Tag Archives: René Descartes

THE CODE AND THE CANDLE

A Computer Scientist’s Crisis of Certainty

When Ada signed up for The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, she thought it would be an easy elective. Instead, Gibbon’s ghost began haunting her code—reminding her that doubt, not data, is what keeps civilization from collapse.

By Michael Cummins | October 2025

It was early autumn at Yale, the air sharp enough to make the leaves sound brittle underfoot. Ada walked fast across Old Campus, laptop slung over her shoulder, earbuds in, mind already halfway inside a problem set. She believed in the clean geometry of logic. The only thing dirtying her otherwise immaculate schedule was an “accidental humanities” elective: The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. She’d signed up for it on a whim, liking the sterile irony of the title—an empire, an algorithm; both grand systems eventually collapsing under their own logic.

The first session felt like an intrusion from another world. The professor, an older woman with the calm menace of a classicist, opened her worn copy and read aloud:

History is little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.

A few students smiled. Ada laughed softly, then realized no one else had. She was used to clean datasets, not registers of folly. But something in the sentence lingered—its disobedience to progress, its refusal of polish. It was a sentence that didn’t believe in optimization.

That night she searched Gibbon online. The first scanned page glowed faintly on her screen, its type uneven, its tone strangely alive. The prose was unlike anything she’d seen in computer science: ironic, self-aware, drenched in the slow rhythm of thought. It seemed to know it was being read centuries later—and to expect disappointment. She felt the cool, detached intellect of the Enlightenment reaching across the chasm of time, not to congratulate the future, but to warn it.

By the third week, she’d begun to dread the seminar’s slow dismantling of her faith in certainty. The professor drew connections between Gibbon and the great philosophers of his age: Voltaire, Montesquieu, and, most fatefully, Descartes—the man Gibbon distrusted most.

“Descartes,” the professor said, chalk squeaking against the board, “wanted knowledge to be as perfect and distinct as mathematics. Gibbon saw this as the ultimate victory of reason—the moment when Natural Philosophy and Mathematics sat on the throne, viewing their sisters—the humanities—prostrated before them.”

The room laughed softly at the image. Ada didn’t. She saw it too clearly: science crowned, literature kneeling, history in chains.

Later, in her AI course, the teaching assistant repeated Descartes without meaning to. “Garbage in, garbage out,” he said. “The model is only as clean as the data.” It was the same creed in modern syntax: mistrust what cannot be measured. The entire dream of algorithmic automation began precisely there—the attempt to purify the messy, probabilistic human record into a series of clear and distinct facts.

Ada had never questioned that dream. Until now. The more she worked on systems designed for prediction—for telling the world what must happen—the more she worried about their capacity to remember what did happen, especially if it was inconvenient or irrational.

When the syllabus turned to Gibbon’s Essay on the Study of Literature—his obscure 1761 defense of the humanities—she expected reverence for Latin, not rebellion against logic. What she found startled her:

At present, Natural Philosophy and Mathematics are seated on the throne, from which they view their sisters prostrated before them.

He was warning against what her generation now called technological inevitability. The mathematician’s triumph, Gibbon suggested, would become civilization’s temptation: the worship of clarity at the expense of meaning. He viewed this rationalist arrogance as a new form of tyranny. Rome fell to political overreach; a new civilization, he feared, would fall to epistemic overreach.

He argued that the historian’s task was not to prove, but to weigh.

He never presents his conjectures as truth, his inductions as facts, his probabilities as demonstrations.

The words felt almost scandalous. In her lab, probability was a problem to minimize; here, it was the moral foundation of knowledge. Gibbon prized uncertainty not as weakness but as wisdom.

If the inscription of a single fact be once obliterated, it can never be restored by the united efforts of genius and industry.

He meant burned parchment, but Ada read lost data. The fragility of the archive—his or hers—suddenly seemed the same. The loss he described was not merely factual but moral: the severing of the link between evidence and human memory.

One gray afternoon she visited the Beinecke Library, that translucent cube where Yale keeps its rare books like fossils of thought. A librarian, gloved and wordless, placed a slim folio before her—an early printing of Gibbon’s Essay. Its paper smelled faintly of dust and candle smoke. She brushed her fingertips along the edge, feeling the grain rise like breath. The marginalia curled like vines, a conversation across centuries. In the corner, a long-dead reader had written in brown ink:

Certainty is a fragile empire.

Ada stared at the line. This was not data. This was memory—tactile, partial, uncompressible. Every crease and smudge was an argument against replication.

Back in the lab, she had been training a model on Enlightenment texts—reducing history to vectors, elegance to embeddings. Gibbon would have recognized the arrogance.

Books may perish by accident, but they perish more surely by neglect.

His warning now felt literal: the neglect was no longer of reading, but of understanding the medium itself.

Mid-semester, her crisis arrived quietly. During a team meeting in the AI lab, she suggested they test a model that could tolerate contradiction.

“Could we let the model hold contradictory weights for a while?” she asked. “Not as an error, but as two competing hypotheses about the world?”

Her lab partner blinked. “You mean… introduce noise?”

Ada hesitated. “No. I mean let it remember that it once believed something else. Like historical revisionism, but internal.”

The silence that followed was not hostile—just uncomprehending. Finally someone said, “That’s… not how learning works.” Ada smiled thinly and turned back to her screen. She realized then: the machine was not built to doubt. And if they were building it in their own image, maybe neither were they.

That night, unable to sleep, she slipped into the library stacks with her battered copy of The Decline and Fall. She read slowly, tracing each sentence like a relic. Gibbon described the burning of the Alexandrian Library with a kind of restrained grief.

The triumph of ignorance, he called it.

He also reserved deep scorn for the zealots who preferred dogma to documents—a scorn that felt disturbingly relevant to the algorithmic dogma that preferred prediction to history. She saw the digital age creating a new kind of fanaticism: the certainty of the perfectly optimized model. She wondered if the loss of a physical library was less tragic than the loss of the intellectual capacity to disagree with the reigning system.

She thought of a specific project she’d worked on last summer: a predictive policing algorithm trained on years of arrest data. The model was perfectly efficient at identifying high-risk neighborhoods—but it was also perfectly incapable of questioning whether the underlying data was itself a product of bias. It codified past human prejudice into future technological certainty. That, she realized, was the triumph of ignorance Gibbon had feared: reason serving bias, flawlessly.

By November, she had begun to map Descartes’ dream directly onto her own field. He had wanted to rebuild knowledge from axioms, purged of doubt. AI engineers called it initializing from zero. Each model began in ignorance and improved through repetition—a mind without memory, a scholar without history.

The present age of innovation may appear to be the natural effect of the increasing progress of knowledge; but every step that is made in the improvement of reason, is likewise a step towards the decay of imagination.

She thought of her neural nets—how each iteration improved accuracy but diminished surprise. The cleaner the model, the smaller the world.

Winter pressed down. Snow fell between the Gothic spires, muffling the city. For her final paper, Ada wrote what she could no longer ignore. She called it The Fall of Interpretation.

Civilizations do not fall when their infrastructures fail. They fall when their interpretive frameworks are outsourced to systems that cannot feel.

She traced a line from Descartes to data science, from Gibbon’s defense of folly to her own field’s intolerance for it. She quoted his plea to “conserve everything preciously,” arguing that the humanities were not decorative but diagnostic—a culture’s immune system against epistemic collapse.

The machine cannot err, and therefore cannot learn.

When she turned in the essay, she added a note to herself at the top: Feels like submitting a love letter to a dead historian. A week later the professor returned it with only one comment in the margin: Gibbon for the age of AI. Keep going.

By spring, she read Gibbon the way she once read code—line by line, debugging her own assumptions. He was less historian than ethicist.

Truth and liberty support each other: by banishing error, we open the way to reason.

Yet he knew that reason without humility becomes tyranny. The archive of mistakes was the record of what it meant to be alive. The semester ended, but the disquiet didn’t. The tyranny of reason, she realized, was not imposed—it was invited. Its seduction lay in its elegance, in its promise to end the ache of uncertainty. Every engineer carried a little Descartes inside them. She had too.

After finals, she wandered north toward Science Hill. Behind the engineering labs, the server farm pulsed with a constant electrical murmur. Through the glass wall she saw the racks of processors glowing blue in the dark. The air smelled faintly of ozone and something metallic—the clean, sterile scent of perfect efficiency.

She imagined Gibbon there, candle in hand, examining the racks as if they were ruins of a future Rome.

Let us conserve everything preciously, for from the meanest facts a Montesquieu may unravel relations unknown to the vulgar.

The systems were designed to optimize forgetting—their training loops overwriting their own memory. They remembered everything and understood nothing. It was the perfect Cartesian child.

Standing there, Ada didn’t want to abandon her field; she wanted to translate it. She resolved to bring the humanities’ ethics of doubt into the language of code—to build models that could err gracefully, that could remember the uncertainty from which understanding begins. Her fight would be for the metadata of doubt: the preservation of context, irony, and intention that an algorithm so easily discards.

When she imagined the work ahead—the loneliness of it, the resistance—she thought again of Gibbon in Lausanne, surrounded by his manuscripts, writing through the night as the French Revolution smoldered below.

History is little more than the record of human vanity corrected by the hand of time.

She smiled at the quiet justice of it.

Graduation came and went. The world, as always, accelerated. But something in her had slowed. Some nights, in the lab where she now worked, when the fans subsided and the screens dimmed to black, she thought she heard a faint rhythm beneath the silence—a breathing, a candle’s flicker.

She imagined a future archaeologist decoding the remnants of a neural net, trying to understand what it had once believed. Would they see our training data as scripture? Our optimization logs as ideology? Would they wonder why we taught our machines to forget? Would they find the metadata of doubt she had fought to embed?

The duty of remembrance, she realized, was never done. For Gibbon, the only reliable constant was human folly; for the machine, it was pattern. Civilizations endure not by their monuments but by their memory of error. Gibbon’s ghost still walks ahead of us, whispering that clarity is not truth, and that the only true ruin is a civilization that has perfectly organized its own forgetting.

The fall of Rome was never just political. It was the moment the human mind mistook its own clarity for wisdom. That, in every age, is where the decline begins.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

The Dangerous Clarity, and Disquieting Tremors, of René Descartes

The following essay was written by AI and edited by Intellicurean.

René Descartes once promised a world rebuilt on certainty. Strip away all illusions, he said, and we might begin again—this time on solid ground. For centuries, he has been honored as a liberator of reason. But what if the revolution he sparked came not from clarity, but confusion?

Sandrine Parageauis professor of early modern British history at Sorbonne University in Paris, France. She is the author of The Paradoxes of Ignorance in Early Modern England and France (2023).

In her recent Aeon essay, “The French Liar,” historian Sandrine Parageau reintroduces Descartes not as the serene founder of modern philosophy, but as a figure who provoked psychological vertigo in his readers and existential dread among his contemporaries. Rather than a clear-eyed rationalist, he appears here as an unsettling alchemist of doubt—one whose method seemed, to some, less like reason and more like manipulation.

A towering figure in intellectual history, Descartes (1596-1650) famously declared, “Cogito, ergo sum”—I think, therefore I am. His Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy laid the groundwork for modern science, yet they also disoriented many of his peers. Parageau reveals that, far from being universally hailed, Descartes was condemned by some as a dangerous deceiver. These accusations, initially paradoxical against the architect of systematic reason, become, under Parageau’s scrutiny, a mirror reflecting the profound anxieties of a society on the cusp of modernity.

The Discomfort of Radical Doubt

With almost surgical precision, Descartes urged his readers to divest themselves of all prior opinions, prejudices, and “false knowledge”—to undergo what he called “hyperbolical doubt.” Only by demolishing inherited beliefs, he argued, could one rebuild on indubitable foundations. Parageau highlights how this radical intellectual purification, though meant to be temporary, was viewed by many 17th-century thinkers as dangerous. It wasn’t just a methodological reset; it felt like a descent into cognitive vertigo.

Recent scholarship has begun to echo this emotional reading of Cartesian skepticism. Jan Forsman, in his 2021 dissertation Of Dreams, Demons, and Whirlpools, contends that Descartes’s doubt was not merely a tool, but a lived, transformative experience meant to disorient before it could rebuild. His approach aligns with Parageau’s interpretation of Descartes not as a detached logician, but as a man whose method required emotional unmooring.

Christia Mercer, in her groundbreaking 2017 article “Descartes’ Debt to Teresa of Ávila,” suggests that Descartes may have borrowed from mystical traditions that emphasized introspective purgation—further embedding emotion into method. The Cartesian self, it turns out, may not have emerged from reason alone, but from something more elemental and uncertain.

The Accusation of Manipulation

One of the most vivid condemnations came from Meric Casaubon, who in a 1668 letter accused Descartes of constructing a philosophy that first annihilated belief, only to restore it through rhetorical domination. Casaubon accused Descartes of promoting ignorance as the pathway to the mysterious grandeur of the Cogito, dragging readers into despair before lifting them back with persuasive flair. “He casts down, and raises again, when they see cause,” Casaubon warned, likening Descartes to a puppet master of the intellect.

Parageau draws a chilling parallel between this 17th-century critique and the modern phenomenon of gaslighting—the psychological manipulation by which one is made to doubt their own sanity. Dutch theologian Martin Schoock was even more explicit in his 1643 Admirable Method, warning that Descartes’s system would lead to “mental disorder,” as it required “putting off the light of reason” and embracing ignorance. What Descartes called meditation, Schoock acidly dismissed as “doing nothing.”

For Casaubon and Schoock, the philosopher’s aim was not liberation, but domination. Descartes’s rigorous doubt appeared, from this angle, as an epistemic trap—a means to unmoor the mind only to reanchor it in his authority. It’s a startling idea: that the father of rationalism was seen by some as an emotional manipulator, wielding confusion as a tool of influence.

Religious and Intellectual Backlash

But such critiques were not merely philosophical. They were deeply rooted in the turbulent religious context of post-Reformation Europe. Descartes’s adversaries often likened his tactics to those of the Roman Catholic Church, which Protestants accused of maintaining clerical control through the suppression of lay understanding.

Parageau reminds us that these condemnations were colored by sectarian conflict. Casaubon aligned Descartes with both Puritans and Jesuits—groups seen as enemies by many Protestant intellectuals. The stakes were theological: Descartes’s critics feared his system lacked the means to support key Christian doctrines, like the soul’s immortality or the existence of God.

Steven Nadler, in recent lectures, has emphasized how Descartes’s method emerged in a time of crumbling metaphysical certainties and escalating religious anxiety. His dismantling of scholastic traditions felt, to many, like a spiritual as well as intellectual provocation.

Even those who admired Descartes’s scientific prowess were uneasy about his religious implications. As Parageau notes, English Protestants of the late 17th century often lauded his mechanics while warning against his metaphysics. His emphasis on method over received wisdom was viewed not merely as innovation, but as insurrection.

The Emotional Roots of Rationality

Here lies Parageau’s most powerful insight. Descartes, she argues, was not coldly analytical, but emotionally raw. His philosophy did not spring from dispassionate logic, but from crisis. As a young man, he discovered the teachings of his youth to be riddled with error. This epiphany caused what biographer Adrien Baillet called “violent agitations” and “psychological distress.”

Parageau, drawing on Tristan Dagron’s interpretation, connects this upheaval to a series of dreams Descartes experienced in 1619—dreams so disturbing that he later modeled his Meditations after them. These dreams blurred the boundaries between wakefulness and delusion, instilling a terror that would echo throughout his philosophical system.

Michel Foucault once argued, in Madness and Civilization, that Descartes expelled madness from the domain of reason. But new interpretations suggest otherwise. Instead of excluding madness, Descartes began from it. Forsman, Mercer, and others point to a method rooted in the very vulnerability it sought to overcome.

Susan James, in her work Passion and Action, has argued that Cartesian philosophy requires the management, not the elimination, of passion. The purification Descartes demanded was emotional as much as intellectual.

A Disquieting Foundation

Parageau concludes that Descartes’s critics were not entirely wrong: his philosophy did produce epistemic anxiety. But where they saw danger, she sees a more nuanced truth. Descartes embraced doubt, disorientation, even a kind of madness—not to harm, but to transform. His rational edifice was not built upon peace of mind, but upon its very rupture. In this, he resembles not a manipulator, but a figure more complex: part mystic, part surgeon, part exile from certainty.

We have long imagined Descartes as the calm architect of modernity. But as Parageau and recent scholars reveal, his foundations were laid atop psychological fault lines. The search for clarity began not with answers, but with tremors. And from that trembling ground, he built a system that still shapes how we think today.