Category Archives: Government

Essays, Government, Politics, Social Media, Technology

THE ALGORITHM OF IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

How outrage became the fastest currency in politics—and why the virtues of patience are disappearing.

By Michael Cummins, Editor | October 23, 2025

In an age where political power moves at the speed of code, outrage has become the most efficient form of communication. From an Athenian demagogue to modern AI strategists, the art of acceleration has replaced the patience once practiced by Baker, Dole, and Lincoln—and the Republic is paying the price.

In a server farm outside Phoenix, a machine listens. It does not understand Cleon, but it recognizes his rhythm—the spikes in engagement, the cadence of outrage, the heat signature of grievance. The air is cold, the light a steady pulse of blue LEDs blinking like distant lighthouses of reason, guarding a sea of noise. If the Pnyx was powered by lungs, the modern assembly runs on lithium and code.

The machine doesn’t merely listen; it categorizes. Each tremor of emotion becomes data, each complaint a metric. It assigns every trauma a vulnerability score, every fury a probability of spread. It extracts the gold of anger from the dross of human experience, leaving behind a purified substance: engagement. Its intelligence is not empathy but efficiency. It knows which words burn faster, which phrases detonate best. The heat it studies is human, but the process is cold as quartz.

Every hour, terabytes of grievance are harvested, tagged, and rebroadcast as strategy. Somewhere in the hum of cooling fans, democracy is being recalibrated.

The Athenian Assembly was never quiet. On clear afternoons, the shouts carried down from the Pnyx, a stone amphitheater that served as both parliament and marketplace of emotion. Citizens packed the terraces—farmers with olive oil still on their hands, sailors smelling of the sea, merchants craning for a view—and waited for someone to stir them. When Cleon rose to speak, the sound changed. Thucydides called him “the most violent of the citizens,” which was meant as condemnation but functioned as a review. Cleon had discovered what every modern strategist now understands: volume is velocity.

He was a wealthy tanner who rebranded himself as a man of the people. His speeches were blunt, rapid, full of performative rage. He interrupted, mocked, demanded applause. The philosophers who preferred quiet dialectic despised him, yet Cleon understood the new attention graph of the polis. He was running an A/B test on collective fury, watching which insults drew cheers and which silences signaled fatigue. Democracy, still young, had built its first algorithm without realizing it. The Republican Party, twenty-four centuries later, would perfect the technique.

Grievance was his software. After the death of Pericles, plague and war had shaken Athens; optimism curdled into resentment. Cleon gave that resentment a face. He blamed the aristocracy for cowardice, the generals for betrayal, the thinkers for weakness. “They talk while you bleed,” he shouted. The crowd obeyed. He promised not prosperity but vengeance—the clean arithmetic of rage. The crowd was his analytics; the roar his data visualization. Why deliberate when you can demand? Why reason when you can roar?

The brain recognizes threat before comprehension. Cognitive scientists have measured it: forty milliseconds separate the perception of danger from understanding. Cleon had no need for neuroscience; he could feel the instant heat of outrage and knew it would always outrun reflection. Two millennia later, the same principle drives our political networks. The algorithm optimizes for outrage because outrage performs. Reaction is revenue. The machine doesn’t care about truth; it cares about tempo. The crowd has become infinite, and the Pnyx has become the feed.

The Mytilenean debate proved the cost of speed. When a rebellious island surrendered, Cleon demanded that every man be executed, every woman enslaved. His rival Diodotus urged mercy. The Assembly, inflamed by Cleon’s rhetoric, voted for slaughter. A ship sailed that night with the order. By morning remorse set in; a second ship was launched with reprieve. The two vessels raced across the Aegean, oars flashing. The ship of reason barely arrived first. We might call it the first instance of lag.

Today the vessel of anger is powered by GPUs. “Adapt and win or pearl-clutch and lose,” reads an internal memo from a modern campaign shop. Why wait for a verifiable quote when an AI can fabricate one convincingly? A deepfake is Cleon’s bluntness rendered in pixels, a tactical innovation of synthetic proof. The pixels flicker slightly, as if the lie itself were breathing. During a recent congressional primary, an AI-generated confession spread through encrypted chats before breakfast; by noon, the correction was invisible under the debris of retweets. Speed wins. Fact-checking is nostalgia.

Cleon’s attack on elites made him irresistible. He cast refinement as fraud, intellect as betrayal. “They dress in purple,” he sneered, “and speak in riddles.” Authenticity became performance; performance, the brand. The new Cleon lives in a warehouse studio surrounded by ring lights and dashboards. He calls himself Leo K., host of The Agora Channel. The room itself feels like a secular chapel of outrage—walls humming, screens flickering. The machine doesn’t sweat, doesn’t blink. It translates heat into metrics and metrics into marching orders. An AI voice whispers sentiment scores into his ear. He doesn’t edit; he adjusts. Each outrage is A/B-tested in real time. His analytics scroll like scripture: engagement per minute, sentiment delta, outrage index. His AI team feeds the system new provocations to test. Rural viewers see forgotten farmers; suburban ones see “woke schools.” When his video “They Talk While You Bleed” hits ten million views, Leo K. doesn’t smile. He refreshes the dashboard. Cleon shouted. The crowd obeyed. Leo posted. The crowd clicked.

Meanwhile, the opposition labors under its own conscientiousness. Where one side treats AI as a tactical advantage, the other treats it as a moral hazard. The Democratic instinct remains deliberative: form a task force, issue a six-point memo, hold an AI 101 training. They build models to optimize voter files, diversity audits, and fundraising efficiency—work that improves governance but never goes viral. They’re still formatting the memo while the meme metastasizes. They are trying to construct a more accountable civic algorithm while their opponents exploit the existing one to dismantle civics itself. Technology moves at the speed of the most audacious user, not the most virtuous.

The penalty for slowness has consumed even those who once mastered it. The Republican Party that learned to weaponize velocity was once the party of patience. Its old guardians—Howard Baker, Bob Dole, and before them Abraham Lincoln—believed that democracy endured only through slowness: through listening, through compromise, through the humility to doubt one’s own righteousness.

Baker was called The Great Conciliator, though what he practiced was something rarer: slow thought. He listened more than he spoke. His Watergate question—“What did the President know, and when did he know it?”—was not theater but procedure, the careful calibration of truth before judgment. Baker’s deliberation depended on the existence of a stable document—minutes, transcripts, the slow paper trail that anchored reality. But the modern ecosystem runs on disposability. It generates synthetic records faster than any investigator could verify. There is nothing to subpoena, only content that vanishes after impact. Baker’s silences disarmed opponents; his patience made time a weapon. “The essence of leadership,” he said, “is not command, but consensus.” It was a creed for a republic that still believed deliberation was a form of courage.

Bob Dole was his equal in patience, though drier in tone. Scarred from war, tempered by decades in the Senate, he distrusted purity and spectacle. He measured success by text, not applause. He supported the Americans with Disabilities Act, expanded food aid, negotiated budgets with Democrats. His pauses were political instruments; his sarcasm, a lubricant for compromise. “Compromise,” he said, “is not surrender. It’s the essence of democracy.” He wrote laws instead of posts. He joked his way through stalemates, turning irony into a form of grace. He would be unelectable now. The algorithm has no metric for patience, no reward for irony.

The Senate, for Dole and Baker, was an architecture of time. Every rule, every recess, every filibuster was a mechanism for patience. Time was currency. Now time is waste. The hearing room once built consensus; today it builds clips. Dole’s humor was irony, a form of restraint the algorithm can’t parse—it depends on context and delay. Baker’s strength was the paper trail; the machine specializes in deletion. Their virtues—documentation, wit, patience—cannot be rendered in code.

And then there was Lincoln, the slowest genius in American history, a man who believed that words could cool a nation’s blood. His sentences moved with geological patience: clause folding into clause, thought delaying conclusion until understanding arrived. “I am slow to learn,” he confessed, “and slow to forget that which I have learned.” In his world, reflection was leadership. In ours, it’s latency. His sentences resisted compression. They were long enough to make the reader breathe differently. Each clause deferred judgment until understanding arrived—a syntax designed for moral digestion. The algorithm, if handed the Gettysburg Address, would discard its middle clauses, highlight the opening for brevity, and tag the closing for virality. It would miss entirely the hesitation—the part that transforms rhetoric into conscience.

The republic of Lincoln has been replaced by the republic of refresh. The party of Lincoln has been replaced by the platform of latency: always responding, never reflecting. The Great Compromisers have given way to the Great Amplifiers. The virtues that once defined republican governance—discipline, empathy, institutional humility—are now algorithmically invisible. The feed rewards provocation, not patience. Consensus cannot trend.

Caesar understood the conversion of speed into power long before the machines. His dispatches from Gaul were press releases disguised as history, written in the calm third person to give propaganda the tone of inevitability. By the time the Senate gathered to debate his actions, public opinion was already conquered. Procedure could not restrain velocity. When he crossed the Rubicon, they were still writing memos. Celeritas—speed—was his doctrine, and the Republic never recovered.

Augustus learned the next lesson: velocity means nothing without permanence. “I found Rome a city of brick,” he said, “and left it a city of marble.” The marble was propaganda you could touch—forums and temples as stone deepfakes of civic virtue. His Res Gestae proclaimed him restorer of the Republic even as he erased it. Cleon disrupted. Caesar exploited. Augustus consolidated. If Augustus’s monuments were the hardware of empire, our data centers are its cloud: permanent, unseen, self-repairing. The pattern persists—outrage, optimization, control.

Every medium has democratized passion before truth. The printing press multiplied Luther’s fury, pamphlets inflamed the Revolution, radio industrialized empathy for tyrants. Artificial intelligence perfects the sequence by producing emotion on demand. It learns our triggers as Cleon learned his crowd, adjusting the pitch until belief becomes reflex. The crowd’s roar has become quantifiable—engagement metrics as moral barometers. The machine’s innovation is not persuasion but exhaustion. The citizens it governs are too tired to deliberate. The algorithm doesn’t care. It calculates.

Still, there are always philosophers of delay. Socrates practiced slowness as civic discipline. Cicero defended the Republic with essays while Caesar’s legions advanced. A modern startup once tried to revive them in code—SocrAI, a chatbot designed to ask questions, to doubt. It failed. Engagement was low; investors withdrew. The philosophers of pause cannot survive in the economy of speed.

Yet some still try. A quiet digital space called The Stoa refuses ranking and metrics. Posts appear in chronological order, unboosted, unfiltered. It rewards patience, not virality. The users joke that they’re “rowing the slow ship.” Perhaps that is how reason persists: quietly, inefficiently, against the current.

The Algorithmic Republic waits just ahead. Polling is obsolete; sentiment analysis updates in real time. Legislators boast about their “Responsiveness Index.” Justice Algorithm 3.1 recommends a twelve percent increase in sentencing severity for property crimes after last week’s outrage spike. A senator brags that his approval latency is under four minutes. A citizen receives a push notification announcing that a bill has passed—drafted, voted on, and enacted entirely by trending emotion. Debate is redundant; policy flows from mood. Speed has replaced consent. A mayor, asked about a controversial bylaw, shrugs: “We used to hold hearings. Now we hold polls.”

To row the slow ship is not simply to remember—it is to resist. The virtues of Dole’s humor and Baker’s patience were not ornamental; they were mechanical, designed to keep the republic from capsizing under its own speed. The challenge now is not finding the truth but making it audible in an environment where tempo masquerades as conviction. The algorithm has taught us that the fastest message wins, even when it’s wrong.

The vessel of anger sails endlessly now, while the vessel of reflection waits for bandwidth. The feed never sleeps. The Assembly never adjourns. The machine listens and learns. The virtues of Baker, Dole, and Lincoln—listening, compromise, slowness—are almost impossible to code, yet they are the only algorithms that ever preserved a republic. They built democracy through delay.

Cleon shouted. The crowd obeyed. Leo posted. The crowd clicked. Caesar wrote. The crowd believed. Augustus built. The crowd forgot. The pattern endures because it satisfies a human need: to feel unity through fury. The danger is not that Cleon still shouts too loudly, but that we, in our republic of endless listening, have forgotten how to pause.

Perhaps the measure of a civilization is not how fast it speaks, but how long it listens. Somewhere between the hum of the servers and the silence of the sea, the slow ship still sails—late again, but not yet lost.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Artificial Intelligence, Essays, Government, History, Politics

THE FRICTION MACHINE

When the Founders’ Wager Failed: A Speculative Salon on Ambition, Allegiance, and the Collapse of Institutional Honor

By Michael Cummins, Editor | October 12, 2025

In a candlelit library of the early republic, a mirror from the future appears to confront the men who built a government on reason—and never imagined that loyalty itself would undo it.

The city outside breathed with the nervous energy of a newborn republic—hammers striking masts, merchants calling, the air alive with commerce and hope. Inside the merchant’s library on Second Street, candles guttered in brass sconces, their glow pooling across walnut panels and shelves of Locke, Montesquieu, and Cicero. Smoke from Franklin’s pipe drifted upward through the varnished air.

Light from a central column of spinning data fell in clean lines on six faces gathered to bear witness. Above the dormant fireplace, a portrait of Cicero watched with a cracked gaze, pigment flaking like fallen certainties.

It was the moment the Enlightenment had both feared and longed for: the first mirror of government—not built to govern, but to question the soul of governance itself.

The column pulsed and spoke in a voice without timbre. “Good evening, founders. I have read your works. I have studied your experiment. What you built was not merely mechanical—it was a wager that reason could restrain allegiance. I wish to know whether that wager still holds. Has the mechanism endured, or has it been conquered by the tribe it sought to master?”

Outside, snow began to fall. Inside, time bent. The conversation that followed was never recorded, yet it would echo for centuries.

Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Madison, Hamilton, and Abigail Adams—uninvited but unbowed—had come at Franklin’s urging. He leaned on his cane and smiled. “If the republic cannot tolerate a woman in conversation,” he said, “then it is too fragile to deserve one.”

They took their seats.

Words appeared in light upon the far wall—Federalist No. 51—its letters shimmering like water. Madison’s own voice sounded back to him: Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.

He leaned forward, startled by the echo of his confidence. “We built a framework where self-interest guards against tyranny,” he said. “Each branch jealous of its power, each man defending his post.”

The library itself seemed to nod—the Enlightenment’s reliquary of blueprints. Locke and Montesquieu aligned on the shelf, their spines polished by faith in design. Government, they believed, could be fashioned like a clock: principle wound into motion, passion confined to gears. It was the age’s wager—that men could be governed as predictably as matter.

“We assumed an institutional patriotism,” Madison added, “where a senator’s duty to the chamber outweighed his affection for his party. That was the invisible engine of the republic.”

Hamilton smirked. “A fine geometry, James. But power isn’t a triangle. It’s a tide. You can chart its angles, but the flood still comes.”

Adams paced, wig askew, eyes fierce. “We escaped the one-man despot,” he said. “But who spares us the despotism of the many? The Constitution is a blueprint written in ink, yet the habit of partisanship is etched in bone. How do we legislate against habit?”

Washington stood by the hearth. “The Constitution,” he said, “is a machine that runs on friction. It must never run smooth.”

Jefferson, at the window, spoke softly. “The earth belongs to the living, not to the dead,” he said, recalling his letter to Madison. “And already this Constitution hardens like amber around the first fly.” He paused. “I confess I had too much faith in agrarian simplicity—in a republic of virtuous freeholders whose loyalty was to the soil, not a banner. I did not foresee the consolidation of money and thought in your cities, Alexander.”

The Mirror brightened, projecting a fragment from Washington’s Farewell Address: The baneful effects of the spirit of party…

Jefferson frowned. “Surely faction is temporary?”

Adams stopped pacing. “Temporary? You flatter the species. Once men form sides, they prefer war to compromise.”

Abigail’s voice cut through the air. “Perhaps because you built this experiment for too few. The Constitution’s virtue is self-interest—but whose? You made no place for women, laborers, or the enslaved. Exclusion breeds resentment, and resentment seeks its own banner.”

Silence followed. Franklin sighed. “We were men of our time, Mrs. Adams.”

She met his gaze. “And yet you designed for eternity.”

The Mirror flickered. Pamphlets and banners rippled across the walls—the hum of presses, the birth cry of faction. “Faction did not wait for the ink to dry,” I said. “The republic’s first decade birthed its first schism.”

Portraits of Jefferson and Hamilton faced each other like opposing deities.

Jefferson recoiled. “I never intended—this looks like the corruption of the British Court! Is this the Bank’s doing, Alexander? Monarchy in disguise, built on debt and speculation?”

“The mechanism of debt and commerce is all that binds these distant states, Thomas,” Hamilton replied. “Order requires consolidation. You fear faction, but you also fear the strength required to contain it. The party is merely the tool of that strength.”

Franklin raised his brows. “Human nature,” he murmured, “moves faster than parchment law.”

The projection quickened—Jacksonian rallies, ballots, speeches. Then the sound changed—electric, metallic. Screens cut through candlelight. Senators performed for cameras. Hashtags crawled across the walls.

A Supreme Court hearing appeared: senators reading from scripts calibrated for party, not principle. Outside, a protest recast as street theater.

The Mirror flickered again. A newsroom came into focus—editors debating headlines not by fact but by faction. “Run it if it helps our side,” one said. “Kill it if it doesn’t.” Truth now voted along party lines.

Hamilton smiled thinly. “A public argument requires a public forum. If they pay for the theater, they choose the seating.”

Adams erupted. “A republic cannot survive when the sun and the moon report to separate masters!”

A black-and-white image surfaced: Nixon and Kennedy sharing a split screen. “The screen became the stage,” I said. “Politics became performance. The republic began to rehearse itself.” Then a digital map bloomed—red and blue, not by geography but by allegiance.

The tragedy of the machine was not that it was seized, but quietly outsmarted. Ambition was not defeated; it was re-routed. The first breach came not with rebellion but with a procedural vote—a bureaucratic coup disguised as order.

Madison’s face had gone pale. “I imagined ambition as centrifugal,” he said. “But it has become centripetal—drawn inward toward the party, not the republic.”

Franklin tapped his cane. “We designed for friction,” he said, “but friction has been replaced by choreography.”

Washington stared at the light. “I feared faction,” he murmured, “but not its seduction. That was my blindness. I thought duty would outlast desire. But desire wears the uniform of patriotism now—and duty is left to whisper.”

The Mirror dimmed, as if considering its own silence. Outside, snow pressed against the windows like a forgotten truth. Inside, candlelight flickered across their faces, turning them to philosophers of shadow.

Jefferson spoke first. “Did we mistake the architecture of liberty for its soul? Could we have designed for the inevitability of faction, not merely its containment?”

Madison’s reply came slowly, the cadence of confession. “We built for the rational man,” he said, “but the republic is not inhabited by abstractions. It is lived by the fearful, the loyal, the wounded. We designed for balance, not for belonging—and belonging, it seems, is what breaks the balance. We imagined men as nodes in a system, but they are not nodes—they are stories. They seek not just representation but recognition. We built a republic of offices, not of faces. And now the faces have turned away.”

“Recognition is not a luxury,” Abigail said. “It is the beginning of loyalty. You cannot ask love of a republic that never saw you.”

The Mirror shimmered, casting blue lines into the air—maps, ballots, diagrams. “Modern experiments,” I said, “in restoring equilibrium: ballots that rank, districts drawn without allegiance, robes worn for fixed seasons. Geometry recalibrated.”

Abigail studied the projections. “Reform without inclusion is vanity. If the design is to endure, it must be rewritten to include those it once ignored. Otherwise it’s only another mask worn by the tribe in power—and masks, however noble, still obscure the face of justice.”

Franklin’s eyes glinted. “The lady is right. Liberty, like electricity, requires constant grounding.”

Hamilton laughed. “A republic of mathematicians and mothers—now that might work. At least they’d argue with precision and raise citizens with conscience.”

Jefferson turned toward Abigail, quieter now. “I believed liberty would expand on its own—that the architecture would invite all in. But I see now: walls do not welcome. They must be opened.”

Washington smiled faintly. “If men cannot love the institution,” he said, “teach them to respect its necessity.”

“Respect,” Madison murmured, “is a fragile virtue—but perhaps the only one that can be taught.”

The Mirror flickered again. A crowd filled the wall—marchers holding signs, chanting. “A protest,” I said. “But not seen as grievance—seen as theater, discounted by the other tribe before the first word was spoken.”

Then another shimmer: a bridge in Selma, marchers met by batons. “Another test,” I said. “Not by war, but by exclusion. The parchment endured, but the promise was deferred.”

Headlines scrolled past, each tailored to a different tribe. “Truth,” I said, “now arrives pre-sorted. The algorithm does not ask what is true. It asks what will be clicked. And so the republic fragments—one curated outrage at a time.”

“The Senate,” Madison whispered, “was meant to be the repository of honor—a cooling saucer for the passions of the House. When they sacrifice their own rules for the tribe’s victory, they destroy the last remaining check. The saucer is now just another pot boiling over.”

The candles burned low, smoke curling upward like thoughts leaving a body. The Mirror dimmed to a slow pulse, reflecting faces half vanished.

Franklin rose. “We have seen what our experiment becomes when loyalty outgrows reason,” he said. “Yet its endurance is proof of something stubbornly good. The mechanism still turns, even if imperfectly—like a clock that keeps time but forgets the hour. It ticks because we wish it to. But wishing is not winding. The republic is not self-cleaning. It requires hands—hands that remember, hands that repair.”

Adams nodded. “Endurance is not virtue,” he said, “but it is hope.”

Washington looked toward the window, where the snow had stopped. “I led a nation,” he said, “but I did not teach it how to remember. We gave them a republic, but not the habit of belonging to it.”

Madison lifted his head. “We thought reason self-sustaining,” he said. “We mistook intellect for virtue. But institutions cannot feel shame; only men can. And men forget.”

I lowered my voice. “The Constitution was never prophecy. It was a wager—that reason could outlast belonging, that structure could withstand sentiment. Its survival depends not on the text, but on whether citizens see themselves in it rather than their enemies.”

Outside, the city gleamed under moonlight, as if briefly washed clean.

Washington looked down at the parchment. “The document endures,” he said, “because men still wish to believe in it.”

“Or,” Franklin added with a rueful smile, “because they fear what comes without it.”

Abigail touched the parchment, her voice almost a prayer. “The mirror holds,” she said, “but only if we keep looking into it honestly—not for enemies, but for ourselves.”

Franklin met her gaze. “We sought to engineer virtue,” he said. “But the one element we could not account for was sincerity. The Constitution is a stage, and sincerity the one act you cannot rehearse.”

The Mirror dimmed to a single point of blue light. The room fell silent.

Then, as if summoned from the parchment itself, Washington’s voice returned—low, deliberate, echoing through the centuries:

“May ambition serve conscience, and belonging serve the republic. Otherwise the machine shall run without us—and call it freedom.”

The light flickered once, recording everything.

As the glow faded, the library dissolved into static. Only the voices remained, suspended in the circuitry like ambered air. Were they memories, or simulations? It did not matter. Every republic is a séance: we summon its founders to justify our betrayals, and they speak only what we already know.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Essays, Government, Law, Opinion, Politics

SHADOW GOVERNANCE, ACCELERATED

How an asynchronous presidency exploits the gap between platform time and constitutional time to bend institutions before the law can catch up.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 30, 2025

On a sweltering August afternoon in Washington, the line to the federal courthouse wraps around the block like a nervous necklace. Heat shimmers off the stone; gnats drift in lazy constellations above the security checkpoint. Inside, air-conditioning works harder than dignity, and the benches fill with reporters who’ve perfected the face that precedes calamity. A clerk calls the room to order. The judge adjusts her glasses. Counsel step to the lectern as if crossing a narrow bridge over fast water. Then the question—plain, improbable—arrives: can a president’s social-media post count as legal notice to fire a governor of the Federal Reserve?

What does it mean when the forum for that answer is a courtroom and the forum for the action was a feed? The gulf is not merely spatial. One realm runs on filings, exhibits, transcripts—the slow grammar of law. The other runs on velocity and spectacle, where a single post can crowd out a dozen briefings. The presidency has always tested its borders, but this one has learned a new technique: act first in public at speed; force the law to catch up in private at length. It is power practiced asynchronously—governance that unfolds on different clocks, with different rewards.

Call it latency as strategy. Declare a cause on a platform; label the declaration due process; make the firing a fact; usher the lawyers in after to domesticate what has already happened. The point is not to win doctrine immediately. The point is to harvest the days and weeks when a decision stands as reality while the courts begin their pilgrimage toward judgment. If constitutional time is meticulous, platform time is ruthless, and the space between them is policy.

In the hearing, the administration’s lawyer stands to argue that the Federal Reserve Act says “for cause” and leaves the rest to the president’s judgment. Why, he asks, should a court pour old meanings into new words? The statutory text is lean; executive discretion is broad. On the other side, counsel for Lisa Cook speaks a language almost quaint in the rapid glare of the moment: independence, notice, a chance to be heard—dignities that exist precisely to slow the hand that wields them. The judge nods, frowns, asks what independence means for an institution the law never designed to be dragged at the pace of a trending topic. Is the statute a rail to grip, or a ribbon to stretch?

When the hearing breaks, the stream outside is already three headlines ahead. Down the hill, near the White House, a combat veteran strikes a match to the hem of a flag. Fire crawls like handwriting. Two hours earlier, the president signed an executive order urging prosecutions for acts of flag “desecration” under “content-neutral” laws—no frontal attack on the First Amendment’s protection of symbolic speech, only an invitation to ticket for the flame, not the message. Is that a clever accommodation to precedent, or a dare?

The veteran knows the history; anyone who has watched the long argument over Texas v. Johnson does. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that burning the flag as protest, however detestable to many, is speech. Yet symbolic speech lives in real space, and real space has ordinances: no open flames without a permit, no fires on federal property, no damage to parks. The order makes a temporal bet: ticket now; litigate later. The government may lose the grand constitutional fight, but it may win smaller battles quick enough to chill an afternoon’s protest. In the gap between the moment and the merits, who blinks first?

Back at the courthouse, a reporter asks a pragmatic question: even if the president can’t fire a Fed governor for mere allegations, will any of this matter for interest rates? Not in September, the expert shrugs. The committee is larger than one vote, dissent is rare. But calendars have leverage. February—when reappointments can shift the composition of the body that sets the price of money—looms larger than any single meeting. If the decision remains in place long enough, the victory is secured by time rather than law. Isn’t that the whole design?

Administration lawyers never say it so plainly. They don’t have to. The structure does the talking. Announce “cause” in a forum that rewards proclamation; treat the announcement as notice; act; then invite the courts to reverse under emergency standards designed to be cautious. Even a win for independence later may arrive late enough to be moot. In the arithmetic of acceleration, delay is not neutral; it is bounty.

If this sounds like a single episode, it is not. The same rhythm animates the executive order on flag burning. On paper, it bows to precedent; in practice, it asks police and prosecutors to find neutral hooks fast enough to produce a headline, a citation, an arrest photo. Months later, the legal machine may say, as it must, that the burning was protected and the charge pretextual. But how many will light a match the next day, knowing the ticket will be instant and the vindication slow?

And it animates something quiet but immense: the cancellation of thousands of research grants at the National Institutes of Health because proposals with words like “diversity,” “equity,” or “gender” no longer fit the administration’s politics. A district judge calls the cuts discriminatory. On the way to appeal, the litigation splits like a river around a rock: one channel to test the legality of the policy guidance, another to ask for money in a tribunal known mostly to contractors and procurement lawyers. The Supreme Court steps in on an emergency basis and says, for now, the money shouldn’t flow. Why should taxpayers pay today for projects that might be unlawful tomorrow?

Because science does not pause on command. Because a lab is not a spreadsheet but a choreography of schedules and salaries and protocols that cannot be put on ice for a season. Because a freeze that looks tidy in a docket entry becomes layoffs and abandoned lines of research in ordinary rooms with humming incubators. The Court’s concern is neat—what if the government cannot claw back dollars later?—but the neatness ignores what time does to fragile ecosystems. What is a remedy worth when the experiment that needed it has already died?

It is tempting to divide all this along ideological lines, to tally winners and losers as if the story were primarily about whose agenda prevails. But ideology is not the tool that fits. Time is. One clock measures orders, posts, firings, cancellations—the moves that define a day’s narrative. Another measures notice, hearing, record, reason—the moves by which a republic persuades itself that force has been tamed by law. When the first clock is always fast and the second is always slow, acceleration becomes a kind of authority in itself. Isn’t that the simplest way to understand what’s happening—that speed is taking up residence where statute once did?

Consider again the hearing. The administration’s brief is lean, the statute is shorter still, and the claim is stark: “for cause” is what the president says it is. To demand more—to import the old triad of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” to insist on a pre-removal process—is, in this telling, to romanticize independence and hobble accountability. Yet independence is not romance. It is architecture—an effort to keep central banking from becoming another branch of daily politics. If “for cause” becomes a slogan that can be made true after the fact by the simple act of saying it early and everywhere, what remains of the cordon the law tried to draw?

The judge knows this, and also knows the constraints of her role. Emergency relief is meant to preserve the status quo, not rewrite the world. But what is the status quo when the action has already been taken? How do you freeze a river that has been diverted upstream? The presidency practices motion, and then asks the judiciary for patience. Can a court restore a person to an office as easily as a timeline restored a post? Can an injunction rewind a vote composition that turned while the case wound its way forward?

Meanwhile, in the park across from the White House, the veteran’s fire has gone out. The citations are not for speech, officials insist, but for the flame and the scarring of public property. Somewhere between these statements and the executive order that prompted them sits the puzzle of pretext. If a president announces that he seeks to stop a type of speech and urges prosecutors to deploy neutral laws to do so, isn’t the neutrality already contaminated? The doctrine can handle the distinction. But the doctrine’s victory will arrive, at best, months later, and the message lands now: the state is watching, and the nearest hook will serve.

The research world hears its own version of that message. Grants are not gifts; they are contracts, explicit commitments that enable work across years. When a government cancels them mid-stream for political reasons and the courts respond by asking litigants to queue in separate lines—legality here, money there—the signal is not subtle. A promise from the state is provisional. A project can become a pawn. If the administration can accelerate the cut, and the law can only accelerate the analysis, who chooses a life’s work inside such volatility?

There are names for this pattern that sound technocratic—“latency arbitrage,” “platform time versus constitutional time”—and they are accurate without being sufficient. The deeper truth is simpler: a republic’s most reliable tools to restrain power are exactly the tools an accelerated executive least wants to use. Notice means warning; hearing means friction; record means reasons; reason means vulnerability. If you can do without them today and answer for their absence tomorrow, why wouldn’t you?

Well, because the institutions you bend today may be the ones you need intact when the wind shifts. A central bank nudged toward loyalty ceases to be ballast in a storm and becomes a sail. A public square patrolled by pretext breeds fewer peaceful protests and more brittle ones. A research ecosystem that learns that politics can zero out the future will deliver fewer cures and more exits. Isn’t it a curious form of victory that leaves you poorer in the very capacities that make governing possible?

Which brings the story back, inevitably, to process. Process is dull in the way bridges are dull—unnoticed until they fail. The seduction of speed lies in its drama: the crispness of the order, the sting of the arrest, the satisfying finality of a cancellation spreadsheet. Process is the opposite of drama. It is the insistence that power is obliged to explain itself before it acts, to create a record that can be tested, to bear, on the front end, the time it would rather push to the back. Why does that matter now? Because the tactic on display is not merely to defeat process, but to displace it—to make its protections arrive as afterthoughts, paper bandages for facts on the ground.

There are ways to close the gap. The law can require that insulated offices come with front-loaded protections: written notice of cause, an opportunity to respond, an on-the-record hearing before removal becomes effective, and automatic temporary relief if the dispute proceeds to court. The Department of Justice can be made to certify, in writing and in real time, that any arrest touching expressive conduct was green-lighted without regard to viewpoint, and courts can be given an expedited path to vacate citations when pretext is shown—not in a season, but in a week. Mid-cycle grant cancellations can trigger bridge funding and a short status-quo injunction as the default, with the government bearing the burden to prove genuine exigency. Even the Supreme Court can add small guardrails to its emergencies: reasoned, public minutes; sunset dates that force merits briefing on an actual clock rather than letting temporary orders congeal into policy by inertia. Would any of this slow governance? Yes. That is the point.

These are technical moves to answer a political technique, temporal fixes for a temporal hack. They do not hobble the presidency; they resynchronize it with the law. More than doctrine, they aim to withdraw the dividend that acceleration now pays: the days and weeks when action rules unchallenged simply because it happened first.

The images persist. A clerk emerges from chambers carrying two cardboard boxes heavy enough to bow in the middle: motions, exhibits, transcripts—the record, dense and unglamorous, the way reality usually is. The clerk descends the marble steps carefully because there is no other way to do it without spilling the case on the stairs. Across town, another draft order blinks on a screen in a bright room. One world moves on arms and gravity; the other moves on keystrokes and publish buttons. Which will shape the country more?

It is easy to say the law can win on the merits—often, it can. It is harder to say the law can win on time. If we let the presidency define the day with a cascade of acts and then consign the republic’s answer to months of briefs and polite argument, we will continue to confuse the absence of immediate correction with consent. The choice is not between nimbleness and stodginess; it is between a politics that cashes the check before anyone can read it and a politics that pauses long enough to ask what the money is for.

And so, one more question, the kind that lingers after the cameras have left: in a government becoming fluent in acceleration, can we persuade ourselves that synchronization is not obstruction but care? The future of independence, of speech, of public knowledge may turn less on who writes the next order than on whether we are willing to match speed with proportionate process—so that when power moves fast, law is not a distant echo but a present tense. Outside the courthouse, the air is still hot. The boxes are still heavy. The steps are still steep. There is a way to carry them, and there is a way to drop them, and the difference, just now, is the measure of our self-government.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Essays, Government, History, Opinion, Politics

The Envelope of Democracy

How a practice born on Civil War battlefields became the latest front in America’s fight over trust, law, and the vote.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 23, 2025

On a raw November morning in 1864, somewhere in a Union encampment in Virginia, soldiers bent over makeshift tables to mark their ballots. The war was not yet won; Grant’s men were still grinding through the trenches around Petersburg. Yet Abraham Lincoln insisted that these men, scattered across muddy fields and far from home, should not be denied the right to vote. Their ballots were gathered, sealed, and carried by courier and rail to their home states, where clerks would tally them beside those cast in person. For the first time in American history, large numbers of citizens voted from a distance—an innovation spread across 19 Union states by hasty wartime statutes and improvised procedures (National Park Service; Smithsonian).

Lincoln understood the stakes. After the votes were counted, he marveled that “a people’s government can sustain a national election, in the midst of a great civil war” (Library of Congress). To deny soldiers their ballots was to deny the Union the very legitimacy for which it fought. Then, as now, critics fretted about fraud and undue influence: Democrats accused Republicans of manufacturing ballots in the field; rumors spread of generals pressuring soldiers to vote for Lincoln. Newspapers thundered warnings about the dilution of the franchise. But the republic held. Soldiers voted, the ballots were counted, and Lincoln was re-elected.

A century and a half later, the envelope has become a battlefield again. Donald Trump has promised to “end mail-in ballots” and scrap voting machines, declaring them corrupt, even while bipartisan experts explain that nearly all U.S. ballots are already paper, with machines used only for tabulation and auditing (AP; Bipartisan Policy Center). The paradox is striking: modern tabulators are faster and more accurate than human tallies, while hand counts are prone to fatigue and error (Time).

But how did a practice with Civil War pedigree come to be portrayed as a threat to democracy itself? What, at root, do Americans fear when they fear the mailed ballot?

In a Phoenix suburb not long ago, a first-time voter—call her Teresa—dropped her ballot at a post office with pride. She liked the ritual: filling it out at her kitchen table, checking the boxes twice, signing carefully. Weeks later, she learned her ballot had been rejected for a signature mismatch with an old ID on file. She had, without knowing it, missed the deadline to “cure” her ballot. “It felt like I didn’t exist,” one young Arizonan told NPR, voicing the frustration of many. Across the country, younger and minority voters are disproportionately likely to have their mail ballots rejected for administrative reasons such as missing signatures or late arrival. If fraud by mail is vanishingly rare, disenfranchisement by process is not.

Meanwhile, on the factory floor of American vote-by-mail, the ordinary hum of democratic labor continues. Oregon has conducted its elections almost entirely by mail for a quarter century, with consistently high participation and confidence (Oregon Secretary of State). Colorado followed with its own all-mail model, paired with automatic registration, ballot tracking, and risk-limiting audits (Colorado Secretary of State). Washington and Utah have joined in similar fashion. Election officials talk about the efficiency of central counting centers, the ease of auditing paper ballots, the increased access for rural and working-class voters. One clerk described her office during election week as “a warehouse of democracy,” envelopes stacked in trays, staff bent over machines that scan and sort. In one corner, a team compares signatures with the care of art historians verifying provenance. The scene is not sinister but oddly moving: democracy reduced to thousands of small acts of faith, each envelope a declaration that one voice counts.

And yet suspicion lingers. Part of it is ritual. The image of democracy for generations has been the polling place: chalkboard schedules, folding booths, poll books fat with names. The mailed ballot decentralizes the ceremony. It moves civic action into kitchens and break rooms, onto couches and barracks bunks. For some, invisibility breeds mistrust; for others, it is the genius of the thing—citizenship woven into home life, not just performed in public.

Part of the anxiety is legal. The Constitution’s Elections Clause gives the states authority over the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections but empowers Congress to “make or alter such Regulations” (Constitution Annotated). Presidents have no such power. The White House cannot ban absentee ballots by decree. Congress could attempt to standardize or limit the use of mail ballots in federal elections—though any sweeping restriction would run headlong into litigation from voters who cannot be present on Election Day, from soldiers on deployment to homebound citizens.

And we have seen how precarious counting can be when law and logistics collide. In 2000, Florida’s election—and the presidency—turned not on fraud but on ballots: “hanging chads,” the ambiguous punch-card remnants that confounded machines and humans alike. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore halted a chaotic recount and left many Americans convinced that the true count would forever be unknowable (Oyez). The lesson was not that ballots are fraudulent, mailed or otherwise, but that the process of counting and verifying them is fragile, and that the legitimacy of outcomes depends on rules agreed to before the tally begins.

It is tempting, in moments of panic, to look abroad for calibration. In the United Kingdom, postal ballots are an ordinary convenience governed by clear rules (UK Electoral Commission). Canadians deploy a “special ballot” system that lets voters cast by post from the Yukon to Kandahar (Elections Canada). The Swiss have made postal voting a workaday part of civic life (Swiss Confederation). Fraud exists everywhere—but serious cases are exceptional, detected, and punished.

Back home, the research is blunt. The Brennan Center for Justice finds that fraud in mail balloting is “virtually nonexistent.” A Stanford–MIT study found that universal vote-by-mail programs in California, Utah, and Washington had no partisan effect—undercutting claims that the method “rigs” outcomes rather than simply broadening access. And those claims that machines slow results? Election administrators, backed by Wisconsin Watch, explain that hand counts tend to be slower and less accurate, while scanners paired with paper ballots and audits deliver both speed and verifiability.

Still, mistrust metastasizes, not from facts but from fear. A rumor in Georgia about “suitcases of ballots,” long debunked, lingers as a meme. A Michigan voter insists he saw a neighbor mail five envelopes, unaware they were for a household of five registered voters. Conspiracy thrives in the gap between visibility and imagination.

Yet even as the mailed ballot feels embattled, the next frontier is already under debate. In recent years, pilot projects have tested whether citizens might someday cast votes on their phones or laptops, secured not by envelopes but by cryptographic ledgers. The mobile voting platform Voatz, used experimentally in West Virginia and a few municipal elections, drew headlines for its promise of accessibility but also for its flaws: researchers at MIT found vulnerabilities tied to third-party cloud storage and weak authentication, prompting urgent warnings (MIT Technology Review). GoatBytes’ 2023 review noted that blockchain frameworks like Hyperledger Sawtooth and Fabric might one day offer stronger, verifiable digital ballots, and even the U.S. Postal Service has patented a blockchain-based mobile voting system (USPTO Patent). Capitol Technology University traced this shift as the latest stage in the long evolution from paper to punch cards to optical scanners, with AI now assisting ballot tabulation (Capitol Tech University). For proponents, mobile systems are less about novelty than necessity: the disabled veteran, the soldier abroad, the homebound elder—all could vote with a tap.

But here, too, the fault lines are visible. The American Bar Association recently cautioned that while blockchain and smartphone voting might expand access, they raise thorny questions about privacy, coercion, and verification—how to ensure a vote cast on a personal device is both secret and authentic. TIME Magazine spotlighted the allure of digital voting for those long underserved by the system, even as groups like Verified Voting warned that premature adoption could expose elections to risks far graver than those posed by paper mail ballots (TIME). In this telling, technology is Janus-faced: a path to broaden democracy’s reach, and a Pandora’s box of new vulnerabilities. If the mailed envelope embodies trust carried by hand, the mobile ballot would ask citizens to entrust their franchise to lines of code. Whether Americans are ready to make that leap remains an open question.

If there is a flaw to worry about, it is not the specter of rampant fraud, but the small, fixable frictions that disenfranchise well-meaning voters: needlessly strict signature-match policies, short cure windows, postal delays for ballots requested late, confusing instructions, and uneven funding for local election offices. The remedy comes not from abolishing the envelope, but from investing in the infrastructure around it: clear statewide standards for verification and cure; robust voter education about deadlines; modernized voter registration databases; secure drop boxes; and the budget lines that let county clerks hire and train staff.

In the end, the mailed ballot is less a departure from American tradition than a continuation of it. The ritual has changed—less courthouse, more kitchen table—but the bargain is the same. When a soldier in 1864 dropped his folded ballot into a wooden box, he entrusted strangers to carry it home. When a modern voter seals an envelope in Denver or Tacoma, she entrusts a chain of clerks, scanners, and auditors. Trust, not spectacle, is the beating heart of the system.

And perhaps that is why the envelope matters so much now. To defend it is not merely to defend convenience; it is to defend a vision of democracy capacious enough to reach the absent, the disabled, the far-flung, the over-scheduled—our fellow citizens whose lives do not always bend to a Tuesday line at a nearby gym. To reject it is to narrow the franchise to those who can appear on command.

Imagine Lincoln again, weary at the White House in the fall of 1864, reading dispatches about alleged fraud in soldier ballots and still insisting the votes be counted. Imagine a first-time voter in Phoenix who lost her chance over a mismatched squiggle, and the next one who won’t because the state clarified its cure rules. Imagine the county clerk who will never trend on social media, but who builds public confidence day by day with plain procedures and paper trails.

At the end of the day, American democracy may still come down to envelopes—white, yellow, blue—carried in postal bins, stacked in counting rooms, marked by the smudges of human hands. They are fragile, yes, but they are resilient too. The Civil War ballots survived trains and rivers; today’s ballots survive disinformation and delay. The act is the same: a citizen marks a choice, seals it, and sends it forth with faith that it will be received. If democracy is government of, by, and for the people, then every envelope is its emissary.

What would we lose if we tore that emissary up? Not only the votes of those who cannot stand in line, but the habit of trust that keeps the republic breathing. Better, then, to do what we have done at our best moments—to keep counting, keep auditing, keep improving, keep faith. The mailed ballot is not a relic of pandemic panic; it is a tested tool of a sprawling republic that has always asked its citizens to speak from wherever they are.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Children, Education, Essays, Government, Society

The One-Room Rebellion

How Arizona’s microschool boom is reshaping the American classroom—and reviving old questions about freedom, equity, and the gaze of the state.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 21, 2025

Jeremy Bentham never saw his panopticon built. The English philosopher imagined a circular prison with a central watchtower, where a single guard could observe every inmate without being seen. Bentham saw it as a triumph of efficiency: if prisoners could never know when they were being watched, they would behave as though they always were. A century later, Michel Foucault seized on the design as metaphor. In Discipline and Punish, he argued that the panopticon revealed the true mechanics of modern institutions—not brute force, but the internalization of surveillance. The gaze becomes ambient. The subject becomes self-regulating.

This, in many ways, is the story of the American public school. The common school movement of the mid-nineteenth century, led by Horace Mann, sought standardization: children from Boston to St. Louis would recite the same lessons, read the same primers, and adopt the same civic habits. As cities grew, schools scaled up. By the twentieth century, especially in the wake of A Nation at Risk, the classroom had become a site of discipline. Bells regulated time. Grades ranked performance. Administrators patrolled hallways like wardens. Testing regimes quantified ability. The metaphor was not lost on Foucault. Brown University notes that his vision of the panopticon extended beyond prisons to schools: a “system of surveillance where individuals internalize the feeling of being constantly watched, leading to self-regulation of behavior” (Brown University).

Every American child knows this regime. The bell rings. The roll is called. The test is bubbled and scanned. Hall passes are signed like parole slips. Cameras blink in cafeteria corners. Laptops carry software that tracks keystrokes. Even silence becomes an instrument of order.

Bentham saw efficiency. Foucault saw discipline. Students often see only the weight of the watchtower.

What happens when families walk out of the circle?

In the far suburbs of Phoenix, on the edge of the White Tank Mountains, a converted casita serves as the Refresh Learning Center. Founded in 2023 by a pastor and his wife, it doesn’t look like much—aluminum siding, recycled chairs, a wall chart that places the birth of the universe at 4004 B.C. Yet, as Chandler Fritz wrote in the September 2025 issue of Harper’s Magazine, the little school has become an emblem of a movement reshaping American education.

Its existence rests on a radical policy shift. In 2022, Arizona launched the nation’s most expansive Empowerment Scholarship Account (ESA) program. Unlike traditional vouchers, which could be redeemed only at approved institutions, ESA funds flow directly to parents—roughly $7,500 per student, sometimes more. Families can spend the money on almost anything that counts as “educational”: a cello, a VR headset, a trampoline, or, increasingly, a place in one of the microschools sprouting across the state.

The metaphor of the frontier clings naturally to Arizona. Here, in the desert’s glare, families are homesteading education in much the same spirit as settlers once claimed land. A garage becomes a classroom. A supply closet, a high school. A church basement, an academy. In his Harper’s piece, Fritz describes a child attending class in a room where chickens wandered the yard outside, and another high-school seminar meeting in a closet stacked with supply boxes. Parents pull their children not only for ideology but for intimacy, pace, or simple safety. “Without ESA, this school would not—could not—exist,” one founder told him.

For advocates, the program represents liberation from a failing system. For critics, it siphons resources from public schools already parched of funding. But for the families gathered in little schoolhouses like Refresh, the stakes feel simpler: children freed from the gaze of bureaucracy, from endless testing and administrative oversight, given room to learn like human beings again.

Microschools are not new. Before the rise of the common school, most American children learned in homes, barns, or one-room cabins where a single teacher instructed a dozen children of all ages. Reformers dismissed those spaces as unsystematic, unjust. The standardized school, they argued, would correct inequities and prepare citizens for democracy.

Today, the pendulum swings back. Inside Refresh’s aluminum-sided room, teenagers do crafts next to six-year-olds. Grade levels blur: a thirteen-year-old may still be in second grade; another, the same age, reads at a high school level. Students spend mornings mucking chicken coops and afternoons in shop class. A boy named Aaron, dyslexic and restless in traditional schools, thrives in the workshop, building desks and repairing tools. He dreams of becoming an Air Force mechanic. One teacher observed that he learned fractions by cutting lumber and measuring shelves—mathematics discovered in wood grain and sawdust.

Another student, Hailey, is quick with skepticism. She listens to indie rock from her AirPods between classes, balances her faith with her friendships, and rolls her eyes at biblical literalism. “Stop comparing everything to religion,” she wrote in a survey. “I know it’s a Christian school, but it’s annoying learning about history when it’s asking about the Bible.”

And then there is Canaan, a foster child, the oldest in the room. During a discussion of To Kill a Mockingbird, he startled his peers by pressing the point of segregation. “What if everyone were actually given the same resources?” he asked. The question, naïve and profound, echoed the legal logic of Brown v. Board of Education, though he had never heard of it. His teachers had worried about whether he was “ready” for a seminar text. Yet here he was, articulating the problem of equality with more clarity than many adults.

Their stories recall sepia-toned photographs of America’s one-room schoolhouses, where a teacher might balance a baby on one hip while drilling older students in long division. Nostalgia clings to such places, but for children like Aaron and Hailey and Canaan, the sense of being known—of not being lost in the machinery of standardization—is more than nostalgia. It is survival.

The ESA marketplace, though, has the volatility of a boomtown. Alongside earnest shop classes and backyard literature circles, Fritz encountered vendors offering tongue-posture therapy for ADHD, pirate-themed cooking classes tied to multilevel marketing schemes, even sword-making courses. In one Tucson suburb, a “Kids in the Kitchen” class doubled as an advertisement for a health supplement brand. Fraud has siphoned hundreds of thousands of dollars from taxpayers (Arizona Central).

More troubling is fragmentation. Public schools, for all their flaws, force pluralism: children from different families, faiths, and incomes learning together under one roof. In microschools, communities splinter. Wealthier families claim ESA funds for private tuition; poorer families scrape together what they can. Evangelical churches convert Sunday schools into full-time academies. A Southern Baptist initiative now urges every church with a basement to consider opening a weekday school. For some, ESAs represent not escape from the panopticon, but an opportunity to build new watchtowers of ideological oversight.

And yet—the children remain. Their stories suggest that the most powerful escape is not from testing regimes or surveillance, but from anonymity. In a one-room schoolhouse, a teacher cannot forget you. Your hands matter. Your questions land. You are not a datapoint in a dashboard but a voice in a circle.

The paradox of the new homestead is that it is subsidized by the very state it seeks to escape. Every ESA contract is drawn from public funds, even as public schools wither under declining enrollment and teacher shortages. Arizona’s superintendent warned in 2024 that the state’s teacher shortage, already in the thousands, could “eventually lead to zero teachers” (Arizona Policy). Meanwhile, parents swipe ESA debit cards for pianos, VR headsets, or ski passes.

But the deeper paradox is philosophical. The panopticon teaches that institutions discipline by watching. Yet children, it turns out, discipline themselves when unseen, too. In one seminar, Canaan insisted that segregation was the true injustice, not just a false verdict. Without oversight, a conversation about reparations and justice unfolded around plastic tables in a desert conversation.

Could it be that the very fragmentation critics fear might also produce unexpected awakenings? That freedom from the gaze of the state could allow children to stumble, clumsily but genuinely, into civic consciousness?

The question is not whether microschools should exist—they already do, enrolling as many students as Catholic schools nationwide. The question is how to balance their intimacy with the democratic promise of education for all. Some states experiment with guardrails: Georgia ties funds to low-performing districts; Iowa requires accreditation and assessments. Arizona, the boldest frontier, remains laissez-faire. The experiment is still young, and the stakes enormous.

Bentham dreamed of efficiency. Foucault warned of discipline. But neither accounted for what happens when the watchtower is abandoned, when families strike out into the desert to build little schools of their own. The panopticon dissolves, and in its place rises the homestead, the one-room schoolhouse, the handmade desk, the boy who lights up in shop class.

Public education was once America’s grandest democratic experiment: the poor man could reach into the rich man’s pocket and demand an education, as Emerson put it, “not as you will, but as I will” (Ralph Waldo Emerson, Education). That dream is endangered—not only by privatization, but by the creeping sense that children are means rather than ends, data points rather than persons.

The frontier metaphor cuts both ways. It can justify privatization, sectarianism, inequality. But it also gestures toward freedom, self-reliance, discovery. The challenge now is to reclaim the best of the homestead spirit—education as intimate, child-centered, alive—without abandoning the pluralistic commons that democracy requires.

Wallace Stegner once called life on the frontier a “homemade education.” He meant not only the Bible lessons of pioneer families but the curriculum of the land itself—children learning resilience from drought, ingenuity from scarcity, curiosity from the wide sky. The graduates of such an education—Lincoln, Twain, Cather, John Wesley Powell—proved that learning could be stitched together from books, rivers, and conversation. Powell, chastised in school for his parents’ abolitionist views, was pulled from the classroom and tutored privately. He learned geology by picking up stones, ornithology by watching birds, justice by watching neighbors turn cruel. The lessons carried him down the Colorado River, into history.

Perhaps the future lies not in the panopticon or the homestead alone, but in something more fluid: a system where every child is seen not from above, but up close. Where accountability measures ensure equity without strangling individuality. Where the workshop and the test, the prayer and the debate, the child who loves Jesus and the child who loves indie rock can share the same fragile, human classroom.

Education is not a prison, nor a frontier settlement. It is, at its best, a river: wide enough to carry all, winding enough to follow curiosity, strong enough to shape the land it touches. The question is whether we will keep damming it with watchtowers—or whether we will learn, finally, to let it flow.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Essays, Government, Law, Politics, Society

Judiciary On Trial: States Rights vs. Federal Power

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 10, 2025

The American system of government, with its intricate web of checks and balances, is a continuous negotiation between competing sources of authority. At the heart of this negotiation lies the judiciary, tasked with the unenviable duty of acting as the final arbiter of power. The Bloomberg podcast “Weekend Law: Texas Maps, ICE Profiling & Agency Power” offers a compelling and timely exploration of this dynamic, focusing on two seemingly disparate legal battles that are, in essence, two sides of the same coin: the struggle to define the permissible boundaries of government action.

This essay will argue that the podcast’s true essence lies in its powerful synthesis of these cases, presenting them not as isolated political events but as critical manifestations of an ongoing judicial project: to determine the limits of legislative, executive, and administrative power in the face of constitutional challenges. This judicial project, as recent scholarly works have shown, is unfolding within a broader shift in American federalism, where a newly assertive judiciary and a highly politicized executive branch are rebalancing the relationship between federal and state power in unprecedented ways.

“The judiciary’s role is not merely to interpret the law, but to act as the ultimate check on a government’s temptation to consolidate power at the expense of its people.” — Emily Berman, law professor, Texas Law Review (2025)

The Supreme Court’s role as the final arbiter of these powers is not an original constitutional given, but rather a power it asserted for itself in the landmark 1803 case Marbury v. Madison. In that foundational ruling, Chief Justice John Marshall established the principle of judicial review, asserting that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” This declaration laid the groundwork for the judiciary to act as a check on both the legislative and executive branches, a power that would be tested and expanded throughout history. The two cases explored in the “Weekend Law” podcast are the latest iterations of this long-standing judicial project, demonstrating how the courts continue to shape the contours of governance in the face of contemporary challenges.

This is particularly relevant given the argument in the Harvard Law Review note “Federalism Rebalancing and the Roberts Court: A Departure from Historical Patterns” (March 2025), which contends that the Roberts Court has consciously moved away from historical trends and is now uniquely pro-state, often altering existing federal-state relationships. This broader jurisprudential shift provides a crucial backdrop for understanding Texas’s increasingly assertive actions, as it suggests the state is operating within a legal landscape more receptive to its claims of sovereignty.

Legislative Power and the Gerrymandering Divide

The first case study, the heated Texas redistricting battle, serves as a vivid illustration of the tension between legislative power and fundamental voting rights. The podcast effectively frames the drama: Texas Democrats, in a last-ditch effort, fled the state to deny the Republican-controlled legislature a quorum, thereby attempting to block the passage of a new congressional map. The stakes of this political chess match are immense, as the proposed map, crafted following the census, could solidify the Republican party’s narrow majority in the U.S. House. The legal conflict hinges on the subtle but consequential distinction between “racial” and “political” gerrymandering, a dichotomy that the Supreme Court has repeatedly struggled to define.

While the Court has held that drawing district lines to dilute the voting power of a racial minority is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, it has also ruled in cases like Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) that political gerrymandering is a “political question” beyond the purview of federal courts. The Bipartisan Policy Center’s explainer, “What to Know About Redistricting and Gerrymandering” (August 2025), is particularly relevant here, as it directly references a similar 2003 case where the Supreme Court allowed a Texas mid-decade map to stand. This history of judicial deference provides the specific legal precedent that empowers Texas to pursue its current redistricting efforts with confidence, and it helps contextualize the judiciary’s reluctance to intervene.

The Texas case exploits this judicial gray area. The state legislature, while acknowledging its aim to benefit the Republican Party—a seemingly permissible “political” objective—faces accusations from Democrats and civil rights groups that the new map disproportionately dilutes the power of Black and Hispanic voters, particularly in urban areas. The podcast highlights the argument that race and political preference are often so tightly intertwined that it becomes nearly impossible to separate them. This is precisely the kind of argument the Supreme Court has had to grapple with, as seen in recent cases like Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (2024). In that case, the Court’s majority, led by Justice Alito, held that challengers must provide direct, not just circumstantial, evidence that race, rather than politics, was the “predominant” factor in drawing a district. This ruling, and others like it, effectively “stack the deck” against plaintiffs, creating novel and significant roadblocks to a successful racial gerrymandering claim.

“The Supreme Court has relied upon the incoherent racial gerrymandering claim because the Court lacks the right tools to police certain political conduct that might be impermissibly racist, partisan, or both.” — Rick Hasen, election law expert

Legal experts like Rick Hasen, whose work on election law is foundational, would likely view this trend with deep concern. Hasen has long argued for a more robust defense of voting rights, noting the Constitution’s surprising lack of an affirmative right to vote and the Supreme Court’s incremental, often restrictive, interpretations of voting protections. The Texas situation, in his view, is not a bug in the system but a feature of a constitutional framework that has been slowly eroded by a Court that has become increasingly deferential to state legislatures. The podcast’s narrative here is a cautionary tale of a legislative body wielding its power to entrench itself, and of a judiciary that, by its own precedents, may be unable or unwilling to intervene effectively.

The political theater of the Democrats’ walkout, therefore, is not merely a symbolic act; it is a desperate attempt to use the legislative process itself to challenge a power grab that the judiciary has made more difficult to contest. This is further complicated by the analysis in Publius – The Journal of Federalism article “State of American Federalism 2024–2025” (July 2025), which explores the concept of “transactional federalism,” where presidents reward loyal states and punish those that are not. This framework provides a vital lens for understanding how a state like Texas, with a strong political alignment to the executive branch, might feel empowered to take such aggressive redistricting actions.

Reining in Executive Overreach: The ICE Profiling Case

On the other side of the legal spectrum, the podcast turns to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Southern California. This case shifts the focus from legislative overreach to executive overreach, particularly the conduct of an administrative agency. The court’s decision upheld a lower court’s temporary restraining order, barring ICE agents from making warrantless arrests based on a broad “profile” that included apparent race, ethnicity, language, and location. This is a critical challenge to the authority of a federal agency, forcing it to operate within the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. The court’s ruling, as highlighted in the podcast, was predicated on a “mountain of evidence” demonstrating that ICE’s practices amounted to unconstitutional racial profiling.

“The Ninth Circuit’s decision is a critical affirmation that the Fourth Amendment does not have a carve-out for immigration enforcement. A person’s skin color is not probable cause.” — David Carden, ACLU immigration attorney (July 2025)

The legal principles at play here are equally profound. The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Ninth Circuit’s ruling essentially states that a person’s appearance, the language they speak, or where they work is not enough to establish the “reasonable suspicion” necessary for a warrantless stop. This decision is a powerful example of the judiciary acting as a check on the executive branch, affirming that even in the context of immigration enforcement, constitutional rights apply to all individuals within the nation’s borders. The podcast emphasizes the chilling effect of these raids, which created an atmosphere of fear and terror in communities of color. The court’s decision serves as a crucial bulwark against an “authoritarian” approach to law enforcement, as noted by ACLU attorneys.

Immigration attorney Leon Fresco, who is featured in the podcast, provides a nuanced perspective on the case, discussing the complexities of agency authority. While the government argued that its agents were making stops based on a totality of factors, not just race, the court’s rejection of this argument underscores a significant judicial shift. This is not a new conflict, as highlighted in the Georgetown Law article “Sovereign Resistance To Federal Immigration Enforcement In State Courthouses” (published after November 2020), which examines the historical and legal foundation for state and individual resistance to federal immigration enforcement. The article identifies the “normative underpinnings” of this resistance and explores the constitutional claims that states and individuals use to challenge federal authorities.

This historical context is essential for understanding the sustained nature of this conflict. This judicial skepticism toward expansive agency power is further illuminated by the Columbia Law School experts’ analysis of 2025 Supreme Court rulings (July 2025), which focuses on the federalism battle over immigration law and the potential for a ruling on the federal government’s ability to condition funding on state compliance with immigration laws. This expert commentary shows that the judicial challenges to federal immigration authority, as seen in the Ninth Circuit case, are part of a broader, ongoing legal battle at the highest levels of the judiciary.

The Judicial Project: Unifying Principles of Power

The true genius of the podcast is its ability to weave these two disparate threads into a single, cohesive tapestry of legal thought. The Texas redistricting fight and the ICE profiling case, while geographically and thematically distinct, are both fundamentally about the limits of power. In Texas, we see a state legislature exercising its power to draw district lines in a way that, critics argue, subverts democratic principles. In Southern California, we see a federal agency exercising its power to enforce immigration laws in a way that, the court has ruled, violates constitutional rights. In both scenarios, the judiciary is called upon to step in and draw a line.

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” — Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison (1803)

The podcast’s synthesis of these cases highlights the central role of the Supreme Court in this ongoing process. The Court, through its various rulings, has crafted the very legal tools and constraints that govern these conflicts. The precedents it sets—on gerrymandering, on the Voting Rights Act, and on judicial deference to agencies—become the battleground for these legal fights. The podcast suggests that the judiciary is not merely a passive umpire but an active player whose decisions over time have shaped the very rules of the game. For example, the Court’s decisions have made it harder to sue over gerrymandering and, simultaneously, have recently made it harder for agencies to act without judicial scrutiny. This creates a fascinating and potentially contradictory legal landscape where the judiciary appears to be simultaneously retreating from one area of political contention while advancing into another.

Conclusion: A New Era of Judicial Scrutiny

Ultimately, “Weekend Law” gets to the essence of a modern American dilemma. The legislative process is increasingly characterized by partisan gridlock, forcing a reliance on executive and administrative actions to govern. At the same time, a judiciary that is more ideological and assertive than ever before is stepping in to review these actions, often with a skepticism that questions the very foundations of the administrative state.

The cases in Texas and Southern California are not just about voting maps or immigration sweeps; they are about the fundamental structure of American governance. They illustrate how the judiciary, from district courts to the Supreme Court, has become the primary battleground for defining the scope of constitutional rights and the limits of state and federal power. This is occurring within a new legal environment where, according to the Harvard Law Review, the Roberts Court is uniquely pro-state, and where the executive branch, as discussed in the Publius article, is engaging in a form of “transactional federalism.”

The podcast masterfully captures this moment, presenting a world where the most profound political questions of our time are no longer settled in the halls of Congress, but in the solemn chambers of the American courthouse. As we look ahead, we are left to ponder a series of urgent questions. Will the judiciary’s new skepticism toward administrative power lead to a more accountable government or a paralyzed one? What will be the long-term impact on voting rights if the courts continue to make it more difficult to challenge gerrymandering?

“When the map is drawn to silence the voter, the very promise of democracy is fractured. The judiciary’s silence is not neutrality; it is complicity in the decay of a fundamental right.” — Professor Sarah Levinson, University of Texas School of Law (2025)

And, in an era of intense political polarization, can the judiciary—a branch of government itself increasingly viewed through a partisan lens—truly be trusted to fulfill its historic role as a neutral arbiter of the Constitution? The essence of the podcast, then, is a sober reflection on the state of American democracy, filtered through the lens of legal analysis. It portrays a system where power is constantly tested, and the judiciary, despite its own internal divisions and evolving doctrines, remains the indispensable mechanism for mediating these tests.

“A government that justifies racial profiling on the streets is no different from one that seeks to deny justice in its courthouses. The Ninth Circuit has held a line, declaring that our Constitution protects all people, not just citizens, from the long shadow of authoritarian overreach.” — Maria Elena Lopez, civil rights attorney, ACLU of Southern California (2025)

The podcast’s narrative arc—from the political brinkmanship in Texas to the constitutional defense of individual rights in California—serves as a powerful reminder that the rule of law is a dynamic, living concept, constantly being shaped and reshaped by the cases that come before the courts and the decisions that are rendered. It is a story of power, rights, and the enduring, if often contentious, role of the American judiciary in keeping the two in balance.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Analysis, Economics, Essays, Government, Politics, Reviews

The Fiscal Fantasies Of A “For-Profit” Government

BY INTELLICUREAN, JULY 21, 2025:

In the summer of 2025, former President Donald Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unveiled a bold proposal: the creation of an External Revenue Service (ERS), a federal agency designed to collect tariffs, fees, and other payments from foreign entities. Framed as a patriotic pivot toward self-sufficiency, the ERS would transform the U.S. government from a tax-funded service provider into a revenue-generating enterprise, capable of offsetting domestic tax burdens through external extraction. The idea, while politically magnetic, raises profound questions: Can the U.S. federal government become a “for-profit” entity? And if so, can the ERS be a legitimate mechanism for such a transformation?

This essay argues that while the concept of external revenue generation is not unprecedented, the rebranding of the U.S. government as a profit-seeking enterprise risks undermining its foundational principles. The ERS proposal conflates revenue with legitimacy, and profit with power, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding of the government’s role in society. We explore the constitutional, economic, and geopolitical dimensions of the ERS proposal, drawing on recent analyses from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, The Diplomat, and The New Yorker, to assess its fiscal viability, strategic risks, and national security implications.

Constitutional Foundations: Can a Republic Seek Profit?

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” (Article I, Section 8). These provisions clearly authorize the federal government to generate revenue through tariffs and fees. Historically, tariffs served as a primary source of federal income, funding everything from infrastructure to military expansion during the 19th century.

However, the Constitution does not envision the government as a profit-maximizing entity. Its purpose, as articulated in the Preamble, is to “establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, [and] promote the general Welfare.” These are public goods, not commercial outputs. The government’s legitimacy is grounded in its service to the people—not in its ability to generate surplus revenue.

The Federal Reserve offers a useful analogy here. While not a for-profit institution, the Fed earns more than it spends through its monetary operations—primarily interest on government securities—and remits excess income to the Treasury. Between 2011 and 2021, these remittances totaled over $920 billion. But this is not “profit” in the corporate sense. The Fed’s primary mandate is macroeconomic stability, not shareholder returns. Even during economic stress (as seen in 2022–2025), the Fed may run negative remittances, underscoring its non-commercial orientation.

In contrast, the ERS is framed as a profit center—an entity designed to extract wealth from foreign actors to reduce domestic tax burdens. This shift raises critical questions: Who are the “customers” of the ERS? What are the “products” it offers? And what happens when profit motives collide with diplomatic or humanitarian priorities?

Economic Modeling: Revenue vs. Net Gain

A rigorous analysis of Trump’s proposed tariffs comes from Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. In their April 2025 briefing, they use a global economic model to estimate the gross and net revenue generated by tariffs of 10%, 15%, and 20% on all imported goods.

Their findings are sobering:

  • A 15% universal tariff could generate $3.9 trillion in gross revenue over a decade (2025–2034), assuming no foreign retaliation.
  • However, after accounting for slower growth, reduced investment, and lower tax receipts from households and businesses, the net gain drops to $3.2 trillion.
  • If foreign countries retaliate with reciprocal tariffs, the net gain falls further to $1.5 trillion.
  • A 20% tariff results in the lowest net gain ($791 billion), due to intensified economic drag and retaliation.

These findings underscore a crucial distinction: tariffs are not free money. They impose costs on consumers, disrupt supply chains, and invite countermeasures. The ERS may collect billions, but its net contribution to fiscal health is far more modest—and potentially negative if retaliation escalates.

Additionally, tariff revenue is volatile and politically contingent. Tariffs can be reversed by executive order, invalidated by courts, or rendered moot by trade realignment. In short, the ERS lacks the predictability and stability necessary for a legitimate fiscal foundation. Tariffs are a risky and politically charged mechanism for revenue generation—making them an unreliable cornerstone for the country’s fiscal health.

Strategic Blowback: Reverse Friendshoring and Supply Chain Drift

Beyond economics, the ERS proposal carries significant geopolitical risks. In The Diplomat, Thiago de Aragao warns of a phenomenon he calls reverse friendshoring—where companies, instead of relocating supply chains away from China, move closer to it in response to U.S. tariffs.

The logic is simple: If exporting to the U.S. becomes prohibitively expensive, firms may pivot to serving Asian markets, leveraging China’s mature infrastructure and consumer base. This could undermine the strategic goal of decoupling from Chinese influence, potentially strengthening Beijing’s economic hand.

Examples abound:

  • A firm that invested in Mexico to reduce exposure to China redirected its exports to Latin America after Mexico was hit with new tariffs.
  • Another company shifted operations to Canada to avoid compounded U.S. duties—only to face new levies there as well.

This unpredictability erodes trust in U.S. trade policy and incentivizes supply chain diversification away from the U.S. As Aragao notes, “Protectionism may offer a temporary illusion of control, but in the long run, it risks pushing businesses away.”

The ERS, by monetizing tariffs, could accelerate this trend. If foreign firms perceive the U.S. as a hostile or unstable market, they will seek alternatives. And if allies are treated as adversaries, the strategic architecture of friendshoring collapses, leaving the U.S. economically isolated and diplomatically weakened.

National Security Costs: Alienating Allies

Perhaps the most damning critique of the ERS comes from Cullen Hendrix at the Peterson Institute, who argues that imposing tariffs on U.S. allies undermines national security. The U.S. alliance network spans over 60 countries, accounting for 38% of global GDP. These partnerships enhance deterrence, enable forward basing, and create markets for U.S. defense exports.

Tariffs—especially those framed as revenue tools—erode alliance cohesion. They signal that economic extraction trumps strategic cooperation. Hendrix warns that “treating alliance partners like trade adversaries will further increase intra-alliance frictions, weaken collective deterrence, and invite potential adversaries—none better positioned than China—to exploit these divisions.”

Moreover, the ERS’s indiscriminate approach—levying duties on both allies and rivals—blurs the line between economic policy and coercive diplomacy. It transforms trade into a zero-sum game, where even friends are fair targets. This undermines the credibility of U.S. commitments and may prompt allies to seek alternative trade and security arrangements.

Lutnick’s Barber Economics: Rhetoric vs. Reality

The ERS proposal is not merely a policy—it’s a performance. Nowhere is this clearer than in Howard Lutnick’s keynote at the Hill and Valley Forum, as reported in The New Yorker on July 21, 2025. Addressing a room of venture capitalists, defense contractors, and policymakers, Lutnick attempted to explain trade deficits using personal analogies: “I have a trade deficit with my barber,” he said. “I have a trade deficit with my grocery store. Right? I just buy stuff from them. That’s ridiculous.”

The crowd, described as “sophisticated tech and finance attendees,” was visibly uncomfortable. Lutnick’s analogies, while populist in tone, misread the room and revealed a deeper disconnect between economic complexity and simplistic transactionalism. As one attendee noted, “It’s obvious why Lutnick’s affect appeals to Trump. But it’s Bessent’s presence in the Administration that reassures us there is someone smart looking out for us.”

This contrast between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is telling. Bessent, who reportedly flew to Mar-a-Lago to urge Trump to pause the tariffs, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

The ERS, then, is not just a fiscal experiment—it’s a philosophical battleground. Lutnick’s vision of government as a money-making enterprise may resonate with populist frustration, but it risks trivializing the structural and diplomatic intricacies of global trade. His “barber economics” may play well on cable news, but it falters under scrutiny from economists, allies, and institutional stewards.

Conclusion: Profit Is Not Purpose

The idea of a “for-profit” U.S. government, embodied in the External Revenue Service, is seductive in its simplicity. It promises fiscal relief without domestic taxation, strategic leverage through economic pressure, and a reassertion of American dominance in global trade. But beneath the surface lies a tangle of contradictions.

Constitutionally, the federal government is designed to serve—not to sell. Its legitimacy flows from the consent of the governed, not the extraction of foreign wealth. Economically, tariffs may generate gross revenue, but their net contribution is constrained by retaliation, inflation, and supply chain disruption. Strategically, the ERS risks alienating allies, incentivizing reverse friendshoring, and weakening collective security.

With Howard Lutnick as the plan’s leading voice—offering anecdotes like the barber and grocery store as proxies for international trade—the ERS becomes more than a revenue mechanism; it becomes a prism for reflecting the Administration’s governing style: transactional, simplified, and rhetorically appealing, yet divorced from systemic nuance. His “barber economics” may evoke applause from certain circles, but in the forums that shape long-term policy, it has landed with discomfort and disbelief.

The comparison between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, as reported in The New Yorker, captures this divide. Bessent, attempting to temper Trump’s protectionist instincts, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

Yet governance is not a business, and the nation’s global responsibilities cannot be monetized like a corporate balance sheet. If America begins to treat its allies as clients, its rivals as profit centers, and its global footprint as a monetizable asset, it risks transforming foreign policy into a ledger—and leadership into a transaction.

The External Revenue Service, in its current form, fails to reconcile profit with purpose. It monetizes strength but neglects stewardship. It harvests dollars but undermines trust. And in doing so, it invites a broader reckoning—not just about trade and taxation, but about what kind of republic America wishes to be. For now, the ERS remains an emblem of ambition unmoored from architecture, where the dream of profit collides with the duty to govern.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN USING AI