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Culture, Essays, History, Philosophy, Politics

THE REPUBLIC OF VOICES

At the height of its power in 1364, Venice was a republic where eloquence was currency and every piazza a stage.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 24, 2025

The bells began before sunrise. Their iron tongues tolled across the lagoon, vibrating against the damp November air, carrying from the Campanile of San Marco to the Arsenal’s yards and into the canals of Cannaregio. This was Venice in 1364—at the height of its power, its fleets unrivaled in the Mediterranean, its markets setting the prices of silk and spice across Europe. The city sat at the hinge of East and West, commanding trade routes between Byzantium, the Mamluk Sultanate, and Western Christendom. Venetian galleys, sleek and maneuverable, patrolled waters thick with pirates, their timbers assembled in the Arsenale di Venezia, a proto-industrial marvel capable of producing a galley in a single day. Venice was wood, stone, and gold, but above all, it was sound. “The city is never silent,” one German pilgrim marveled, “every tongue of Christendom and beyond seems to shout at once.”

Venice’s supremacy was not abstract. Its colonies in Crete and Cyprus served as staging posts; its consulates dotted the Dalmatian coast. In Constantinople and Alexandria, Venetians lived in fortified fondaci—walled compounds where merchants traded under their own laws. The wealth of Murano’s glassmakers, Rialto’s bankers, and San Polo’s textile dyers depended on this vast maritime lattice. Even the Doge—Venice’s elected head of state, chosen for life from among the patrician class, part monarch, part magistrate but hemmed in by councils—was more merchant than monarch. Venetian nobility was not feudal but commercial: a patrician might chair the Senate one year and finance a convoy to the Levant the next. Bills of exchange, maritime insurance, joint-stock ventures—all pioneered here—reduced risk and turned uncertainty into empire.

Yet the republic was also built on voices. Speech was its second currency, flowing through churches, palaces, markets, and courts. Treaties were sealed with words before they were inked; rumors shifted markets as much as cargoes; sermons inflamed consciences long before decrees reached the streets.

In San Marco, the Basilica of mosaics and incense, the preacher’s voice dominated. On feast days friars addressed audiences that blurred patrician and plebeian, women and sailors, artisans and merchants. A Franciscan, recalling the Black Death, likened Venetian greed to “a contagion that spreads from house to house.” Andrea Dandolo, the Doge who also wrote a chronicle of his age, noted the murmurs of unease that followed. A parable about false shepherds might by nightfall become tavern gossip, retooled as an attack on patrician governors.

In 1364, Venice granted Petrarch a palazzo on the Riva degli Schiavoni in exchange for his library, a collection that would become the foundation of the Biblioteca Marciana. Known as the father of Humanism and now often called the father of the Italian Renaissance, he was among Europe’s most influential figures—poet of the Canzoniere, rediscoverer of Cicero’s letters, and advocate for the revival of classical eloquence. From his Venetian residence, he praised the city as “a republic not only of ships and laws, but of eloquence itself, where voices, raised in harmony or dissent, bind the state together.” For him, Venice was not only a naval empire but also a theater of speech.

Across the piazza in the Doge’s Palace, words carried a different weight. The cavernous Sala del Maggior Consiglio could hold a thousand patricians, their decisions shaping treaties and wars. The Doge spoke little, his ritual response to petitions—“Si vedrà”, “It will be seen”—an eloquence of restraint. More dramatic were the relazioni, oral reports of ambassadors returning from Constantinople or Cairo. Though later transcribed, in the fourteenth century they were performances. An envoy describing the Byzantine emperor’s throne gestured so vividly that senators felt transported to the imperial court.

Yet it was in the Rialto that Venice’s speech was most raw, where chatter became commerce and gossip became power. By day, the wooden bridge creaked under merchants and beggars, its planks worn smooth by boots from every corner of Europe. Below, spices from Alexandria, silk from Cathay, and pepper from India changed hands, but so too did stories. “The Rialto is a world itself,” wrote the chronicler Marino Sanudo, “where the news of all Christendom and beyond is traded swifter than spices.” Rumors of Ottoman fleets could shift the price of cinnamon. Satirical verses, recited sotto voce, mocked the deafness of patricians: “A house of nodding heads, deaf to its people.”

And when night fell, the Rialto became something else entirely. Carnival transformed it into a stage where anonymity and satire thrived. Masked singers, some of them patrician youths disguised as artisans, improvised verses lampooning senators and guild leaders. One chronicler described young nobles in Greek disguise singing ballads about the Senate’s obsession with ceremony. The laughter echoed across the Grand Canal, tolerated because, as Venetians said, “the republic breathes satire as easily as air.”

The Grand Canal itself was Venice’s liquid stage. By day it was an artery of commerce, alive with the slap of oars, the curses of gondoliers, the hammering of crates. By dusk the atmosphere shifted. Lanterns swayed from boats, their reflections shimmering across the black water. Gondoliers sang what would one day evolve into the barcarolle. Noble families staged boat processions with lutes and trumpets, music drifting across the canal in competing layers of sound. Commerce by day, serenade by night—the same canal a bazaar and a ballroom.

And then there was the Piazza San Marco, the great stage of the republic. On feast days, choirs filled the basilica, their plainsong swelling into polyphony that ricocheted off Byzantine domes. Trumpeters announced the Doge, banners unfurled, and processions wound through the square until, as Dandolo wrote, “the piazza shone with gold and sounded with voices and trumpets.” During Carnival, the sacred gave way to the profane: jugglers, acrobats, and improvisatori recited comic verses in dialect. A fire-breather might draw crowds near the bronze horses while a masked singer mocked senators. It was noisy, unruly, profoundly Venetian—a place where art, politics, and voice collided.

Artisans, too, had their stages. The scuole, confraternities of tradesmen, were gatherings where chants gave way to orations. Statutes might be inscribed, but obligations were enforced aloud. A shoemakers’ statute from 1360 commanded that “each master shall stand and speak before his fellows, giving account not only of his work but of his conduct.” Eloquence was honor; to falter was to risk shame.

The courts offered a harsher stage. Justice, too, was spoken. The Statuta Veneta emphasized testimony over parchment: “testimony is judged not by parchment but by voice.” In 1362, a fisherman accused of theft protested, “Non rubai, ma trovai.”—“I did not steal, I found.” His trembling voice, the notary observed, betrayed him. Eloquence could acquit; faltering speech could condemn.

And words could also damn. After the plague, prophets thundered in piazzas, sailors cursed saints in taverns, women repeated visions too vividly. One inquisitorial record recalls a woman accused of declaring, “the plague is God’s punishment for the pride of merchants.” Whether prophecy or lament, her words were evidence of heresy.

To live in Venice was to live in a polyphony of languages. From Dalmatia to Crete, Cyprus to Trebizond, the city’s empire infused it with voices. The pilgrim Ludolf of Sudheim marveled that in one square he heard “Latin, Greek, Saracen, and Hebrew, all arguing.” Translators ferried not only goods but ideas—fragments of Averroes, Byzantine theology, Jewish philosophy. Did a spice-seller at the Rialto know he was transmitting the seeds of the Renaissance?

In patrician libraries and monastic scriptoria, another kind of voice was taking shape: Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, arriving in Latin translation, read aloud in candlelit chambers. By 1364, copies of Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics were circulating among patricians. What did it mean to live a life of virtue? Could the common good outweigh private interest? Such debates mattered in a republic balancing mercantile ambition with civic restraint.

Thomas Aquinas, too, was debated in Dominican houses. His Summa Theologica offered a scaffolding that united reason and faith. Did divine law supersede human law, or did the latter participate in the former? A friar might thunder against usury on Sunday while echoing Aquinas’s careful distinctions on just exchange.

What is striking is that these scholastic voices did not remain confined to cloisters. They mingled with guild disputations, senatorial deliberations, carnival satire. And just beyond the horizon, Humanism was stirring. Petrarch, uneasy yet pivotal, urged Venetians to recover eloquence from Cicero and Livy. The republic was poised between worlds: the scholastic synthesis of Aquinas and the humanist insistence that civic life could be ennobled by rhetoric and classical virtue. Venice in 1364 was thus not only a theater of speech but also a laboratory of ideas.

At dusk, the bells tolled once more. Gondoliers sang across the black canal, masked youths mocked senators in the Rialto, choirs rehearsed in San Marco. Senators lingered in debate, artisans rehearsed speeches, children recited prayers before sleep. Venice in 1364 was not only a republic of ships, coins, and statutes. It was a republic of voices. Andrea Dandolo wrote that “our city is a harmony of voices, discordant yet united, a choir upon the waters.”

Perhaps that is the truest way to understand the city at its zenith. Its power lay not only in fleets or treaties, but in the ceaseless interplay of sound and sense: the preacher stirring unease, the envoy swaying senators, the gondolier echoing Aristotle, the satirist mocking the elite. The same city that hammered out galleys in the Arsenale was also hammering out philosophies in its libraries, rhythms in its shipyards, and laughter in its carnivals. To live in Venice in 1364 was to inhabit a world where speech, spectacle, and speculation were indivisible, where every bridge or piazza might become a stage. The republic endured not because it silenced discord but because it orchestrated it—turning sermon, satire, and song into the polyphony of civic life. Venice was, and remains, a choir upon the waters.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Arts & Literature, Culture, Essays, History, Religion

The Multi-Faith Prosperity Of 10th-Century Córdoba

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 13, 2025

While much of Christian Europe was mired in the intellectual and economic stagnation of the so-called “Dark Ages,” 10th-century Córdoba, the capital of the Umayyad Caliphate of al-Andalus, blazed as a singular exception in the medieval world. It was not merely its population of over 250,000, its paved streets, or its public baths that made it a marvel. The true marvel of Córdoba lay in its unprecedented model of intellectual and economic collaboration, a model that harnessed the talents of its diverse Muslim, Jewish, and Christian populations. While modern historians like [suspicious link removed] have rightly challenged the romanticized notion of a perfect convivencia—or coexistence—there is no denying that the collective contributions of its Jewish and Christian communities were not peripheral. They were, in fact, integral to the caliphate’s rise as a preeminent power, forging a society so unique that it stands apart in human history.

This era’s success was a testament to a pragmatic, collaborative environment. As scholar María Rosa Menocal eloquently argued in her book, The Ornament of the World, the period was defined by a culture where “tolerance was an inherent aspect of Andalusian society,” allowing for an extraordinary degree of exchange and innovation. In this multi-faith environment, Jewish and Christian communities were not simply tolerated subjects; they were indispensable collaborators. Their contributions were so intertwined with the caliphate’s achievements that its success would have been impossible without them. This collaborative ethos also extended to the roles of women, who, despite the era’s patriarchal legal framework, rose to prominence as scholars, poets, scribes, and even political figures, further enriching the city’s intellectual and cultural life.

The Engine of Scholarship: A Shared Knowledge Base

The intellectual life of 10th-century Córdoba was a testament to the power of a shared, multilingual knowledge base, a system that was virtually without parallel in the medieval world. The Umayyad rulers, particularly Caliph al-Hakam II, created the institutional framework for learning. A dedicated bibliophile, al-Hakam II amassed a caliphal library that some sources claim numbered as many as 400,000 volumes, commissioning scribes and bookbinders to produce new copies.

While monastic libraries in Christian Europe contained only a few hundred manuscripts, often focused on religious dogma, the caliphal library was a dynamic workshop where scholars of all faiths worked side by side to translate ancient Greek and Latin texts, a process that preserved and expanded upon classical knowledge largely lost to the rest of Europe. The caliph’s agents were dispatched across the Islamic world and beyond to acquire rare manuscripts on every conceivable subject, from medicine and astronomy to poetry and philosophy.

The caliph’s patronage extended to a diverse group of intellectuals who curated the collection, and the role of women in this intellectual flowering was particularly striking. Among them was Lubna of Córdoba, a remarkable intellectual, poet, and mathematician who rose from slavery to become one of al-Hakam II’s most trusted secretaries, instrumental in the administration of the library itself. Her story is a powerful example of the city’s unique meritocratic ethos, where talent and intellect could transcend social barriers.

The contributions of women in scholarship were not limited to Lubna; records show that hundreds of women worked as professional scribes and copyists, transcribing books and manuscripts for the royal library. Beyond the library, the era produced celebrated female poets and scholars whose work was highly regarded, such as ‘A’isha bint Ahmad al-Qurtubiyya, a renowned poet and calligrapher, and the poet Wallada bint al-Mustakfi, famous for her sharp wit and love poems.

The Great Mosque of Córdoba served as the city’s de facto university, a hub of religious and secular learning where scholars and students from diverse backgrounds gathered for instruction. The caliphs funded chairs for distinguished professors, and the mosque’s courtyards provided a space for open intellectual exchange, fostering a culture of critical inquiry and debate. As Dr. Nowar Nizar Al-Ani and his colleagues noted, this institutional framework was designed to “foster a kind of intellectual pluralism that was revolutionary for its time.”

It was in this environment that Jewish and Christian scholars were not just conduits for old ideas but active contributors to new ones. The Jewish community, in particular, experienced a golden age under this system. Hasdai ibn Shaprut, a Jewish court physician and scholar, was at the forefront of medical research and botanical studies. He was also a major patron of Jewish intellectual life, sponsoring scholars and poets who would compose masterpieces of Hebrew literature and helping to establish Córdoba as a new center for Jewish scholarship, eclipsing the traditional academies in Baghdad.

This era also produced pioneering scientific advancements, such as those of the physician Abulcasis (Al-Zahrawi), a key figure of the late 10th century. He wrote a comprehensive 30-volume medical encyclopedia, Al-Tasrif, which was revolutionary for its detailed descriptions of surgical procedures and instruments, many of which he invented. His work would become a standard medical text in Europe for centuries, directly influencing the development of surgery.

The fusion of knowledge and faith led to a unique intellectual environment where, as Jerrilynn D. Dodds‘s edited volume, Al-Andalus: The Art of Islamic Spain, suggests, “the arts of the mind were as celebrated as the arts of the hand.” This collaborative spirit permeated scholarly life: a Christian monk might have been translating a Greek medical treatise in one corner of a library while a Jewish botanist analyzed a new plant in another. It was this cross-pollination of ideas, made possible by the linguistic and cultural fluency of the Christian and Jewish communities, that truly powered Córdoba’s intellectual engine.

The Foundation of Prosperity: Economic and Diplomatic Contributions

The wealth and political stability of the Umayyad Caliphate did not emerge in a vacuum; they were built on the contributions of its non-Muslim subjects, who served as a vital economic and diplomatic backbone. In a period when European feudal society was strictly hierarchical and exclusive, Córdoba’s pragmatic approach was historically unique.

The Jewish community was essential to Córdoba’s sophisticated diplomatic network, with its members highly valued for their linguistic skills and relative neutrality in disputes between Muslim and Christian rulers. The elevation of Hasdai ibn Shaprut to a position of such immense influence—a Jewish diplomat and physician serving as a key advisor to the caliph—was a political innovation without parallel in the medieval West. Fluent in Arabic, Hebrew, and Latin, Hasdai was an indispensable intermediary in diplomatic missions to Christian kingdoms like León and the Holy Roman Empire, skillfully navigating political tensions and securing alliances. He also served as the head of the Jewish community, centralizing cultural life in Córdoba and fostering its independence from the Jewish academies in Baghdad.

The economic engine of Córdoba was also powered by its minorities. The Jewish community was instrumental in the city’s robust international trade, acting as merchants and financiers. Their extensive networks across Europe and the Mediterranean were crucial to Córdoba’s commercial success, helping to establish trade routes that brought precious silks, spices, and other luxury goods into al-Andalus. This immense wealth funded the caliphate’s ambitious building projects. As L. P. Harvey notes in his work, Islamic Spain, 1250 to 1500, the caliphate’s political authority rested on a “pragmatic reliance on a professional class of civil servants, many of whom came from the dhimmi communities, whose loyalty and expertise were a cornerstone of the administrative apparatus.”

Christians, known as Mozarabs, also played critical, though often different, roles. While the highest offices were reserved for Muslims, some Christians rose to positions of influence. For example, a Christian cleric named Recemund served as a civil servant for ‘Abd al-Rahman III and even undertook a diplomatic mission to the Holy Roman Emperor, Otto I. However, the majority of the Christian population was essential to the agricultural economy in the surrounding rural areas. Their contributions as farmers and artisans, who continued many of the traditions and techniques from the Visigothic period, were fundamental to the food supply and wealth of the caliphate.

The Unique Fabric: Cultural and Artistic Synthesis

The artistic and cultural identity of 10th-century Córdoba was a magnificent tapestry woven from the threads of all three religions. The caliphs’ patronage of the arts led to a unique blending of styles that is most famously showcased in the Great Mosque. Its most significant and elaborate expansion, led by Caliph al-Hakam II, featured intricate polylobed arches, ribbed domes, and the lavish use of mosaics—a technique learned directly from Byzantine Christian craftsmen. According to the article “Historical restorations of the Maqṣūrah glass mosaics from the Great Mosque of Córdoba” by J. V. Tarín et al., the caliph specifically sought out Byzantine craftsmen, a profound act of cultural confidence that integrated Christian artistic tradition into the very heart of Islamic worship. In a world often defined by sectarian art, this was a revolutionary aesthetic vision.

Beyond the grand monuments, this cultural synthesis permeated everyday life. The “Mozarabic” style of art and architecture—a blend of Christian and Islamic design—flourished. Christian artisans were not only employed on royal projects but also developed their own unique style that incorporated elements of Islamic geometric patterns and calligraphy. This fusion was also evident in language and literature. Many Christians and Jews adopted Arabic as their language for daily life and scholarship, leading to a unique body of work where Jewish poets composed in a sophisticated Hebrew deeply influenced by Arabic meter and rhyme schemes. As the volume Al-Andalus: The Art of Islamic Spain captures, the art of the period was a “visual dialogue between cultures.” The result was a truly syncretic culture, a unique and irreplaceable expression of the people who created it.

The caliphate’s immense wealth also fueled a boom in refined artistic crafts. Cordoban artisans were celebrated for their skills in calligraphy, which adorned not only architecture but also the lavish ivory caskets and boxes that were prized possessions of the caliph’s court. These caskets, often carved with intricate scenes and calligraphic inscriptions, are a perfect example of how different artistic traditions were fused. Similarly, the city was famous for its fine metalwork, glazed tiles, and high-quality textiles, which were not only major economic drivers but also expressions of a sophisticated and cosmopolitan taste. The creation of the palatine city of Madinat al-Zahra, a new capital built by ‘Abd al-Rahman III, further exemplified this artistic ambition. Its lavish palaces and gardens, described in scholarly works as “a testament to the state’s power and artistic ambition,” were a massive undertaking that drew on the combined skills of Muslim, Jewish, and Christian artisans, cementing the visual legacy of the golden age.

Conclusion

Córdoba in the 10th century was more than just a powerful city; it was a testament to the potential for a pluralistic society to flourish. Its success was a collaborative endeavor, with Jewish, Christian, and female communities providing the crucial intellectual, economic, and cultural components that enabled the Umayyad Caliphate to achieve its zenith. Through their roles as translators, scholars, diplomats, merchants, and artisans, these groups were not simply tolerated subjects but indispensable collaborators in the creation of a sophisticated civilization.

The modern scholarship of historians like Kenneth Baxter Wolf has rightly challenged the romanticized “myth of coexistence,” pointing to the complex realities of power dynamics. But even with this more critical lens, the story that emerges is not one of a failed paradise, but a more compelling and historically significant narrative: a society where, for a sustained period, deep cultural and intellectual collaboration was possible. The lessons of Córdoba continue to resonate today, reminding us that cultural exchange is often the true catalyst for progress.

This legacy is perhaps best captured by a post on the Jewish Andalusian Heritage Route, which describes how the Jewish sages of Andalusia “loved the Torah but understood existence and Judaism as a whole that encompassed religion, spirituality, science, poetry and literature, music, medicine and philosophy.” This powerful insight tells a more complete and hopeful story of how diverse people, bound together by a shared quest for knowledge and prosperity, can build an enduring legacy.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Economics, Essays, Opinion, Society, Technology

ADVANCING TOWARDS A NEW DEFINITION OF “PROGRESS”

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 9, 2025

The very notion of “progress” has long been a compass for humanity. Yet, what we consider an improved state is a question whose answer has shifted dramatically over time. As the Cambridge Dictionary defines it, progress is simply “movement to an improved or more developed state.” But whose state is being improved? And toward what future are we truly moving? The illusion of progress is perhaps most evident in technology, where breathtaking innovation often masks a troubling truth: the benefits are frequently unevenly shared, concentrating power and wealth while leaving many behind.

Historically, the definition of progress was a reflection of the era’s dominant ideology. The medieval period saw it as a spiritual journey toward salvation. The Enlightenment shattered this, replacing it with the ascent of humanity through reason, science, and the triumph over superstition. This optimism fueled the Industrial Revolution, where thinkers like Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer saw progress as an unstoppable climb toward knowledge and material prosperity. But this vision was a mirage for many. The same steam engines that powered unprecedented economic growth subjected workers to brutal, dehumanizing conditions. The Gilded Age enriched railroad magnates and steel barons while workers struggled in poverty and faced violent crackdowns.

Today, a similar paradox haunts our digital age. Meet Maria, a fictional yet representative 40-year-old factory worker in Flint, Michigan. For decades, her livelihood was a steady source of income. But last year, the factory where she worked introduced an AI-powered assembly line, and her job, along with hundreds of others, was automated away. Maria’s story is not an isolated incident; it’s a global narrative that reflects the experiences of billions. Technologies like the microchip and generative AI promise to solve complex problems, yet they often deepen inequality in their wake. Her story is a poignant call to arms, demanding that we re-examine our collective understanding of progress.

This essay argues for a new, more deliberate definition of progress—one that moves beyond the historical optimism rooted in automatic technological gains and instead prioritizes equity, empathy, and sustainability. We will explore the clash between techno-optimism—a blind faith in technology’s ability to solve all problems—and techno-realism—a balanced approach that seeks inclusive and ethical innovation. Drawing on the lessons of history and the urgent struggles of individuals like Maria, we will chart a course toward a progress that uplifts all, not just the powerful and the privileged.

The Myth of Automatic Progress

The allure of technology is a siren’s song, promising a frictionless world of convenience, abundance, and unlimited potential. Marc Andreessen’s 2023 “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” captured this spirit perfectly, a rallying cry for the belief that technology is the engine of all good and that any critique is a form of “demoralization.” However, this viewpoint ignores the central lesson of history: innovation is not inherently a force for equality.

The Industrial Revolution, while a monumental leap for humanity, was a masterclass in how progress can widen the chasm between the rich and the poor. Factory owners, the Andreessens of their day, amassed immense wealth, while the ancestors of today’s factory workers faced dangerous, low-wage jobs and lived in squalor. Today, the same forces are at play. A 2023 McKinsey report projected that up to 30% of U.S. jobs could be automated by 2030, a seismic shift that will disproportionately affect low-income workers, the very demographic to which Maria belongs.

Progress, therefore, is not an automatic outcome of innovation; it is a result of conscious choices. As economists Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson argue in their pivotal 2023 book Power and Progress, the distribution of a technology’s benefits is not predetermined.

“The distribution of a technology’s benefits is not predetermined but rather a result of governance and societal choices.” — Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity

Redefining progress means moving beyond the naive assumption that technology’s gains will eventually “trickle down” to everyone. It means choosing policies and systems that uplift workers like Maria, ensuring that the benefits of automation are shared broadly rather than being captured solely as corporate profits.

The Uneven Pace of Progress

Our perception of progress is often skewed by the dizzying pace of digital advancements. We see the exponential growth of computing power and the rapid development of generative AI and mistakenly believe this is the universal pace of all human progress. But as Vaclav Smil, a renowned scholar on technology and development, reminds us, this is a dangerous illusion.

“We are misled by the hype of digital advances, mistaking them for universal progress.” — Vaclav Smil, The Illusion of Progress: The Promise and Peril of Technology

A look at the data confirms Smil’s point. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the global share of fossil fuels in the primary energy mix only dropped from 85% to 80% between 2000 and 2022—a change so slow it’s almost imperceptible. Simultaneously, global crop yields for staples like wheat have largely plateaued since 2010, and an estimated 735 million people were undernourished in 2022, a stark reminder that our most fundamental challenges aren’t being solved by the same pace of innovation we see in Silicon Valley.

Even the very tools of the digital revolution can be a source of regression. Social media, once heralded as a democratizing force, has become a powerful engine for division and misinformation. For example, a 2023 BBC report documented how WhatsApp was used to fuel ethnic violence during the Kenyan elections. These platforms, while distracting us with their endless streams of content, often divert our attention from the deeper, more systemic issues squeezing families like Maria’s, such as stagnant wages and rising food prices. Yet, progress is possible when innovation is directed toward systemic challenges. The rise of microgrid solar systems in Bangladesh, which has provided electricity to millions of households, demonstrates how targeted technology can bridge gaps and empower communities. Redefining progress means prioritizing these systemic solutions over the next shiny gadget.

Echoes of History in Today’s World

Maria’s job loss in Flint isn’t a modern anomaly; it’s an echo of historical patterns of inequality and division. It resonates with the Gilded Age of the late 19th century, when railroad monopolies and steel magnates amassed colossal fortunes while workers faced brutal, 12-hour days in unsafe factories. The violent Homestead Strike of 1892, where workers fought against wage cuts, is a testament to the bitter class struggle of that era. Today, wealth inequality rivals that gilded age, with a recent Oxfam report showing that the world’s richest 1% have captured almost two-thirds of all new wealth created since 2020. Families like Maria’s are left to struggle with rising rents and stagnant wages, a reality far removed from the promise of prosperity.

“History shows that technological progress often concentrates wealth unless society intervenes.” — Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress

Another powerful historical parallel is the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. Decades of poor agricultural practices and corporate greed led to an environmental catastrophe that displaced 2.5 million people. This is an eerie precursor to our current climate crisis. A recent NOAA report on California’s wildfires shows how a similar failure to prioritize long-term well-being is now displacing millions more, just as it did nearly a century ago.

In Flint, the social fabric is strained, with some residents blaming immigrants for economic woes—a classic scapegoat tactic that ignores the significant contributions of immigrants to the U.S. economy. This echoes the xenophobic sentiment of the 1920s Red Scare. Unchecked AI-driven misinformation and viral “deepfakes” are the modern equivalent of 1930s radio propaganda, amplifying fear and division.

“We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us, often reviving old divisions.” — Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow

Yet, history is also a source of hope. Germany’s proactive refugee integration programs in the mid-2010s, which trained and helped integrate hundreds of thousands of migrants into the workforce, show that societies can choose inclusion over exclusion. A new definition of progress demands that we confront these cycles of inequality, fear, and division. By choosing empathy and equity, we can ensure that technology serves to bridge divides and uplift communities like Maria’s, rather than fracturing them further.

The Perils of Techno-Optimism

The belief that technology will, on its own, solve our most pressing problems is a seductive but dangerous trap. It promises a quick fix while delaying the difficult, structural changes needed to address crises like climate change and social inequality. In their analysis of climate discourse, scholars Sofia Ribeiro and Viriato Soromenho-Marques argue that techno-optimism is a distraction from necessary action.

“Techno-optimism distracts from the structural changes needed to address climate crises.” — Sofia Ribeiro and Viriato Soromenho-Marques, The Techno-Optimists of Climate Change

The Arctic’s indigenous communities, like the Inuit, face the existential threat of melting permafrost. Meanwhile, some oil companies tout expensive and unproven technologies like direct air capture to justify continued fossil fuel extraction, all while delaying the real solutions—a massive investment in renewable energy. This is not progress; it is a corporate strategy to delay accountability, echoing the tobacco industry’s denialism of the 1980s. As Nathan J. Robinson’s 2023 critique in Current Affairs notes, techno-optimism is a form of “blind faith” that ignores the need for regulation and ethical oversight, risking a repeat of catastrophes like the 2008 financial crisis.

The gig economy is a perfect microcosm of this peril. Driven by AI platforms like Uber, it exemplifies how technology can optimize for profits at the expense of fairness. A recent study from UC Berkeley found that a significant portion of gig workers earn below the minimum wage, as algorithms prioritize efficiency over worker well-being. Today, unchecked AI is amplifying these harms, with a 2023 Reuters study finding that a large percentage of content on platforms like X is misleading, fueling division and distrust.

“Technology without politics is a recipe for inequality and instability.” — Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom

Yet, rejecting blind techno-optimism is not a rejection of technology itself. It is a demand for a more responsible, regulated approach. Denmark’s wind energy strategy, which has made it a global leader in renewables, is a testament to how pragmatic government regulation and public investment can outpace the empty promises of technowashing. Redefining progress means embracing this kind of techno-realism.

Choosing a Techno-Realist Path

To forge a new definition of progress, we must embrace techno-realism—a balanced approach that harnesses innovation’s potential while grounding it in ethics, transparency, and human needs. As Margaret Gould Stewart, a prominent designer, argues, this is an approach that asks us to design technology that serves society, not just markets.

This path is not about rejecting technology, but about guiding it. Think of the nurses in rural Rwanda, where drones zip through the sky, delivering life-saving blood and vaccines to remote clinics. This is technology not as a shiny, frivolous toy, but as a lifeline, guided by a clear human need. History and current events show us that this path is possible. The Luddites of 1811 were not fighting against technology; they were fighting for fairness in the face of automation’s threat to their livelihoods. Their spirit lives on in the European Union’s landmark AI Act, which mandates transparency and safety standards to protect workers like Maria from biased algorithms. In Chile, a national program is retraining former coal miners to become renewable energy technicians, demonstrating that a just transition to a sustainable future is possible.

The heart of this vision is empathy. Finland’s national media literacy curriculum, which has been shown to be effective in combating misinformation, is a powerful model for equipping citizens to navigate the digital world. In Mexico, indigenous-led conservation projects are blending traditional knowledge with modern science to heal the land. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen wrote, true progress is about a fundamental expansion of human freedom.

“Development is about expanding the freedoms of the disadvantaged, not just advancing technology.” — Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom

Costa Rica’s incredible achievement of powering its grid with nearly 100% renewable energy is a beacon of what is possible when a nation aligns innovation with ethics. These stories—from Rwanda’s drones to Mexico’s forests—prove that technology, when guided by history, regulation, and empathy, can serve all.

Conclusion: A Progress We Can All Shape

Maria’s story—her job lost to automation, her family struggling in a community beset by historical inequities—is not a verdict on progress but a powerful, clear-eyed challenge. It forces us to confront the fact that progress is not an inevitable, linear march toward a better future. It is a series of deliberate choices, a constant negotiation between what is technologically possible and what is ethically and socially responsible. The historical echoes of inequality, environmental neglect, and division are loud, but they are not our destiny.

Imagine Maria today, no longer a victim of technological displacement but a beneficiary of a new, more inclusive model. Picture her retrained as a solar technician, her hands wiring a community-owned energy grid that powers Flint’s homes with clean energy. Imagine her voice, once drowned out by economic hardship, now rising on social media to share stories of unity and resilience. This vision—where technology is harnessed for all, guided by ethics and empathy—is the progress we must pursue.

The path forward lies in action, not just in promises. It requires us to engage in our communities, pushing for policies that protect and empower workers. It demands that we hold our leaders accountable, advocating for a future where investments in renewable energy and green infrastructure are prioritized over short-term profits. It requires us to support initiatives that teach media literacy, allowing us to discern truth from the fog of misinformation. It is in these steps, grounded in the lessons of history, that we turn a noble vision into a tangible reality.

Progress, in its most meaningful sense, is not about the speed of a microchip or the efficiency of an algorithm. It is about the deliberate, collective movement toward a society where the benefits of innovation are shared broadly, where the most vulnerable are protected, and where our shared future is built on the foundations of empathy, community, and sustainability. It is a journey we must embark on together, a progress we can all shape.

Progress: movement to a collectively improved and more inclusively developed state, resulting in a lessening of economic, political, and legal inequality, a strengthening of community, and a furthering of environmental sustainability.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Analysis, Economics, Essays, Government, Politics, Reviews

The Fiscal Fantasies Of A “For-Profit” Government

BY INTELLICUREAN, JULY 21, 2025:

In the summer of 2025, former President Donald Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unveiled a bold proposal: the creation of an External Revenue Service (ERS), a federal agency designed to collect tariffs, fees, and other payments from foreign entities. Framed as a patriotic pivot toward self-sufficiency, the ERS would transform the U.S. government from a tax-funded service provider into a revenue-generating enterprise, capable of offsetting domestic tax burdens through external extraction. The idea, while politically magnetic, raises profound questions: Can the U.S. federal government become a “for-profit” entity? And if so, can the ERS be a legitimate mechanism for such a transformation?

This essay argues that while the concept of external revenue generation is not unprecedented, the rebranding of the U.S. government as a profit-seeking enterprise risks undermining its foundational principles. The ERS proposal conflates revenue with legitimacy, and profit with power, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding of the government’s role in society. We explore the constitutional, economic, and geopolitical dimensions of the ERS proposal, drawing on recent analyses from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, The Diplomat, and The New Yorker, to assess its fiscal viability, strategic risks, and national security implications.

Constitutional Foundations: Can a Republic Seek Profit?

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” (Article I, Section 8). These provisions clearly authorize the federal government to generate revenue through tariffs and fees. Historically, tariffs served as a primary source of federal income, funding everything from infrastructure to military expansion during the 19th century.

However, the Constitution does not envision the government as a profit-maximizing entity. Its purpose, as articulated in the Preamble, is to “establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, [and] promote the general Welfare.” These are public goods, not commercial outputs. The government’s legitimacy is grounded in its service to the people—not in its ability to generate surplus revenue.

The Federal Reserve offers a useful analogy here. While not a for-profit institution, the Fed earns more than it spends through its monetary operations—primarily interest on government securities—and remits excess income to the Treasury. Between 2011 and 2021, these remittances totaled over $920 billion. But this is not “profit” in the corporate sense. The Fed’s primary mandate is macroeconomic stability, not shareholder returns. Even during economic stress (as seen in 2022–2025), the Fed may run negative remittances, underscoring its non-commercial orientation.

In contrast, the ERS is framed as a profit center—an entity designed to extract wealth from foreign actors to reduce domestic tax burdens. This shift raises critical questions: Who are the “customers” of the ERS? What are the “products” it offers? And what happens when profit motives collide with diplomatic or humanitarian priorities?

Economic Modeling: Revenue vs. Net Gain

A rigorous analysis of Trump’s proposed tariffs comes from Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. In their April 2025 briefing, they use a global economic model to estimate the gross and net revenue generated by tariffs of 10%, 15%, and 20% on all imported goods.

Their findings are sobering:

  • A 15% universal tariff could generate $3.9 trillion in gross revenue over a decade (2025–2034), assuming no foreign retaliation.
  • However, after accounting for slower growth, reduced investment, and lower tax receipts from households and businesses, the net gain drops to $3.2 trillion.
  • If foreign countries retaliate with reciprocal tariffs, the net gain falls further to $1.5 trillion.
  • A 20% tariff results in the lowest net gain ($791 billion), due to intensified economic drag and retaliation.

These findings underscore a crucial distinction: tariffs are not free money. They impose costs on consumers, disrupt supply chains, and invite countermeasures. The ERS may collect billions, but its net contribution to fiscal health is far more modest—and potentially negative if retaliation escalates.

Additionally, tariff revenue is volatile and politically contingent. Tariffs can be reversed by executive order, invalidated by courts, or rendered moot by trade realignment. In short, the ERS lacks the predictability and stability necessary for a legitimate fiscal foundation. Tariffs are a risky and politically charged mechanism for revenue generation—making them an unreliable cornerstone for the country’s fiscal health.

Strategic Blowback: Reverse Friendshoring and Supply Chain Drift

Beyond economics, the ERS proposal carries significant geopolitical risks. In The Diplomat, Thiago de Aragao warns of a phenomenon he calls reverse friendshoring—where companies, instead of relocating supply chains away from China, move closer to it in response to U.S. tariffs.

The logic is simple: If exporting to the U.S. becomes prohibitively expensive, firms may pivot to serving Asian markets, leveraging China’s mature infrastructure and consumer base. This could undermine the strategic goal of decoupling from Chinese influence, potentially strengthening Beijing’s economic hand.

Examples abound:

  • A firm that invested in Mexico to reduce exposure to China redirected its exports to Latin America after Mexico was hit with new tariffs.
  • Another company shifted operations to Canada to avoid compounded U.S. duties—only to face new levies there as well.

This unpredictability erodes trust in U.S. trade policy and incentivizes supply chain diversification away from the U.S. As Aragao notes, “Protectionism may offer a temporary illusion of control, but in the long run, it risks pushing businesses away.”

The ERS, by monetizing tariffs, could accelerate this trend. If foreign firms perceive the U.S. as a hostile or unstable market, they will seek alternatives. And if allies are treated as adversaries, the strategic architecture of friendshoring collapses, leaving the U.S. economically isolated and diplomatically weakened.

National Security Costs: Alienating Allies

Perhaps the most damning critique of the ERS comes from Cullen Hendrix at the Peterson Institute, who argues that imposing tariffs on U.S. allies undermines national security. The U.S. alliance network spans over 60 countries, accounting for 38% of global GDP. These partnerships enhance deterrence, enable forward basing, and create markets for U.S. defense exports.

Tariffs—especially those framed as revenue tools—erode alliance cohesion. They signal that economic extraction trumps strategic cooperation. Hendrix warns that “treating alliance partners like trade adversaries will further increase intra-alliance frictions, weaken collective deterrence, and invite potential adversaries—none better positioned than China—to exploit these divisions.”

Moreover, the ERS’s indiscriminate approach—levying duties on both allies and rivals—blurs the line between economic policy and coercive diplomacy. It transforms trade into a zero-sum game, where even friends are fair targets. This undermines the credibility of U.S. commitments and may prompt allies to seek alternative trade and security arrangements.

Lutnick’s Barber Economics: Rhetoric vs. Reality

The ERS proposal is not merely a policy—it’s a performance. Nowhere is this clearer than in Howard Lutnick’s keynote at the Hill and Valley Forum, as reported in The New Yorker on July 21, 2025. Addressing a room of venture capitalists, defense contractors, and policymakers, Lutnick attempted to explain trade deficits using personal analogies: “I have a trade deficit with my barber,” he said. “I have a trade deficit with my grocery store. Right? I just buy stuff from them. That’s ridiculous.”

The crowd, described as “sophisticated tech and finance attendees,” was visibly uncomfortable. Lutnick’s analogies, while populist in tone, misread the room and revealed a deeper disconnect between economic complexity and simplistic transactionalism. As one attendee noted, “It’s obvious why Lutnick’s affect appeals to Trump. But it’s Bessent’s presence in the Administration that reassures us there is someone smart looking out for us.”

This contrast between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is telling. Bessent, who reportedly flew to Mar-a-Lago to urge Trump to pause the tariffs, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

The ERS, then, is not just a fiscal experiment—it’s a philosophical battleground. Lutnick’s vision of government as a money-making enterprise may resonate with populist frustration, but it risks trivializing the structural and diplomatic intricacies of global trade. His “barber economics” may play well on cable news, but it falters under scrutiny from economists, allies, and institutional stewards.

Conclusion: Profit Is Not Purpose

The idea of a “for-profit” U.S. government, embodied in the External Revenue Service, is seductive in its simplicity. It promises fiscal relief without domestic taxation, strategic leverage through economic pressure, and a reassertion of American dominance in global trade. But beneath the surface lies a tangle of contradictions.

Constitutionally, the federal government is designed to serve—not to sell. Its legitimacy flows from the consent of the governed, not the extraction of foreign wealth. Economically, tariffs may generate gross revenue, but their net contribution is constrained by retaliation, inflation, and supply chain disruption. Strategically, the ERS risks alienating allies, incentivizing reverse friendshoring, and weakening collective security.

With Howard Lutnick as the plan’s leading voice—offering anecdotes like the barber and grocery store as proxies for international trade—the ERS becomes more than a revenue mechanism; it becomes a prism for reflecting the Administration’s governing style: transactional, simplified, and rhetorically appealing, yet divorced from systemic nuance. His “barber economics” may evoke applause from certain circles, but in the forums that shape long-term policy, it has landed with discomfort and disbelief.

The comparison between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, as reported in The New Yorker, captures this divide. Bessent, attempting to temper Trump’s protectionist instincts, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

Yet governance is not a business, and the nation’s global responsibilities cannot be monetized like a corporate balance sheet. If America begins to treat its allies as clients, its rivals as profit centers, and its global footprint as a monetizable asset, it risks transforming foreign policy into a ledger—and leadership into a transaction.

The External Revenue Service, in its current form, fails to reconcile profit with purpose. It monetizes strength but neglects stewardship. It harvests dollars but undermines trust. And in doing so, it invites a broader reckoning—not just about trade and taxation, but about what kind of republic America wishes to be. For now, the ERS remains an emblem of ambition unmoored from architecture, where the dream of profit collides with the duty to govern.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN USING AI

Books, Economics, Essays, History

The Unholy Offspring of Economic Theory: The Far Right’s Neoliberal Roots

The following essay is AI -generated, edited by Intellicurean, as part of our “The Cynic & The Dandy” series, of an interview article published on July 6, 2025 on the Toynbee Prize Foundation website titled Hayek’s Bastards and the Global Origins of the Far Right: An Interview with Quinn Slobodian.

One finds oneself, much like a seasoned playgoer observing a particularly convoluted modern drama, grappling with the profound complexities of our age. The curtain, it seems, has risen on “Trump 2.0,” a performance so bewildering in its contradictions that even the most astute critics of human folly might pause for breath. This curious administration simultaneously seeks to disentangle itself from global commitments while igniting fresh international disputes; it endeavours to depreciate the dollar to boost exports whilst clinging to its status as the world’s reserve currency; and it champions a reduction in global economic reliance while striving to unilaterally dictate global economic terms. The American colossus, one might observe, appears caught in a most perplexing dance with its own identity, and the global audience watches, utterly transfixed.

It is into this very contemporary conundrum that Quinn Slobodian, a historian of capitalism whose intellectual acuity is as sharp as a well-honed epigram, strides with his latest volume: Hayek’s Bastards: Race, Gold, IQ, and the Capitalism of the Far Right (Princeton University Press, 2025). This title, one must concede, possesses a certain Wildean flourish, hinting at the delightful audacity within its pages. Slobodian, with the keen eye of a diagnostician, posits that the apparent contradiction of the Far Right simultaneously embracing pro-market liberalism and social hierarchies – facilitating the free movement of capital but not of people – is, in fact, no contradiction at all. He argues that neoliberalism has always possessed the intellectual elasticity to accommodate such a narrative.

The Unruly Offspring of Thought: “Bastards” and “Volk Capital”

Slobodian’s current work builds upon his earlier seminal analyses in Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018) and Crack-up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy (Metropolitan, 2023). However, Hayek’s Bastards shifts its chronological focus decisively to the 1990s, illuminating this pivotal decade through the lens of figures not previously central to his explorations. If Globalists dissected the intellectual elite of the Mont Pèlerin Society, and Crack-Up Capitalism examined market radicals within the broader globalisation context, this new work turns its penetrating gaze to paleo-libertarianism. This intriguing ideological fusion, combining libertarian disdain for global governance with paleo-conservative traditionalism and isolationism (a distinct contrast to the more recent neoconservative branch of the Republican Party), forms the crux of Slobodian’s argument.

At the heart of Slobodian’s contention lies a startling conclusion: the rise of the Far Right is an acceleration, not a rejection of capitalism; a frontlash, not a backlash. He meticulously demonstrates how right-wing libertarians of the 1990s, through their convergence with paleoconservatives and their burgeoning interest in biology, IQ, and gold, inadvertently laid the intellectual foundations for our present reality.

In a recent conversation with Asensio Robles of Comillas Pontifical University, Slobodian elucidated the two primary concepts underpinning his book. The notion of “bastards,” he explains, serves as a vivid metaphor for the generations of intellectual influence, where adherents, though inspired by mentors, may diverge significantly from the original spirit and content of their masters’ work. In the case of Friedrich Hayek, Slobodian points to those who, in their pursuit of his scientific and complexity-focused ideas, veered into domains such as scientific racism or the belief in human nature as an absolute organizing principle. These, Slobodian asserts, represent the “illegitimate” heirs who strayed far enough to betray Hayek’s fundamental principles.

Friedrich Hayek, a Nobel laureate in Economics (1974) and a leading figure of the Austrian School of economics, is perhaps best known for his fervent defense of free-market capitalism and his critiques of central planning, notably articulated in his seminal 1944 work, The Road to Serfdom. Hayek argued that economic coordination arises not from central design, but from a “spontaneous order” – the result of millions of individuals making decisions based on dispersed, localized knowledge communicated primarily through the price system. He believed that any attempt by the state to centrally plan the economy would inevitably lead to a loss of individual liberty and, ultimately, totalitarianism, because such planners could never possess the vast, tacit knowledge embedded within a decentralized market.

The second crucial concept is “Volk capital.” Slobodian critiques the common, overly generalized understanding of neoliberalism as simply advocating for the commodification of all things and the reduction of all humans to an interchangeable substance. By adopting a narrower, more historically precise definition, focusing on a discrete group of thinkers (including those within the Mont Pèlerin Society, which Hayek co-founded in 1947), he reveals a significant inflection point in the 1960s and 1970s. This period saw a shift in neoliberal thought towards an emphasis on human difference, rather than equality.

Slobodian argues that the universalizing concept of human capital became “re-grounded” in specific genetic populations or cultural groups. He observes the re-emergence of 19th-century notions of the “Volk”—the idea of an essential character of a kinship group—fused with economic categories. This, he contends, transforms “human capital” into “Volk capital,” demonstrating how an ideology often associated with abstract market principles could regress to antiquated distinctions. For instance, by the 1980s, Hayek himself, often considered a progenitor of neoliberalism, suggested a unique quality of the Western world in producing an “optimal economic actor.”

A “Frontlash” Unveiled: Beyond the “Left-Behinds” Narrative

Slobodian further clarifies the genesis of these two books, revealing they were initially conceived as a single grand volume. The political shocks of 2016-2017 – the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit “Leave” vote, and the rise of parties like Alternative for Germany – prompted his inquiry. He expresses dissatisfaction with mainstream interpretations that viewed these developments as a revolt against neoliberal capitalism by those “left behind” by globalisation. This narrative, he argues, incorrectly positioned figures like Trump and Boris Johnson as unexpected challengers to the neoliberal consensus.

To counter this, Slobodian first introduced the concept of the “zone” in Crack-up Capitalism. This refers to more fluid spaces for investor capital within nations, such as freeports in the United Kingdom or the proliferation of Special Economic Zones in countries like China and India. He notes that in 2017-2018, much of the apparent economic nationalism was, in fact, about creating these spaces for capital mobility. For example, as of 2023, there were over 7,000 Special Economic Zones globally, employing tens of millions of people and contributing significantly to trade and investment, illustrating this practical application of “zones.”

He then sought to integrate the observation that many within the alt-right in 2016 originated from the paleo-libertarian camp. These individuals, skeptical of both global and national governments, sought a fracturing of the state system. The “grand narrative” of bundling these ideas proved “quixotic,” leading to the separate publication of Crack-up Capitalism and Hayek’s Bastards, the latter focusing on the paleo-alliance between dissident right-wing figures and the neoliberal movement.

The Unseen Hand of Difference: Chronology and Community

The chronological alignment between the two books is evident. In Hayek’s Bastards, the post-Cold War period is presented as a moment of reckoning for neoliberals, who questioned whether they had truly “won” or if “state spending and socialism” persisted in new guises, such as environmentalism or feminism. Similarly, in Crack-up Capitalism, the 1990s marked a breakthrough for zones, representing a form of globalisation that fostered “diversities across territory” rather than uniform regulatory spaces. The fundamental thread uniting both narratives, Slobodian suggests, is the “use of difference, politically or economically.” This challenges the widely held assumption that the 1990s and 2000s were periods of increasing uniformity, arguing instead that they were also times when “irreconcilable differences” were intensified and leveraged for new political agendas.

Slobodian also tackles the pervasive assumption that neoliberalism is solely a celebration of individualism. He argues that while individualism is indeed a focus, neoliberals are intensely concerned with the conditions under which it can be realized. When the traditional “republican tradition” – based on an impartial state providing space for individual expression – is discarded, a new framework for community must be forged. This is particularly true for the “subgenre of neoliberal thought” that advocates for the dissolution of the state.

In this context, the necessity arises to constitute communities that can function and allow for individual expression without uniform regulations from a representative state. This leads to an interest in factors like the role of ethnic homogeneity in decreasing transaction costs and fostering trust, thereby allowing communities to self-perpetuate. It also involves examining the importance of the “social contract” as a literal set of terms for participation in smaller communities, and questions of social reproduction – specifically, the necessary gender orders to ensure sufficient population in a “closed-border model of political organization.” This, he notes, is where anarcho-capitalists and conservatives find common ground, the former seeking abstract individual freedom but recognizing the need for parameters, and the latter striving to preserve existing moral and cultural orders.

A striking observation from Slobodian’s research is the neoliberal fear that the Cold War might have been “lost” despite the Soviet Union’s collapse, due to persistent high state spending. The end of the Cold War, Slobodian reveals, raised the possibility of completely dismantling the social state, which in turn brought forth new questions about how a post-redistributive order could be anchored. This, he asserts, directly relates to the current moment in the United States, where campaigns to significantly cut the federal budget, such as proposals to reduce it by one-third (as seen in certain fiscal proposals from conservative groups, often citing a need to return to pre-expansion levels of spending), would necessitate the dismantling of the existing social state. This scenario, he suggests, brings to mind the ominous question posed by Charles Murray regarding the aftermath of the welfare state’s disappearance – whether it would lead to anarchy, organic self-organization, or a segment of the population perishing. The “vexed triumphalism” following the Cold War, Slobodian concludes, thus set the stage for the “apocalyptic forms of politics” now all too familiar.

The Historical Lens: Unveiling Hidden Cleavages

Slobodian highlights the remarkable absence of significant sectarian splits within neoliberalism between the 1940s and 1980s. The clear ideological battle lines drawn between the “free, liberal, capitalist” world and the “planned command economies” of the communist bloc maintained a cohesive front. However, with the abrupt erasure of this divide in the 1990s, two paths emerged: either assume inevitable global convergence and the end of meaningful political divisions, or contend that divisions persisted, merely migrating to previously overlooked domains. The global Right, he observes, opted for the latter.

The 1990s became a period of “restless search for a new enemy” for the Right. This sometimes involved resurrecting older tropes, such as the anti-Semitic portrayal of George Soros as a conspiratorial figure, a narrative prominently used by figures like Viktor Orbán. Neoliberals, too, participated in this search, ultimately identifying their new adversary in the Left’s “march through the institutions” – specifically, movements advocating for gender and racial equality and a “politically correct” discourse. Slobodian emphasizes that this framing of issues like affirmative action and state-led efforts to redress inequality began remarkably early – some 35 years ago. He argues that the Left, too focused on internal critiques of a more mainstream neoliberalism (like that associated with Bill Clinton or Barack Obama), was often “caught off guard” by the “disruptive politics of the last decade,” failing to recognize the emerging “villain” that would ultimately manifest in today’s culture wars.

Slobodian’s methodological approach, as noted by Robles, is characterized by his commitment to “reading against the grain.” He consistently challenges conventional wisdom: if neoliberalism is thought to strive for state dissolution, Globalists shows its reliance on state intervention; if it promotes a borderless society, Crack-up Capitalism highlights its attention to “human separation”; and if the alt-right is seen as a backlash, Hayek’s Bastards frames it as a “frontlash,” an acceleration of the ideology. This “counterintuitive position” is, for Slobodian, a means to explore the profound revelations found within such contradictions. His advice to students – to begin a paper with “We think it’s like this, but it’s actually like that, and I’m going to show you why” – underscores his dedication to empirical evidence and intellectual revision.

He also draws a strong correlation between the 1990s and the 1960s, suggesting that understanding paleo-libertarian interests in hard borders, IQ, and gold necessitates examining earlier debates surrounding the 1965 Immigration Act, 1960s evolutionary psychology, or monetary reform post-Bretton Woods. These two decades, both periods of relative prosperity, represented moments where attempts were made to reconfigure societal settlements. Slobodian contends that the Left’s focus on criticizing a “progressive neoliberalism” (e.g., of the Clinton or Obama era) that paid “lip service” to 1960s social movements while blunting their critical edge meant they were “caught off guard” in 2016. He suggests that identifying what neoliberals “worried about” in a given decade, such as environmental demands disrupting growth models in the 1970s and 1990s, could reveal “vulnerability in the economic system” and “soft spots” for counter-movements to exploit.

Future Horizons: AI, Animals, and the Unseen Hand of Technology

Regarding future inquiries, Robles points to the absence of cryptocurrencies and AI in Hayek’s Bastards. Slobodian confirms these will be explored in his forthcoming book, Muskism, co-authored with Ben Tarnoff, which will delve into AI, effective altruism, and superintelligence. This work is slated for release next year.

However, Slobodian maintains a critical stance on cryptocurrencies, viewing them as “parasitical on a functioning traditional monetary system” and primarily “a hedge-speculative asset” or “plaything for a small number of libertarians and more recently large investors.” He believes his skepticism has been “a wise bet,” as the number of “true believers” in blockchain as a political template remains small, with most investors using crypto like any other growth sector.

Intriguingly, Slobodian’s other new research direction looks not to the digital future, but to a historical “backward” step: the changes in the human sciences in the postwar decades, specifically “How humans became animals at Harvard.” This project will explore the world of figures like Richard Herrnstein (a student of B. F. Skinner) and E. O. Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s, examining how humans were increasingly “analogized to animals.”

In Hayek’s Bastards, Quinn Slobodian has, with surgical precision, woven a compelling and unsettling thread through the tapestry of intellectual history. He compels us to confront the uncomfortable truths about the origins of our present predicament, reminding us that the seemingly spontaneous outbursts of populism are, in fact, the meticulously cultivated fruits of a long and complex intellectual lineage. One leaves his analysis with a renewed sense of vigilance, a heightened awareness of the subtle, often insidious, ways in which ideas, like the most potent of poisons, can mutate and proliferate, shaping our world in ways we are only now beginning to comprehend. Indeed, the stage is set for future acts in this ongoing drama, and one eagerly awaits Slobodian’s next intellectual curtain call.

“The Cynic & The Dandy” is an AI-generated essay series based on a hypothetical collaboration between Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw.

Book Reviews, Economics, History, Reviews

‘Recalculating The Economic Gains Of Slavery’ (Review)

TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (April 2, 2025):

In 2011, builders in the Rio de Janeiro docklands uncovered the ruins of the Cais do Valongo, a wharf where, between 1780 and 1831, 800,000 enslaved people disembarked. Of the roughly 10.7 million people who survived the passage across the Atlantic in the nearly four centuries of the transatlantic slave trade, nearly 5 million were sent to Brazil – almost five times as many as to Jamaica and more than fourteen times as many as to North America. More slave ships left for the West African coast from the Americas than from Europe; the majority of those vessels sailed from Brazil, where slavery was abolished only in 1888. The foundations of modern Brazil are poured over the infrastructure of the transatlantic slave trade.

Yet, though the history of Brazilian slavery is not “untold”, the histories of Caribbean and North American slavery are generally better known among anglophone readers. Two new books by distinguished historians of slavery, Humans in Shackles: An Atlantic history of slavery by Ana Lucia Araujo and Atlantic Cataclysm: Rethinking the Atlantic slave trades by David Eltis, offer a correction, emphasizing the longevity and scale of slavery in Brazil and the South Atlantic. In Enslavement: Past and present, another distinguished academic, the sociologist Orlando Patterson, shows the relevance and utility of his theory of slavery as “social death”, a powerlessness whose malignance structures slave societies and persists long after emancipation. What follows, however, from recognizing that Brazil was first, last and largest in Atlantic slavery? Slavery existed long before the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade; are the ruins of the slave-ship dock under Rio relics of the longue durée of enslavement or evidence of the violent birth of the modern world?

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Economics, Essays, Politics

Political Essay: ‘America’s Future Is Hungary’

ATLANTIC MAGAZINE (March 31, 2025) :

lashy hotels and upmarket restaurants now dominate the center of Budapest, a city once better known for its shabby facades. New monuments have sprung up in the center of town too. One of them, a pastiche of the Vietnam War memorial in Washington, D.C., mourns Hungary’s lost 19th-century empire. Instead of war dead, the names of formerly “Hungarian” places—cities and villages that are now in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland—are engraved in long granite walls, solemnly memorialized with an eternal flame.

But the nationalist kitsch and tourist traps hide a different reality. Once widely perceived to be the wealthiest country in Central Europe (“the happiest barrack in the socialist camp,” as it was known during the Cold War), and later the Central European country that foreign investors liked most, Hungary is now one of the poorest countries, and possibly the poorest, in the European Union. Industrial production is falling year-over-year.

Productivity is close to the lowest in the region. Unemployment is creeping upward. Despite the ruling party’s loud talk about traditional values, the population is shrinking. Perhaps that’s because young people don’t want to have children in a place where two-thirds of the citizens describe the national education system as “bad,” and where hospital departments are closing because so many doctors have moved abroad. Maybe talented people don’t want to stay in a country perceived as the most corrupt in the EU for three years in a row. Even the Index of Economic Freedom—which is published by the Heritage Foundation, the MAGA-affiliated think tank that produced Project 2025—puts Hungary at the bottom of the EU in its rankings of government integrity.

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Economics, Essays, Opinion, Politics

‘Make Europe Great Again’

NATIONAL REVIEW MAGAZINE (March 27, 2025) by David Frost:

Just over five years ago, shortly after Boris Johnson won a decisive election victory in Britain and two weeks after Britain finally left the European Union, I gave a speech in Brussels titled “Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe.”

It hit many British front pages the next day. Partly that was because the speech set out Britain’s uncompromising negotiating position for the next stage of the Brexit talks. But equally it was because it was the first attempt to set out and give renewed intellectual legitimacy to the cause of leaving the EU and of reviving British nationhood. I wanted the British people to hear, after years of being told that to leave the EU was to vote against the modern world, that there was in fact a rational, reputable, and practically deliverable case for national independence. And I wanted Europeans to understand our thinking properly and consider what it meant for them too.

I argued that what we were seeing in Europe was a clash of two revolutions in governance. The first was the creation of the EU itself. As I put it, this was “the greatest revolution in European governance since 1648: a new governmental system overlaid on an old one, purportedly a Europe of nation-states, but in reality the paradigm of a new system of transnational collective governance.”

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I don’t of course expect many in Europe to heed my call. The recent European thrashing around on geopolitics, and the refusal to face Europe’s relative impotence to affect outcomes in Ukraine, suggest that the current leadership of most European countries is unable to see things straight or do more than respond to day-to-day challenges. But the problems will not go away. If conservatives don’t put forward their own clear vision for Europe, then the instinctual movements of the EU and its leaders will dominate. European conservatives are unlikely then to find themselves in a “nation called Europe,” but they will be in a political construct that by design will stop them from fulfilling their conservative goals. The sooner they face up to that, the better. Changing things is, after all, a major task. It took the EU 70 years to get to this point. It will take a long time to reverse it. Better start soon.

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This article appears as “For a Conservative Europe” in the May 2025 print edition of National Review.

David Frost – Lord Frost of Allenton was the minister for EU relations and chief negotiator for Brexit in Boris Johnson’s government. He is now a Conservative Party member in Britain’s House of Lords. His essay is an edited version of a speech given at the Danube Institute, Budapest, on March 4.

Book Reviews, Business, Economics, Reviews, Technology

‘It’s Time To Question The Relationship Between Technology & Capitalism’

The Mechanic and the Luddite book cover

LSE REVIEW OF BOOKS (March 24, 2025):

With the ongoing dismantling of the US administrative state by a handful of ill-informed programmers, I would like to declare the current moment a failure of tech criticism. For decades, academics in the social sciences and humanities have built a critical edifice that challenged the cultural hegemony propping up the US tech industry, an industry grounded in science fiction parables, speculative fiction, “rationalist” dreaming, and an endless stream of technological solutionism. We can now count “AI safety” as a new field of knowledge production about technology captured by industry interests. I do not attribute blame to tech critics for this state, but now is a good moment to stop and reflect: what are we doing? In being so caught up in cataloguing new horrors of the digital age, we have been unable to stop its worst excesses. We need a new way of thinking about that project, of how we catalogue the problems of technology and hope that corporate appeals or policymaking will address them.  

While there is plenty of tech criticism around, much of it is not comfortable explicitly labelling itself as anti-capitalist tout court.

In his new book, The Mechanic and the Luddite, Jathan Sadowski provides a model of “ruthless criticism” that might meet that requirement. As he explains, many academics have created criticism isolated from the source of its complaints: “Too much of the tech criticism that exists today is happy to ignore, if not remain ignorant of, the links between technology and capitalism. We can see this anodyne style in the sudden burst of work on “AI ethics,” which is content with offering superficial tweaks to, say, the training data for an algorithm without ever challenging how that algorithm will be used or why it should exist at all” (24). In contrast, he calls for more materialist analysis of technology and the internet – that is, Marxism.  

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The Mechanic and the Luddite: A Ruthless Criticism of Technology and Capitalism. Jathan Sadowski. University of California Press. 2025.

Jathan Sadowski’s The Mechanic and the Luddite critiques technology’s entanglement with capitalism, advocating for “ruthless criticism” of this dual system in order to dismantle it. Sadowski’s forthright materialist approach and argument for actionable, anti-capitalist tech critique make the book an original and vital read for our times, writes Sam DiBella.

Economics, Essays

Economics: It’s Time To Get Rid Of “Capitalism”

MODERN AGE – A CONSERVATIVE REVIEW (March 12, 2025):

The term “capitalism” is past its sell-by date. Why? It means too many things to too many different people to be useful. 

For some conservatives, capitalism is central to our American identity. This is despite the fact that none of the Founders had ever heard the term, which was not invented until 1850: James Madison, for example, advocated laws that “without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity.”  

For the followers of Karl Marx, capitalism is an economic system that, while having unleashed great productive forces, relies on the exploitation of workers by a class of capitalists, who capture all the workers’ “surplus value” and put it in their own pockets. For Ayn Rand and her followers, however, capitalism is an “unknown ideal,” which could possibly come about if the government completely refrained from economic interventions. 

The market is an engine of great economic efficiency, but it is fundamentally amoral: No demonstration of the economic efficacy of market transactions can tell us if there are things that should not be bought or sold because allowing mere private demand for them to determine their availability is destructive for society as a whole.

If we recognize that all the complex societies embody some combination of markets and governmental creation of conditions that permit, ban, or encourage some sorts of market transactions, we might be able to embark on a more serious discussion of these matters, instead of continuing to bloviate about “capitalism.” 

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Gene Callahan is the author of Economics for Real People: An Introduction to the Austrian School and Oakeshott on Rome and America. He teaches computer science at NYU.