the Lettere, “are the punctuation marks of my story.”

Aretino’s letters functioned like serialized thrillers. Each installment built tension, each cliffhanger left its audience half-terrified, half-delighted. He understood that suggestion could be more devastating than revelation, that anticipation was more dangerous than disclosure. He used ambiguity as a weapon, seeding his pages with conditional phrases: “It is said,” “One hears,” “Were I less discreet…” They were not evasions. They were traps.

One courtier compared the experience to “sitting at supper and finding the meat still bleeding.” The reader was implicated, made complicit in the scandal’s unfolding. Aretino’s genius lay in turning the audience into co-conspirators.

And Venice—city of masks, labyrinths, and whispered betrayals—was practically designed as the birthplace of the thriller. Long before the genre had a name, its ingredients were already steeping in the canals: duplicity, desire, surveillance, and the ever-present threat of exposure. Aretino didn’t write thrillers in form, but he mastered their emotional architecture. His letters were suspenseful, his dialogues scandalous, his persona a walking cliffhanger. Venice gave him the perfect mise-en-scène: a place where truth wore a disguise and reputation was currency. The city itself functioned like a thriller plot—beautiful on the surface, treacherous underneath.

And consider the mechanics: the masked ball becomes the thriller’s false identity. The gondola ride at midnight becomes the covert rendezvous. The whispered rumor in a candlelit salon becomes the inciting incident. The Contarini garden becomes the secret meeting place where alliances shift and truths unravel. It is no accident that Henry James, Daphne du Maurier, Patricia Highsmith, and Donna Leon all returned to Venice when they wanted to explore psychological tension and moral ambiguity. The city doesn’t just host thrillers—it is one.

Imagine a summer evening in 1537. The garden is fragrant with jasmine and fig. Aretino reclines beneath a pergola, flanked by Titian and a Greek scholar from Crete. A courtesan named Nanna pours wine into silver cups.

“You paint gods,” Aretino says to Titian, “but I paint men. And men are far more dangerous.”

Titian chuckles. “Gods do not pay commissions.”

The scholar leans in. “And men do not forgive.”

Nanna smirks, leaning on the marble balustrade. “And yet men pay both of you—in gold for their portraits, in secrets for his letters.”

Aretino raises his cup. “Which is why I never ask forgiveness. Only attention.”

Venice itself became a character: beautiful, deceptive, morally ambiguous. Its canals mirrored the duplicity of its citizens. Its masks—literal and figurative—echoed Aretino’s own performative identity.

But letters were only one weapon. In 1527, Aretino detonated another: the Sonetti lussuriosi, written to accompany Giulio Romano’s engravings known as I Modi. The sonnets made no attempt at discretion. In one, a woman gasps mid-embrace, “Oh God, if this be sin, then let me sin forever!” In another, a lover interrupts her partner’s poetic boasting with the sharp command: “Speak less and thrust more.” The verses shocked even worldly Rome. Pope Clement VII banned the work, copies were burned, and Aretino’s name became synonymous with obscenity. Yet suppression only heightened its allure. “My verses are daggers,” he later said, “that caress before they strike.”

He followed with the Ragionamenti (1534–1536), dialogues between prostitutes and matrons that turned confession into carnival. In the Dialogo della Nanna e della Antonia, one woman scoffs, “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.” In the Dialogo nel quale la Nanna insegna a la Pippa, the older courtesan instructs a young girl in survival: “A woman must learn to wield her body as men wield their swords.” These were not just bawdy jokes but philosophical inversions. They exposed hypocrisy with laughter and turned vice into discourse.

His comedies struck with equal force. In La Cortigiana (1534), a satire of Roman society, a friar assures his audience: “Do as I say, not as I do—for my sins are a privilege of office.” In Il Marescalco, a groom forced into marriage laments, “Better to wed a sword than a wife, for steel at least does not betray.” In La Talanta, he boasted with characteristic swagger: “My tongue is the scourge of princes and the trumpet of truth.” These plays were not staged fantasies but mirrors held to the world. Rome and Venice recognized themselves, and recoiled.

Even his occasional pieces carried teeth. During the sack of Rome, he penned the Frottole (1527), short verses filled with bitter humor: “The Germans loot the altars, the Spaniards strip the nuns, and Christ hides his face behind the clouds.” Earlier still, in Il Testamento dell’Elefante Hanno (1516), he composed a mock will for Pope Leo X’s pet elephant. The beast bequeathed its tusks to the cardinals and its dung to the faithful: “For the people, my eternal gift, what Rome already feeds them daily.” Juvenile, grotesque, and brilliant, it set the tone for a lifetime of satiric violence.

Was Aretino a moralist or a manipulator? The question haunts his legacy. Like Machiavelli, he understood power. Like Montaigne, he understood performance. His satire was not disinterested—it was strategic. He exposed corruption, yes, but he also profited from it. His critics accused him of blackmail, of cruelty, of vulgarity. But Aretino saw himself as a mirror. “I do not invent,” he wrote, “I reflect.” The discomfort lay not in his words, but in their accuracy.

The dilemma still feels modern. When does exposure serve truth, and when does it become spectacle? Is scandal a form of justice—or just another form of entertainment? To read Aretino is to feel that question sharpen into relevance. He knew the intoxicating pleasure of watching a hypocrite stripped bare, but he also knew the profit of keeping the knife just shy of the skin.

For centuries, Aretino was dismissed as a pornographer and blackmailer, an obscene footnote beside Petrarch and Ariosto. But scandal has a way of surviving. Nineteenth-century Romantics rediscovered him as a prophet of modernity. Today, critics trace his fingerprints across satire, reportage, and fiction. Balzac’s Parisian intrigues, Wilde’s aesthetic scandals, Patricia Highsmith’s Venetian thrillers—all echo Aretino’s mix of desire and dread.

And then there are the heirs who claimed him outright. The Marquis de Sade, that relentless anatomist of transgression, drew directly from Aretino’s playbook. Sade’s philosophical obscenities echo the structures of the Ragionamenti and the Sonetti lussuriosi: dialogues in which sexuality becomes both performance and interrogation, the bed a courtroom, the embrace a cross-examination. Like Aretino, Sade deployed eroticism not only to shock but to dismantle. Both men wielded obscenity as an intellectual weapon, stripping religion and politics of their sanctity by exposing their hypocrisies in the stark light of desire. When Sade has his libertines sneer at clerics who preach chastity while gorging on pleasure, he repeats Aretino’s barbed observation from a century earlier: “The cardinals pray with their lips while their hands wander beneath the skirts.”

Sade shared Aretino’s radical anti-clericalism, his love of dialogue as a tool of exposure, and his cultivation of notoriety as a literary strategy. The “Divine Marquis” may have been locked in the Bastille, but he carried in his cell Aretino’s scandalous legacy: the belief that obscenity could be philosophy, that provocation itself could be a mode of truth-telling.

Three centuries later, Guillaume Apollinaire would rediscover Aretino with a different eye. In the early twentieth century, Apollinaire praised him as a master who combined “the obscene with the sublime.” In works like Les Onze Mille Verges (The Eleven Thousand Rods), Apollinaire blurred the line between pornography and poetry, scandal and art, just as Aretino had done in his Venetian salons. He admired Aretino’s ability to turn audacity into literature, to make provocation itself a kind of aesthetic. “There is,” Apollinaire wrote of Aretino, “a grandeur in obscenity when it reveals the soul of an age.”

Apollinaire saw in Aretino a precedent for his own experiments: erotic audacity, satirical edge, literary innovation, and a fascination with scandal as aesthetic principle. Where Aretino staged dialogues between courtesans and matrons, Apollinaire crafted delirious erotic parables; where Aretino mocked clerics in his comedies, Apollinaire mocked bourgeois morality with surreal extravagance. Both men made literature dangerous again—texts that could be banned, burned, whispered, yet still survive.

In this long genealogy, Aretino is less a Renaissance curiosity than the origin point of a scandalous tradition that threads through Sade’s prisons, Apollinaire’s Paris, and our own scandal-hungry media. Each recognized that literature need not be safe, that scandal could be structure, that provocation could outlast sermons.

Most uncanny is how current Aretino feels. “What is whispered,” he mused in the Ragionamenti, “weighs more than what is spoken.” That line could be Twitter’s motto, or the tagline of an exposé-driven news cycle. Aretino would have thrived online: the cryptic tweet, the artful insinuation, the screenshot without context. He would have understood the logic of cancel culture, the way scandal circulates as performance, the way innuendo becomes currency.

Imagine him at the end, older now, dictating one last letter. The room is quieter, the scars deeper, the city outside still murmuring with intrigue. He knows his enemies wait for him to fall silent, but he also knows the page will outlive him. The candlelight no longer dances—it trembles. His scribe, older now too, no longer rushes. They have learned the rhythm of Aretino’s menace: slow, deliberate, inevitable.

He pauses mid-sentence, gazing out toward the lagoon. The bells of San Zanipolo toll the hour. A gondola glides past, its oars whispering against the water. Somewhere in the Palazzo Contarini dal Zaffo garden, jasmine blooms in the dark.

“Write this,” he says finally. “To be feared is to be remembered. To be remembered is to be read.”

The scribe hesitates. “And to be read?”

Aretino smiles. “Is to survive.”

He signs his name with a flourish—Pietro Aretino—and sets the quill down. The letter will travel, as they always have, faster than truth and deeper than rumor. It will be copied, misquoted, condemned, and preserved. It will be read by those who hate him and those who become him.

Centuries later, in a world of digital whispers and algorithmic outrage, his voice still echoes. In every scandal that unfolds like a story, in every tweet that wounds like a dagger, in every exposé that trembles with withheld revelation—Aretino is there. Not as ghost, but as architect. He understood what we are still learning: that scandal is not the opposite of art. It is one of its oldest forms. And in the hands of a master, it becomes not just spectacle, but structure. Not just provocation, but prophecy.

The trumpet still sounds. The question is not whether we hear it. The question is whether we recognize the tune.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Augmented Reality, Essays, Literature, Opinion, Travel

Möbius Dreams: A Journey Of Identity Without End

From Nietzsche’s wanderings to Brodsky’s winters in Venice, identity loops like a Möbius strip—and augmented reality may carry those returns to us all.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 25, 2025

It begins, as so many pilgrimages of mind and imagination do, in Italy. To step into one of its cities—Florence with its domes, Rome with its ruins, Venice with its waters—is to experience time folding over itself. Stones are worn by centuries of feet; bells still toll hours as they did five hundred years ago; water mirrors façades that have witnessed empires rise and fall. Italy resists linearity. It does not advance from one stage to another; it loops, bends, recurs. For those who enter it, identity itself begins to feel less like a straight line than like a Möbius strip—a single surface twisting back on itself, where past and present, memory and desire, fold into one another.

Friedrich Nietzsche felt that pull most keenly. His journeys through Italy in the 1870s and 1880s were more than therapeutic sojourns for his fragile health; they were laboratories for thought. He spent time in Sorrento, where the Mediterranean air and lemon groves framed his writing of Human, All Too Human. In Genoa, he walked the cliffs above the port, watching the sun rise and fall in a rhythm that struck him as recurrence itself. In Turin, under its grand porticoes, he composed letters and aphorisms before his final collapse in 1889. And in Venice, he found a strange equilibrium between the city’s music, its tides, and his own restlessness. To his confidant Peter Gast, he wrote: “When I seek another word for ‘music,’ I never find any other word than ‘Venice.’” The gondoliers’ calls, the bells of San Marco, the lapping water—all repeated endlessly, yet never the same, embodying the thought that came to define him: the eternal return.

For Nietzsche, Italy was not a backdrop but a surface on which recurrence became tangible. Each city was a half-twist in the strip of his identity: Sorrento’s clarity, Genoa’s intensity, Turin’s collapse, Venice’s rhythm. He sensed that to live authentically meant to live as though each moment must be lived again and again. Italy, with its cycles of light, water, and bells, made that philosophy palpable.

Henry James —an American expatriate author with a different temperament—also found Italy less a destination than a structure. His Italian Hours (1909) reveals both rapture and unease. “The mere use of one’s eyes in Italy is happiness enough,” he confessed, yet he described Venice as “half fairy tale, half trap.” The city delighted and unsettled him in equal measure. He wandered Rome’s ruins, Florence’s galleries, Venice’s piazzas, and found that they all embodied a peculiar temporal layering—what he called “a museum of itself.” Italy was not history frozen; it was history repeating, haunting, resurfacing.

James’s fiction reflects that same looping structure. In The Aspern Papers, an obsessive narrator circles endlessly around an old woman’s letters, desperate to claim them, caught in a cycle of desire and denial. In The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer discovers that the freedom she once thought she had secured returns as entrapment; her choices loop back on her with tragic inevitability. Even James’s prose mirrors the Möbius curve: sentences curl and return, digress and double back, before pushing forward. Reading James can feel like walking Venetian alleys—you arrive, but only by detour.

Joseph Brodsky, awarded the 1987 Nobel Prize in Literature after being exiled from the Soviet Union in 1972, found in Venice a winter refuge that became ritual. Each January he returned, until his death in 1996, and from those returns came Watermark (1992), a prose meditation that circles like the canals it describes. “Every January I went to Venice, the city of water, the city of mirrors, perhaps the city of illusions,” he wrote. Fog was his companion, “the city’s most faithful ghost.” Brodsky’s Venice was not Nietzsche’s radiant summer or James’s bustling salons. It was a city of silence, damp, reflection—a mirror to exile itself.

He repeated his returns like liturgy: sitting in the Caffè Florian, notebook in hand, crossing the Piazza San Marco through fog so dense the basilica dissolved, watching the lagoon become indistinguishable from the sky. Each January was the same, and yet not. Exile ensured that Russia was always present in absence, and Venice, indifferent to his grief yet faithful in its recurrence, became his Möbius surface. Each year he looped back as both the same man and someone altered.

What unites these three figures—Nietzsche, James, Brodsky—is not their similarity of thought but their recognition of Italy as a mirror for recurrence. Lives are often narrated as linear: childhood, youth, adulthood, decline. But Italy teaches another geometry. Like a Möbius strip, it twists perspective so that to move forward is also to circle back. An old anxiety resurfaces in midlife, but it arrives altered by experience. A desire once abandoned returns, refracted into new form. Nietzsche’s eternal return, James’s recursive characters, Brodsky’s annual exiles—all reveal that identity is not a line but a fold.

Italy amplifies this lesson. Its cities are not progressions but palimpsests. In Rome, one stands before ruins layered upon ruins: the Colosseum shadowed by medieval houses, Renaissance palaces built into ancient stones. In Florence, Brunelleschi’s dome rises above medieval streets, Renaissance paintings glow under electric light. In Venice, Byzantine mosaics shimmer beside Baroque marble while tourists queue for modern ferries. Each city is a surface where centuries loop, never erased, only folded over.

Philosophers and writers have groped toward metaphors for this looping. Nietzsche’s eternal return insists that each moment recurs infinitely. Derrida’s différance plays on the way meaning is always deferred, never fixed, endlessly circling. Borges imagined labyrinths where every turn leads back to the start. Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands describes identity as hybrid, cyclical, recursive. Italy stages all of these. To walk its piazzas is to feel history as Möbius surface: no beginning, no end, only continuous return.

But the Möbius journey of return is not without strain. Increasing overcrowding in Venice has made Piazza San Marco feel at times like a funnel for cruise-ship day trippers, raising questions of whether the city can survive its admirers. Rising costs of travel —inflated flights, pricier accommodations, surcharges for access—place the dream of pilgrimage out of reach for many. The very recurrence that writers once pursued with abandon now risks becoming the privilege of the few. And so the question arises: if one cannot return physically, can another kind of return suffice?

The answer is already being tested. Consider the Notre-Dame de Paris augmented exhibition, created by the French startup Histovery. Visitors carry a HistoPad, a touchscreen tablet, and navigate 850 years of the cathedral’s history. Faux stone tiles line the floor, stained-glass projections illuminate the walls, recordings of tolling bells echo overhead. With a swipe, one moves from the cathedral’s medieval construction to Napoleon’s coronation, then to the smoke and flames of the 2019 fire, then to the scaffolds of its restoration. It is a Möbius strip of architecture, looping centuries in minutes. The exhibition has toured globally, making Notre-Dame accessible to millions who may never step foot in Paris.

Italy, with its fragile architecture and layered history, is poised for the same transformation. Imagine a virtual walk through Venice’s alleys, dry and pristine, free of floods. A reconstructed Pompeii, where one can interact with residents moments before the eruption. Florence restored to its quattrocento brilliance, free of scaffolding and tourist throngs. For those unable to travel, AR offers an uncanny loop: recurrence of experience without presence.

Yet the question lingers: if one can walk through Notre-Dame without smelling the stone, without hearing the echo of one’s own footsteps, have they truly arrived? Recurrence, after all, has always been embodied. Nietzsche needed the Venetian fog to sting his lungs. James needed to feel the cold stones of a Florentine palazzo. Brodsky needed the damp silence of January to write his Watermark. The Möbius loop of identity was sensory, mortal, physical. Can pixels alone replicate that?

Perhaps this is too stark a contrast. Italy itself has always been both ruin and renewal, both stone and scaffolding, both presence and representation. Rome is simultaneously crumbling and rebuilt. Florence is both painted canvas and postcard reproduction. Venice is both sinking and endlessly photographed. Italy has survived by layering contradictions. Augmented reality may become one more layer.

Indeed, there is hope in this possibility. Technology can democratize what travel once restricted. The Notre-Dame exhibition allows a child in Kansas to toggle between centuries in an afternoon. It lets an elder who cannot fly feel the weight of medieval Paris. Applied to Italy, AR could make the experience of recurrence more widely available. Brodsky’s fog, Nietzsche’s bells, James’s labyrinthine sentences—these could be accessed not only by the privileged traveler but by anyone with a headset. The Möbius strip of identity, always looping, would expand to include more voices, more bodies, more experiences.

And yet AR is not a replacement so much as an extension. Those who can still travel will always seek stone, water, and bells. They will walk the Rialto and feel the wood beneath their feet; they will stand in Florence and smell the paint and dust; they will sit in Rome’s piazzas and feel the warmth of stone in the evening. These are not illusions but recurrences embodied. Technology will not end this; it will supplement it, add folds to the Möbius strip rather than cutting it.

In this sense, the Möbius book of identity continues to unfold. Nietzsche’s Italian sojourns, James’s expatriate wanderings, Brodsky’s winter rituals—all are chapters inscribed on the same continuous surface. Augmented reality will not erase those chapters; it will add marginalia, footnotes, annotations accessible to millions more. The loop expands rather than contracts.

So perhaps the hopeful answer is that recurrence itself becomes more democratic. Italy will always be there for those who return, in stone and water. But AR may ensure that those who cannot return physically may still enter the loop. A student in her dormitory may don a headset and hear the same Venetian bells that Nietzsche once called music. A retiree may walk through Florence’s restored galleries without leaving her home. A child may toggle centuries in Notre-Dame and begin to understand what it means to live inside a Möbius strip of time.

Identity, like travel, has never been a straight line. It is a fold, a twist, a surface without end. Italy teaches this lesson in stone and water. Technology may now teach it in pixels and projections. The Möbius book has no last page. It folds on—Nietzsche in Turin, James in Rome, Brodsky in Venice, and now, perhaps, millions more entering the same loop through new, augmented doors.

The self is not a line but a surface, infinite and recursive. And with AR, more of us may learn to trace its folds.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Criticism, Essays, Literature, Philosophy, Profiles

Cervantes in the Cave — The Art of Illusion

From Lepanto to Algiers to Seville, he recast Plato’s cave: instead of fleeing, he trimmed the wick—using comedy and narrative to make honest light out of shadow.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 22, 2025

In a cave in Argamasilla de Alba, Spain, a man sits hunched over a manuscript. The air is damp; the light keeps deciding what to keep. He writes not with the flourish of a court poet but with the urgency of someone who has known confinement—who has lived among shadows and learned to speak their language. The man is Miguel de Cervantes. The cave, according to local legend, is where he began Don Quixote. Whether the story is true hardly matters. The image endures: Cervantes, imprisoned, wounded, obscure, writing the book that would fracture the very idea of literary realism.

He breaks the silence first, as if talking to the walls. “Engendrado en una cárcel, donde toda incomodidad tiene su asiento,” he says—begotten in a prison, where every discomfort keeps its chair. He smiles at his own choice of verb. Begotten. It gives hardship hands.

A foot scuffs the threshold. Mateo steps into the half-light, a fellow freed captive from a life the two men still carry like a watermark. He takes the cave in at a glance—the whitewash, the barred slit of window, the stone bench that knows the shape of a tired back.

“You write in the dark, Miguel,” Mateo says. “Still chasing shadows?”

“Not chasing,” Cervantes replies, without looking up. “Refracting. These shadows are more honest than the sunlit lies of court and empire.”

Plato’s prisoners mistook flicker for fact. Cervantes has no such innocence; he knows exactly what light can do and what it cannot. In Algiers he learned the cost of sunlight and the uses of a candle. “We invented stories to survive,” he says. “We imagined rescue. We became authors of unreality. And in doing so, we learned how unreality works.”

He had boarded a homeward ship in 1575 and sailed straight into a profession he did not apply for. Corsairs took the vessel. Letters of recommendation—ironically the very proof of his merit—made him valuable. Algiers swallowed him for five years. Four escape attempts, each with its choreography of bribes, whispers, and night boats, failed in turn; punishments followed with bureaucratic punctuality. In the baños he organized fellow captives, staged plays that felt like oxygen rations, and discovered a kind of command that requires neither rank nor drumrolls. The lesson was not transcendence. It was texture. Captivity did not reveal some pure, sunlit truth; it revealed illusion’s machinery: how shadows are cast, how they persuade, how they can be turned from weapon into instrument.

“So you believe captivity reveals truth?” Mateo asks.

“No,” Cervantes says. “It reveals illusion. But if you know you’re in a cave, illusion can be honest about itself.”

He speaks like a man who has balanced too many ledgers and decided to keep one for the soul. In his prologue to the Exemplary Novels he would boast with a craftsman’s pride: mías propias, no imitadas ni hurtadas—my own pieces, not imitated or stolen. After a life in which other people held the keys, authorship felt like a kind of lawful possession. He is not naïve about it; theft will come in a thousand copies. Still, he plants his flag in sentences.

Mateo lowers himself onto the bench. The cave keeps its cool.

“Begin earlier,” Mateo says softly. “Begin with the wound.”

Cervantes nods, as if paging back. “Lepanto,” he says. “Two shots to the chest, one to the hand. El mayor bien que me vino. The greatest favor that came to me.”

Mateo laughs—a short, incredulous bark. “Favor?”

“A hand is a tool,” Cervantes says, flexing his right, letting the left sleeve fall into its gentle emptiness. “So is a story. One broke and taught the other its work. I learned that honor is not trumpets; it is the bruise that stays after the sound goes.”

“What did it smell like—the battle?” Mateo asks, because some questions insist.

“Oak and salt and a fire that wandered,” Cervantes says. “The sea keeps bad accounts—always debits, never balance. We threw our bodies at its ledger and called it glory. I got a bill I could live with.”

The cave changes its mind about brightness by a single shade. Light climbs a little higher on the wall, as if memory has a temperature.

“After Algiers,” Mateo says, “you came home to paper.”

“To paper and suspicion,” Cervantes answers. “Spain wanted receipts more than epics.” He became a purchasing agent, then a tax collector—the sort of work that presses humility into a man’s pockets and takes the lint besides. A banker fell in Seville and the ground gave way beneath him. Jail happened the way weather happens. Bureaucracy, he discovered, is a prison with nicer pens.

He thumps the palm of his right hand on the bench, a quiet imitation of a ledger closing. “Always the same sum,” he says. “Loyalty plus wounds equals suspicion.”

“That arithmetic,” Mateo says, “taught you comedy.”

“It taught me instruments,” Cervantes corrects gently. “Comedy is a surgeon’s knife you can carry in public.”

He had tried other rooms. La Galatea (1585), a pastoral romance, sighs under painted trees and speaks expertly in a fashionable voice—too expertly for a man who had learned to breathe in iron. “A ceiling too low for the lungs,” he says. Failure did not embarrass him; it emancipated him. “I loved what books promised. I wrote the promise’s correction.”

“And then you choose another cave,” Mateo says, looking around.

“This time I brought the candle.” Cervantes nods at the stub trembling in its dish. “The cave is not a prison if you know you’re inside it. Fiction is not delusion if you wield it knowingly.”

“Is that freedom?” Mateo asks. “To live in fiction?”

Cervantes answers with a line he will later put in a knight’s mouth because knights carry sentences farther than taxmen do. “La libertad, Sancho, es uno de los más preciosos dones…” Freedom, Sancho, is one of the most precious gifts. He lets the clause hang and then adds the counterweight: captivity is the greatest evil. “But there is a third thing,” he says. “The discipline of the wick. Not everyone reaches the sun. Many of us live by hearth-light. So make the hearth honest.”

He laughs, not kindly but not unkindly, at the memory of a barber’s basin mistaken for a helmet. “A basin can be a helmet,” he says, “if the story is honest about the trick.” The joke is not cruelty; it’s consent. Illusions that confess their wages are allowed to work.

“You sound like Plato’s least obedient pupil,” Mateo says. “He wants the prisoner out of the cave. You stay.”

“Plato had less practice with caves,” Cervantes says. “I stay and trim the wick.”

The man who stays in the cave can tell you about the cost of zeal. He knows what happens when mercy runs faster than attention: chaos dresses up as freedom. He has written a scene in which a knight frees a chain gang of galley slaves with a fine speech and a flash of temper, and the liberated—unbriefed on narrative responsibility—repay the favor with stones. “Pity without comprehension,” he says, “is a door swinging in a storm. Freedom without narrative becomes a mess that lets tyrants say, ‘You see? Chains keep order.’”

Mateo’s eyes drift toward a wooden head in the corner, painted eyes arrested mid-glance. “Master Pedro,” Cervantes says, amused at the prop the cave has supplied. He tells the story of a puppet theater, a knight who cannot bear strings, a sword that corrects an illusion into splinters. Even illusions keep accounts, he reminds Mateo. Someone pays for the pleasure. “In that scene,” he says, “I taxed zeal. I sent the bill to laughter.”

“So your book is a theater?” Mateo asks.

“A theater that shows its ropes,” Cervantes says. “A historian with a wink in his ink. A narrator who argues with me, and I with him. A false sequel enters the room, and I absorb him into the play. If illusion is a crime, let the evidence be visible. If it is a craft, let the strings show and the audience decide.”

He keeps his quotes short and to the point, letting them behave like tools rather than trophies. “Yo sé quién soy,” he says, not to boast but to set a boundary—I know who I am. “And I know what I am not. I am not the sun. I am a candle with a good memory.”

Memory is a troublesome servant. “¡Oh memoria, enemiga mortal de mi descanso!,” he mutters with theatrical exasperation—Oh memory, mortal enemy of my rest—knowing full well he cannot do without her. In the deepest fold of the book he is writing, he lowers his knight into the Cave of Montesinos and gives him a private vision no one can verify. Minutes pass in the world; days unfold in the cave. Readers will fight about that descent for centuries: lie or parable? He shrugs. The rope held. The telling is what matters.

“What about truth?” Mateo asks. “You dodge it like a matador.”

“Truth is errant,” Cervantes says. “Like my knight. It wanders, stumbles, reinvents itself. La verdad adelgaza y no quiebra—truth thins but does not break. It lives in the flicker between shadow and flame.” He aims for a truth you can sit with, not a blaze you must worship. Even now, when the cave dims or brightens by a breath, he adjusts nothing in his voice. He trusts the room to keep up.

The room has heard other versions of this life. Soldier, captive, clerk, failed author—the catalogue is accurate and useless until you give it breath. He has learned that a life of refusals and humiliations can be rearranged into a lamp. “El que lee mucho y anda mucho, ve mucho y sabe mucho,” he says with a grin—he who reads much and travels much sees much and knows much—and Mateos’s chuckle bounces off the whitewash and returns as agreement.

If the cave is a theater, it is also a workshop. He places three objects on the bench as if laying out tools: a frayed rope (failed escape; lesson kept), a ledger (bureaucracy’s Bible, now a prop for comedy), and the puppet head (illusion, demystified and retained). He sets the rope across the ledger like a sash and props the puppet against both like a child asleep between two patient adults.

“You’re staging your own life,” Mateo says.

“Everything I own appears in my books,” Cervantes answers. “Better to put them to work than let them gather dust.”

He will put even injury to work. He has already done it. “There is no book so bad that it does not have something good,” he says—No hay libro tan malo que no tenga algo bueno—and he means, among other things, his own early efforts. He tried the fashion and failed; he learned to write beyond it. The failure cleared the room.

“And the counterfeit?” Mateo asks. “The other Quixote?”

“I made room,” Cervantes says, not quite happily. He doesn’t bother to call the rival by name. “I let the counterfeit into Part II and gave him the dignity of being wrong on the page. It is the politest way to win.”

Outside, late afternoon arranges itself. Inside, the candle practices its small weather. The conversation acquires the unhurried gravity of men who have been forced to wait before and know that waiting can be made useful. They speak of the Información de Argel—the sworn testimonies that stitched a biography out of scars and courage; of the petition to the Council of the Indies that asked for four possible offices across the ocean and delivered no; of Seville’s auditoriums of suspicion where a man could do arithmetic all day and still owe.

“You turned all that into a style,” Mateo says.

“I turned it into a temperament,” Cervantes corrects. Style is the residue. The temperament is the choice: to stay in the cave and make the light adjustable; to refuse the panic of transcendence in favor of the patience of attention; to let laughter be a form of moral accounting. “I wanted a book in which the strings show,” he says. “So when someone pulls, we know who is moving what.”

He reaches for the candle with wetted fingers and trims the wick. The flame tightens, steadies, sharpens the edges of the room with a surgeon’s manners. The gesture is mundane and feels like a thesis.

“Why not flee?” Mateo asks one last time, because some questions return until answered in the body.

“Because someone must tend the flame,” Cervantes says. “Because most people live by hearth-light. Because the cave tells the truth about limits, and I prefer honest rooms to lying palaces.”

He stands, and the bench acknowledges the change with a creak that has learned both complaint and loyalty. He touches the stone with the backs of his fingers, as one does a sleeping child. The puppet keeps its round attention. The rope adopts its length. The ledger decides to be heavy again.

“Begin,” Mateo says, suddenly shy of making a ceremony of it.

“I did,” Cervantes answers, and returns to his page.

He writes the opening lines of Don Quixote as the candle throws a peninsula of light bordered by ink. A poor gentleman with a head full of books starts out into a world that will bruise him into philosophy. A squire with a sack of proverbs learns to spend them one by one, after listening. Windmills declare their innocence; a basin negotiates a new title. Dukes turn out to be children who have learned cruelty by playing. Priests explain themselves into farce. Puppets are freed to their ruin, then repaired by a writer who has learned to apologize with laughter.

Cervantes does not flee illusion; he illuminates it. He does not reject reality; he reframes it. He does not promise truth; he escorts it, errant and sturdy, through rooms with honest walls. He turns shadows into stories and stories into a way of seeing that does not blind. He has stayed where Plato urged ascension and found, by staying, a different kind of ascent: the climb of attention, the charity of proportion, the courage to let strings show and still believe in the show.

Unlike Plato’s prisoner, Cervantes remains in the cave. He writes. He refracts. He talks to the walls and to the future, and both answer. His broken hand, his captive mind, his errant knight—everything he survived and everything he invented—gathers in the small weather of a candle and becomes, against all instruction, a form of daylight.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Essays, Literature, Reviews, Society, Theater

Passion Unleashed Or Reason Restrained: The Tale Of Two Theaters

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 6, 2025

The theatrical landscapes of England and France, while both flourishing in the early modern period, developed along distinct trajectories, reflecting their unique cultural, philosophical, and political climates. The English Renaissance stage, exemplified by the towering figures of Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare, embraced a sprawling, often chaotic, exploration of human experience, driven by individual ambition and psychological depth. In contrast, the French Neoclassical theatre, championed by masters like Molière and Jean Racine, championed order, reason, and a more focused examination of societal manners and tragic passions within a stricter dramatic framework.

This essay will compare and contrast these two powerful traditions by examining how Marlowe and Shakespeare’s expansive and character-driven dramas differ from Molière’s incisive social comedies and Racine’s intense psychological tragedies. Through this comparison, we can illuminate the divergent artistic philosophies and societal preoccupations that shaped the dramatic arts in these two influential European nations.

English Renaissance Drama: The Expansive Human Spirit and Societal Flux

The English Renaissance theatre was characterized by its boundless energy, its disregard for classical unities, and its profound interest in the multifaceted human psyche. Playwrights like Christopher Marlowe and William Shakespeare captured the era’s spirit of exploration and individualism, often placing ambitious, flawed, and deeply introspective characters at the heart of their narratives. These plays, performed in bustling public theaters, offered a mirror to an English society grappling with rapid change, shifting hierarchies, and the exhilarating—and terrifying—potential of the individual.

Christopher Marlowe (1564–1593), a contemporary and rival of Shakespeare, pioneered the use of blank verse and brought a new intensity to the English stage. His plays often feature protagonists driven by overwhelming, almost superhuman, desires—for power, knowledge, or wealth—who challenge societal and divine limits. In Tamburlaine the Great, the Scythian shepherd rises to conquer empires through sheer force of will, embodying a ruthless individualism that defied traditional hierarchies. Marlowe’s characters are often defined by their singular, often transgressive, ambition.

“I hold the Fates bound fast in iron chains, / And with my hand turn Fortune’s wheel about.” — Christopher Marlowe, Tamburlaine the Great

Similarly, Doctor Faustus explores the dangerous pursuit of forbidden knowledge, with its protagonist selling his soul for intellectual mastery and worldly pleasure. Marlowe’s drama is characterized by its grand scale, its focus on the exceptional individual, and its willingness to delve into morally ambiguous territory, reflecting a society grappling with new ideas about human potential and the limits of authority. His plays were often spectacles of ambition and downfall, designed to provoke and awe, suggesting an English fascination with the raw, unbridled power of the individual, even when it leads to destruction. They spoke to a society where social mobility, though limited, was a potent fantasy, and where traditional religious and political certainties were increasingly open to radical questioning.

William Shakespeare (1564–1616) built upon Marlowe’s innovations, expanding the scope of English drama to encompass an unparalleled range of human experience. While his historical plays and comedies are diverse, his tragedies, in particular, showcase a profound psychological realism. Characters like Hamlet, Othello, and King Lear are not merely driven by singular ambitions but are complex individuals wrestling with internal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and the unpredictable nature of fate. Shakespeare’s plays often embrace multiple plots, shifts in tone, and a blend of prose and verse, reflecting the messy, unconstrained reality of life.

“All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players; / They have their exits and their entrances; / And one man in his time plays many parts…” — William Shakespeare, As You Like It

Hamlet’s introspection and indecision, Lear’s descent into madness, and Othello’s tragic jealousy reveal a deep fascination with the inner workings of the human mind and the devastating consequences of human fallibility. Unlike the French emphasis on decorum, Shakespeare’s stage could accommodate violence, madness, and the full spectrum of human emotion, often without strict adherence to classical unities of time, place, or action. This freedom allowed for a rich, multifaceted exploration of the human condition, making his plays enduring studies of the soul. These plays vividly portray an English society grappling with the breakdown of traditional order, the anxieties of political succession, and the moral ambiguities of power. They suggest a national character more comfortable with contradiction and chaos, finding truth in the raw, unfiltered experience of human suffering and triumph rather than in neat, rational resolutions.

French Neoclassical Drama: Order, Reason, and Social Control

The French Neoclassical theatre, emerging in the 17th century, was a reaction against the perceived excesses of earlier drama, favoring instead a strict adherence to classical rules derived from Aristotle and Horace. Emphasizing reason, decorum, and moral instruction, playwrights like Molière and Jean Racine crafted works that were elegant, concentrated, and deeply analytical of human behavior within a structured society. These plays offered a reflection of French society under the centralized power of the monarchy, particularly the court of Louis XIV, where order, hierarchy, and the maintenance of social appearances were paramount.

Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin, 1622–1673), the master of French comedy, used wit and satire to expose the follies, hypocrisies, and social pretensions of his contemporary Parisian society. His plays, such as Tartuffe, The Misanthrope, and The Miser, feature characters consumed by a single dominant passion or vice (e.g., religious hypocrisy, misanthropy, avarice). Molière’s genius lay in his ability to create universal types, using laughter to critique societal norms and encourage moral rectitude. His comedies often end with the restoration of social order and the triumph of common sense over absurdity.

“To live without loving is not really to live.” — Molière, The Misanthrope

Unlike the English focus on individual transformation, Molière’s characters often remain stubbornly fixed in their vices, serving as satirical mirrors for the audience. The plots are tightly constructed, adhering to the classical unities, and the language is precise, elegant, and witty, reflecting the French emphasis on clarity and rational thought. His plays were designed not just to entertain, but to instruct and reform, making them crucial vehicles for social commentary. Molière’s comedies reveal a French society deeply concerned with social decorum, the perils of pretense, and the importance of maintaining a rational, harmonious social fabric. They highlight the anxieties of social climbing and the rigid expectations placed upon individuals within a highly stratified and centralized court culture.

Jean Racine (1639–1699), the preeminent tragedian of the French Neoclassical period, explored the destructive power of human passions within a highly constrained and formal dramatic structure. His tragedies, including Phèdre, Andromaque, and Britannicus, focus intensely on a single, overwhelming emotion—often forbidden love, jealousy, or ambition—that inexorably leads to the protagonist’s downfall. Racine’s plays are characterized by their psychological intensity, their elegant and precise Alexandrine verse, and their strict adherence to the three unities (time, place, and action).

“There is no greater torment than to be consumed by a secret.” — Jean Racine, Phèdre

Unlike Shakespeare’s expansive historical sweep, Racine’s tragedies unfold in a single location over a short period, concentrating the emotional and moral conflict. His characters are often members of the aristocracy or historical figures, whose internal struggles are presented with a stark, almost clinical, precision. The tragic outcome is often a result of an internal moral failing or an uncontrollable passion, rather than external forces or a complex web of events. Racine’s work reflects a society that valued order, reason, and a clear understanding of human nature, even when depicting its most destructive aspects. Racine’s tragedies speak to a French society that, despite its pursuit of order, recognized the terrifying, almost inevitable, power of human passion to disrupt that order. They explore the moral and psychological consequences of defying strict social and religious codes, often within the confines of aristocratic life, where reputation and controlled emotion were paramount.

Divergent Stages, Shared Human Concerns: A Compelling Contrast

The comparison of these two dramatic traditions reveals fundamental differences in their artistic philosophies and their reflections of national character. English Renaissance drama, as seen in Marlowe and Shakespeare, was expansive, embracing complexity, psychological depth, and a vibrant, often chaotic, theatricality. It reveled in the individual’s boundless potential and tragic flaws, often breaking classical rules to achieve greater emotional impact and narrative freedom. The English stage was a mirror to a society undergoing rapid change, where human ambition and internal conflict were paramount, and where the individual’s journey, however tumultuous, was often the central focus.

French Neoclassical drama, in contrast, prioritized order, reason, and decorum. Molière’s comedies satirized social behaviors to uphold moral norms, while Racine’s tragedies meticulously dissected destructive passions within a tightly controlled framework. Their adherence to classical unities and their emphasis on elegant language reflected a desire for clarity, balance, and a more didactic approach to theatre. The French stage was a laboratory for examining universal human traits and societal structures, often through the lens of a single, dominant characteristic or emotion, emphasizing the importance of social harmony and rational control.

The most compelling statement arising from this comparison is that while English drama celebrated the unleashing of the individual, often leading to magnificent chaos, French drama sought to contain and analyze the individual within the strictures of reason and social order. The English stage, with its public accessibility and fewer formal constraints, became a crucible for exploring the raw, unvarnished human condition, reflecting a society more comfortable with its own contradictions and less centralized in its cultural authority. The French stage, often patronized by the monarchy and adhering to strict classical principles, became a refined instrument for social critique and the dissection of universal passions, reflecting a society that valued intellectual control, social hierarchy, and the triumph of reason over disruptive emotion.

Despite these significant stylistic and philosophical divergences, both traditions ultimately grappled with universal human concerns: ambition, love, betrayal, morality, and the search for meaning. Whether through the grand, sprawling narratives of Shakespeare and Marlowe, or the concentrated, analytical dramas of Molière and Racine, the theatre in both nations served as a vital arena for exploring the human condition, shaping national identities, and laying groundwork for future intellectual movements. The “stages of the soul” in the Renaissance and Neoclassical periods, though built on different principles, each offered profound insights into the timeless complexities of human nature.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Essays, Ethics, Literature, Society, Theology

The Ethics of Defiance in Theology and Society

By Intellicurean, July 30, 2025

Before Satan became the personification of evil, he was something far more unsettling: a dissenter with conviction. In the hands of Joost van den Vondel and John Milton, rebellion is not born from malice, but from moral protest—a rebellion that echoes through every courtroom, newsroom, and protest line today.

Seventeenth-century Europe, still reeling from the Protestant Reformation, was a world in flux. Authority—both sacred and secular—was under siege. Amid this upheaval, a new literary preoccupation emerged: rebellion not as blasphemy or chaos, but as a solemn confrontation with power. At the heart of this reimagining stood the devil—not as a grotesque villain, but as a tragic figure struggling between duty and conscience.

“As old certainties fractured, a new literary fascination emerged with rebellion, not merely as sin, but as moral drama.”

In Vondel’s Lucifer (1654) and Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667), Satan is no longer merely the adversary of God; he becomes a symbol of conscience in collision with authority. These works do not justify evil—they dramatize the terrifying complexity of moral defiance. Their protagonists, shaped by dignity and doubt, speak to an enduring question: when must we obey, and when must we resist?

Vondel’s Lucifer: Dignity, Doubt, and Divine Disobedience

In Vondel’s hands, Lucifer is not a grotesque demon but a noble figure, deeply shaken by God’s decree that angels must serve humankind. This new order, in Lucifer’s eyes, violates the harmony of divine justice. His poignant declaration, “To be the first prince in some lower court” (Act I, Line 291), is less a lust for domination than a refusal to surrender his sense of dignity.

Vondel crafts Lucifer in the tradition of Greek tragedy. The choral interludes frame Lucifer’s turmoil not as hubris, but as solemn introspection. He is a being torn by conscience, not corrupted by pride. The result is a rebellion driven by perceived injustice rather than innate evil.

The playwright’s own religious journey deepens the text. Raised a Mennonite, Vondel converted to Catholicism in a fiercely Calvinist Amsterdam. Lucifer becomes a veiled critique of predestination and theological rigidity. His angels ask: if obedience is compelled, where is moral agency? If one cannot dissent, can one truly be free?

Authorities saw the danger. The play was banned after two performances. In a city ruled by Reformed orthodoxy, the idea that angels could question God threatened more than doctrine—it threatened social order. And yet, Lucifer endured, carving out a space where rebellion could be dignified, tragic, even righteous.

The tragedy’s impact would echo beyond the stage. Vondel’s portrayal of divine disobedience challenged audiences to reconsider the theological justification for absolute obedience—whether to church, monarch, or moral dogma. In doing so, he planted seeds of spiritual and political skepticism that would continue to grow.

Milton’s Satan: Pride, Conscience, and the Fall from Grace

Milton’s Paradise Lost offers a cosmic canvas, but his Satan is deeply human. Once Heaven’s brightest, he falls not from chaos but conviction. His famed credo—“Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven” (Book I, Line 263)—isn’t evil incarnate. It is a cry of autonomy, however misguided.

Early in the epic, Satan is a revolutionary: eloquent, commanding, even admirable. Milton allows us to feel his magnetism. But this is not the end of the arc—it is the beginning of a descent. As the story unfolds, Satan’s rhetoric calcifies into self-justification. His pride distorts his cause. The rebel becomes the tyrant he once defied.

This descent mirrors Milton’s own disillusionment. A Puritan and supporter of the English Commonwealth, he witnessed Cromwell’s republic devolve into authoritarianism and the Restoration of the monarchy. As Orlando Reade writes in Paradise Lost: Mourned, A Revolution Betrayed (2024), Satan becomes Milton’s warning: even noble rebellion, untethered from humility, can collapse into tyranny.

“He speaks the language of liberty while sowing the seeds of despotism.”

Milton’s Satan reminds us that rebellion, while necessary, is fraught. Without self-awareness, the conscience that fuels it becomes its first casualty. The epic thus dramatizes the peril not only of blind obedience, but of unchecked moral certainty.

What begins as protest transforms into obsession. Satan’s journey reflects not merely theological defiance but psychological unraveling—a descent into solipsism where he can no longer distinguish principle from pride. In this, Milton reveals rebellion as both ethically urgent and personally perilous.

Earthly Echoes: Milgram, Nuremberg, and the Cost of Obedience

Centuries later, the drama of obedience and conscience reemerged in psychological experiments and legal tribunals.

In 1961, psychologist Stanley Milgram explored why ordinary people committed atrocities under Nazi regimes. Participants were asked to deliver what they believed were painful electric shocks to others, under the instruction of an authority figure. Disturbingly, 65% of subjects administered the maximum voltage.

Milgram’s chilling conclusion: cruelty isn’t always driven by hatred. Often, it requires only obedience.

“The most fundamental lesson of the Milgram experiment is that ordinary people… can become agents in a terrible destructive process.” — Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1974)

At Nuremberg, after World War II, Nazi defendants echoed the same plea: we were just following orders. But the tribunal rejected this. The Nuremberg Principles declared that moral responsibility is inalienable.

As the Leuven Transitional Justice Blog notes, the court affirmed: “Crimes are committed by individuals and not by abstract entities.” It was a modern echo of Vondel and Milton: blind obedience, even in lawful structures, cannot absolve the conscience.

The legal implications were far-reaching. Nuremberg reshaped international norms by asserting that conscience can override command, that legality must answer to morality. The echoes of this principle still resonate in debates over drone warfare, police brutality, and institutional accountability.

The Vietnam War: Protest as Moral Conscience

The 1960s anti-war movement was not simply a reaction to policy—it was a moral rebellion. As the U.S. escalated involvement in Vietnam, activists invoked not just pacifism, but ethical duty.

Martin Luther King Jr., in his 1967 speech “Beyond Vietnam: A Time to Break Silence,” denounced the war as a betrayal of justice:

“A time comes when silence is betrayal.”

Draft resistance intensified. Muhammad Ali, who refused military service, famously declared:

“I ain’t got no quarrel with them Viet Cong.”

His resistance cost him his title, nearly his freedom. But it transformed him into a global symbol of conscience. Groups like Vietnam Veterans Against the War made defiance visceral: returning soldiers hurled medals onto Capitol steps. Their message: moral clarity sometimes demands civil disobedience.

The protests revealed a generational rift in moral interpretation: patriotism was no longer obedience to state policy, but fidelity to justice. And in this redefinition, conscience took center stage.

Feminism and the Rebellion Against Patriarchy

While bombs fell abroad, another rebellion reshaped the domestic sphere: feminism. The second wave of the movement exposed the quiet tyranny of patriarchy—not imposed by decree, but by expectation.

In The Feminine Mystique (1963), Betty Friedan named the “problem that has no name”—the malaise of women trapped in suburban domesticity. Feminists challenged laws, institutions, and social norms that demanded obedience without voice.

“The first problem for all of us, men and women, is not to learn, but to unlearn.” — Gloria Steinem, Revolution from Within (1992)

The 1968 protest at the Miss America pageant symbolized this revolt. Women discarded bras, girdles, and false eyelashes into a “freedom trash can.” It was not just performance, but a declaration: dignity begins with defiance.

Feminism insisted that the personal was political. Like Vondel’s angels or Milton’s Satan, women rebelled against a hierarchy they did not choose. Their cause was not vengeance, but liberation—for all.

Their defiance inspired legal changes—Title IX, Roe v. Wade, the Equal Pay Act—but its deeper legacy was ethical: asserting that justice begins in the private sphere. In this sense, feminism was not merely a social movement; it was a philosophical revolution.

Digital Conscience: Whistleblowers and the Age of Exposure

Today, rebellion occurs not just in literature or streets, but in data streams. Whistleblowers like Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Frances Haugen exposed hidden harms—from surveillance to algorithmic manipulation.

Their revelations cost them jobs, homes, and freedom. But they insisted on a higher allegiance: to truth.

“When governments or corporations violate rights, there is a moral imperative to speak out.” — Paraphrased from Snowden

These figures are not villains. They are modern Lucifers—flawed, exiled, but driven by conscience. They remind us: the battle between obedience and dissent now unfolds in code, policy, and metadata.

The stakes are high. In an era of artificial intelligence and digital surveillance, ethical responsibility has shifted from hierarchical commands to decentralized platforms. The architecture of control is invisible—yet rebellion remains deeply human.

Public Health and the Politics of Autonomy

The COVID-19 pandemic reframed the question anew: what does moral responsibility look like when authority demands compliance for the common good?

Mask mandates, vaccines, and quarantines triggered fierce debates. For some, compliance was compassion. For others, it was capitulation. The virus became a mirror, reflecting our deepest fears about trust, power, and autonomy.

What the pandemic exposed is not simply political fracture, but ethical ambiguity. It reminded us that even when science guides policy, conscience remains a personal crucible. To obey is not always to submit; to question is not always to defy.

The challenge is not rebellion versus obedience—but how to discern the line between solidarity and submission, between reasoned skepticism and reckless defiance.

Conclusion: The Sacred Threshold of Conscience

Lucifer and Paradise Lost are not relics of theological imagination. They are maps of the moral terrain we walk daily.

Lucifer falls not from wickedness, but from protest. Satan descends through pride, not evil. Both embody our longing to resist what feels unjust—and our peril when conscience becomes corrupted.

“Authority demands compliance, but conscience insists on discernment.”

From Milgram to Nuremberg, from Vietnam to feminism, from whistleblowers to lockdowns, the line between duty and defiance defines who we are.

To rebel wisely is harder than to obey blindly. But it is also nobler, more human. In an age of mutating power—divine, digital, political—conscience must not retreat. It must adapt, speak, endure.

The final lesson of Vondel and Milton may be this: that conscience, flawed and fallible though it may be, remains the last and most sacred threshold of freedom. To guard it is not to glorify rebellion for its own sake, but to defend the fragile, luminous space where justice and humanity endure.

Arts & Literature, Book Reviews, Essays, Literature, Reviews

Moby-Dick, Perpetual Inquiry, and the Sublime

“Call me Ishmael.”

This iconic first line anchors one of the most enduring openings in American literature. Yet before it is spoken, before Ishmael’s voice emerges on the page, we encounter something more unusual: a kind of literary invocation. The opening pages of Moby-Dick—those dense, eclectic “Extracts” quoting scripture, classical literature, scientific treatises, and forgotten travelogues—do not serve as a traditional preface. Instead, they operate like a ritual threshold. They ask us to enter the novel not as a narrative, but as a vast textual cosmos.

Melville’s fictional “sub-sub-librarian” gathers fragments from Job to Shakespeare to obscure whaling reports, assembling a chorus of voices that have, across centuries, spoken of the whale. This pre-narrative collage is more than ornamentation. It proposes a foundational idea: that the whale lives not only in the ocean, but in language. Not only in myth, but in memory. Not only in flesh, but in thought.

Before the Pequod ever sets sail, Melville has already charted his central course—into the ocean of human imagination, where the whale swims through texts, dreams, and questions that refuse easy resolution.

Proof of Two Lives

“There’s something I find strangely moving about the ‘Extracts’ section,” remarks literary critic Wyatt Mason on The World in Time, a podcast hosted by Lewis Lapham. “It’s proof of two kinds of life. The life of the creature itself, and the life of the mind—the attention we pay over time to this creature.”

Mason’s comment offers a keel for the voyage ahead. In Moby-Dick, the whale is not simply an animal or antagonist. It becomes a metaphysical magnet, a mirror for human understanding, a challenge to the limits of knowing. The “Extracts” and “Etymologies,” often dismissed as digressions, are in fact sacred rites—texts that beg to be read with reverence.

In teaching the novel to incarcerated students through the Bard Prison Initiative, Mason and fellow writer Donovan Hohn describe how these obscure, labyrinthine sections are received not as trivia but as scripture. The students descend into the archive as divers into a shipwreck—recovering fragments of forgotten wisdom, learning to breathe in the pressure of incomprehensibility. “The whale,” Mason repeats, “resides or lives in texts.” And what a library it is.

The Whale as Philosophy

“All my means are sane, my motive and my object mad.”

Harold Bloom, the late sage of literary criticism, would have nodded at Mason’s insight. For Bloom, Moby-Dick was not merely a novel, but “a giant Shakespearean prose poem.” Melville, he believed, was a tragedian of the American soul. Captain Ahab, mad with self-reliance, became for Bloom a Promethean figure—bound not by divine punishment, but by his own obsessive will.

In Bloom’s classroom at Yale in 2011, there were no lecture notes. He taught Moby-Dick like a jazz solo—improvised, living, drawn from a lifetime of memory and myth. “It’s very unfair,” he said, reflecting on the whale hunts—great mammals hunted with harpoons and lances. Yet the Pequod’s most moral man, Starbuck, is also its most proficient killer. A Quaker devoted to peace, he is also the ship’s deadliest lance. This contradiction—gentleness and violence braided together—is the essence of Melville’s philosophy.

The whale, in Bloom’s reading, is sublime not because it symbolizes any one thing—God, evil, justice, nature—but because it cannot be pinned down. It is an open question. An unending inquiry. A canvas for paradox. “Heaven help them all,” Bloom said of the Pequod’s doomed crew. “And us.”

Melville the Environmentalist

“There she blows! There she blows! A hump like a snow-hill! It is Moby Dick!”

Where Bloom heard Melville’s music in metaphor and myth, Richard J. King hears it in science. In Ahab’s Rolling Sea: A Natural History of Moby-Dick (2019), King charts a different map—overlaying Melville’s imagined ocean onto real tides, real whales, real voyages. He sails replica whalers, interviews marine biologists, pores over Melville’s notebooks.

His inquiry begins with a straightforward question: could a sperm whale really destroy a ship? Historical records suggest yes. But King doesn’t stop at anatomy. His portrait of Melville reveals a proto-environmentalist, someone who revered the sea not just as symbol but as system. Melville’s whale, King argues, is a creature of wonder and terror, not just prey but presence.

In an age of ecological crisis, King reframes Moby-Dick as a book not just of metaphor but of environmental ethics. Ishmael’s meandering digressions become meditations on the ocean as moral agent—an entity capable of sustaining and destroying. The sea is no backdrop; it is a character, a god, an intelligence. Melville’s ocean, King suggests, humbles the hubris of Ahab and calls readers to ecological humility.

Rediscovery in Dark Times

“Strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach outside except by thrusting through the wall?”

Aaron Sachs, in Up From the Depths: Herman Melville, Lewis Mumford, and Rediscovery in Dark Times (2022), picks up the whale’s trail in the 20th century. In 1929, as the world plunged into the Great Depression, the writer and historian Lewis Mumford resurrected Melville from literary oblivion. His biography of the long-forgotten author recast Melville not as a failure, but as a visionary.

For Mumford, Melville was a kindred spirit—a man who, long before the term “modernity” took hold, had already seen its psychic cost. As Mumford watched the rise of industry, mass production, and spiritual exhaustion, he found in Melville a dark prophet. Ahab’s fury was not personal—it was civilizational.

Critics have praised Sachs’s biography as timely and thoughtful. Its thesis is clear: in times of disorientation, literature does more than reflect the world—it refracts it. It preserves vital truths, repurposing them when our present crises demand older insights.

In Sachs’s telling, Moby-Dick is not just a classic; it’s a living text. A lighthouse in the storm. A warning bell. A whale-shaped mirror reflecting our fears, failures, and persistent hope.

The Whale in the Classroom

“Ignorance is the parent of fear.”

The classroom, as Sachs and Mason both suggest, becomes a site of literary resurrection. In prison education programs, students discover themselves in the “Extracts”—not despite their difficulty, but because of it. The very act of grappling with Melville’s arcane references, strange structures, and encyclopedic digressions becomes an act of reclamation.

To teach Moby-Dick in a prison is to raise a sunken ship. Its sentences, like salvaged artifacts, reveal new meaning. Forgotten knowledge becomes fuel for rediscovery. Students, many of whom have been dismissed by society, see in Melville’s endless inquiry a validation of their own intelligence and complexity.

Harold Bloom taught Moby-Dick the same way. Every reading was new. No fixed script, only the swell of thought. He modeled Melville’s method: trust the reader, trust the text, trust the mystery.

The whale resists capture—literal and interpretive. It is not a symbol with a key, but a question without an answer. That resistance is what makes Moby-Dick enduring. It insists on being re-read. Re-thought. Re-discovered.

The Archive That Breathes

“It is not down in any map; true places never are.”

Taken together, the voices of Wyatt Mason, Harold Bloom, Richard J. King, and Aaron Sachs reveal Moby-Dick as something more than literature. It is a breathing archive—a repository of imagination, inquiry, and paradox.

Within its pages dwell theologies and taxonomies, drama and digression, sermons and sea shanties. It houses the ethical weight of ecology, the fury of Ahab, the wonder of Ishmael, and the ghosts of Melville’s century. It defies genre, resists reduction, and insists on complexity.

Melville did not write to close arguments but to open them. He did not believe in neat endings. His whale is the quintessential “true place”: uncapturable, immeasurable, endlessly sublime.

And yet we return. We keep hunting—not with harpoons, but with attention. With interpretation. With awe.

A Final Breach

What, then, do we do with Moby-Dick in the twenty-first century? How do we reconcile Ahab’s consuming fury with Ishmael’s contemplative awe? How do we carry Bloom’s Prometheus, King’s Leviathan, Sachs’s resurrected Melville, and Mason’s classroom in a single imagination?

We read. We reread. We become “sub-sub-librarians”—archivists of ambiguity, curators of complexity. We do not read Moby-Dick for closure. We read it to learn how to remain open—to contradiction, to paradox, to mystery.

But what if we, like Captain Ahab, set off to find Moby Dick and never found the whale?

What if all our intellectual harpoons missed their mark? What if the whale was never there to begin with—not as symbol, not as certainty, not as prize?

Would we call that failure?

Or might we discover, like Ishmael adrift on the coffin-raft, that survival is not about conquest, but endurance? That truth lives not in the kill, but in the quest?

Perhaps Melville’s greatest lesson is that the whale must never be caught. Its sublimity lies in its elusiveness—in its capacity to remain just beyond the reach of definition, control, and meaning. It breaches in metaphor. It disappears in digression. It waits—not to be captured, but to be considered.

We will never catch it. But we must keep following.

For in the following, we become something more than readers.
We become seekers.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN BY INTELLICUREAN UTILIZING AI