Category Archives: Economics

Commerce, Culture, Economics, Essays, History

The Silvered City with a Fevered Heart

In 1590, the Spanish port of Seville was the epicenter of the first global economy—a city drowning in silver, haunted by plagues, and inventing the anxieties we now know all too well. Its story is a warning.

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 20, 2025

Before there was Wall Street, London, or Shanghai, there was Seville. We live today in a world defined by intricate global supply chains, where fortunes are made on the abstract flow of capital and data, and where a single ship stuck in a canal can trigger worldwide anxiety. We know the feeling of living in a hyper-connected age, with all its dizzying wealth and its profound fragility. We talk of unicorn companies, bubbles, and systemic risk, sensing that the towering edifice of our prosperity rests on foundations we don’t fully understand. But what did the very first version of that world feel like, before the risks were modeled and the consequences were known?

To understand the unnerving vertigo of our own time, you have to go back to a muddy river in southern Spain, four centuries ago, when the modern world was being born in a flash of silver and blood. You have to imagine a spring morning in 1590.

At first light, the galleon Nuestra Señora de la Merced drifts slowly up the Guadalquivir River. Its sails, slack after the long Atlantic crossing from Panama, are stained with salt and sea-spray. Its sturdy Iberian oak hull, scarred by shipworms and storms, creaks under the registered weight of 500 tons. On the bustling Arenal waterfront, a dockworker named Mateo shields his eyes against the rising sun. He sees not a symbol of imperial glory, but the promise of a day’s wage, the chance to buy bread for his family at a price that seems to climb higher every month. His ropes are coiled in calloused hands, the air thick around him with the smell of pitch, citrus, and the river’s brackish breath.

Further back, shielded from the morning sun in the arcaded loggias of the Calle de las Gradas, men of a different class watch the same ship with a far more specific terror. A Genoese banker in sober black silk mentally calculates the interest on the massive loan he extended to King Philip II, a loan secured against this very shipment. Beside him, a Castilian merchant, having mortgaged his ancestral lands to finance a speculative cargo of wine and olive oil on the outgoing voyage, feels a tremor of hope and fear. Was the voyage profitable? Did pirates strike? Did the storms claim his fortune?

In a dusty office nearby, a scribe from the Casa de la Contratación—the formidable House of Trade—readies his quills and ledgers. He will spend the day recording every ingot, every barrel, every notarized claim, his neat columns tracking the quinto real, the “royal fifth,” the 20% tax on all precious metals that funds Spain’s sprawling wars in Flanders and the Mediterranean. In this moment, a city of nearly 150,000 souls—the largest and most important in Castile—holds its breath. The Guadalquivir carries not only treasure but the very lifeblood of an empire. And with it, a new kind of global pulse.

For nearly a century, Seville held the absolute monopoly on all trade with the Americas. Granted by the crown in 1503, this privilege meant every ounce of silver from the great mountain-mine of Potosí, every barrel of cochineal dye, every crate of indigo, and every human being—whether a returning colonist, a hopeful migrant, or an enslaved African—was funneled through its port. It was not merely a metropolis; it was a complex, living organism. Its artery was the river; its brain was the bureaucracy of the Casa; its beating heart was the Plaza de San Francisco, where coin, credit, and rumor changed hands with dizzying speed.

The brain of this operation, the Casa de la Contratación, was an institution without precedent. It was a combination of a shipping board, a research institute, and a supreme court for all maritime affairs. Within its walls, master cartographers secretly updated the Padrón Real, the master map of the New World, a document of such immense geopolitical value that its theft would be a blow to the entire empire. Its school for pilots trained men to navigate by the stars to a world that was, to most Europeans, still a realm of myth. The Casa licensed every ship, certified every sailor, and processed every manifest. It was the centralized, bureaucratic engine of the world’s first truly global enterprise.

The lifeblood of the system was the annual treasure fleet, the Flota de Indias. This convoy system, a necessity born from the existential threat of French and English privateers, was a marvel of logistics. Sailing in two main branches—one to Mexico, the other to Panama to collect the silver of Peru—the fleets were floating cities, military and commercial operations of immense scale. Their return, usually in late spring, was the moment the imperial heart beat loudest. The sheer volume of wealth was staggering. According to the foundational economic data compiled by Earl J. Hamilton, in the two decades from 1581 to 1600, over 52 million pesos in silver and gold were officially registered passing through Seville. The clang of heavy presses striking that silver into the iconic reales de a ocho, or pieces of eight—the world’s first global currency—echoed from the Royal Mint near the river.

This deluge of wealth transformed the city. To manage the booming trade, construction had begun in 1584 on a grand new merchant exchange, the Casa Lonja de Mercaderes. Designed by Juan de Herrera, the architect of the king’s austere Escorial palace, its monumental Renaissance style was a physical manifestation of Seville’s self-image: ordered, powerful, and the nerve center of a global Christian empire. The great Gothic Cathedral, already one of the largest in Christendom, glittered with new silver candlesticks and gold-leafed altarpieces forged from American bullion. The city attracted a complex web of foreign merchants and bankers who operated in a state of symbiotic tension with the Spanish crown. As historian Eberhard Crailsheim explains, foreign merchants were “indispensable for the functioning of the Spanish monopoly system, while at the same time they were its greatest threat.” They provided the credit and financial instruments the empire desperately needed, ensuring that American silver circulated rapidly into the European economy to pay the crown’s debts, often before it had even been unloaded at the Arenal.

But this firehose of silver was never pure. The same river that delivered the bullion also carried plague, contraband, and devastating floodwaters. That river of wealth was also a river of poison.

The most visceral fear was disease. Each arriving fleet was a potential vector for an epidemic. Ships from the Caribbean, their crews weakened by months at sea and ravaged by scurvy, disgorged sailors carrying typhus, smallpox, and what was then called vómito negro (yellow fever) into the densely packed, unsanitary tenements of the Triana neighborhood across the river. An outbreak meant sudden, terrifying death. It meant closed gates, armed guards preventing travel, and the dreaded chalk mark on the door of an infected house. While the truly catastrophic Great Castilian Plague of 1596–1601, which would kill a quarter of the city’s population, was still a few years away, smaller outbreaks kept the city in a perpetual state of anxiety.

Economic contagion was just as insidious. The endless flood of American silver triggered a century-long inflationary crisis known as the Price Revolution. As the money supply swelled, the value of each coin fell, and the price of everything—from bread and wine to cloth and rent—skyrocketed. A blacksmith or farmer in the Castilian countryside found himself poorer each year, his labor worth less and less. The very treasure that enriched the king and a small class of merchants was simultaneously impoverishing the kingdom. This paradox revealed the empire’s core fragility: it was living on credit, perpetually on the verge of bankruptcy (which it would declare again in 1596), its vast military and political ambitions financed by treasure it had not yet received.

Illicit trade pulsed through the artery with the same rhythm as legal commerce. Silver was smuggled to avoid the quinto real, often with the collusion of the very officials meant to prevent it. Forbidden books—Protestant tracts from Northern Europe or scientific texts deemed heretical—were hidden in barrels and circulated in the city’s more than one hundred taverns. And in the shadows of the Cathedral, a teeming underworld flourished. This was the world Miguel de Cervantes knew intimately. In the late 1580s, he served in Seville as a naval commissary, requisitioning wheat and olive oil for the navy—a frustrating job that landed him in jail and exposed him to the city’s seedy underbelly. His experience shaped his picaresque tale Rinconete y Cortadillo, a brilliant portrait of a city of hustlers, thieves, and corrupt officials who had created a perfect, parasitic society in the shadow of imperial wealth.

The Guadalquivir itself, the source of all this prosperity, was turning against the city. Centuries of deforestation and agricultural runoff were causing the river channel to silt up, creating treacherous sandbars near its mouth. As modern hydrological studies confirm, the late sixteenth century was a period of extreme environmental change in the estuary. At the time, the city’s frequent, devastating floods were interpreted as divine punishment for its sins of greed and luxury. In reality, it was a slow, man-made thrombosis. The great artery was hardening.

In a city defined by such spectacular contradictions—unimaginable wealth and desperate poverty, global connection and epidemic disease, rigid piety and rampant crime—life was lived on a knife’s edge. To manage these profound anxieties, Seville transformed itself into a grand stage, and the river became the backdrop for its most important dramas of power, faith, and identity.

The sensory experience of the port was an unforgettable piece of theater. Chroniclers describe the overwhelming smells of spices and sewage, the cacophony of ships’ bells and construction cranes, and the shouts of sailors in a dozen languages. Enslaved West Africans loaded and unloaded cargo in the grueling sun, their forced labor the invisible foundation of the entire enterprise. Moorish artisans crafted vibrant ceramics in Triana, while Flemish merchants in lace collars inspected textiles near the Casa Lonja. It was a microcosm of a new, globalized world, assembled by force and commerce on the banks of a single river.

To contain the social and spiritual anxieties this world produced, the city deployed the power of art and ritual. Painters of the emerging Seville School, like Francisco Pacheco, experimented with dramatic chiaroscuro, their canvases echoing the city’s tension between divine order and worldly excess. The church, enriched beyond measure by the tithes on American silver, became the primary patron of this art. As historian Amanda Wunder argues in her book Baroque Seville, these spectacular displays were essential civic mechanisms. The city, she writes, sought to “transmute the New World’s silver into a spiritual treasure that could be stored up in heaven” as a defense against the very instability that wealth created.

Nowhere was this clearer than during the feast of Corpus Christi, the city’s most important celebration. The streets were covered in flowers. The great guilds marched with their banners. And at the heart of the procession was the custodia, an immense, fortress-like monstrance of solid silver, paraded through the city as a tangible symbol of God’s presence. This was not mere decoration; it was a carefully choreographed piece of public therapy. It took the source of the city’s anxiety—silver—and transformed it into an object of sacred devotion, reassuring the populace that their chaotic world was still under divine control. In this baroque theater, as the eminent historian Antonio Domínguez Ortiz noted, Seville’s greatness was inseparable from its “spectacular fragility.”

Overseeing this entire performance was the Holy Office of the Inquisition, its headquarters looming in the castle of Triana. The Inquisition was not just hunting heretics; it was policing the boundaries of thought and expression in a dangerously cosmopolitan city. Its public trials, the autos-da-fé, were another, darker form of theater, designed to root out dissent and reinforce social order. Its presence created a climate of suspicion that simmered beneath the city’s vibrant surface.

The year 1590 was, in retrospect, a historical precipice. To a contemporary observer standing on the Triana bridge, watching the forest of masts on the river, Seville must have seemed invincible, the permanent heart of a permanent empire. The monumental walls of the Casa Lonja were rising, the mint’s hammers clanged incessantly, and the Cathedral shone with American treasure.

Yet within its very triumph lay the seeds of its decay. The shocking defeat of the Spanish Armada just two years prior had been a blow to both the treasury and the national psyche. The bankruptcy of 1596 loomed. The river’s sedimentation was worsening, a physical reality that would, over the next few decades, slowly choke the port and eventually divert the monopoly of trade to Cádiz. The great artery was silting, even as its pulse quickened.

Still, to walk the riverbank in 1590 was to witness the apex. Children stared at ships vanishing over the horizon toward a nearly mythical world; merchants prayed over contracts sealed with a handshake; artisans fashioned silver into monstrances of breathtaking complexity. The Guadalquivir carried all these flows—material, sensory, and symbolic. Its pulse was not merely economic; it was emotional, theological, and aesthetic. A popular epithet of the time called Seville “the city where the world’s heart beats.” In 1590, that heartbeat was fevered, irregular, and already trembling with overexertion—but it was magnificent.

At dusk, as the river darkened to ink, the silver locked away in the city’s coffers seemed to gleam like a heart beating too fast, too bright, and far too fragile to last. In that shimmer lay the paradox of Seville: a city at once glorious and doomed, sustained and threatened by the very waters that had forged its destiny. It’s a paradox baked into the very nature of globalization—a fevered heartbeat we can still hear in the rhythm of our own world.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Economics, Essays, Opinion, Society, Technology

ADVANCING TOWARDS A NEW DEFINITION OF “PROGRESS”

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 9, 2025

The very notion of “progress” has long been a compass for humanity. Yet, what we consider an improved state is a question whose answer has shifted dramatically over time. As the Cambridge Dictionary defines it, progress is simply “movement to an improved or more developed state.” But whose state is being improved? And toward what future are we truly moving? The illusion of progress is perhaps most evident in technology, where breathtaking innovation often masks a troubling truth: the benefits are frequently unevenly shared, concentrating power and wealth while leaving many behind.

Historically, the definition of progress was a reflection of the era’s dominant ideology. The medieval period saw it as a spiritual journey toward salvation. The Enlightenment shattered this, replacing it with the ascent of humanity through reason, science, and the triumph over superstition. This optimism fueled the Industrial Revolution, where thinkers like Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer saw progress as an unstoppable climb toward knowledge and material prosperity. But this vision was a mirage for many. The same steam engines that powered unprecedented economic growth subjected workers to brutal, dehumanizing conditions. The Gilded Age enriched railroad magnates and steel barons while workers struggled in poverty and faced violent crackdowns.

Today, a similar paradox haunts our digital age. Meet Maria, a fictional yet representative 40-year-old factory worker in Flint, Michigan. For decades, her livelihood was a steady source of income. But last year, the factory where she worked introduced an AI-powered assembly line, and her job, along with hundreds of others, was automated away. Maria’s story is not an isolated incident; it’s a global narrative that reflects the experiences of billions. Technologies like the microchip and generative AI promise to solve complex problems, yet they often deepen inequality in their wake. Her story is a poignant call to arms, demanding that we re-examine our collective understanding of progress.

This essay argues for a new, more deliberate definition of progress—one that moves beyond the historical optimism rooted in automatic technological gains and instead prioritizes equity, empathy, and sustainability. We will explore the clash between techno-optimism—a blind faith in technology’s ability to solve all problems—and techno-realism—a balanced approach that seeks inclusive and ethical innovation. Drawing on the lessons of history and the urgent struggles of individuals like Maria, we will chart a course toward a progress that uplifts all, not just the powerful and the privileged.

The Myth of Automatic Progress

The allure of technology is a siren’s song, promising a frictionless world of convenience, abundance, and unlimited potential. Marc Andreessen’s 2023 “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” captured this spirit perfectly, a rallying cry for the belief that technology is the engine of all good and that any critique is a form of “demoralization.” However, this viewpoint ignores the central lesson of history: innovation is not inherently a force for equality.

The Industrial Revolution, while a monumental leap for humanity, was a masterclass in how progress can widen the chasm between the rich and the poor. Factory owners, the Andreessens of their day, amassed immense wealth, while the ancestors of today’s factory workers faced dangerous, low-wage jobs and lived in squalor. Today, the same forces are at play. A 2023 McKinsey report projected that up to 30% of U.S. jobs could be automated by 2030, a seismic shift that will disproportionately affect low-income workers, the very demographic to which Maria belongs.

Progress, therefore, is not an automatic outcome of innovation; it is a result of conscious choices. As economists Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson argue in their pivotal 2023 book Power and Progress, the distribution of a technology’s benefits is not predetermined.

“The distribution of a technology’s benefits is not predetermined but rather a result of governance and societal choices.” — Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity

Redefining progress means moving beyond the naive assumption that technology’s gains will eventually “trickle down” to everyone. It means choosing policies and systems that uplift workers like Maria, ensuring that the benefits of automation are shared broadly rather than being captured solely as corporate profits.

The Uneven Pace of Progress

Our perception of progress is often skewed by the dizzying pace of digital advancements. We see the exponential growth of computing power and the rapid development of generative AI and mistakenly believe this is the universal pace of all human progress. But as Vaclav Smil, a renowned scholar on technology and development, reminds us, this is a dangerous illusion.

“We are misled by the hype of digital advances, mistaking them for universal progress.” — Vaclav Smil, The Illusion of Progress: The Promise and Peril of Technology

A look at the data confirms Smil’s point. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the global share of fossil fuels in the primary energy mix only dropped from 85% to 80% between 2000 and 2022—a change so slow it’s almost imperceptible. Simultaneously, global crop yields for staples like wheat have largely plateaued since 2010, and an estimated 735 million people were undernourished in 2022, a stark reminder that our most fundamental challenges aren’t being solved by the same pace of innovation we see in Silicon Valley.

Even the very tools of the digital revolution can be a source of regression. Social media, once heralded as a democratizing force, has become a powerful engine for division and misinformation. For example, a 2023 BBC report documented how WhatsApp was used to fuel ethnic violence during the Kenyan elections. These platforms, while distracting us with their endless streams of content, often divert our attention from the deeper, more systemic issues squeezing families like Maria’s, such as stagnant wages and rising food prices. Yet, progress is possible when innovation is directed toward systemic challenges. The rise of microgrid solar systems in Bangladesh, which has provided electricity to millions of households, demonstrates how targeted technology can bridge gaps and empower communities. Redefining progress means prioritizing these systemic solutions over the next shiny gadget.

Echoes of History in Today’s World

Maria’s job loss in Flint isn’t a modern anomaly; it’s an echo of historical patterns of inequality and division. It resonates with the Gilded Age of the late 19th century, when railroad monopolies and steel magnates amassed colossal fortunes while workers faced brutal, 12-hour days in unsafe factories. The violent Homestead Strike of 1892, where workers fought against wage cuts, is a testament to the bitter class struggle of that era. Today, wealth inequality rivals that gilded age, with a recent Oxfam report showing that the world’s richest 1% have captured almost two-thirds of all new wealth created since 2020. Families like Maria’s are left to struggle with rising rents and stagnant wages, a reality far removed from the promise of prosperity.

“History shows that technological progress often concentrates wealth unless society intervenes.” — Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress

Another powerful historical parallel is the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. Decades of poor agricultural practices and corporate greed led to an environmental catastrophe that displaced 2.5 million people. This is an eerie precursor to our current climate crisis. A recent NOAA report on California’s wildfires shows how a similar failure to prioritize long-term well-being is now displacing millions more, just as it did nearly a century ago.

In Flint, the social fabric is strained, with some residents blaming immigrants for economic woes—a classic scapegoat tactic that ignores the significant contributions of immigrants to the U.S. economy. This echoes the xenophobic sentiment of the 1920s Red Scare. Unchecked AI-driven misinformation and viral “deepfakes” are the modern equivalent of 1930s radio propaganda, amplifying fear and division.

“We shape our tools, and thereafter our tools shape us, often reviving old divisions.” — Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow

Yet, history is also a source of hope. Germany’s proactive refugee integration programs in the mid-2010s, which trained and helped integrate hundreds of thousands of migrants into the workforce, show that societies can choose inclusion over exclusion. A new definition of progress demands that we confront these cycles of inequality, fear, and division. By choosing empathy and equity, we can ensure that technology serves to bridge divides and uplift communities like Maria’s, rather than fracturing them further.

The Perils of Techno-Optimism

The belief that technology will, on its own, solve our most pressing problems is a seductive but dangerous trap. It promises a quick fix while delaying the difficult, structural changes needed to address crises like climate change and social inequality. In their analysis of climate discourse, scholars Sofia Ribeiro and Viriato Soromenho-Marques argue that techno-optimism is a distraction from necessary action.

“Techno-optimism distracts from the structural changes needed to address climate crises.” — Sofia Ribeiro and Viriato Soromenho-Marques, The Techno-Optimists of Climate Change

The Arctic’s indigenous communities, like the Inuit, face the existential threat of melting permafrost. Meanwhile, some oil companies tout expensive and unproven technologies like direct air capture to justify continued fossil fuel extraction, all while delaying the real solutions—a massive investment in renewable energy. This is not progress; it is a corporate strategy to delay accountability, echoing the tobacco industry’s denialism of the 1980s. As Nathan J. Robinson’s 2023 critique in Current Affairs notes, techno-optimism is a form of “blind faith” that ignores the need for regulation and ethical oversight, risking a repeat of catastrophes like the 2008 financial crisis.

The gig economy is a perfect microcosm of this peril. Driven by AI platforms like Uber, it exemplifies how technology can optimize for profits at the expense of fairness. A recent study from UC Berkeley found that a significant portion of gig workers earn below the minimum wage, as algorithms prioritize efficiency over worker well-being. Today, unchecked AI is amplifying these harms, with a 2023 Reuters study finding that a large percentage of content on platforms like X is misleading, fueling division and distrust.

“Technology without politics is a recipe for inequality and instability.” — Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom

Yet, rejecting blind techno-optimism is not a rejection of technology itself. It is a demand for a more responsible, regulated approach. Denmark’s wind energy strategy, which has made it a global leader in renewables, is a testament to how pragmatic government regulation and public investment can outpace the empty promises of technowashing. Redefining progress means embracing this kind of techno-realism.

Choosing a Techno-Realist Path

To forge a new definition of progress, we must embrace techno-realism—a balanced approach that harnesses innovation’s potential while grounding it in ethics, transparency, and human needs. As Margaret Gould Stewart, a prominent designer, argues, this is an approach that asks us to design technology that serves society, not just markets.

This path is not about rejecting technology, but about guiding it. Think of the nurses in rural Rwanda, where drones zip through the sky, delivering life-saving blood and vaccines to remote clinics. This is technology not as a shiny, frivolous toy, but as a lifeline, guided by a clear human need. History and current events show us that this path is possible. The Luddites of 1811 were not fighting against technology; they were fighting for fairness in the face of automation’s threat to their livelihoods. Their spirit lives on in the European Union’s landmark AI Act, which mandates transparency and safety standards to protect workers like Maria from biased algorithms. In Chile, a national program is retraining former coal miners to become renewable energy technicians, demonstrating that a just transition to a sustainable future is possible.

The heart of this vision is empathy. Finland’s national media literacy curriculum, which has been shown to be effective in combating misinformation, is a powerful model for equipping citizens to navigate the digital world. In Mexico, indigenous-led conservation projects are blending traditional knowledge with modern science to heal the land. As Nobel laureate Amartya Sen wrote, true progress is about a fundamental expansion of human freedom.

“Development is about expanding the freedoms of the disadvantaged, not just advancing technology.” — Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom

Costa Rica’s incredible achievement of powering its grid with nearly 100% renewable energy is a beacon of what is possible when a nation aligns innovation with ethics. These stories—from Rwanda’s drones to Mexico’s forests—prove that technology, when guided by history, regulation, and empathy, can serve all.

Conclusion: A Progress We Can All Shape

Maria’s story—her job lost to automation, her family struggling in a community beset by historical inequities—is not a verdict on progress but a powerful, clear-eyed challenge. It forces us to confront the fact that progress is not an inevitable, linear march toward a better future. It is a series of deliberate choices, a constant negotiation between what is technologically possible and what is ethically and socially responsible. The historical echoes of inequality, environmental neglect, and division are loud, but they are not our destiny.

Imagine Maria today, no longer a victim of technological displacement but a beneficiary of a new, more inclusive model. Picture her retrained as a solar technician, her hands wiring a community-owned energy grid that powers Flint’s homes with clean energy. Imagine her voice, once drowned out by economic hardship, now rising on social media to share stories of unity and resilience. This vision—where technology is harnessed for all, guided by ethics and empathy—is the progress we must pursue.

The path forward lies in action, not just in promises. It requires us to engage in our communities, pushing for policies that protect and empower workers. It demands that we hold our leaders accountable, advocating for a future where investments in renewable energy and green infrastructure are prioritized over short-term profits. It requires us to support initiatives that teach media literacy, allowing us to discern truth from the fog of misinformation. It is in these steps, grounded in the lessons of history, that we turn a noble vision into a tangible reality.

Progress, in its most meaningful sense, is not about the speed of a microchip or the efficiency of an algorithm. It is about the deliberate, collective movement toward a society where the benefits of innovation are shared broadly, where the most vulnerable are protected, and where our shared future is built on the foundations of empathy, community, and sustainability. It is a journey we must embark on together, a progress we can all shape.

Progress: movement to a collectively improved and more inclusively developed state, resulting in a lessening of economic, political, and legal inequality, a strengthening of community, and a furthering of environmental sustainability.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Economics, Essays, Politics, Society, Technology

The Peril Of Perfection: Why Utopian Cities Fail

By Michael Cummins, Editor, August 7, 2025

Throughout human history, the idea of a perfect city—a harmonious, orderly, and just society—has been a powerful and enduring dream. From the philosophical blueprints of antiquity to the grand, state-sponsored projects of the modern era, the desire to create a flawless urban space has driven thinkers and leaders alike. This millennia-long aspiration, rooted in a fundamental human longing for order and a rejection of present-day flaws, finds its most recent and monumental expression in China’s Xiongan New Area, a project highlighted in an August 7, 2025, Economist article titled “Xi Jinping’s city of the future is coming to life.” Xiongan is both a marvel of technological and urban design and a testament to the persistent—and potentially perilous—quest for an idealized city.

By examining the historical precedents of utopian thought, we can understand Xiongan not merely as a contemporary infrastructure project but as the latest chapter in a timeless and often fraught human ambition to build paradise on earth. This essay will trace the evolution of the utopian ideal from ancient philosophy to modern practice, arguing that while Xiongan embodies the most technologically advanced and politically ambitious vision to date, its top-down, state-driven nature and astronomical costs raise critical questions about its long-term viability and ability to succeed where countless others have failed.

The Philosophical and Historical Roots

The earliest and most iconic examples of this utopian desire were theoretical and philosophical, serving as intellectual critiques rather than practical blueprints. Plato’s mythological city of Atlantis, described in his dialogues Timaeus and Critias, was not just a lost city but a complex philosophical thought experiment. Plato detailed a powerful, technologically advanced, and ethically pure island society, governed by a wise and noble lineage. The city itself was a masterpiece of urban planning, with concentric circles of land and water, advanced canals, and stunning architecture.

However, its perfection was ultimately undone by human greed and moral decay. As the Atlanteans became corrupted by hubris and ambition, their city was swallowed by the sea. This myth is foundational to all subsequent utopian thought, serving as a powerful and enduring cautionary tale that even the most perfect physical and social structure is fragile and susceptible to corruption from within. It suggests that a utopian society cannot simply be built; its sustainability is dependent on the moral fortitude of its citizens.

Centuries later, in 1516, Thomas More gave the concept its very name with his book Utopia. More’s work was a masterful social and political satire, a searing critique of the harsh realities of 16th-century England. He described a fictional island society where there was no private property, and all goods were shared. The citizens worked only six hours a day, with the rest of their time dedicated to education and leisure. The society was governed by reason and justice, and there were no social classes, greed, or poverty. More’s Utopia was not about a perfect physical city, but a perfect social structure.

“For where pride is predominant, there all these good laws and policies that are designed to establish equity are wholly ineffectual, because this monster is a greater enemy to justice than avarice, anger, envy, or any other of that kind; and it is a very great one in every man, though he have never so much of a saint about him.” – Utopia by Thomas More

It was an intellectual framework for political philosophy, designed to expose the flaws of a European society plagued by poverty, inequality, and the injustices of land enclosure. Like Atlantis, it existed as an ideal, a counterpoint to the flawed present, but it established a powerful cultural archetype.

The city as a reflection of societal ideals. — Intellicurean

Following this, Francis Bacon’s unfinished novel New Atlantis (1627) offered a different, more prophetic vision of perfection. His mythical island, Bensalem, was home to a society dedicated not to social or political equality, but to the pursuit of knowledge. The core of their society was “Salomon’s House,” a research institution where scientists worked together to discover and apply knowledge for the benefit of humanity. Bacon’s vision was a direct reflection of his advocacy for the scientific method and empirical reasoning.

In his view, a perfect society was one that systematically harnessed technological innovation to improve human life. Bacon’s utopia was a testament to the power of collective knowledge, a vision that, unlike More’s, would resonate profoundly with the coming age of scientific and industrial revolution. These intellectual exercises established a powerful cultural archetype: the city as a reflection of societal ideals.

From Theory to Practice: Real-World Experiments

As these ideas took root, the dream of a perfect society moved from the page to the physical world, often with mixed results. The Georgia Colony, founded in 1732 by James Oglethorpe, was conceived with powerful utopian ideals, aiming to be a fresh start for England’s “worthy poor” and debtors. Oglethorpe envisioned a society without the class divisions that plagued England, and to that end, his trustees prohibited slavery and large landholdings. The colony was meant to be a place of virtue, hard work, and abundance. Yet, the ideals were not fully realized. The prohibition on slavery hampered economic growth compared to neighboring colonies, and the trustees’ rules were eventually overturned. The colony ultimately evolved into a more typical slave-holding, plantation-based society, demonstrating how external pressures and economic realities can erode even the most virtuous of founding principles.

In the 19th century, with the rise of industrialization, several communities were established to combat the ills of the new urban landscape. The Shakers, a religious community founded in the 18th century, are one of America’s most enduring utopian experiments. They built successful communities based on communal living, pacifism, gender equality, and celibacy. Their belief in simplicity and hard work led to a reputation for craftsmanship, particularly in furniture making. At their peak in the mid-19th century, there were over a dozen Shaker communities, and their economic success demonstrated the viability of communal living. However, their practice of celibacy meant they relied on converts and orphans to sustain their numbers, a demographic fragility that ultimately led to their decline. The Shaker experience proved that a society’s success depends not only on its economic and social structure but also on its ability to sustain itself demographically.

These real-world attempts demonstrate the immense difficulty of sustaining a perfect society against the realities of human nature and economic pressures. — Intellicurean

The Transcendentalist experiment at Brook Farm (1841-1847) attempted to blend intellectual and manual labor, blurring the lines between thinkers and workers. Its members, who included prominent figures like Nathaniel Hawthorne, believed that a more wholesome and simple life could be achieved in a cooperative community. However, the community struggled from the beginning with financial mismanagement and the impracticality of their ideals. The final blow was a disastrous fire that destroyed a major building, and the community was dissolved. Brook Farm’s failure illustrates a central truth of many utopian experiments: idealism can falter in the face of economic pressures and simple bad luck.

A more enduring but equally radical experiment, the Oneida Community (1848-1881), achieved economic success through manufacturing, particularly silverware, under the leadership of John Humphrey Noyes. Based on his concept of “Bible Communism,” they practiced communal living and a system of “complex marriage.” Despite its radical social structure, the community thrived economically, but internal disputes and external pressures ultimately led to its dissolution. These real-world attempts demonstrate the immense difficulty of sustaining a perfect society against the realities of human nature and economic pressures.

Xiongan: The Modern Utopia?

Xiongan is the natural, and perhaps ultimate, successor to these modern visions. It represents a confluence of historical utopian ideals with a uniquely contemporary, state-driven model of urban development. Touted as a “city of the future,” Xiongan promises short, park-filled commutes and a high-tech, digitally-integrated existence. It seeks to be a model of ecological civilization, where 70% of the city is dedicated to green space and water, an explicit rejection of the “urban maladies” of pollution and congestion that plague other major Chinese cities.

Its design principles are an homage to the urban planners of the past, with a “15-minute lifecycle” for residents, ensuring all essential amenities are within a short walk. The city’s digital infrastructure is also a modern marvel, with digital roads equipped with smart lampposts and a supercomputing center designed to manage the city’s traffic and services. In this sense, Xiongan is a direct heir to Francis Bacon’s vision of a society built on scientific and technological progress.

Unlike the organic, market-driven growth of a city like Shenzhen, Xiongan is an authoritarian experiment in building a perfect city from scratch. — The Economist

This vision, however, is a top-down creation. As a “personal initiative” of President Xi, its success is a matter of political will, with the central government pouring billions into its construction. The project is a key part of the “Jing-Jin-Ji” (Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei) coordinated development plan, meant to relieve the pressure on the capital. Unlike the organic, market-driven growth of a city like Shenzhen, Xiongan is an authoritarian experiment in building a perfect city from scratch. Shenzhen, for example, was an SEZ (Special Economic Zone) that grew from the bottom up, driven by market forces and a flexible policy environment. It was a chaotic, rapid, and often unplanned explosion of economic activity. Xiongan, in stark contrast, is a meticulously planned project from its very inception, with a precise ideological purpose to showcase a new kind of “socialist” urbanism.

This centralized approach, while capable of achieving rapid and impressive infrastructure development, runs the risk of failing to create the one thing a true city needs: a vibrant, organic, and self-sustaining culture. The criticisms of Xiongan echo the failures of past utopian ventures; despite the massive investment, the city’s streets remain “largely empty,” and it has struggled to attract the talent and businesses needed to become a bustling metropolis. The absence of a natural community and the reliance on forced relocations have created a city that is technically perfect but socially barren.

The Peril of Perfection

The juxtaposition of Xiongan with its utopian predecessors highlights the central tension of the modern planned city. The ancient dream of Atlantis was a philosophical ideal, a perfect society whose downfall served as a moral warning against hubris. The real-world communities of the 19th century demonstrated that idealism could falter in the face of economic and social pressures, proving that a perfect society is not a fixed state but a dynamic, and often fragile, process. The modern reality of Xiongan is a physical, political, and economic gamble—a concrete manifestation of a leader’s will to solve a nation’s problems through grand design. It is a bold attempt to correct the mistakes of the past and a testament to the immense power of a centralized state. Yet, the question remains whether it can escape the fate of its predecessors.

The ultimate verdict on Xiongan will not be about the beauty of its architecture or the efficiency of its smart infrastructure alone, but whether it can successfully transcend its origins as a state project. — The Economist

The ultimate verdict on Xiongan will not be about the beauty of its architecture or the efficiency of its smart infrastructure alone, but whether it can successfully transcend its origins as a state project to become a truly livable, desirable, and thriving city. Only then can it stand as a true heir to the timeless dream of a perfect urban space, rather than just another cautionary tale. Whether a perfect city can be engineered from the top down, or if it must be a messy, organic creation, is the fundamental question that Xiongan, and by extension, the modern world, is attempting to answer.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED UTILIZING AI

Businees, Culture, Economics, Essays, Food

A Deep-Dish Dive Into The U.S. Obsession With Pizza

By Michael Cummins, Editor, Intellicurean

We argue over thin crust versus deep-dish, debate the merits of a New York slice versus a Detroit square, and even defend our favorite topping combinations. Pizza is more than just a meal; it’s a cultural cornerstone of American life. Yet, behind this simple, beloved food lies a vast and powerful economic engine—an industry generating tens of billions of dollars annually. This essay explores the dual nature of America’s pizza landscape, a world where tech-driven corporate giants and passionate independent artisans coexist. We will dive into the macroeconomic trends that fuel its growth, the fine-grained struggles of small business owners, and the cultural diversity that makes pizza a definitive pillar of the American culinary experience.

Craft, Community, and the Independent Spirit

The true heart of the pizza industry lies in the human element, particularly within the world of independent pizzerias. While national chains like Domino’s and Pizza Hut rely on standardized processes and massive marketing budgets, local shops thrive on the passion of their owners, the skill of their pizzaiolos, and their deep connection to the community. This dedication to craft is a defining characteristic. For many, like the co-founders of New York City’s Zeno’s Pizza, making pizza is not just a business; it’s a craft rooted in family tradition and personal expertise. This meticulous attention to detail, from sourcing high-quality ingredients to the 48-hour fermentation of their dough, translates directly into a superior and unique product that fosters a fiercely loyal local following.

Running an independent pizzeria is an exercise in juggling passion with the practicalities of business. Owners must navigate the complexities of staffing, operations, and the ever-present pressure of online reviews. One successful owner shared his philosophy on building a strong team: instead of hiring many part-time employees, he created a smaller, dedicated crew with more hours and responsibility. This approach made employees feel more “vested” in the company, leading to higher morale, a greater sense of ownership, and significantly lower turnover in an industry notorious for its transient workforce. Another owner emphasized efficiency through cross-training, teaching every staff member to perform multiple roles from the kitchen to the front counter. This not only ensured smooth operations during peak hours but also empowered employees with new skills, making them more valuable assets to the business.

Customer relationships are equally crucial for independent shops. Instead of fearing negative online feedback, many owners see it as a direct line of communication with their customer base. A common practice is for an owner to insist that customers with a bad experience contact him directly, offering to “make it right” with a new order or a refund. This personal touch builds trust and often turns a negative situation into a positive one, demonstrating how successful independent pizzerias become true community hubs, built on a foundation of trust and personal connection. These businesses are more than just restaurants; they are local institutions that sponsor Little League teams, host fundraisers, and serve as gathering places that strengthen the fabric of their neighborhoods.

Macroeconomic Trends and Profitability

The macroeconomic picture of the pizza industry tells a story of immense scale and consistent growth. The U.S. pizza market alone generates over $46.9 billion in annual sales and is supported by a vast network of more than 75,000 pizzerias. To put that into perspective, the American pizza market is larger than the entire GDP of some small countries. This financial robustness isn’t just impressive on its own; it gains perspective when you realize that pizza holds its own against other major food categories like burgers and sandwiches, often dominating the quick-service restaurant sector. This success is underpinned by a powerful and reliable engine: constant consumer demand.

The U.S. pizza market alone generates over $46.9 billion in annual sales and is supported by a vast network of more than 75,000 pizzerias. — PMQ Pizza Magazine, “Pizza Power Report 2024”

A staggering 13% of Americans eat pizza on any given day, and a significant portion of the population enjoys it at least once a week. This high-frequency demand is driven by a broad and loyal consumer base that spans all demographics, but is particularly strong among younger consumers. For Gen Z and Millennials, pizza’s customizability, shareability, and convenience make it a perfect choice for nearly any occasion, from a quick solo lunch to a communal dinner with friends. The rise of digital ordering platforms and the optimization of delivery logistics have only amplified this demand, making it easier than ever for consumers to satisfy their craving.

The economic viability of a pizzeria is built on a simple yet powerful formula: inherent profitability. The cost of goods sold (COGS) for a pizza is remarkably low compared to many other dishes. The core ingredients—flour, tomatoes, and cheese—are relatively inexpensive commodities. While the quality of these ingredients can vary, the basic ratio of cost to sale price remains highly favorable. This low cost allows operators to achieve high profit margins, even at competitive price points. This profitability is further enhanced by pizza’s versatility. Operators can easily create a vast menu of specialty and premium pies by adding a variety of toppings, from artisanal meats and cheeses to fresh vegetables, all of which can be sold at a higher margin. This flexibility is a key reason why pizzerias are often cited as one of the most profitable types of restaurants to operate, providing a solid foundation for both national chains and independent startups.

Chains vs. Independents and Regional Identity

The enduring appeal of pizza in America is largely due to its remarkable diversity. The concept of “pizza” is not monolithic; it encompasses a wide array of regional styles, each with its own loyal following and distinct characteristics. The great pizza debate often revolves around the choice between thick and thin crusts, from the foldable, iconic New York-style slice to the hearty, inverted layers of a Chicago deep-dish. Other popular styles include the cracker-thin St. Louis-style, known for its Provel cheese blend, and the thick, crispy-edged Detroit-style, which has seen a recent surge in popularity. Each style represents a unique chapter in American food history and reflects the local culture from which it was born.

This diversity is reflected in the market dynamics, characterized by a fascinating duality: the coexistence of powerful national chains and a dense network of independent pizzerias. Dominant chains like Domino’s, with over 7,000 U.S. locations and $9 billion in annual sales, and Pizza Hut, with more than 6,700 locations and $5.6 billion in sales, leverage economies of scale and sophisticated technology to dominate the market. Their success is built on brand recognition, supply chain efficiency, and a focus on seamless digital innovation and rapid delivery.

In contrast, independents thrive by leaning into their unique identity, focusing on high-quality ingredients, traditional techniques, and a strong connection to their local communities. This dynamic is particularly evident in cities with rich pizza histories. In New York, the independent scene is a constellation of legendary establishments, from the historical Lombardi’s in Little Italy—often credited as America’s first pizzeria—to modern classics like Joe’s Pizza in Greenwich Village and L&B Spumoni Gardens in Brooklyn. These shops are not just restaurants; they are destinations. Chicago’s famous deep-dish culture is built on a foundation of iconic independent pizzerias like Lou Malnati’s and Giordano’s, which have since grown into regional chains but maintain a local identity forged by decades of tradition. Similarly, Detroit’s burgeoning pizza scene is defined by beloved institutions such as Buddy’s Pizza and Loui’s Pizza, which were instrumental in popularizing the city’s unique rectangular, thick-crust style. These places represent the soul of their cities, each telling a unique story through their distinctive pies.

The Fine-Grained Economics of a New York Slice

While the national picture is one of robust growth, the hyper-local reality, especially in a city like New York, is a constant battle for survival. As the owners of Zeno’s Pizza shared on the Bloomberg “Odd Lots” podcast, they saw an opportunity to open their new shop in a “pizza desert” in Midtown East after the pandemic forced many established places to close. They recognized that while the East Village is a “knife fight” of competition with pizzerias on every block, their location was a green space for a new business. This kind of strategic thinking is essential for anyone trying to enter the market.

The initial capital investment for a new pizzeria is a daunting obstacle. As discussed on the podcast, the Zeno’s team noted that a 1,000-square-foot quick-serve restaurant requires a minimum of $400,000, and more likely $500,000 to $600,000, in working capital before the doors can even open. Much of this goes to costly, specialized equipment: a single pizza oven can cost anywhere from $32,000 and is now up to $45,000, and a commercial cheese shredder can run $5,000. Beyond the equipment, the build-out costs are substantial, including commercial-grade plumbing, electrical work, specialized ventilation systems, and a multitude of city permits. These expenses, along with supply chain issues that led to back-ordered equipment and construction delays, mean the payback period for a restaurant has stretched from a pre-COVID average of 18 months to a new normal of three years.

The historic rule of thumb for a pizzeria’s cost structure was a balanced 30/30/30/10 split—30% for fixed costs (rent, utilities), 30% for labor, 30% for food costs, and a 10% profit margin. Today, that model has been shattered. — Bloomberg’s ‘Odd Lots’ podcast

Pizza’s profitability, while historically strong, is also under immense pressure. The historic rule of thumb for a pizzeria’s cost structure was a balanced 30/30/30/10 split—30% for fixed costs (rent, utilities), 30% for labor, 30% for food costs, and a 10% profit margin. Today, that model has been shattered. Labor costs, for example, have ballooned to 45% of a restaurant’s budget due to rising minimum wages and a tight labor market, while insurance premiums have climbed by 20-30%. This leaves very little room for a profit margin, forcing owners to find creative solutions to survive.

To counter these rising costs, pizzerias are being forced to innovate their business models. The Zeno’s co-founders noted that they are now pushing their prices higher to a premium product segment, relying on fresh, high-quality ingredients and a meticulous process like a 48-hour dough fermentation that makes the pizza healthier and less heavy. This strategy allows them to justify a higher price point to a discerning customer base. They also actively seek new sales by cold-calling companies for catering orders, a crucial part of their business that offers a higher ticket price and a predictable revenue stream.

The increasing use of third-party delivery services adds another layer of complexity to the financial landscape. While these platforms offer a wider reach, they take a significant cut, often charging up to 20%, plus additional fees for delivery. To make this work, pizzerias are forced to list prices on these platforms that are 15% higher than their in-house menu. The owners noted that the post-pandemic cap on these fees is expiring, which will place even more pressure on an already-tight profit margin. The decision to partner with these services becomes a difficult trade-off between increased exposure and reduced profitability.

Conclusion: A Lasting Legacy for America’s Favorite Food

The story of pizza in America is a compelling narrative of resilience, innovation, and cultural integration. It is a tale of a massive, multi-billion-dollar industry that thrives on both the hyper-efficient, tech-driven operations of its largest chains and the passion-fueled, community-centric efforts of its independent artisans.

Will this obsession last? All evidence points to a resounding yes. Pizza is not a fleeting trend; it is a fundamental part of the American diet and cultural landscape. Its unique ability to be a family meal, a late-night snack, a celebratory dish, and an affordable comfort food ensures its enduring relevance. The industry’s financial robustness, driven by constant consumer demand and inherent profitability, provides a sturdy foundation for its future.

So, how will the pizza category keep reinvigorating itself? By continually adapting and reflecting the evolving tastes of the public. This reinvigoration will come from multiple fronts:

  • Regional Innovation: The discovery and popularization of new regional styles, like the recent surge in Detroit-style pizza, will continue to capture the public’s imagination.
  • Creative Toppings: As palates become more sophisticated, chefs will experiment with bolder, more diverse ingredients, pushing the boundaries of what a “pizza” can be.
  • Technological Integration: The adoption of cutting-edge technology will continue to streamline operations, enhance delivery logistics, and provide new, seamless ordering experiences.
  • The Artisanal Revival: The push for high-quality, artisanal products and a return to traditional techniques by independent pizzerias will offer a crucial counterpoint to the efficiency of the national chains, ensuring that pizza remains a craft as well as a commodity.

The challenges of rising costs and competitive pressures are real, but the industry has proven its ability to adapt and thrive. The story of pizza in America reminds us that a business can still thrive on a foundation of passion and community. It’s a timeless testament to the power of a simple, delicious idea—one that will continue to unite and divide us, slice by delicious slice.

This essay was written and edited utilizing AI

Analysis, Economics, Essays, Government, Politics, Reviews

The Fiscal Fantasies Of A “For-Profit” Government

BY INTELLICUREAN, JULY 21, 2025:

In the summer of 2025, former President Donald Trump and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick unveiled a bold proposal: the creation of an External Revenue Service (ERS), a federal agency designed to collect tariffs, fees, and other payments from foreign entities. Framed as a patriotic pivot toward self-sufficiency, the ERS would transform the U.S. government from a tax-funded service provider into a revenue-generating enterprise, capable of offsetting domestic tax burdens through external extraction. The idea, while politically magnetic, raises profound questions: Can the U.S. federal government become a “for-profit” entity? And if so, can the ERS be a legitimate mechanism for such a transformation?

This essay argues that while the concept of external revenue generation is not unprecedented, the rebranding of the U.S. government as a profit-seeking enterprise risks undermining its foundational principles. The ERS proposal conflates revenue with legitimacy, and profit with power, leading to a fundamental misunderstanding of the government’s role in society. We explore the constitutional, economic, and geopolitical dimensions of the ERS proposal, drawing on recent analyses from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, The Diplomat, and The New Yorker, to assess its fiscal viability, strategic risks, and national security implications.

Constitutional Foundations: Can a Republic Seek Profit?

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations” (Article I, Section 8). These provisions clearly authorize the federal government to generate revenue through tariffs and fees. Historically, tariffs served as a primary source of federal income, funding everything from infrastructure to military expansion during the 19th century.

However, the Constitution does not envision the government as a profit-maximizing entity. Its purpose, as articulated in the Preamble, is to “establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, [and] promote the general Welfare.” These are public goods, not commercial outputs. The government’s legitimacy is grounded in its service to the people—not in its ability to generate surplus revenue.

The Federal Reserve offers a useful analogy here. While not a for-profit institution, the Fed earns more than it spends through its monetary operations—primarily interest on government securities—and remits excess income to the Treasury. Between 2011 and 2021, these remittances totaled over $920 billion. But this is not “profit” in the corporate sense. The Fed’s primary mandate is macroeconomic stability, not shareholder returns. Even during economic stress (as seen in 2022–2025), the Fed may run negative remittances, underscoring its non-commercial orientation.

In contrast, the ERS is framed as a profit center—an entity designed to extract wealth from foreign actors to reduce domestic tax burdens. This shift raises critical questions: Who are the “customers” of the ERS? What are the “products” it offers? And what happens when profit motives collide with diplomatic or humanitarian priorities?

Economic Modeling: Revenue vs. Net Gain

A rigorous analysis of Trump’s proposed tariffs comes from Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. In their April 2025 briefing, they use a global economic model to estimate the gross and net revenue generated by tariffs of 10%, 15%, and 20% on all imported goods.

Their findings are sobering:

  • A 15% universal tariff could generate $3.9 trillion in gross revenue over a decade (2025–2034), assuming no foreign retaliation.
  • However, after accounting for slower growth, reduced investment, and lower tax receipts from households and businesses, the net gain drops to $3.2 trillion.
  • If foreign countries retaliate with reciprocal tariffs, the net gain falls further to $1.5 trillion.
  • A 20% tariff results in the lowest net gain ($791 billion), due to intensified economic drag and retaliation.

These findings underscore a crucial distinction: tariffs are not free money. They impose costs on consumers, disrupt supply chains, and invite countermeasures. The ERS may collect billions, but its net contribution to fiscal health is far more modest—and potentially negative if retaliation escalates.

Additionally, tariff revenue is volatile and politically contingent. Tariffs can be reversed by executive order, invalidated by courts, or rendered moot by trade realignment. In short, the ERS lacks the predictability and stability necessary for a legitimate fiscal foundation. Tariffs are a risky and politically charged mechanism for revenue generation—making them an unreliable cornerstone for the country’s fiscal health.

Strategic Blowback: Reverse Friendshoring and Supply Chain Drift

Beyond economics, the ERS proposal carries significant geopolitical risks. In The Diplomat, Thiago de Aragao warns of a phenomenon he calls reverse friendshoring—where companies, instead of relocating supply chains away from China, move closer to it in response to U.S. tariffs.

The logic is simple: If exporting to the U.S. becomes prohibitively expensive, firms may pivot to serving Asian markets, leveraging China’s mature infrastructure and consumer base. This could undermine the strategic goal of decoupling from Chinese influence, potentially strengthening Beijing’s economic hand.

Examples abound:

  • A firm that invested in Mexico to reduce exposure to China redirected its exports to Latin America after Mexico was hit with new tariffs.
  • Another company shifted operations to Canada to avoid compounded U.S. duties—only to face new levies there as well.

This unpredictability erodes trust in U.S. trade policy and incentivizes supply chain diversification away from the U.S. As Aragao notes, “Protectionism may offer a temporary illusion of control, but in the long run, it risks pushing businesses away.”

The ERS, by monetizing tariffs, could accelerate this trend. If foreign firms perceive the U.S. as a hostile or unstable market, they will seek alternatives. And if allies are treated as adversaries, the strategic architecture of friendshoring collapses, leaving the U.S. economically isolated and diplomatically weakened.

National Security Costs: Alienating Allies

Perhaps the most damning critique of the ERS comes from Cullen Hendrix at the Peterson Institute, who argues that imposing tariffs on U.S. allies undermines national security. The U.S. alliance network spans over 60 countries, accounting for 38% of global GDP. These partnerships enhance deterrence, enable forward basing, and create markets for U.S. defense exports.

Tariffs—especially those framed as revenue tools—erode alliance cohesion. They signal that economic extraction trumps strategic cooperation. Hendrix warns that “treating alliance partners like trade adversaries will further increase intra-alliance frictions, weaken collective deterrence, and invite potential adversaries—none better positioned than China—to exploit these divisions.”

Moreover, the ERS’s indiscriminate approach—levying duties on both allies and rivals—blurs the line between economic policy and coercive diplomacy. It transforms trade into a zero-sum game, where even friends are fair targets. This undermines the credibility of U.S. commitments and may prompt allies to seek alternative trade and security arrangements.

Lutnick’s Barber Economics: Rhetoric vs. Reality

The ERS proposal is not merely a policy—it’s a performance. Nowhere is this clearer than in Howard Lutnick’s keynote at the Hill and Valley Forum, as reported in The New Yorker on July 21, 2025. Addressing a room of venture capitalists, defense contractors, and policymakers, Lutnick attempted to explain trade deficits using personal analogies: “I have a trade deficit with my barber,” he said. “I have a trade deficit with my grocery store. Right? I just buy stuff from them. That’s ridiculous.”

The crowd, described as “sophisticated tech and finance attendees,” was visibly uncomfortable. Lutnick’s analogies, while populist in tone, misread the room and revealed a deeper disconnect between economic complexity and simplistic transactionalism. As one attendee noted, “It’s obvious why Lutnick’s affect appeals to Trump. But it’s Bessent’s presence in the Administration that reassures us there is someone smart looking out for us.”

This contrast between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is telling. Bessent, who reportedly flew to Mar-a-Lago to urge Trump to pause the tariffs, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

The ERS, then, is not just a fiscal experiment—it’s a philosophical battleground. Lutnick’s vision of government as a money-making enterprise may resonate with populist frustration, but it risks trivializing the structural and diplomatic intricacies of global trade. His “barber economics” may play well on cable news, but it falters under scrutiny from economists, allies, and institutional stewards.

Conclusion: Profit Is Not Purpose

The idea of a “for-profit” U.S. government, embodied in the External Revenue Service, is seductive in its simplicity. It promises fiscal relief without domestic taxation, strategic leverage through economic pressure, and a reassertion of American dominance in global trade. But beneath the surface lies a tangle of contradictions.

Constitutionally, the federal government is designed to serve—not to sell. Its legitimacy flows from the consent of the governed, not the extraction of foreign wealth. Economically, tariffs may generate gross revenue, but their net contribution is constrained by retaliation, inflation, and supply chain disruption. Strategically, the ERS risks alienating allies, incentivizing reverse friendshoring, and weakening collective security.

With Howard Lutnick as the plan’s leading voice—offering anecdotes like the barber and grocery store as proxies for international trade—the ERS becomes more than a revenue mechanism; it becomes a prism for reflecting the Administration’s governing style: transactional, simplified, and rhetorically appealing, yet divorced from systemic nuance. His “barber economics” may evoke applause from certain circles, but in the forums that shape long-term policy, it has landed with discomfort and disbelief.

The comparison between Lutnick and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, as reported in The New Yorker, captures this divide. Bessent, attempting to temper Trump’s protectionist instincts, represents the limits of ideological fervor when confronted with institutional complexity. Lutnick, by contrast, champions the ERS as a populist vessel—a way to turn deficits into dues, relationships into revenue, and governance into a business plan.

Yet governance is not a business, and the nation’s global responsibilities cannot be monetized like a corporate balance sheet. If America begins to treat its allies as clients, its rivals as profit centers, and its global footprint as a monetizable asset, it risks transforming foreign policy into a ledger—and leadership into a transaction.

The External Revenue Service, in its current form, fails to reconcile profit with purpose. It monetizes strength but neglects stewardship. It harvests dollars but undermines trust. And in doing so, it invites a broader reckoning—not just about trade and taxation, but about what kind of republic America wishes to be. For now, the ERS remains an emblem of ambition unmoored from architecture, where the dream of profit collides with the duty to govern.

THIS ESSAY WAS WRITTEN AND EDITED BY INTELLICUREAN USING AI

Books, Economics, Essays, History

The Unholy Offspring of Economic Theory: The Far Right’s Neoliberal Roots

The following essay is AI -generated, edited by Intellicurean, as part of our “The Cynic & The Dandy” series, of an interview article published on July 6, 2025 on the Toynbee Prize Foundation website titled Hayek’s Bastards and the Global Origins of the Far Right: An Interview with Quinn Slobodian.

One finds oneself, much like a seasoned playgoer observing a particularly convoluted modern drama, grappling with the profound complexities of our age. The curtain, it seems, has risen on “Trump 2.0,” a performance so bewildering in its contradictions that even the most astute critics of human folly might pause for breath. This curious administration simultaneously seeks to disentangle itself from global commitments while igniting fresh international disputes; it endeavours to depreciate the dollar to boost exports whilst clinging to its status as the world’s reserve currency; and it champions a reduction in global economic reliance while striving to unilaterally dictate global economic terms. The American colossus, one might observe, appears caught in a most perplexing dance with its own identity, and the global audience watches, utterly transfixed.

It is into this very contemporary conundrum that Quinn Slobodian, a historian of capitalism whose intellectual acuity is as sharp as a well-honed epigram, strides with his latest volume: Hayek’s Bastards: Race, Gold, IQ, and the Capitalism of the Far Right (Princeton University Press, 2025). This title, one must concede, possesses a certain Wildean flourish, hinting at the delightful audacity within its pages. Slobodian, with the keen eye of a diagnostician, posits that the apparent contradiction of the Far Right simultaneously embracing pro-market liberalism and social hierarchies – facilitating the free movement of capital but not of people – is, in fact, no contradiction at all. He argues that neoliberalism has always possessed the intellectual elasticity to accommodate such a narrative.

The Unruly Offspring of Thought: “Bastards” and “Volk Capital”

Slobodian’s current work builds upon his earlier seminal analyses in Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Harvard University Press, 2018) and Crack-up Capitalism: Market Radicals and the Dream of a World Without Democracy (Metropolitan, 2023). However, Hayek’s Bastards shifts its chronological focus decisively to the 1990s, illuminating this pivotal decade through the lens of figures not previously central to his explorations. If Globalists dissected the intellectual elite of the Mont Pèlerin Society, and Crack-Up Capitalism examined market radicals within the broader globalisation context, this new work turns its penetrating gaze to paleo-libertarianism. This intriguing ideological fusion, combining libertarian disdain for global governance with paleo-conservative traditionalism and isolationism (a distinct contrast to the more recent neoconservative branch of the Republican Party), forms the crux of Slobodian’s argument.

At the heart of Slobodian’s contention lies a startling conclusion: the rise of the Far Right is an acceleration, not a rejection of capitalism; a frontlash, not a backlash. He meticulously demonstrates how right-wing libertarians of the 1990s, through their convergence with paleoconservatives and their burgeoning interest in biology, IQ, and gold, inadvertently laid the intellectual foundations for our present reality.

In a recent conversation with Asensio Robles of Comillas Pontifical University, Slobodian elucidated the two primary concepts underpinning his book. The notion of “bastards,” he explains, serves as a vivid metaphor for the generations of intellectual influence, where adherents, though inspired by mentors, may diverge significantly from the original spirit and content of their masters’ work. In the case of Friedrich Hayek, Slobodian points to those who, in their pursuit of his scientific and complexity-focused ideas, veered into domains such as scientific racism or the belief in human nature as an absolute organizing principle. These, Slobodian asserts, represent the “illegitimate” heirs who strayed far enough to betray Hayek’s fundamental principles.

Friedrich Hayek, a Nobel laureate in Economics (1974) and a leading figure of the Austrian School of economics, is perhaps best known for his fervent defense of free-market capitalism and his critiques of central planning, notably articulated in his seminal 1944 work, The Road to Serfdom. Hayek argued that economic coordination arises not from central design, but from a “spontaneous order” – the result of millions of individuals making decisions based on dispersed, localized knowledge communicated primarily through the price system. He believed that any attempt by the state to centrally plan the economy would inevitably lead to a loss of individual liberty and, ultimately, totalitarianism, because such planners could never possess the vast, tacit knowledge embedded within a decentralized market.

The second crucial concept is “Volk capital.” Slobodian critiques the common, overly generalized understanding of neoliberalism as simply advocating for the commodification of all things and the reduction of all humans to an interchangeable substance. By adopting a narrower, more historically precise definition, focusing on a discrete group of thinkers (including those within the Mont Pèlerin Society, which Hayek co-founded in 1947), he reveals a significant inflection point in the 1960s and 1970s. This period saw a shift in neoliberal thought towards an emphasis on human difference, rather than equality.

Slobodian argues that the universalizing concept of human capital became “re-grounded” in specific genetic populations or cultural groups. He observes the re-emergence of 19th-century notions of the “Volk”—the idea of an essential character of a kinship group—fused with economic categories. This, he contends, transforms “human capital” into “Volk capital,” demonstrating how an ideology often associated with abstract market principles could regress to antiquated distinctions. For instance, by the 1980s, Hayek himself, often considered a progenitor of neoliberalism, suggested a unique quality of the Western world in producing an “optimal economic actor.”

A “Frontlash” Unveiled: Beyond the “Left-Behinds” Narrative

Slobodian further clarifies the genesis of these two books, revealing they were initially conceived as a single grand volume. The political shocks of 2016-2017 – the election of Donald Trump, the Brexit “Leave” vote, and the rise of parties like Alternative for Germany – prompted his inquiry. He expresses dissatisfaction with mainstream interpretations that viewed these developments as a revolt against neoliberal capitalism by those “left behind” by globalisation. This narrative, he argues, incorrectly positioned figures like Trump and Boris Johnson as unexpected challengers to the neoliberal consensus.

To counter this, Slobodian first introduced the concept of the “zone” in Crack-up Capitalism. This refers to more fluid spaces for investor capital within nations, such as freeports in the United Kingdom or the proliferation of Special Economic Zones in countries like China and India. He notes that in 2017-2018, much of the apparent economic nationalism was, in fact, about creating these spaces for capital mobility. For example, as of 2023, there were over 7,000 Special Economic Zones globally, employing tens of millions of people and contributing significantly to trade and investment, illustrating this practical application of “zones.”

He then sought to integrate the observation that many within the alt-right in 2016 originated from the paleo-libertarian camp. These individuals, skeptical of both global and national governments, sought a fracturing of the state system. The “grand narrative” of bundling these ideas proved “quixotic,” leading to the separate publication of Crack-up Capitalism and Hayek’s Bastards, the latter focusing on the paleo-alliance between dissident right-wing figures and the neoliberal movement.

The Unseen Hand of Difference: Chronology and Community

The chronological alignment between the two books is evident. In Hayek’s Bastards, the post-Cold War period is presented as a moment of reckoning for neoliberals, who questioned whether they had truly “won” or if “state spending and socialism” persisted in new guises, such as environmentalism or feminism. Similarly, in Crack-up Capitalism, the 1990s marked a breakthrough for zones, representing a form of globalisation that fostered “diversities across territory” rather than uniform regulatory spaces. The fundamental thread uniting both narratives, Slobodian suggests, is the “use of difference, politically or economically.” This challenges the widely held assumption that the 1990s and 2000s were periods of increasing uniformity, arguing instead that they were also times when “irreconcilable differences” were intensified and leveraged for new political agendas.

Slobodian also tackles the pervasive assumption that neoliberalism is solely a celebration of individualism. He argues that while individualism is indeed a focus, neoliberals are intensely concerned with the conditions under which it can be realized. When the traditional “republican tradition” – based on an impartial state providing space for individual expression – is discarded, a new framework for community must be forged. This is particularly true for the “subgenre of neoliberal thought” that advocates for the dissolution of the state.

In this context, the necessity arises to constitute communities that can function and allow for individual expression without uniform regulations from a representative state. This leads to an interest in factors like the role of ethnic homogeneity in decreasing transaction costs and fostering trust, thereby allowing communities to self-perpetuate. It also involves examining the importance of the “social contract” as a literal set of terms for participation in smaller communities, and questions of social reproduction – specifically, the necessary gender orders to ensure sufficient population in a “closed-border model of political organization.” This, he notes, is where anarcho-capitalists and conservatives find common ground, the former seeking abstract individual freedom but recognizing the need for parameters, and the latter striving to preserve existing moral and cultural orders.

A striking observation from Slobodian’s research is the neoliberal fear that the Cold War might have been “lost” despite the Soviet Union’s collapse, due to persistent high state spending. The end of the Cold War, Slobodian reveals, raised the possibility of completely dismantling the social state, which in turn brought forth new questions about how a post-redistributive order could be anchored. This, he asserts, directly relates to the current moment in the United States, where campaigns to significantly cut the federal budget, such as proposals to reduce it by one-third (as seen in certain fiscal proposals from conservative groups, often citing a need to return to pre-expansion levels of spending), would necessitate the dismantling of the existing social state. This scenario, he suggests, brings to mind the ominous question posed by Charles Murray regarding the aftermath of the welfare state’s disappearance – whether it would lead to anarchy, organic self-organization, or a segment of the population perishing. The “vexed triumphalism” following the Cold War, Slobodian concludes, thus set the stage for the “apocalyptic forms of politics” now all too familiar.

The Historical Lens: Unveiling Hidden Cleavages

Slobodian highlights the remarkable absence of significant sectarian splits within neoliberalism between the 1940s and 1980s. The clear ideological battle lines drawn between the “free, liberal, capitalist” world and the “planned command economies” of the communist bloc maintained a cohesive front. However, with the abrupt erasure of this divide in the 1990s, two paths emerged: either assume inevitable global convergence and the end of meaningful political divisions, or contend that divisions persisted, merely migrating to previously overlooked domains. The global Right, he observes, opted for the latter.

The 1990s became a period of “restless search for a new enemy” for the Right. This sometimes involved resurrecting older tropes, such as the anti-Semitic portrayal of George Soros as a conspiratorial figure, a narrative prominently used by figures like Viktor Orbán. Neoliberals, too, participated in this search, ultimately identifying their new adversary in the Left’s “march through the institutions” – specifically, movements advocating for gender and racial equality and a “politically correct” discourse. Slobodian emphasizes that this framing of issues like affirmative action and state-led efforts to redress inequality began remarkably early – some 35 years ago. He argues that the Left, too focused on internal critiques of a more mainstream neoliberalism (like that associated with Bill Clinton or Barack Obama), was often “caught off guard” by the “disruptive politics of the last decade,” failing to recognize the emerging “villain” that would ultimately manifest in today’s culture wars.

Slobodian’s methodological approach, as noted by Robles, is characterized by his commitment to “reading against the grain.” He consistently challenges conventional wisdom: if neoliberalism is thought to strive for state dissolution, Globalists shows its reliance on state intervention; if it promotes a borderless society, Crack-up Capitalism highlights its attention to “human separation”; and if the alt-right is seen as a backlash, Hayek’s Bastards frames it as a “frontlash,” an acceleration of the ideology. This “counterintuitive position” is, for Slobodian, a means to explore the profound revelations found within such contradictions. His advice to students – to begin a paper with “We think it’s like this, but it’s actually like that, and I’m going to show you why” – underscores his dedication to empirical evidence and intellectual revision.

He also draws a strong correlation between the 1990s and the 1960s, suggesting that understanding paleo-libertarian interests in hard borders, IQ, and gold necessitates examining earlier debates surrounding the 1965 Immigration Act, 1960s evolutionary psychology, or monetary reform post-Bretton Woods. These two decades, both periods of relative prosperity, represented moments where attempts were made to reconfigure societal settlements. Slobodian contends that the Left’s focus on criticizing a “progressive neoliberalism” (e.g., of the Clinton or Obama era) that paid “lip service” to 1960s social movements while blunting their critical edge meant they were “caught off guard” in 2016. He suggests that identifying what neoliberals “worried about” in a given decade, such as environmental demands disrupting growth models in the 1970s and 1990s, could reveal “vulnerability in the economic system” and “soft spots” for counter-movements to exploit.

Future Horizons: AI, Animals, and the Unseen Hand of Technology

Regarding future inquiries, Robles points to the absence of cryptocurrencies and AI in Hayek’s Bastards. Slobodian confirms these will be explored in his forthcoming book, Muskism, co-authored with Ben Tarnoff, which will delve into AI, effective altruism, and superintelligence. This work is slated for release next year.

However, Slobodian maintains a critical stance on cryptocurrencies, viewing them as “parasitical on a functioning traditional monetary system” and primarily “a hedge-speculative asset” or “plaything for a small number of libertarians and more recently large investors.” He believes his skepticism has been “a wise bet,” as the number of “true believers” in blockchain as a political template remains small, with most investors using crypto like any other growth sector.

Intriguingly, Slobodian’s other new research direction looks not to the digital future, but to a historical “backward” step: the changes in the human sciences in the postwar decades, specifically “How humans became animals at Harvard.” This project will explore the world of figures like Richard Herrnstein (a student of B. F. Skinner) and E. O. Wilson in the 1960s and 1970s, examining how humans were increasingly “analogized to animals.”

In Hayek’s Bastards, Quinn Slobodian has, with surgical precision, woven a compelling and unsettling thread through the tapestry of intellectual history. He compels us to confront the uncomfortable truths about the origins of our present predicament, reminding us that the seemingly spontaneous outbursts of populism are, in fact, the meticulously cultivated fruits of a long and complex intellectual lineage. One leaves his analysis with a renewed sense of vigilance, a heightened awareness of the subtle, often insidious, ways in which ideas, like the most potent of poisons, can mutate and proliferate, shaping our world in ways we are only now beginning to comprehend. Indeed, the stage is set for future acts in this ongoing drama, and one eagerly awaits Slobodian’s next intellectual curtain call.

“The Cynic & The Dandy” is an AI-generated essay series based on a hypothetical collaboration between Oscar Wilde and George Bernard Shaw.

Analysis, Economics, Financial, Opinion, Profiles, Reviews

REVIEW: “A BIG, BEAUTIFUL BILL AND AN EVEN BIGGER DEBT: THREE PERSPECTIVES”

The following is an in-depth analysis of President Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” written by ChatGPT from important, bi-partisan fiscal, economic and political sources, all listed below:

If there is one unassailable truth in American political life, it is that no grand legislative gesture arrives without the promise of prosperity—and the prospect of unintended consequences. Donald Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill,” signed into law on July 4th, stands as a monument to this dynamic: a sprawling package of permanent tax cuts, entitlement retrenchments, and fresh spending, all wrapped in a populist bow and accompanied by the familiar refrain that the deficits will somehow pay for themselves.

To understand the bill’s import—and its likely fallout—it helps to consider three vantage points. The first is that of Milton Friedman, who would see in these provisions a laboratory for the free market, tempered by fiscal illusions. The second is Paul Krugman’s, for whom this is a brazen experiment in upward redistribution. The third is David Stockman’s, whose uniquely jaundiced eye discerns an unholy alliance of crony capitalism and debt-fueled political theatre.

Friedman, the Nobel laureate and evangelist of free enterprise, might first commend the bill’s unapologetic tax relief. A permanent extension of the 2017 tax cuts is precisely the sort of measure he once called “a way to restore incentives, reduce distortions, and reward enterprise.” For Friedman, a tax system ought to be predictable, broad-based, and minimally intrusive. In this sense, the bill’s elimination of taxes on tips and overtime income, coupled with higher thresholds for the estate tax, will likely increase the incentive to work, save, and invest.

Yet Friedman would be quick to warn that no tax cut exists in a vacuum. The real test of fiscal virtue, he always argued, is not in slashing tax rates but in restraining spending. This bill, by combining aggressive tax cuts with continued defense expansions and only partial reductions to social spending, falls short of the discipline he prescribed. The result, Friedman would say, is a structural deficit that will eventually require either inflation or future tax hikes. “There is no such thing as a free lunch,” he liked to remind audiences. This is a lunch billed to generations unborn.

Krugman, viewing the same legislation, would perceive not a triumph of market freedom but an egregious abdication of public responsibility. He has long argued that the most misleading idea in modern politics is the notion that tax cuts inevitably pay for themselves. As the Congressional Budget Office’s scoring shows, the bill is likely to add over $3 trillion to the national debt in the next decade, even after accounting for higher GDP. Krugman would note that the permanent nature of the cuts deprives lawmakers of future leverage and crowds out investments in education, infrastructure, and health.

More pointedly, Krugman would argue that the bill’s distributional impact is regressive by design. Expanded deductions for capital gains and estates, the restoration of a higher SALT cap, and corporate incentives all tilt the benefits toward the affluent, while Medicaid cuts and SNAP work requirements fall hardest on those with the least. In Krugman’s view, this is not simply poor economics but a moral failing: a return to what he calls “the era of Dickensian inequality, dressed up in the rhetoric of growth.”

Yet the critique most likely to sting is the one that David Stockman would deliver. Unlike Krugman, Stockman began as a champion of supply-side tax reform. But he has since become its most unflinching critic. To him, the “Big Beautiful Bill” represents the final stage of a fiscal derangement decades in the making: a bipartisan addiction to borrowing and a refusal to reckon with arithmetic. “This is not capitalism,” Stockman might write, “it’s a simulacrum of capitalism—an endless auction of political favors financed by the Fed’s printing press.”

Stockman would remind readers that when he served as Reagan’s budget director, the expectation was that tax cuts would be offset by deep spending restraint. Instead, deficits ballooned and discipline eroded. The new bill, with its eye-watering cost and lack of credible offsets, is an even more flamboyant departure from any pretense of balance. Stockman would likely deride the Republican celebration as a form of magical thinking, no more credible than the illusions peddled by Democrats. In his telling, the bill is both symptom and accelerant of a broader collapse of fiscal sanity.

All three perspectives converge on a single point: the bill’s enormous impact on the debt trajectory. According to estimates from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, the legislation could push the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio past 145% by 2050—an unprecedented level for a peacetime economy. While proponents insist that higher growth will mitigate the burden, the Tax Foundation’s dynamic scoring suggests the additional output will cover only a fraction of the revenue loss.

Friedman would insist that economic growth requires both lower taxes and leaner government. Krugman would counter that social stability and productivity demand sustained public investment. Stockman would argue that the entire paradigm—borrowing trillions to finance giveaways—has become a bipartisan racket. Despite their ideological divergences, all three would agree that the arithmetic is merciless. Eventually, debts must be serviced, entitlements must be funded, and the dollar’s credibility must be defended.

What remains is the question of public memory. In the years ahead, as interest payments rise and fiscal constraints tighten, politicians will doubtless blame one another for the bill’s consequences. The narrative will fracture along familiar lines: Republicans will claim the tax cuts were sabotaged by spending; Democrats will argue the spending was hobbled by tax cuts. Independents will declare that neither side ever intended to balance the books. But the numbers, as Friedman and Krugman and Stockman all understood in their own ways, are immune to spin.

There is an old line, attributed variously to Keynes and to an anonymous Treasury mandarin, that the markets can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent. Perhaps, in this case, Washington can remain irrational longer than the public can remain attentive. But eventually, the bill will come due—not only the legislation signed on Independence Day, but the larger bill for decades of self-deception.

A big, beautiful bill indeed. And perhaps, in the fullness of time, an even bigger, less beautiful reckoning.

Key Elements of the Bill

  • Permanent tax cuts (≈ $4.5 trillion): Extends nearly all parts of Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, including individual rate brackets, expanded standard deduction, plus new deductions—no taxes on tips/overtime (through 2028), boosted SALT deduction ($40k cap for five years), larger child/senior credits, plus expansions like auto loan interest write-offs and “Trump Accounts” for parents apnews.com+15ft.com+15crfb.org+15.
  • Major spending cuts: $1–1.2 trillion in savings via Medicaid cuts (work requirements, provider taxes), SNAP/state cost-shifts, rollback of clean energy incentives .
  • Increased enforcement and defense: $150 B added to defense, another $150 B+ for border/ICE enhancements; ICE funding grows tenfold – now largest federal law enforcement budget .
  • Debt-ceiling hike: Allows a $4–$5 trillion statutory increase in borrowing authority as.com+3en.wikipedia.org+3reuters.com+3.

📊 Economic & Fiscal Outlook

🏛️ Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

🏦 CRFB & Budget Advocates

  • Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) puts the Senate’s reconciliation version at $4.1 trillion added debt through 2034—and warns a permanent version could add $5.3–5.5 trillion en.wikipedia.org.
  • CRFB also flags that Social Security and Medicare’s projected insolvency deadlines are now accelerated by roughly one year .

🧮 Tax Foundation

  • Estimates that permanent tax measures could yield a +1.2% GDP boost over the long run, but also slash federal revenue by $4 trillion (dynamically)—meaning growth would only cover ~19% of the revenue loss en.wikipedia.org+15en.wikipedia.org+15reuters.com+15.
  • Shorter-term growth boost around +0.6% by 2027, but turns mildly negative (–0.1%) by 2034 once fiscal constraints bite taxfoundation.org.

🌍 International Outlook (Moody’s, Reuters)

💬 Media & Policy Experts

  • Reuters warns of a “debt spiral,” with rising interest costs jeopardizing Fed independence .
  • FT, Washington Post, The Guardian, The Economist describe it as the largest GOP tax/deficit expansion since Reagan, dubbing it a “reverse Robin Hood”—favoring corporations and wealthy over vulnerable groups .
  • Economists at Yale, Penn warn severe health-care cuts could increase preventable mortality and financial distress en.wikipedia.org+1ft.com+1.

🔍 Bottom Line Summary

MetricEstimate
Deficit Increase (2025–34)$3.3–4.1 T (CBO: ≈ $3.4T; CRFB Senate: ≈ $4.1T)
Debt-to-GDP TrajectoryRising, potentially 145–200% by 2050
GDP Growth Impact+0.6% by 2027, fading to –0.1% by 2034
Revenue Loss~$4–5 T over a decade (dynamic)
Insured Loss & Social Costs~11 M fewer insured; Medicaid/SNAP and health impacts significant
  • Neutral consensus: Deficit historians, nonpartisan agencies agree debt will balloon sharply in absence of offsetting revenues or spending reversals.
  • Growth trade-off: While tax relief offers modest short-term growth, it does not offset long-run fiscal burdens.
  • Debt consequences: Higher mandatory interest costs, credit rating erosion, pressure on policy flexibility, and future tax hikes or spending cuts loom.

🧠 Final Take

Trump’s “One Big Beautiful Bill” delivers sweeping tax cuts, spending reductions in social safety nets, and major border/defense expansions—all rolled into one 940-page, $4–5 trillion fiscal package. Bipartisan institutions like the CBO, CRFB, Tax Foundation, and independent watchdogs align on its massive impact:

  1. Adds trillions to the deficit, sharply escalating national debt.
  2. Offers modest, short-term output gains, but risks longer-term economic drag.
  3. Amplifies fiscal risk, stokes interest burden, and could strain future budgets.
  4. Contains explicit regressive elements—favoring higher-income households and corporations over lower-income families and health-care access.

Here are the three writers whose vantage points are considered:

1️⃣ Conservative / Republican

Milton Friedman

Why he stands out:

  • Nobel Prize–winning economist and prolific writer whose work shaped modern conservative and libertarian economic thought.
  • Champion of free markets, limited government, and monetarism (the idea that controlling the money supply is key to managing the economy).
  • His books and columns influenced Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and remain foundational in debates about taxes, deficits, and regulation.
    Major Works:
  • Capitalism and Freedom (1962) – argued that economic freedom underpins political freedom.
  • Free to Choose (1980, with Rose Friedman) – a best-selling defense of deregulation, school vouchers, and lower taxes.
  • Columns for Newsweek and extensive public outreach (including the PBS series Free to Choose).

2️⃣ Liberal / Progressive

Paul Krugman

Why he stands out:

  • Nobel Prize–winning economist and prominent columnist who shaped liberal economic commentary from the 1990s onward.
  • A sharp critic of supply-side tax cuts, deregulation, and austerity.
  • Influential in Democratic policy debates on stimulus spending, inequality, and health care.
    Major Works:
  • The Conscience of a Liberal (2007) – traced the rise of inequality and made a moral case for progressive taxation and social insurance.
  • End This Depression Now! (2012) – argued forcefully for Keynesian stimulus after the Great Recession.
  • Columns in The New York Times, where he has been one of the most-read voices on economic policy.

3️⃣ Independent / Centrist

David Stockman

Why he stands out:

  • Former Reagan budget director who later became an iconoclastic critic of both parties’ fiscal excesses.
  • He helped design the Reagan tax cuts, but later turned against supply-side orthodoxy and big deficits.
  • His writings blend libertarian skepticism of big government with scathing critiques of Wall Street bailouts and crony capitalism.
    Major Works:
  • The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (1986) – a landmark insider account of budget battles and exploding deficits.
  • The Great Deformation: The Corruption of Capitalism in America (2013) – an encyclopedic denunciation of central banking, stimulus, and fiscal irresponsibility.
  • Regular commentary and op-eds across financial and political publications (The New York Times, Zero Hedge, The Atlantic).
Economics, Essays, Foreign Affairs, Politics

Foreign Affairs Essay: ‘Underestimating China’

FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE (April 11, 2025):

Success in great-power competition requires rigorous and unsentimental net assessment. Yet the American estimation of China has lurched from one extreme to the other. For decades, Americans registered blistering economic growth, dominance of international trade, and growing geopolitical ambition, and anticipated the day when China might overtake a strategically distracted and politically paralyzed United States; after the 2008 financial crisis, and then especially at the height of the COVID pandemic, many observers believed that day had come. But the pendulum swung to the other extreme only a few years later as China’s abandonment of “zero COVID” failed to restore growth. Beijing was beset by ominous demographics, once unthinkable youth unemployment, and deepening stagnation while the United States was strengthening alliances, boasting breakthroughs in artificial intelligence and other technologies, and enjoying a booming economy with record low unemployment and record high stock markets.

The rise and fall of great powers often begins with flawed self-diagnosis.

A new consensus took hold: that an aging, slowing, and increasingly less nimble China would not overtake an ascendant United States. Washington shifted from pessimism to overconfidence. Yet just as past bouts of defeatism were misguided, so is today’s triumphalism, which risks dangerously underestimating both the latent and actual power of the only competitor in a century whose GDP has surpassed 70 percent of that of the United States. On critical metrics, China has already outmatched the United States. Economically, it boasts twice the manufacturing capacity. Technologically, it dominates everything from electric vehicles to fourth-generation nuclear reactors and now produces more active patents and top-cited scientific publications annually. Militarily, it features the world’s largest navy, bolstered by shipbuilding capacity 200 times as large as that of the United States; vastly greater missile stocks; and the world’s most advanced hypersonic capabilities—all results of the fastest military modernization in history. Even if China’s growth slows and its system falters, it will remain formidable strategically.

Such a commitment is not just a policy, but a signal of the capabilities of the United States, its allies, and partners. The Chinese Communist Party is inordinately focused on perceptions of American power, and a critical input in that equation is its estimation of Washington’s ability to pull in the allies and partners that even Beijing openly admits are the United States’ greatest advantage. Accordingly, the most effective U.S. strategy—the one that has most unsettled Beijing in recent years and can deter its adventurism in the future—is to build new, enduring, and robust capacities with these states. A sustained, bipartisan commitment to an upgraded alliance network, coupled with strategic cooperation in emerging fields, offers the best path forward to finding scale against the most formidable competitor the United States has ever encountered.

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KURT M. CAMPBELL is Chairman and Cofounder of The Asia Group. He served as Deputy Secretary of State and Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.

RUSH DOSHI is an Assistant Professor at Georgetown University and Director of the China Strategy Initiative at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Deputy Senior Director for China and Taiwan Affairs at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.

Book Reviews, Economics, History, Reviews

‘Recalculating The Economic Gains Of Slavery’ (Review)

TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (April 2, 2025):

In 2011, builders in the Rio de Janeiro docklands uncovered the ruins of the Cais do Valongo, a wharf where, between 1780 and 1831, 800,000 enslaved people disembarked. Of the roughly 10.7 million people who survived the passage across the Atlantic in the nearly four centuries of the transatlantic slave trade, nearly 5 million were sent to Brazil – almost five times as many as to Jamaica and more than fourteen times as many as to North America. More slave ships left for the West African coast from the Americas than from Europe; the majority of those vessels sailed from Brazil, where slavery was abolished only in 1888. The foundations of modern Brazil are poured over the infrastructure of the transatlantic slave trade.

Yet, though the history of Brazilian slavery is not “untold”, the histories of Caribbean and North American slavery are generally better known among anglophone readers. Two new books by distinguished historians of slavery, Humans in Shackles: An Atlantic history of slavery by Ana Lucia Araujo and Atlantic Cataclysm: Rethinking the Atlantic slave trades by David Eltis, offer a correction, emphasizing the longevity and scale of slavery in Brazil and the South Atlantic. In Enslavement: Past and present, another distinguished academic, the sociologist Orlando Patterson, shows the relevance and utility of his theory of slavery as “social death”, a powerlessness whose malignance structures slave societies and persists long after emancipation. What follows, however, from recognizing that Brazil was first, last and largest in Atlantic slavery? Slavery existed long before the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade; are the ruins of the slave-ship dock under Rio relics of the longue durée of enslavement or evidence of the violent birth of the modern world?

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Economics, Essays, Politics

Political Essay: ‘America’s Future Is Hungary’

ATLANTIC MAGAZINE (March 31, 2025) :

lashy hotels and upmarket restaurants now dominate the center of Budapest, a city once better known for its shabby facades. New monuments have sprung up in the center of town too. One of them, a pastiche of the Vietnam War memorial in Washington, D.C., mourns Hungary’s lost 19th-century empire. Instead of war dead, the names of formerly “Hungarian” places—cities and villages that are now in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland—are engraved in long granite walls, solemnly memorialized with an eternal flame.

But the nationalist kitsch and tourist traps hide a different reality. Once widely perceived to be the wealthiest country in Central Europe (“the happiest barrack in the socialist camp,” as it was known during the Cold War), and later the Central European country that foreign investors liked most, Hungary is now one of the poorest countries, and possibly the poorest, in the European Union. Industrial production is falling year-over-year.

Productivity is close to the lowest in the region. Unemployment is creeping upward. Despite the ruling party’s loud talk about traditional values, the population is shrinking. Perhaps that’s because young people don’t want to have children in a place where two-thirds of the citizens describe the national education system as “bad,” and where hospital departments are closing because so many doctors have moved abroad. Maybe talented people don’t want to stay in a country perceived as the most corrupt in the EU for three years in a row. Even the Index of Economic Freedom—which is published by the Heritage Foundation, the MAGA-affiliated think tank that produced Project 2025—puts Hungary at the bottom of the EU in its rankings of government integrity.

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